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DEVOTED TO
Biblical and General Literature, Theological Discussion, the History
of Theological Opinions, etc.

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**THE
AMERICAN
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SECOND SERIES, NO IX.—WHOLE NO. XLI.

ARTICLE I.

THE NESTORIAN CHRISTIANS.

By Rev. Justin Perkins, Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., Ooroomiah, Persia.

THE interest with which we contemplate a people is often in great disproportion to its numbers. The little states of Greece stand unrivalled on the pages of history, as the early instructors and civilizers of the human species. The small community of the Waldenses, pent up in the narrow valleys of Piedmont, was the repository of that inestimable treasure, the vitality of our holy religion, during the long night which veiled the rest of Europe. The few thousands of the Moravians have gained a place on the records of the church, by the vigor of their zeal and the energy of their efforts to extend the triumphs of the gospel, which great Christian nations might worthily covet. And the small island of Britain is now exerting an influence on the condition and destinies of the world, which the vast extent and the unnumbered myriads of China have never known, and never will know till her broad territory and her countless inhabitants shall be illumined by the light of science, and controlled by the spirit of Christianity.

The obscure people, named at the head of this article, possess a humble claim to illustrate the statement I have made. The

Nestorian Christians are the small, but venerable remnant of a once great and influential church. They are the oldest of Christian sects; in their better days they were numerous through all the vast regions from Palestine to China; and they carried the gospel into China itself. Their history is a checkered one. Sometimes, as under the tolerant policy of Gengis Khan and his descendants, they were raised to high places in the camp and at the court; while at other times, as by the crushing arm of the bloody Tamerlane, they were cut down and swept away, till scarce a vestige remained, save in the fastnesses of inaccessible mountains. But in prosperity and adversity, during a period of more than one thousand years, they furnish the brightest examples of persevering toil and self-denial, and often of heroic martyrdom, cheerfully encountered in the profession and zealous promulgation of the gospel,* that are to be found on the records of Christianity, since the days of the apostles.

My object is not to sketch a history of this venerable people; but merely to make a few statements relative to their present position, number, circumstances, character and prospects. I do this in compliance with a repeated request of the former worthy editor of the Repository, and in the hope that its readers may thereby become better acquainted with the people for whose salvation I am laboring, and more interested to co-operate, by prayer and effort, for the advancement of this object.

Before noticing the Nestorians in the particulars proposed, I may remark, that their *lineal origin*, like that of most eastern nations, is hid in the mists of uncertainty. Common, and perhaps universal tradition among themselves claims the *Jews* as their ancestors. As evidence of this descent, they urge the resemblance which exists between the Hebrew language and their own. They also adduce their deep abhorrence of the use of images and pictures in religious worship, while all other eastern Christians, descended from heathen ancestors, still retain their strong attachment to idolatry. The curious inquirer might find many other proofs that the Nestorians are descendants of the Jews. Nor is there any absurdity in the supposition, that their remote ancestors may have been some portion of the Israelites, who were carried away captive by the kings of Assyria, as

* See an interesting article on the "Missions of the Nestorian Christians, in Central and Eastern Asia," in the *Missionary Herald* for August, 1838.

mentioned in 1 Chron. 5: 26, and 2 Kings 15: 29, into places probably not distant from the regions now occupied by the Nestorians. But to attempt to demonstrate as certain the Jewish origin of this people, must be very difficult and unsatisfactory.

Their conversion to Christianity, the Nestorians refer to Thomas, one of the twelve apostles; with whom Adai (Thaddeus), and Mari, one of the seventy, are said to have been associated. Oral tradition and the ancient writings of the Nestorians are united in support of this opinion. And as several of the Christian Fathers inform us that Thomas travelled eastward, even to India, preaching the gospel through the countries intervening, we may regard this claim of the Nestorians as not improbable. This opinion is also confirmed by the fact, that their ritual, composed by ancient ecclesiastics, contains commemorations of Thomas, in the form of thanksgivings to God, for his zealous labors among their ancestors and other eastern nations. At this day, the Nestorians are particularly fond of naming their churches, in honor of that apostle, Mar Thoma, i. e., St. Thomas.

The origin of the Nestorians, as a *Christian sect*, is matter of authentic history.* Nestorius, from whom the sect derives its name, was born and educated in Syria, was a presbyter at Antioch, and was made bishop of Constantinople, A. D. 428. The conspicuousness of his station—that city being the seat of empire—his boldness in attempting to correct some popular superstitions, and perhaps his rashness in theological speculation, drew upon him the envy and hostility of contemporary bishops, particularly of the ambitious Cyril, then bishop of Alexandria. Having been arraigned for heresy, Nestorius was excommunicated at Ephesus, by the third general council, A. D. 431. First banished to Arabia Petræa, and subsequently transported to one of the oases of Lybia, he finally died in Upper Egypt.

* See Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, by Murdock, Vol. I. p. 395 and 428, et passim. A full account of the origin and progress of Nestorianism may also be found in Asseman's "Bibliotheca Orientalis Clementino-Vaticana," Vol. IV., in general very correct, save that it savors strongly of papal prejudice. A brief, but interesting account of the Nestorians also occurs in the "Researches" of Messrs Smith and Dwight, Vol. II. p. 201.

case of *Tiaree*, situated in the rugged, narrow valley of the river Zab—running into the Tigris, the ancient Zabus, or Zabis—which is the most populous of all the Nestorian districts of the mountains. It is governed by meliks—literally *kings*—or chiefs, chosen from its own people, by the popular voice irregularly expressed. The office of these chiefs is usually hereditary in the same family. This district of *Tiaree* is not only quite independent of the Koords, but its inhabitants have such a character for bravery and ferocity, even toward their Koordish neighbors, that the latter seldom hazard the adventure of entering that country; and such as do enter it are said often to atone for their temerity, by being murdered and thrown into the river. The local situation of *Tiaree*,* hemmed in as it is by steep, lofty mountains, save where the river, by narrow defiles, enters and leaves the district, serves, no less than its populousness, effectually to defend its inhabitants from invasion.

The Nestorians of the mountains, like their Koordish neighbors, obtain their subsistence to a great extent from the pasturage of flocks. The principal part of their arable soil, in most places, consists of small terraced patches, on the steep declivities of the mountains. And so rough and barren is much of their territory, that the people find it almost impossible to live in their own country. Many of them are very poor. Some travel abroad and beg as a profession. Considerable numbers come down to the plain of Ooroomiah in summer, to find employment; and still more are driven down in the winter, to seek a subsistence on charity. In some of the districts which are more susceptible of cultivation and less liable to the ravages of the Koords, the inhabitants obtain a comfortable living; though their fare is coarse, consisting chiefly of the products of their flocks, with rice, and bread made of a species of millet. Wheat is seldom cultivated.

The Nestorians of these mountains resemble their Koordish masters and neighbors, not only in their mode of obtaining a subsistence, but also, in a degree, in their exceeding rudeness, wildness and boldness of character. The inhabitants of different districts sometimes quarrel and plunder each other; and if

* The name *Tiaree*, is a Syriac word which means a *fold*, or enclosure (as a sheepfold, John 10: 16 and elsewhere), and was obviously given to this district from its striking local peculiarities.

remonstrance is offered, the pillagers justify themselves by replying, that they rob their Christian brethren to save the spoil from the Koords!

The district of Ooroomiah is in the western part of Azerbaijan—ancient *Atropotene*, the northern portion of Media—the northwestern province of Persia. It consists of a magnificent plain, situated at the eastern base of the Koordish mountains, and extending from them to the beautiful lake of the same name. This lake is about eighty miles in length and thirty in breadth, lying a little to the west of north and east of south. Its waters are very salt, perhaps as much so as the Dead Sea. No fish are found in it; but fowl, particularly the duck and flamingo,* frequent it in immense numbers. The plain of Ooroomiah is about forty miles in length, lying upon the central section of the lake, and in its broadest part is about twenty miles wide. Imposing branches of the Koordish mountains sweep down quite to the waters of the lake, at the extremities of the plain, enclosing it like a vast amphitheatre. With the adjacent declivities of the mountains, it comprises an area of about six hundred square miles, and contains at least three hundred and thirty villages. It is amply watered by three considerable rivers, besides many smaller streams. Its soil is extremely fertile, and is all under high cultivation. Its staple productions are wheat, rice, cotton, tobacco and the vine; and it abounds in a great variety of fruits. Besides ten or twelve species of the grape, it yields cherries, apricots, apples, plums, melons, nuts, etc. etc., in the most ample profusion. And the number of orchards and trees

* The *flamingo* frequents this lake in such numbers, that I have seen miles of the shore whitened by one continuous flock. Their bodies are about the size of a goose; but their slender legs and small flexible neck are of such enormous length, that one fully grown measures six feet from the bill to the toes; and it stretches its wings to even a greater length. Their color is white, save the wings, the front half of which is covered with inimitably delicate and beautiful red feathers, and the back part with black quills. The flesh is reckoned delicious by the inhabitants, who take them in great numbers by means of snares made of hair, and placed in the shallow parts of the lake, where they walk about in search of decayed vegetable matter carried into the lake by the streams.

planted on "the water-courses," is such as to give much of it the appearance of American forests.

About twelve miles back from the lake, and about two miles from the mountains, is the city of Ooroomiah. It is the ancient Thebarma, the birth-place, as tradition says, of Zoroaster. It contains about twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and is four miles in circumference. Like other cities of Persia, it is surrounded by a mud-wall and a ditch; and most of its houses are built of unburnt brick. Its markets are good for this country; its streets are wider than is common in the East; and it has quite an air of comfort, from the great number of shade-trees interspersed among the dwellings.

From elevations back of the city, the beholder, as he looks down upon the smiling gardens directly below him—then on the city, half buried in shrubbery—next on the vast plain, studded with its hundreds of villages, and its thousands of orchards and hedges of poplars, willows and sycamores, and gleaming with its almost illimitable fields, waving a golden harvest,—and farther still on the azure bosom of the placid lake, beaming and sparkling like a mighty mirror, under the brilliancy of a Persian sky,—and finally, on the blue mountains, away in the distance—has before him one of the loveliest and grandest specimens of natural scenery that was ever presented to the eye of man. And forgetting for the moment the moral night that broods over so bright a scene, it is easy for him to conceive that he is surveying the garden of Eden.

The climate of Ooroomiah is *naturally* one of the finest in the world. It resembles, in its temperature, that of our middle States. Unhappily, however, *artificial* causes are at work which render this climate unhealthy, particularly to foreigners;—such as the constant irrigation* in summer of the almost numberless fields and gardens; and, still worse, the extensive pools of stagnant water, that stand most of the time in different places, particularly in the ditch which surrounds the city. The reforming hand of a good government, controlled by the redeeming spirit of Christianity, is all that is needed to drain and dry up these pools and remove other nuisances, and soon restore the climate to its native salubrity.

* There are few showers in Persia during the warm season. The gardens and fields are therefore watered by small canals, which conduct water from the streams.

The Nestorians of Ooroomiah have a tradition that their immediate ancestors came down from the mountains, at a period rather indefinitely known, but about five or six hundred years ago; and that this plain was then but very little inhabited. It is quite probable that the Nestorians were entirely swept away from this province for a season, during the devastations of Tamerlane. But there are some monuments of their earlier residence here. The largest and oldest mosque in this city, for instance, was once a Christian church. In repairing it a few years ago, a vault was found under it containing ancient relics, and among them a manuscript in a state of tolerable preservation, purporting to have been written in that church about eight hundred years ago. Not more than six hundred Nestorians reside in the city of Ooroomiah. These are principally in a compact position, adjacent to which the premises of our mission are situated. There are about two thousand Jews in the city, and the remaining part of the population are Mohammedans. The Nestorians are numerous in the surrounding villages, in some cases living by themselves, and in others, intermingled with Mohammedans. Most of them are employed in the cultivation of the soil, of which they are sometimes, though rarely, the proprietors. A few are mechanics, as masons, joiners, etc. Their common relation to the Mohammedan nobility in the tenure of the soil, is that of serfs to lords. The Mohammedan peasantry sustain nominally the same relation to the higher classes, though their rights are better respected than those of the Christians. The Nestorians often suffer lawless extortion and oppression from their Mohammedan masters. But their circumstances on the whole are quite tolerable for a people in bondage. Their fertile country yields such overflowing abundance, that, so far from being pinched with want, they are always surrounded with plenty.

The Nestorians of Ooroomiah partake in their manners of the suavity and urbanity of the Persian character. By the side of their rude countrymen from the mountains, they appear like antipodes. This difference in the appearance and character of the two classes is owing entirely to their local circumstances. And we may regard it as a felicity, that the mountaineers are impelled by interest or necessity frequently to visit the plain, where they cannot avoid a softening, humanizing influence. And as, in the progress of our work, the people of this province shall become yet more enlightened and elevated by the revival of the spirit of Christianity among them, their intercourse will

tell yet more powerfully on their less civilized brethren, and, through them, on all classes of the wild mountaineers.

It is very difficult to arrive at even tolerable accuracy, in estimating the number of the Nestorian Christians. The methods of obtaining such statistics among Orientals are very indefinite and unsatisfactory. The population of a town, village or district is usually estimated by the number of families; a given number of individuals being assumed as the average in each family. But in the primitive, patriarchal style of living which obtains in these countries, where three, four and even five generations, as the case may be, dwell together—the number of persons in a family varying from five to thirty and even more—it is impossible to fix accurately on an average. Ten is the number often assumed for this purpose. In the Koordish mountains, the population is frequently computed by the soldiers that can be rallied on an emergency, every male adult being reckoned as a soldier. But this method is even more indefinite than the other; and in those wild, inaccessible regions, there is this additional difficulty, that the number of houses and soldiers is but very imperfectly known.

The number of the Nestorian Christians, as nearly as I can ascertain it, is about one hundred and forty thousand. Tiaree—by far the largest and most populous district—has about fifty thousand inhabitants. It is inhabited exclusively by Nestorians, and, as already stated, is quite independent of the Koords. In all the other districts of the mountains, there may be sixty thousand Nestorians. And in the province of Ooroomiah, including the adjacent districts on this side of the mountains, there are about thirty thousand. One hundred and forty thousand is certainly a small number for a nation, or an ancient sect of Christians. But the history of this people, in connection with their present circumstances and character, as was suggested at the commencement of this article, invests this little remnant with an interest independent of numbers.

To the Christian scholar, the *language* and *literature* of the Nestorian Christians are objects of much interest. Their ancient language was the *Syriac*—the common language of Palestine in the days of Christ, and the same doubtless in which the Saviour himself conversed and preached.* This is still the

* See an able and interesting article in relation to this language in the *Biblical Repository*, Vol. I. p. 358.

literary language of the Nestorians; in it their books are all written, and in it they conduct their epistolary correspondence. Though a *dead language*, the best educated of their clergy converse in it with fluency. Their *written character* differs considerably from that of the Western, or Jacobite Syrians, which is the character best known to European scholars. The former was never, to my knowledge, in type, until A. D. 1829, when an edition of the Gospels was printed in it by the British and Foreign Bible Society. It much resembles the Estrangelo, and the Nestorians have some old books written in this character, and they still use it for *capital letters*. The common Nestorian character is very beautiful, and so agreeable to the eye, that members of our mission, when incapacitated by ophthalmia from reading English without pain, are able to read it with but little inconvenience.—The *vowels* used by the Nestorians are *points*, and *not* the *Greek vowels inverted*, as used by the Western Syrians.

The *vernacular* language of the Nestorians is a modern dialect of the ancient Syriac, much barbarized by inversions, contractions and abbreviations, and by the introduction of a great number of Persian, Turkish and Koordish words, each class prevailing, in given districts, according to their proximity to either of those nations. Thus corrupted, however, the body of the language comes directly from the venerable Syriac, as clearly as the modern Greek does from the ancient. Some critics have questioned this opinion, supposing that the language of the Nestorians is a modern dialect of the ancient *Chaldaic*, though all their literature is in the ancient Syriac, and their written correspondence is still conducted in that language. It is incumbent on such as sustain this view, to point out the difference between the Chaldaic and the Syriac, and to show that the spoken language of the Nestorians is more allied to the former than to the latter. I will insert in this connexion a brief extract from a letter which I received from the first editor* of the Repository; whose learned researches on this and kindred subjects entitle his opinion to the highest deference. “Professor Roediger,”† he says, “proposes to go on and publish a fuller account of the Syriac language as now spoken among the Nestorians. The views contained in your letter leave no room to doubt of the character of the language; nor that the *Chaldean*, so called,

* Prof. Edward Robinson, D. D.

† Of Halle.

of Mesopotamia, is the same. I have myself had no doubt of this before ; although on inquiry of R—— and of Mr. S—— in Constantinople, I could get no satisfactory information from either. The prevailing view among scholars at present, is, that the ancient Chaldee and the Syriac are, at the bottom, the same dialect ; the former having developed itself in a more Jewish form and adopted the Hebrew alphabet ; and the latter having been diffused among Christians with a different alphabet ; i. e. one being a Hebraizing Aramaean, and the other, a Christian Aramaean. A similar fact exists now, in relation to the Servian and Illyrian languages. They are the same, or nearly so, as spoken ; but the Servians are Greek Christians, and use a peculiar alphabet ; while the Illyrians are Catholics, and write with the Latin letters.” I may add, that one of my respected associates, the Rev. Mr. Holladay, and myself have taken some pains to compare the language of the Nestorians with the Chaldaic, as exhibited in the books of Daniel and Ezra, and at the same time with the ancient Syriac of those portions of Scripture ; and the result has been a most decided preponderance, in favor of deriving this modern language directly from the Syriac.

Very little attempt had been made to reduce the vernacular language of the Nestorians to writing, until we commenced our missionary operations. The ancient Syriac being a dead language, and entirely unintelligible to the people until studied as a *learned tongue*, it seemed to us, at the outset, quite indispensable to the due accomplishment of our object, to make their modern dialect the medium of written as well as oral instruction. Some *theoretic* philologists question the propriety of reducing to writing any of the spoken languages of the Oriental Christians, and perhaps some other vernacular Asiatic languages, advising that the people should be carried back to the readoption of their ancient tongues. Such philologists should remember, that *popular* language is not that *tractable* thing which will always come and go at one’s bidding,—and especially, march far in a retrograde direction ; that it is an absolute sovereign, whom we may conciliate, but whom we try in vain to coerce. I may here quote another remark from Prof. Robinson’s letter. He says : “ There can be no doubt, I think, as to the propriety and necessity of cultivating the modern Syriac, in the manner you mention, any more than there is in the case of modern Greek. It is the language and the only language of the people, and must remain so, though it should be purified

refined, by a reference to the ancient language, so far as possible." We have, from the first, been fully impressed, in attempting to reduce this spoken dialect to writing, with the high importance of shaping it, so far as is practicable, to the very perfect model of the ancient Syriac; and we strenuously urge on the Nestorians the continued study of the latter, as a learned language. It is visionary, however, to suppose that they could ever be brought to adopt this as their vernacular tongue. By the blessing of God on our labors, we have succeeded in putting considerable portions of the Scriptures and some other matter into this new, and, to the Nestorians, attractive costume.

Of the venerable ancient Syriac, once so highly and extensively cultivated and so rich in its literary stores, as of the unfortunate people who use it, we now find but little more than its ashes. The number of works at present extant among the Nestorians is very limited, and copies of these are extremely rare. The library of the Patriarch,—which had often been represented to us as absolutely prodigious, and might actually appear so to these simple-hearted people, who are acquainted with no method of making books save by the slow motion of the pen,—is found to consist of not more than sixty volumes, and a part of these are duplicates. And no other collection, to compare with this, exists among them. Three, five or ten books, for a large village, or a district even, has been regarded as a liberal supply. The few which they do possess, however, are objects of deep interest. Among them are found the whole of the Holy Scriptures,—save the book of Revelation, which exists in none of their manuscript copies, and seems not to have been known to them, until introduced by us in the printed editions of the British and Foreign Bible Society. They make no objection to it in that connexion, but readily recognise and acknowledge it as canonical. Their Scriptures do not occur in one volume, but usually in six, the division being as follows. 1. The Pentateuch (*Ovrata*), copies of which are not so rare as of some other portions. 2. The remaining books of the Old Testament to the Psalms, with the exception of the two books of Chronicles (*Bitmetwee*)—copies rare. 3. The two books of Chronicles (*Dbereamin*), copies of which are very rare. 4. The Psalms (*Dâvid*, or *Mismoree*)—copies comparatively plenty. 5. The Prophets (*Nowiee*)—copies rare. 6. The New Testament (*Hdetta*)—copies more numerous than of any other portion, except the Psalms. In the second book in this list, occurs the

apochryphal work, *Ecclesiasticus*, or *the Wisdom of Sirach* (*Hahumtha d'bar Seerah*). The Nestorians have also, in a separate volume, a work purporting to be *the revelation of Paul* (*Gileeana d'Paulus*), which is said to consist of communications of what he saw, when he was caught up to the third heaven.

The principal books containing the church services of the Nestorians are the following. 1. Alternate prayers for each day in two weeks (*Kdām Dooatha*). 2. Prayers for every day in the year except the Sabbath and festivals (*Keshkool*). 3. Prayers for the Lord's day and other festivals (*Hoodra*). 4. Prayers for festivals not in Lent (*Gezza*). 5. Services for the communion, ordination, baptism and consecration of churches (*Takhsa*). 6. Legends of the Saints, read in the churches during some of the fasts (*Werda*). 7. Marriage services (*Barukta*). 8. Funeral services (*Oneeda*). A small Romish legend is also found among them, claiming to be an epistle that descended from heaven at Rome, about the year A. D. 777, being engraved by the finger of God on a table of ice! After detailing a pompous array of signs and wonders that attended its descent, it proceeds to enjoin the observance of the laws of God and of the church, and denounces fearful threatenings on the disobedient. It is entitled, *The Epistle of the Sabbath* (*Agertha d'Hosheeba*), i. e. it descended on the Sabbath, and demands a reading every Sabbath. It is very little used by the Nestorians. Reciting the Psalms comprises a very considerable part of the daily church service of the Nestorians. The Gospels are also read, particularly on the Sabbath and on festival occasions. The Epistles and the Old Testament, though less frequently, are read in their churches.

The Nestorians have a book containing the laws and canons of their church (*Sūnhādos**). They have also some of the writings of the Fathers (*Avahatha*), and traditions (*Teshaia-thee*); Books of Martyrs (*Sadee*); and Commentaries (*Noo-haree*) on all portions of the Scriptures, some of which are very entertaining and instructive, but others are equally puerile.

* When the Syriac literature was in its greatest prosperity, the Greek literature was much cultivated by the Syrians, who introduced almost innumerable terms on religious, moral and philosophic subjects from the Greek into their own language. This word, *Sunhados* (Synod), is an instance, and several others which follow.

They have books of wise and moral sayings (Akuldaree, Shaper Doobaree), and books of philosophy (Peelâsoopa), but "falsely so called;" and they have rare copies of ponderous Dictionaries (Lexiconæ) and Grammars (Grammatika).

The Nestorians have some very ancient manuscripts. There are copies of the New Testament written, some on parchment and some on paper, which date back about six hundred years. Some of these are written in the Estrangelo, and others in the common Nestorian character. The very ancient copies of the Scriptures are regarded with much veneration, and preserved with great care. They are kept in envelopes, and when taken into the hands, are reverently kissed as very hallowed treasures.

I find it interesting, in translating the Scriptures, to compare the printed Syriac version, as also our own, with these ancient manuscripts. Slight diversities sometimes occur, not such as at all to invalidate the authority of either as a standard version; but, by the different location of a single *dot*, new light and vividness are often thrown upon a passage of Scripture. A case of this kind occurred a day or two ago. It was in Luke 24: 32, in relation to the conversation between Christ and the two disciples on their way to Emmaus. "Did not our hearts *burn* within us?" In the printed version it is *yakeed, burn*, the same as in English. But my translator, a Nestorian priest, questioned the correctness of this reading; and on referring to a manuscript copy of the New Testament about five hundred years old, instead of "*yakeed, burn*," we found "*yakeer, heavy, or dull*;" the difference being simply in the location of a point, which, in the one case, being placed *below* the final letter of the word made it Daled, and in the other case, placed *above* it, made it Raish. According to the ancient manuscript, the verse in question would read: "And they said one to another, Were not our hearts *heavy* (or *dull*,—reproaching themselves for being slow of understanding), while he talked to us by the way, and while he opened to us the Scriptures;" a reading which certainly loses nothing of beauty and force when compared with our own version.

Few as are the books of the Nestorians, their *readers* are scarcely more numerous. Not more than one in two hundred of the people—in general, only the clergy—could read when we commenced our labors. And such as read at all—their highest and most influential ecclesiastics even—are but very imperfectly educated. A majority of the priesthood can merely chant their devotions in the ancient Syriac, without knowing

the meaning. Some of the bishops even, among the mountains, are in this predicament. We have now about four hundred children and youth in our seminary and schools, who possess as good native talents as an equal number in any country, and are successfully studying both their ancient and modern tongues; and we hope soon to have many more thus employed. We have freely circulated the printed Scriptures in the ancient Syriac, among such as can read, and have multiplied with the pen copies of those portions of the Bible which we have translated into the spoken dialect, and we need only the aid of a printer and press, to enable us to contribute far more rapidly and efficiently, to revive the dying embers of literature, as well as of pure religion, among this venerable people.

The Nestorians, like their Mohammedan masters and neighbors, are very fine-looking people. Their stature is nearly the same as our own. Their features are regular, manly, intelligent, and often handsome. And their complexion, were their habits cleanly, would be as light and fair as that common among Americans. In their character, they are bold, generous, kind, very artless for Asiatics, and extremely hospitable. Oppression from their Persian masters has never been able to reduce the Nestorians of Ooroomiah to the spiritless servility of the Armenian Christians. They are still brave, restless under oppression, and, so far as a subject people can be, remarkably independent in their feelings. On the other hand, the Nestorians of the mountains, with all their wildness, rudeness and bold independence, still possess the same kindness and hospitality of character, which are such prominent traits in the people of this province. There, the hungry man will divide his last piece of bread with a stranger or an enemy. In the district of Ooroomiah, where the Nestorians are so plentifully supplied with the means of living, they, as a matter of calculation, lay in liberal stores for their poor countrymen of Koordistan; who, pinched with want among their own barren mountains, come down to the plain in large numbers, particularly in the winter, to seek a temporary subsistence on charity. The characteristic kindness and hospitality of the Nestorians, which they ever manifest to us to the utmost of their power, contribute much to render our residence among them agreeable and comfortable.

But attractive as are their native traits of character, it is as nominal Christians that the Nestorians are invested with yet deeper interest. The organization of the Nestorian church

is strictly episcopal. Its ecclesiastical head is a Patriarch, with the title of Mar Shimon, i. e. Lord Simeon. The residence of this Patriarch is at Diss, about twenty miles from Julamerk, in the Hakkary district, one of the most inaccessible parts of the Koordish mountains. He formerly resided at Kochanes, still nearer to the town of Julamerk. He is clothed properly with only spiritual power, though his influence is in fact far more general. Among the mountaineers, his word is usually law in both temporal and spiritual matters. Among the Nestorians of Ooroomiah his control is much more limited. He never ventures down among them, probably from the apprehension that he might suffer embarrassment from their Persian rulers. And being thus beyond the reach of the full exercise of his authority, the people of this province have become rather lax in their regard even for his spiritual prerogatives. Still they look up to him with respect and veneration, and requite the visits of his brothers, which are usually annual, with liberal pecuniary contributions. Under the Patriarch are eighteen bishops; four of whom reside in the province of Ooroomiah.

The canons of the Nestorian church, require celibacy in its Patriarch and bishops. They also require, that from childhood they abstain entirely from the use of animal food, save fish, eggs and the productions of the dairy. Indeed, they go a step farther back in the latter requisition. The mother of the candidate for the episcopal office must also have observed the same abstinence, during the period of gestation. This requisition of abstinence from animal food is, however, like many other of their ceremonials, in some cases softened down. One of the bishops of Ooroomiah was never a candidate for episcopacy, until he was forty years old, having eaten animal as well as vegetable food until that period. He was then made a bishop, as a token of the Patriarch's favor, for important services rendered when a deacon, in opposing the influence of papal emissaries. Since becoming a bishop, he has practised the required abstinence. I have sometimes questioned the Nestorian bishops, in relation to the reasons for their practising celibacy and restriction to vegetable diet. They never attempt to found the requirements of their church on the precepts of Scripture; but reply, that in consideration of the sacredness of the episcopal office, these observances are enjoined as matter of propriety, on those intrusted with it,—they being set apart to their high and holy work, as a *consecrated class of Nazarites*. Neither celibacy

nor abstinence from animal food are required of the inferior clergy ; nor do convents exist among them.

The Nestorian clergy, like the laity, are usually poor ; and with the exception of the Patriarch and the bishops, they are obliged to labor with their hands, or teach a few scholars to obtain a subsistence. The priests realize a small pittance, in the form of a trifling annual contribution from their flocks, and a scanty fee for marriages and some other occasional services. The bishops receive an annual tax of about two and a quarter cents on an individual, each from his respective diocese ; and this, in their simple style of living and with no families to support, suffices for their subsistence. The Patriarch receives an annual contribution, collected for him by the bishops, which usually amounts to two hundred and fifty or three hundred dollars.

The Nestorians are very charitable towards other sects of nominal Christians, liberal in their feelings, and strongly desirous of improvement. The Patriarch has repeatedly written to us, expressing his joy and satisfaction at our being among his people, his gratitude for our efforts for their benefit, and his earnest prayers for our prosperity ; and such have been the language and apparently the feelings of all classes of his people. The four bishops of Ooroomiah and several of the most intelligent priests are in our employ as assistants in our missionary labors. They engage in the instruction and superintendence of schools and Sabbath schools, preach the gospel, aid in translation, and render other efficient assistance. And the Patriarch and his brothers pledge to us the same co-operation, whenever we shall be enabled to extend our labors into the mountains.*

The religious belief and practices of the Nestorians are much more simple and scriptural than those of other Oriental Christians.† They have the greatest abhorrence of all image worship,

* Two brothers of the Patriarch (one of them his designated successor) are now with us on a visit, and are desirous of entering our employ as assistant missionaries here at Ooroomiah.

† An exposition of the *religious system* of the Nestorians does not come within the limits or the object of this article. But as the charge of *heresy*, in relation to the *character* of *Christ*, has been so violently laid upon the Nestorian church, by Catholics and other Oriental Christians ever since the days

auricular confession, the doctrine of purgatory, and many other of the corrupt dogmas and practices of the Papal, Greek and Armenian churches; while they cherish the highest reverence

of Nestorius, the present opportunity of vindicating, to Protestants, their orthodoxy on that important subject, ought not to be omitted. This point cannot better be secured, in few words, than by presenting their religious creed, as it occurs in their Liturgy, and is always repeated by them at the close of their services, as often as they hold religious worship, which is at least twice every day. They recognise it as the *Nicene* creed; and, as will be seen by inspection, it differs but little from that venerable document.

Below is a translation of this creed, with the caption prefixed, in the precise form in which it occurs in the Nestorian Liturgy in the ancient Syriac language.

“The creed which was composed by three hundred and eighteen holy fathers at Nice, a city of Bythinia, in the time of king Constantine the pious. The occasion of their assembling was on account of Arius, the infidel accursed.”

“We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, and Creator of all things which are visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten, the first-born of every creature; who was begotten of his Father before all worlds, and was not created; the true God of the true God, of the same substance with his Father, by whose hands the worlds were made and all things were created; who for us men, and for our salvation, descended from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost, and became man, and was conceived and born of the Virgin Mary, and suffered and was crucified in the days of Pontius Pilate, and died and was buried, and rose on the third day according to the Scriptures, and ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of his Father, and is again to come to judge the living and the dead; and we believe in one Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth who proceedeth from the Father, the Spirit that giveth life; and in one holy apostolic, catholic (universal) church. We acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins; and the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting.”

This document, being regarded as a summary of their *religious system*, and so often repeated by the Nestorians, of course exercises a strong influence over their religious belief and feelings.

for the Holy Scriptures, and, in theory at least, exalt them far above all human traditions. Indeed, the Nestorians may not improperly be called the *Protestants* of Asia.

Such being their religious character, it should cease to be a matter of wonder, that they have welcomed us so cordially to our missionary labors, and that we have hitherto experienced not a breath of that violent opposition which has so often and effectually hedged up the way of our missionary brethren, who have been sent to other Eastern churches. We arrogate to ourselves no superior wisdom, prudence or fidelity. The difference is owing to the character of the people among whom we labor. With the Nestorians, we have a broad field of common ground, in the acknowledged supreme authority of the Holy Scriptures and other peculiarities to which I have alluded, that exists among no other Oriental Christians. Upon this ground, the clergy rejoice to take their stand and lend us their hearty and efficient co-operation. The most influential part of them being brought thus under our immediate influence—ten or twelve of them are connected with our families—they advance in intelligence and evangelical views, and keep pace with our missionary operations. And with their ecclesiastics, the people will, of course, move forward, and treat us as brethren engaged in a common cause, regarding our object to be, what in truth it is, not to pull them down but to build them up. And difficult indeed would it be for us not to reciprocate the fraternal estimation in which we are held.

Too much, however, should not be inferred from these statements. The Nestorians are still, to a painful extent, under the influence of many childish traditions. They attach great importance to their periodical fasts—which are about as numerous as in the other Eastern countries—often to the neglect of purity of heart, and even of external morality. The vice of lying is almost universal, among both ecclesiastics and people. Intemperance is quite prevalent. The Sabbath is, to a great extent, regarded as a holiday, and profaneness and some other vices are very common. Indeed, the mass of this people seem literally to have “a name to live,” while they are “dead.”

We ought, however, in the spirit of charity, to make exceptions to this dark picture. There are ecclesiastics in our employ, and probably many other individuals both among the clergy and the laity, who are correct in their external conduct, and serious in their deportment, who sigh and pray over the deg-

radation of their people, and seem “waiting for the consolation of Israel.” Such, if not really Christians,* are, we believe, “not far from the kingdom of God.” And as “the word of the Lord,” in the progress of our labors, shall “have free course and be glorified” among the people, the number of these Simeons and Annas will, we trust, be rapidly increased; until the whole church shall be enlightened, elevated and resuscitated by the spirit and life of the gospel.

Such is the venerable remnant of the Nestorian Christians—situated in the midst of the followers of the False Prophet—invaded on all sides by artful Romish emissaries—and stretching forth their hands to Protestant Christendom with the imploring cry: “Come over and help us!” Their position in relation to the enemies of Christianity, is alike trying and interesting. Over the broad chasm that divides their faith from Mohammedanism, they would doubtless continue, as a mass, extremely reluctant to leap, under almost any temptation or coercion. To the honor of the Persians, too, they are not, for Mohammedans, very overbearing in their efforts to proselyte their Christian subjects. Some hardened culprits are found ready, for the sake of evading merited punishment, to change their religion; and such the Mohammedans readily pardon.

But from the Papists, with the name and some of the forms of Christianity to conceal the deformities of their system, the Nestorians are in far greater danger. Had we not come to their rescue, we have reason to apprehend that the incessant working of the artful machinations of Jesuit emissaries—their endless intrigues—their promises of large sums of money, or favors procured through their instrumentality from government as rewards of conversion—their threats to bring the arm of Mussulman displeasure against such as refuse to yield—and their actual oppression, wherever they can bring power to their aid for this purpose, would gradually have obliterated the Nestorians as a people, and attached the last man of them to the Romish standard. We are here, it would seem, just in season to prevent this result. But every inch of the ground is still to be contested. Papists know the importance of this field, and are coming into it like a flood. Here, as in almost every part

* There is much reason to hope that there are pious individuals in this church, and that there may have been such during the whole period of its existence.

of the world, the Protestant missionary must experience his greatest trials and difficulties from the agents of "the man of sin." No measure will be left untried for leading away the Nestorians from the religion of their fathers, and subjecting them to papal control. A few years ago, a Jesuit offered to the Nestorian Patriarch \$10,000, on condition that he would acknowledge allegiance to the Pope; to whom the Patriarch replied, in the emphatic language of Peter to Simon Magus: **THY MONEY PERISH WITH THEE.** And of late, emissaries from Rome have tendered to him the assurance, that if he will so far become a Catholic as to recognise the supremacy of their master, he shall not only continue to be Patriarch of the Nestorians, but *all the Christians of the East* shall be added to his jurisdiction! To this, the Patriarch replies: *Get thee hence, Satan.* The "newest measure" that has been reported to us is a recent order, fresh from the Pope, to the Catholics of these regions, to **CANONIZE NESTORIUS**, whose memory every Papist has been required, for so many centuries, to *curse*; and to *anathematize* the *Lutherans*, i. e., the Protestant missionaries, with whom they propose also to class such of the Nestorians as shall not go over to the ranks of the Papists. The Nestorians fully understand that this surprising change is intended only to decoy them; and they very naturally spurn the honor thus proffered. And as to being classed with the *Lutherans*, a brother of the Nestorian Patriarch, and his designated successor, who is now with us, told the Catholics, a few days ago, that he regarded it as an enviable exaltation.

As already remarked, Jesuit efforts have succeeded in accomplishing their object on the western side of the Koordish mountains—sometimes drawing individuals or families, and sometimes bishops, and in one or two instances a Patriarch, with parts of their flocks, over to the papal standard. But in the province of Ooroomiah and among the Koordish mountains, Catholic influence has hitherto been very limited. The Nestorians of these regions have nobly resisted, and our prayer and hope is, that they may thus continue to resist. But, destitute of vital religion, and subjected to strong temptation, their condition is perilous. Our confidence is in the Lord to keep them. "If God be for us, who can be against us?"

Is not the almost miraculous preservation of the Nestorian church from being crushed by the heavy arm of Mohammedan oppression on the one hand, and entangled and destroyed by

the wiles of Jesuit emissaries on the other, an animating pledge that the Lord of the church will continue to preserve this venerable remnant;—that he will even revive and build it up, for the glory of his name and the advancement of his kingdom? May he not have important purposes for it to accomplish—a conspicuous part for it to act, in ushering in the millennial glory of Zion? What position could be more important and advantageous, in its bearing on the conversion of the world, than that occupied by the Nestorians, situated as they are in the centre of Mohammedan dominion? And is it too much to believe, that this ancient church, once so renowned for its *missionary* efforts, and still possessing such native capabilities, as well as such felicity of location for the renewal of like missionary labors, will again awake from the slumber of ages, and become bright as the sun, fair as the moon, and terrible as an army with banners!—that it will again diffuse such floods of light, as shall put for ever to shame the corrupt abominations of Mohammedanism, roll back the tide of papal influence, which is now setting in so strongly and threatening to overwhelm it, and send forth faithful missionaries of the cross, in such numbers and with such holy zeal, as shall bear the tidings of salvation to every corner of benighted Asia? We confidently look for such results, and that at no very distant period, from the humble efforts which the American churches are now putting forth, for the revival of religion among their Nestorian brethren. These efforts should be vigorously prosecuted; for a great preparatory work remains to be done, and a momentous crisis is near. The signs of the times in this eastern world, betoken the speedy approach of mighty political revolutions. The Mohammedan powers are crumbling to ruin. Christian nations are soon to rule over all the followers of the False Prophet. Mark the recent extension of British sway over the vast regions of Affghanistan! Turkey and Persia are tottering, and would fall at once by their own weight, were they not upheld by rival European governments. The universal catastrophe of Mohammedan dominion cannot, in all human probability, be much longer postponed. And as the religion of Mohammed was propagated and is sustained by the *sword*, so its overthrow, there can be little doubt, must quickly ensue, when the sword shall be taken from its hands.

The Nestorians, therefore, and other Oriental Christians, should be quickly enlightened and prepared to take advantage of these approaching changes,—ready to plant the standard of

the cross whenever the trembling fabric of Islamism shall fall, and push the conquests of the gospel still onward, as fast as so mighty a revolution in the circumstances and prospects of this continent shall open the way. This done, and how soon will the kingdoms of this world become the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ!

ARTICLE II.

BAPTISM :—THE IMPORT OF *Βαπτίζω*.

By Rev. Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

[Continued from Vol. III., page 371.*]

THE principles and leading positions of the argument in regard to the import of *βαπτίζω* have been stated. This argument involves three main points: 1. The clearing away of irrelevant or false positions, and definitely stating the point really at issue, and the proposition to be maintained—§§ 1—3. 2. The antecedent probability of the meaning claimed, according to the laws of language and of the mind, and from the nature of the subject—§§ 4—7. 3. Philological proof from the writers of Alexandrine Greek and from the fathers—§§ 8—21.

§ 22.

The philological argument is therefore complete, so far as is

* Our constant readers will recollect that this discussion was marked as *concluded* in the Repository for April last, at the page here referred to. This was occasioned by some delay of correspondence, which led to a misunderstanding of the writer's design. We are happy to afford space for the continuance of an argument so cumulative in its power, and the former portions of which have already called forth expressions of high satisfaction from several correspondents both in this country and in England. It will probably be concluded in our No. for April next.

The following *Errata* occurred in the preceding sections of

implied in a statement of its principles and leading positions. It is not, however, complete so far as its cumulative power is concerned. A large number of facts still remains, which, in their proper place, will strongly confirm every main position I have assumed. But here the regular operations of the mind are interrupted by the entrance of disturbing forces of great and bewildering power. In every fundamental investigation of the mode of baptism, three inquiries are commonly involved and combined. 1. The import of the word *βαπτίζω*. 2. The original practice of the church. 3. The full and perfect signification of the rite. The influences of these two last inquiries on the question of philology, I call bewildering and disturbing forces—not because they are not important and legitimate objects of inquiry in their proper sphere; and not because they have no bearing on the main question of the mode—but because they have exercised over the question of philology, an unauthorized though unsuspected power. No attentive observer of the operations of the human mind can have failed to notice, that the impression of an argument, true and sound in itself, is often destroyed by the secret influence of some fact or principle, which does not appear in the discussion. These deep under-currents have frequently a power entirely superior to the logical force of the argument presented, and produce a state of mind which, if expressed in words, would be in substance this: “All this looks well enough; it is quite plausible, to be sure; but still *it cannot be true*; there must be an error somewhere.” States of mind like this—felt but not announced—often do more to break the strength of an argument, than any direct perception of its falsehood. So now,

this discussion, in a part of the edition, which the reader is requested to correct, viz.

- Vol. III. page 41, line 1, after erect, add *each*.
 “ “ “ 42, line 8, for *models* read *modes*.
 “ “ “ 46, line 2, for *word* read *mode*.
 “ “ “ “ line 3, for *more* read *mode*.
 “ “ “ “ line 11, for *word* read *mode*.
 “ “ “ 47, line 35, for *rigorous* read *vigorous*.
 “ “ “ 51, line 38, for *ὑαχινθισ*, etc. read *ὑαχινθισ* etc..
 “ “ “ 63, line 28, for *natural* read *mutual*.
 “ “ “ 64, line 8, for *adopted* read *adapted*.
 “ “ “ 365, lines 18 and 30, for *βαπτισις* read *βάπτισις*.
 “ “ “ 358, line 30, for *Rosenmuller* read *Kuinoel*.

that the philological argument has been stated, I have no doubt that the thought will arise in many a mind: "Well, after all, it is a fact that the early Christians did universally immerse, and did attach great importance to that form; *and they surely understood the import of the word as well as we.* Besides, the rite is designed to represent, not merely purification from sin, but purification in a way significant of the death and resurrection of Christ, as we are expressly told in Rom. 6: 2, 3, and Col. 2: 12. All these learned philological inquiries are no doubt very fine, and quite plausible; but the single expression, "*buried with Christ in baptism,*" is enough to dissipate them all. Now, while these under-currents of thought are overlooked, it is in vain to attempt to give to the philological argument, however sound in itself, any power at all. As some mighty stream, undermining banks, trees and houses, precipitates them together into the flood, and hurries them along in promiscuous ruin, so do these deep under-currents undermine and lay prostrate the walls of the best-compacted logical fabric. Considerations like these, indeed, produce a greater popular effect than reasonings, however profound. The ideas lie upon the surface, and are therefore easily stated and easily apprehended.

It is essential, then, to inquire what are the facts on the first of these points, and what is their bearing on the philological question? Having done this, we may resume and review our investigations.

§ 23.

What, then, are the facts, as it regards the practice of the earlier ages of the church? I am willing freely and fully to concede that, in the primitive church, from the earliest period of which we have any historical accounts, immersion was the mode generally practised, and, except in extraordinary cases, the only mode. I do not mean that these remarks shall apply to the *apostolic age*, but to the earliest historical ages of the uninspired primitive church. The practice of the apostolic age, I shall consider by itself. After all that has been said upon this point by learned men, it will not be deemed necessary for me to advance proof of the position, that, in the primitive church immersion was the general mode of baptism. No one who has candidly examined the original sources of evidence, will entertain a doubt. If any one does doubt, let him read the articles in Suicer on *ἀνάδυσσις* and *κατάδυσσις*; or, still better, some of the

Fathers themselves. For a comprehensive, clear and definite view of the great outlines of primitive practice in this respect, I know of no passages more full, and at the same time eloquent, than the sermons of Augustine to the Neophytes, pp. 97—99, vol. i., supp., Paris, 1555. I do not mean that the early practice included all which is stated by Augustine; for many superstitious usages had, by this time, become prevalent. It is the main outline to which I refer. But admitting these things to be facts, what then? Does it follow of course, that the Fathers were led to adopt this form by a belief that the import of the word βαπτίζω is to immerse? This I know seems very generally to have been taken for granted on both sides of the question. For example, Professor Stuart, after an able and clear exhibition of the proof that the early churches did baptize by immersion, says: "In what manner, then, did the churches of Christ, from a very early period, to say the least, understand the word βαπτίζω in the New Testament? Plainly they construed it as meaning immersion." "That the Greek Fathers, and the Latin ones who were familiar with the Greek, *understood* the usual import of the word βαπτίζω, would hardly seem to be capable of a denial." Bib. Rep. Vol. III. 362. Now, all this is manifestly based on the assumption, that the practice of the Fathers in this case is an infallible index of their philology; i. e. if they did in fact immerse, they must of course have believed that βαπτίζω means to immerse. Indeed, this seems generally to have been regarded as a first principle, an indisputable truth. As long as it is so regarded, the facts already stated, as to early practice, will exert a strong, disturbing influence on the mind. The scholar in the region of philology and logic finds all plain; but he enters the dizzy and bewildering region of early practice, and his brain reels, his energy is dissolved, and some unseen power seems to be wresting his previous philological conclusions from his grasp. Indeed, if it is a sound principle that we must infer the opinions of the Fathers, as to the import of βαπτίζω, from their practice, I see not how he can avoid letting them go; for of the facts there can be no doubt. But it is high time to ask: Is the principle sound? is it logical? has it any force at all? It may seem adventurous to call in question a principle so generally received and so firmly believed. Nevertheless, I am compelled to say that I cannot perceive that the position is based on any sound principle of philology or logic; nay, it seems to me that there is abundant evidence that

it is entirely illogical and unsound. 1. Because, where a given result may have been produced by many causes, it is never logical to assume, without proof, that it is the result of any one of them alone. The proper course is, to inquire which of the possible causes was, in fact, the real and efficient cause of the result in question. 2. Because, on making the inquiry, it appears manifest to me, that the practice in question did not originate in a belief that the word βαπτίζω means immerse, but in entirely different and independent causes. Suppose now the word to mean *to purify*, it is neither impossible nor improbable, that certain local and peculiar causes may have led to some one mode of purifying rather than another, and that this mode may have been immersion; and if all these things may have been so, who has a right to assume, without proof, that they were not so? I believe that they were. If it is inquired: What causes they were? I answer: 1. Oriental usages and the habits of warmer regions. 2. A false interpretation of Rom. 6: 3, 4, and Col. 2: 12. 3. A very early habit of ascribing peculiar virtue to external forms. The first cause is sufficient to begin the practice; the other two to extend, perpetuate and confirm it. Now, if it can be shown that these causes did exist, and did operate, and had great power, then a sufficient account of the origin and progress of the usage *may be given by these alone*; and thus, all presumption against the meaning I have assigned to βαπτίζω, or in favor of the sense to immerse, will be taken away; and thus, the way will be prepared to resume the direct philological proof, that in the earlier ages the word βαπτίζω did mean purify. But of their existence or their power, can there be a doubt? Did not Christianity begin in the warm regions of the East, and in the midst of a people whose climate, habits, costume and mode of life were all adapted to bathing? and was not the practice nearly universal? Hence nothing could be more natural than its use on *convenient occasions*, as a mode of religious purifying; and if, as some maintain, the form had been previously used as a religious rite, nothing could be more natural than its adoption as a mode of purifying in the church. As to the interpretation of Rom. 6: 3, 4, and Col. 2: 12, as referring to the external form, all may not be ready to concede that it was false; yet that it was early prevalent and powerful, no one, I think, at all acquainted with the facts of the case, will deny. But of this, more in another place. As to a superstitious attachment to forms—who can deny it? nay, who

that is a Protestant does? Evidence of it throngs on every page that records the early history of the church. To omit all else, the history of this rite alone would furnish volumes of proof. Let the holy water—the baptismal chrism, to symbolize and bestow the Holy Spirit—the putting on of white robes after baptism, to symbolize the putting on of Christ—the baptism of men and women perfectly naked, to denote their entire moral nakedness before putting on Christ—let the anointing of the eyes and ears, to denote the sanctification of the senses—let the eating of honey and milk—the sign of the cross; and finally, let baptismal regeneration—the sum and completion of all these formal tendencies—bear witness to the mournful truth. Now, when the tendencies to formalism and superstition were so all-pervading and almost omnipotent, what could avert a blind and superstitious devotion to an early form—one especially in which so much was supposed to be involved, both of emblematical import and of sanctifying power.

§ 24.

Having now pointed out causes, amply sufficient in extent and power, to account for the early prevalence of immersion, and thus removed all presumption against the sense I claim, I will resume, and exhibit more fully the philological evidence, that the early understanding of the church was, that *βαπτίζω*, as a *religious* term, did signify *to purify*. I shall, 1, notice more at large those cases in which it is not only in the highest degree probable that *βαπτίζω* has the sense to purify, but, in which it is positively absurd to assign it any other meaning. For examples of such cases, see § 21: 2, 3. 2. Show that a very large number of coincident facts sustains and gives verisimilitude to this view. The argument already presented is, to my own mind, perfectly conclusive. For it has been shown that the sense to purify is, a priori, probable according to the laws of language and of the mind, and from the nature of the subject. See §§ 4—7. It has also been shown that the fair and obvious import of a large class of passages demands the sense; that the coincidence of so many separate probabilities brings together an array of proof that cannot be broken; and also, that no opposite probabilities exist. See §§ 8—21. Still, it may be felt, if not said, how much better, in a case so important, to have proof so clear, unequivocal and decided, that the opposite sense shall not only be highly improbable, but

absolutely impossible. Though I by no means admit the justice of this demand—because hundreds and thousands of senses are daily admitted on evidence far less ample than that already given, and to admit the necessity of such proof to establish a meaning would subvert all principles of sound philology—yet, as the materials for such proof exist, it seems appropriate here to present them.

§ 25.

To perceive fully the force of these, it is necessary to notice, 1. The source whence they are derived, which is ancient usage, as it regards the baptism of blood: 2. The cases to which they relate, which are two; (1) the bloody baptism of Christ; (2) the bloody baptism of the martyrs: 3. Their views in relation to this subject. They apply the word baptism merely to the *act of making an atonement by shedding blood*, even where no one is spoken of, either as sprinkled by it, or immersed in it, and when the only external act spoken of is totally at war with the idea of immersion. In cases of this kind, no sense is possible but καθαρισμός, which is the established sacrificial term for an atonement, as I have already shown, § 12. Let us then begin with the case of our Saviour, of whose bloody baptism they so often speak. He shed his blood for sins, and this is called καθαρισμός in the word of God. Heb. 1: 3. Now, if they call the mere act of shedding his blood a βάπτισμα, it is *totally impossible* that it should be taken in any except the sacrificial sense, καθαρισμός. But in Origen, Hom. 7, on Judges 6, occurs a long passage on the baptism of blood, in which this very usage of language occurs. Speaking of Luke 12: 50, he says: “Pertendit enim nostra probatio non usque ad verbera solum, sed usque ad profusionem sanguinis pervenit. Quia et Christus, quem sequimur, pro redemptione nostra effudit sanguinem suum, ut inde exeamus loti sanguine nostro. Baptisma enim sanguinis solum est, quod nos puriores reddat, quam aquæ baptismus reddit. Et hoc ego non præsumo, sed Scriptura refert, dicente domino ad discipulos: Baptismum habeo baptizari, quod vos nescitis; et quomodo urgeor ut perficiatur. Vides ergo quia *profusionem sanguinis sui, baptismum nominavit.*” Here observe, 1. That the eye of the mind is fixed intently and alone on the *effusion of blood to make atonement*. 2. He expressly states, that Christ calls this *shedding of blood*, irrespective of its actual application in any mode, *a baptism*. 3. The only

external act spoken of is *outpouring* ; and surely, to call this an immersion is absurd. Here, then, an *impossibility* of the sense immersion is clearly proved. 4. But, give to baptism the sense καθαρισμός and all is harmonious and plain ; for an outpouring of blood is a καθαρισμός in the sacrificial sense, i. e. an atonement. In Heb. 1 : 3, καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν is applied to Christ in this very sense. Let now the passages from Chrysostom, Gregory Naz., and Theophylact be re-examined, and carefully compared with this. § 21 : 2, 3. Those from Chrysostom and Theophylact both relate to the baptism of blood, and refer to passages in Matthew and Mark, parallel in sense to that in Luke, to which Origen refers—Mark 10 : 38, 39, Matthew 20 : 22, 23. So that their usage of βάπτισμος to denote καθαρισμός, is certainly and undeniably the same with that of Origen. By Gregory Naz. this same sacrificial sense is just as clearly extended to the baptism of water ; for he says : “ He did not need purification, i. e. forgiveness of sins, who taketh away the sins of the world.” Two points are now perfectly established. 1. Βάπτισμος has the sacrificial sense καθαρισμός. 2. In the description given of the rite by Gregory Naz., not only are καθαίρω and κάθαρσις used in the place of βαπτίζω and βάπτισμος, but they are used as perfectly synonymous. Here, then, a flood of light is thrown over the whole subject, not only as it regards the baptism of blood, but of water also ; and we may now consider it as indisputably proved, that βαπτίζω is a perfect synonyme of καθαρίζω, in the sacrificial sense. With this compare the argument in § 8, and see how every position there assumed is irresistibly verified and sustained. Not only in the days of John was καθαρισμός regarded as a synonyme of βάπτισμος, but the same usage is found running down, in a stream of light, for many centuries. Indeed, it goes beyond the period commonly assigned to the Fathers, even as low as the eleventh century.

§ 26.

But let us look once more at this same usage, not only in the case of Christ, but also of the martyrs who followed his steps. In order to do this the more clearly, let us for a moment consider the feelings of the early ages as it regards martyrdom. The following points are here to be noticed. 1. The religion of Christ began with a solemn act of martyrdom—even that of the Son of God. 2. Christ knew that multitudes of his disci-

ples were soon to be called to endure the same fate. 3. Both by his example and also by his spirit-stirring words, he provided great and powerful motives to excite his disciples to meet death, in its most terrific forms, without weakness or fear. 4. These motives were not only effectual to produce the desired result in multitudes of instances, but the minds of the early Christians were so deeply affected and so highly excited on this subject, that soon they went even to the extreme of undue eagerness for such a death. 5. This disposition was increased by a false construction put on the words of Paul: "I am ready to be offered."—2 Tim. 4: 6. "Yea, and if I be offered up," etc.—Phil. 2: 7. Also on the words of Christ: "Can ye be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized?" which, as we have shown, they understood as: "Can ye be purified with the purification wherewith I am purified?" and regarded as an inquiry, whether they were ready to be purified in their own blood, as he was in his. See, in the preceding passage of Origen: "*loti sanguine nostro.*" Hence they ascribed to the death of a martyr a kind of atoning power, and spoke of it as a *καθαρισμὸς* or *βάπτισμος*, in the sacrificial sense. 6. This purification was supposed to avail especially for the martyr; so that, if he had never been purified in water for the remission of his sins, they were remitted by his purification in his own blood. Hence, the universal idea of a bloody baptism was, that the martyr was purified, or purged from sin, by his own blood. 7. It was also supposed, that the deaths of martyrs had a purifying power in behalf of others. Now the correctness of these views is not the question. They were evidently false. Our only inquiry is: In what language were they expressed? And the answer is as before; *βαπτίζω* and *βάπτισμα* are freely used to denote the act of purifying, or purging from sin by the shedding of blood; and that in such circumstances, all attempts to introduce the idea of immersion are vain. Origen, on John 1: 29, speaking of Jesus, the Lamb of God, says: "Et sane hujus victimæ cognatæ sunt cœteræ, quarum notæ sunt legales: per cœteras vero victimas huic victimæ cognatas, effusiones intelligo sanguinis generosorum martyrum;" and after a few lines he adds: "Quæ purgant eos pro quibus offeruntur." Again, in his notes on Matthew 20: 22, 23, he says: "Quod autem quis in passione remissionem accipit peccatorum baptismus est." He assigns this reason: "Si enim baptismus indulgentiam peccatorum promittit, sicut accepimus de baptismo

aquæ et spiritus, remissionem autem accipit peccatorum, et qui martyrii suscipit baptismum, sine dubio ipsum martyrium rationaliter baptismus appellatur." Here note, 1, the expression "martyrii baptismum." Now, as martyrdom is not a fluid, so immersion in it is impossible; purification by it is the only possible sense. 2. Previously, as we have seen, he has said of Christ, profusionem sanguinis baptisma nominavit. Here he conveys the same idea in other words, when he says, "Martyrium baptismus appellatur." 3. He gives us express reasons for this use of terms. The martyrs are victims like Christ; like his, their death has an atoning or purging power, and because of this power their death is to them a baptism, i. e., a purification. Indeed, had Origen designed to give a concise definition of the sacrificial sense which I have assigned to the word βάπτισμος, he could not have been more exact. "Quod autem quis in passione remissionem accipit peccatorum baptismus est." Because any one through his suffering receives the remission of sins, it is a purification—a καθαρισμός—a βάπτισμος. *It is not called a baptism, because the martyr is immersed, for in fact he is not.* This is not even thought of; it is totally out of the mind. But it is so called simply because, by suffering, by effusion of blood, he secures the forgiveness of sin. But that effusion of blood, which secures the forgiveness of sins, is always called καθαρισμός, and never an immersion, because in fact there is no immersion in the case. An expiatory offering is never called an immersion. The making an atonement by blood is never called the making of an immersion. He who pardons through blood is always said to purify, to purge, to cleanse by blood, but never to immerse by, or with, or in blood. Now, though the idea that the blood of martyrs has an atoning or purging power is false, yet it does not in the least diminish the force of the argument. We are inquiring how Origen expressed his belief that the blood of martyrs was a purgation from sin, and not whether his opinions were correct. In perfect accordance with these ideas, Chrysostom says of the martyrs in the hour of death, "that they have the Spirit copiously," that "their sins are taken away," that "there is a wonderful purification of the mind," καθαρισμός, and "as others are purified, βαπτίζονται, in water, these are washed, λούονται, in their own blood."

So Gregory Naz., speaking of the baptism of blood, says: "it is more august than the rest," those of water, tears, etc.—

because, after it, the martyr is polluted no more (*οὐ μολύνεται*). The same ideas are also found in the writings of Augustine, and in those of his antagonists, thus proving themselves to be the prevailing ideas of the age. See his *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 13. cap. 7, also lib. 2. cap. 23, *contra literas Petilianus*, where Petilianus uses the expression: “*Similes Christo martyres, quos post aquam veri baptismi, sanguis baptista perfundit,*” i. e., whom their own blood, as a purifier, cleanses or washes. So far indeed was this idea carried, that, as we have seen, the purification by blood was even more desired than the purification by water, though to this also they attached an exaggerated, and almost miraculous power. Nor have I found any evidence that the passages in Luke 12: 50, Mark 10: 38, 39, Matt. 20: 22, 23, were ever understood by any of the Fathers in the sense either of immersion or overwhelming. They seem universally to have referred them to the baptism of blood, and to have taken the words *βάπτισμος* and *βαπτίζω* in the sacrificial sense—to purify. Now I do not think that in these passages the words have that sense. I regard them as instances in which the word is used in the sense to overwhelm with cares, and agony of body and mind, as illustrated in § 4 and § 10. But this only shows how deeply fixed and strong was the *usus loquendi* for which I contend; for it was so powerful as even to overrule the true sense, in cases where the word obviously departs from the sense to purify. And if it was sufficiently powerful to force the sense to purify on the word, even when it does not belong there, are we to suppose that it was not powerful enough to retain it, in instances where all the facts of the case show that it truly belongs? In view of these facts, which are a small part only of those which might be adduced, I am utterly unable to resist the conviction, that to *purify*, was clearly, and so far as I have observed, universally the religious sense of the word *βαπτίζω* among the Fathers.

• § 27.

I do not indeed affirm that they did not, any of them, at any time, use it as a religious term to denote *immersion*. To say this intelligently, would require a certainty that every usage of it by the Fathers had been seen, which, in my case, certainly is not true. But I must say, that even if such cases can be found, they will not disprove my position. They can only prove inconsistent usage; and this I have already admitted would be

nothing strange, and might even be expected in writers so numerous and so various. Still, when I consider the extreme power of the usage which I have proved, when I find it clearly and decidedly, even in the eleventh century, I am inclined to believe that a general perception of the true sense was lost or not observed, till the Greek language itself sunk in the ruins of the Eastern empire; and that the present state of opinion has been produced by party spirit, and by the mistakes of learned men to whom the Greek was a dead language, and who, being familiar with the style and usage of classic Greek, as that which holds the earliest and primary place in the modern systems of education, have allowed it to expel the true spiritual and sacred sense of the word, and in place of it, to introduce a merely physical, and, too often, barren and profitless external act.

In opposition to this, the opinion of the Greek church is often alleged as decisive in favor of the meaning immerse. Being by *name* the Greek church, it is inferred that they must, of course, be good judges of the import of a Greek word. In reply to this, I would ask: Is modern Italian ancient Latin? If not, neither is modern Greek ancient Greek. That modern Greek resembles its parent stock, more than modern Italian does the Latin, I do not deny. But the resemblance is not such that the opinion of a modern Greek scholar, on a point like this, is worth any more than that of a modern German, Italian or English scholar. No man can form an opinion on this subject except by a study of the facts found in the ancient writers who exhibit the usage in question; and his opinion is worth most who most carefully investigates, compares, classifies and judges in view of the whole case. And if this be so, the opinions of the modern Greek church, unsustained by argument, ought to have no peculiar weight. Their proficiency in philological studies certainly does not exceed that of other European scholars, to say nothing of those of America.

The passage in 2 Kings 5: 14, is often alleged as decisive proof that βαπτίζω means immerse. The facts are these. The prophet commanded Naaman to wash seven times in Jordan, using רָחַץ. In obeying the command it is said וַיִּטְבַּל, Sept. *ēbaptízato* seven times. It is said to be universally conceded that טָבַל means immerse only. I reply, it is not so conceded. Even Mr. Carson allows that it has passed to the sense to *dye*, without respect to mode. Why then could it not pass to the sense to *wash*, without respect to mode? Scholars of the first emi-

nence believe and affirm that it did. Of these it is enough to mention Suicer. He affirms that the word is here the equivalent both of $\gamma\eta\gamma$ and $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega$, in the sense to wash. Nor can it be disproved, for it is in perfect analogy with other known facts in language. Even if the sense immerse is here admitted, it only proves the coexistence of the secular sense immerse with the religious sense purify, and that in this case there was a desire to fix the mind on the mode of washing. Take a parallel case. Mr. Carson admits the coexistence in $\beta\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega$ of the sense to dye and to dip. Suppose now an order to dye a cloth is given, and in narrating its execution, it is said, a man dipped it seven times in a dye-tub, and in each case $\beta\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega$ is used. Does the fact that it means dip in the last case prove that it does not mean dye in the first? Cannot two different meanings of a word coexist even in the same sentence? Can it not be said, I drank out of this *spring* last *spring*? How then could the use of the word $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega$ to denote an act *here*, prove that it does not mean purify *elsewhere*? On neither ground, then, has the passage any force. For first, it cannot be proved that the word here means to dip; and secondly, if it could, it would be nothing to the purpose.

§ 28.

It only remains that I adduce, as I proposed, a large amount of coincident facts, sustaining and giving verisimilitude to the whole.

1. The early and decidedly predominant idea of the rite was, that it was the appointed, and almost the only means of obtaining the remission of sins. How natural, now, that its name should indicate this idea. It does, if $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ is taken in the sacrificial sense $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$, but not if taken in the sense immersion. A proof that $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ is taken in the sacrificial sense is found in its equivalents in Latin and Greek; *remissio peccatorum*, $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\omega\tilde{\nu}$, $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\omega\tilde{\nu} \kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\alpha\rho\iota\varsigma$, $\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma \pi\lambda\eta\mu\epsilon\lambda\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\tilde{\nu}$. These and similar phrases are used as the names of the rite, and are obviously mere equivalents of $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$. Instances of this usage abound in Tertullian and Augustine; they occur also in Gregory Nyss. and other Greek Fathers.

2. The words with which $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega$ is interchanged, in giving variety to the style, and preventing the too frequent repetition of the same word, show that it is used by the Fathers in the sense of purify. In such interchanges, we always expect the

fundamental idea of the leading term to be retained ; or some one into which it easily passes, and with which it has a natural affinity. The class of words that has an affinity to the idea καθαρίζω, is very large. In Greek they are λούω, ἀγιάζω, ἀγνίζω, ἀναγεννάω, etc. ; in Latin, purgo, mundo, emundo, lavo, abluo, diluo, eluo, perfundo ; together with the nouns and participles derived from them, as λουτρὸν, ἀγνισμὸς, etc., purgatio, lavatio, lavacrum, emundatus, ablutus, etc. The class of words that has an affinity to the idea immersion is small, as it is a mere external act. Now let three facts be noted. 1. The range of equivalents, or substitutes for βαπτίζω, is in fact large. 2. They are all of the class having affinity to καθαρίζω ; and there is a great readiness to pass into any mode of speech equivalent or analogous to it, or derivable from it. 3. There is no readiness to use equivalents of immersion, except in cases in which, for some particular reason, it is intended to give prominence to the form of purifying. Let any one read Augustine's controversies with the Donatists, and his various works on baptism, the works of Origen as translated, and any of the Greek Fathers who have written much on the subject, and he will easily find the same thing. It is impossible by a few quotations to give an idea of the impression produced by noticing such facts in passages of considerable extent.

3. When it is desired to speak definitely of immersion as an act, βαπτισμὸς is not generally used, but κατάδυσις ; and for immersion, ἀνάδυσις. See Suicer on these words. Why is this, if βαπτισμὸς never means any thing but immersion ?

4. On the other hand, in the Apostolic Constitutions, Can. L., the expression τρία βαπτίσματα μίας μνήσεως occurs, in which τρία βαπτίσματα denotes three acts of immersion, but not the name of the rite ; for in trine immersion, three immersions are necessary to one purification. And if the expression were understood to mean three purifications, the idea would be false ; for three immersions make but one purification. Lest any misunderstanding should arise, a note was deemed necessary by Zonaras, informing the reader that βαπτίσματα here means καταδύσεις, and μύησις denotes the rite as a whole, i. e. is used for βάπτισμα. He therefore says, τρία βαπτίσματα, ἐνταῦθα τὰς τρεῖς καταδύσεις φησὶν. As much as to say βάπτισμα is not here used in its common import, but denotes the *act of immersion*, so that the passage means, not three purifications, as you might suppose, but three immersions and one purification. Why

this care to explain and to state that βαπτίσματα in this case—ἐνταῦθα—means immersions, if it never has any other meaning? But if its common meaning is purification, all is plain. We see too the use of the word κατάδυσις. It was univocal: βαπτισμός was equivocal, and in its common religious sense denoted purification.

From this case in the Apostolic Constitutions, and from the closing remarks on βαπτίζω in 2 Kings 5: 14, the following general principles may be derived, which will be of great use in a critical investigation of the meanings of this word in the Fathers.

1. In speaking of baptism, the two senses, immerse and purify, are sometimes both used.
2. They are applied to the rite in different ways, and for different ends. Taken in the sense of purify, βαπτίζω denotes the real import of the rite and the thing enjoined, and is used in the sacrificial and religious sense; but when it denotes the act of immersion, it is not used to denote the real import of the rite, nor in the religious sense, but simply to denote a physical act, i. e. a mode in which purification may be performed. For example, suppose an ancient bishop to have ordered a priest to purify, i. e. baptize a man. The priest obeys and immerses him three times according to the principles of trine immersion; and in describing this trine immersion, uses the word βαπτίζω in the sense of immerse. Here both senses of the word are used in relation to the same rite. In the first instance it is used in the sacred sense of purify, in the second, in the secular sense to denote a *mode* of purifying.
3. Whenever βαπτίσματα is used with the numeral three, in describing a single baptism, of course it is used in the secular sense, as the name of an act; because in such a case, the *purification* is but one, whilst the *immersions* are three.
4. To prove the existence of the secular sense as indicating the mode of a religious washing, does not disprove the existence of the religious sense as the name of the rite itself. This shows the fallacy of all arguments based on 2 Kings 5: 14.
5. To guard against the ambiguity produced by applying the same word to the rite in two senses, κατάδυσις was used to denote immersion, leaving to βάπτισμα the religious sense of purification.

5. Although immersion was deemed of immense importance, yet its necessity was never defended on philological grounds; and leave was conceded to sprinkle in extraordinary cases, on such grounds as plainly show that they did not feel bound by the import of the word. Hear Cyprian: "Neque enim sic in

sacramento salutari delictorum contagia, ut in lavacro carnali et seculari sordes cutis et corporis, abluuntur, ut aphronitris et cœteris quoque adjumentis et solio et piscina opus sit quibus ablui et mundari corpusculum possit. Aliter pectus credentis abluuntur, aliter mens hominis per fidei meritum mundatur." Notice now that this whole passage, designed to prove that a man may be baptized by sprinkling, depends for its force entirely on assigning to the word the sense of purify. His argument in brief is this; the power of baptism to purify from sin, does not depend on the quantity of water used, but upon the internal faith of the person baptized. "In baptism," he says, "the pollution of sin is not washed away, as the pollution of the body and skin is washed away in an external, physical bath, so that there is need of saltpetre (or nitre, see Jer. 2: 22), and other auxiliary means, and a bath or a pool, in which the body can be washed and purified. Far otherwise is the breast of the believer washed; far otherwise is the mind of a man purified from sin by the merits of faith." From all this he inferred that a man might properly be baptized, if necessary, by sprinkling. But how could he do this if he knew that the command was not to purify but to immerse? On this ground all such reasoning would be vain. Any one could have replied: "The command is not *to purify*, but *to immerse*; and you cannot immerse without immersion; and sprinkling is no immersion at all." But such an idea does not seem to have entered Cyprian's mind. To him plainly the only command was a command to *purify*. The word baptize does not indeed occur; but evident synonymes of it are used, as *abluo* and *mundo*. I know not how we can obtain stronger testimony to the prevailing opinion of the age than this; and it is the stronger because indirect and undesigned.

6. In explaining the similitude between baptism and the salvation of Noah in the ark, also between baptism and the passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea—1 Pet. 3: 20, 21, and 1 Cor. 10: 1, 2—Noah and the Israelites are not looked on as immersed, but merely as *purified*, or *saved*; and that too by the same element which overwhelmed and destroyed the enemies of God. They even go so far as to speak of *the wicked as immersed*, by way of antithesis to the righteous, who are *not immersed*, but only *purified* and *saved*. This view is based on the expression in Peter, "saved by water," as applied to the eight souls who were saved by water in the ark. To be purified, with

them was equivalent *to being sanctified, or being saved*; and in looking at baptism, their minds were fixed on this idea. "Now," said they, "as in baptism water saves, so in the flood it saved, and so in the Red Sea it saved; not by overwhelming Noah or the Israelites, but by dividing them from the enemies of God, and by overwhelming and immersing those enemies. And its similarity to baptism lies only in the fact, that it *saves or purifies* the people of God. Augustine (Sermo de Cataclysmo, Vol. 9, p. 320, Paris, ed. 1586) speaks of the Israelites delivered out of Egypt, as hastening to the Red Sea, "*that they may be saved by water*;" the Egyptians follow, the sea opens, the Israelites pass through, the Egyptians enter, then, "Unum elementum aquarum, auctore totius, creatore jubente, judicavit utrosque; separavit enim pios ab impiis. *Illos abluit, istos obruit; illos mundavit, istos occidit.*" "One element, water, by the command of the Creator, judged both; for it separated the righteous from the wicked. The former it washed, the latter it overwhelmed; the former it purified, the latter it destroyed." He then speaks of Moses as a type of Christ, his rod as a type of the cross, and the *Red Sea* as a type of the waters of baptism, *purpled* by the blood of Christ. Now compare with this the anxious efforts of our Baptist brethren, to prove that in some way the *Israelites were immersed*. Augustine says, they were *washed and purified*, and the Egyptians overwhelmed (and of course *immersed*) and destroyed.

It is quite certain that no man, who believed and was anxious to prove that immersion was the sense and the only sense of βαπτισμός, would ever have used this language. In like manner, comparing the salvation of Noah and his family to the salvation effected by baptism, he often calls the flood a sacrament; and compares its effects to those of baptism. He compares the church to the ark; and one out of the church, and unbaptized, to one out of the ark; and his fate to the fate of one so excluded. Concerning the one who perishes out of the ark, he says: "*submersus est diluvio non ablutus.*" Hence he regarded those in the ark, who were saved, as *abluti*, i. e. *purified or saved*, and those out of it, as *submersi*, i. e. *submersed, or immersed and destroyed*. All this he says in commenting on 1 Pet. 3: 20, 21. See Lib. 1. Cap. 21, Vol. 6. p. 253. Here then he opposes the righteous who were *purified*, but *not immersed*, to the wicked who were *immersed*, but not purified;

and regards one as *saved by purification*, and the other as *destroyed by immersion*. Would any modern advocate of immersion have ever written so? For the true sense of 1 Pet. 3: 20, 21, see § 18.

7. Elias is spoken of by Origen as baptizing the wood in the sense of purifying it. In this case I was misled by not noticing that Origen regarded the act of pouring on water as designed to purify the wood. Obviously this was not its end, but to drench it with water, so that when God should burn it by fire the miracle might be more undeniable. Nor did it occur to me that Origen could take any other view of the case. But I find that he did. Dr. Wall and others have quoted this as a case in which βαπτίζω means *pour*. But, being convinced that when it denotes an external act it never means pour or sprinkle, I resorted to the idea to *envelope* or *overwhelm*, as in § 3. That opinion I am obliged now to retract, having found evidence that Origen looked on the transaction as a purification of the wood, however strange and incorrect such an idea may be. The passage is this. Origen is commenting on John 1: 25: "Why baptizest thou, if thou be not the Christ, nor Elias, nor the prophet?" He is aiming to show that they had no reason to suppose that Elias would baptize in person when he should come. The reason is this. Although the wood needed *purification*, yet he did not baptize, *purify*, it himself, but told others to do it. His words are: Οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ θυσιαστήριον ξύλα, κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ Ἀχαὰβ χρόνους, δεόμενα λουτροῦ ἵνα εκκαύθῃ ἐπιφανέντος, ἐν πυρὶ τοῦ κυρίου βαπτίσαντος; ἐπικελεύεται γὰρ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. "Who did not baptize—*purify*—the wood upon the altar in the days of Ahab, although it needed to be purified, in order that it might be burned when the Lord should be revealed in fire; for he commanded the priest to do this." In this case the words ξύλα δεόμενα λουτροῦ, beyond all dispute, fix the sense, and show that he regarded the pouring as a rite of *purification*, and used βαπτίζω in its usual religious sense. In this view the passage remarkably falls in with and confirms the reasoning in § 9; and proves that Origen understood them to inquire in John 1: 25: "Why *purifiest* thou?" This passage also is in perfect accordance with those already quoted from his writings.

8. It was a natural inquiry of old, as now: "Why was Christ baptized?" In answering this question, the Fathers do not say, as does Prof. Chase, he was immersed "as a fit and striking

emblematical declaration of his voluntarily yielding himself up to his sufferings, with the confidence of emerging ;” because, “to represent one as overwhelmed in the water was a well-known figure to indicate deep affliction.” See Chase’s Sermon on the Design of Baptism, p. 13. They do not try to answer the question : “Why was he *immersed* ?” but solely the question : “Why was he purified ?” And in those passages where βαπτίζω really means overwhelm, they retain, as we have seen, the sense of purify. Various answers were given. In general they all denied that he was purified because he had any sin ; and most commonly they added, that he was purified in order to give to the water of baptism a purifying power. See § 21, δύναμιν ἐνθίνειν καθαρτικὴν. Augustine says : “Aquæ quæ cætera mundare consueverant, Domino nostro lavante, mundatæ sunt.” He also says it was to give an example of humility, and to honor the rite so that others should not despise it. Their difficulties were caused by the idea *purify*, as applied to Christ ; to this their answers correspond ; and they do not correspond with the views of those who believe that the word means *immerse*. Can we doubt, then, what was the general understanding of the word ? Had they regarded the word as our Baptist brethren do, would they not have given their solution of the question ?

9. In speaking of the baptism of the Holy Spirit, they do not speak of it as an inward *spiritual immersion*, but as an inward spiritual purification. Gregory Nyss. calls baptism διττὴ κάθαρσις. As we have a body and a soul, so we need a twofold cleansing, δι’ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος τὰ βάθη καθαίροντος. To denote the internal baptism here, he uses καθαίρω, and calls the external and internal together διττὴ κάθαρσις, a twofold cleansing. Augustine says : Baptizatur a Joanne in carne ; sed ipse Joannem in Spiritu lavat. “He is purified by John in the flesh, but he washes, or purifies John in the Spirit.” So he says : “Quod enim dicimus ipse baptizat, non dicimus ipse tenet et in aqua corpus credentis tingit ; sed ipse invisibiliter *mundat* et hoc universam prorsus ecclesiam.” “When we say that Christ baptizes, we do not say that he holds and washes in water the body of the believer, but that he invisibly purifies him, and not only him, but the whole church. Lib. iii. c. 49. In the Fathers, such passages are of constant occurrence ; but in none of them is found the strange, incongruous and modern idea of an internal and spiritual immersion into the Holy Spirit and fire. Comp. § 10.

Origen contrasts those who are *loti aqua*, with those who are *sancto spiritu loti*.

10. In speaking of the *διαφόροι βαπτισμοί*, Heb. 9: 10, they invariably regard them as *purifications of persons*, not as immersions of things. See § 14. In an enumeration of the various kinds of baptism, often ascribed to Athanasius—an unexceptionable witness as to the *usus loquendi* of that century—it is said, as an explanation of the *διαφόροι βαπτισμοί*, *πᾶς γὰρ ἀκάθαρτος ἐλούετο ὕδατι*. Theophylact says, more particularly, that a man was washed in water, and thus purified, *κἂν νεκροῦ ἤψατο, κἂν λεπροῦ, κἂν γονορροῆς ἐγένετο τις*. With this comp. *βαπτίζομενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ*, § 16. Macarius says: *ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς βάπτισμα σάρκα ἀγιάζον, παρ' ἡμῖν βάπτισμα ἁγίου πνεύματος καὶ πυρός*. In this he manifestly refers to Heb. 9: 13: “the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh;” for his use of *ἀγιάζω* and *σὰρξ* is clearly taken from Paul. Of course, he regards this sprinkling as a *βάπτισμα*. Tertullian says: *Judæus quotidie lavat, quia quotidie inquinatur: quod ne in nobis factitaretur, propterea de uno lavacro definitum est*.

11. In § 16, following Jahn and others, I have admitted that washing, as well as sprinkling, was a part of the rite of purification from a dead body. But I find that not only Philo speaks of sprinkling alone, but Josephus, in a minute account of the same rite, does the same. *Antiq. B. iv., C. 4*. He accurately describes the heifer, how slain, how burnt, and how her ashes were used. No superfluous rites are added (as Mr. Carson suggests might have been done before this time), but Moses is followed with minute anxiety. He not only omits washing, but so describes the purification of the people as to imply that washing was no part of the rite—*ἐξοράϊνον τρίτῃ καὶ ἐβδόμῃ τῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ καθαροὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦσαν*. “They sprinkled them with it on the third and on the seventh day, and after that they were clean.” Now, if it was necessary to wash also, then it is not true, that after *sprinkling only*, they were clean—*τὸ λοιπὸν*—for washing still remained. But he says, *καθαροὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦσαν*. Josephus was a Pharisee, a priest, and a man of learning. Have we not, then, the best reason to suppose that he is correct, and that washing was no part of the rite? Paul also, Heb. 9: 13, says nothing of a washing, and speaks of sprinkling as the whole. If we reflect now that both Philo and Josephus, in professed and minute descriptions of the rite, say

nothing of washing, can we hesitate to believe that no washing was involved? And if so, βαπτίζόμενος must refer to the sprinkling alone; and no sense but purified is possible. If any one should ask: Who then is commanded to wash himself in Num. 19: 19? I reply, he who sprinkles the unclean person; not the unclean person himself; he needs sprinkling alone. See Num. 19: 13, where it is clearly implied that sprinkling alone was demanded. See also Num. 19: 21, where it is said that he who toucheth the water of separation shall be unclean; and he that sprinkleth shall wash his clothes, and of course his body; for one involved the other, as the Jews testify and reason shows. Observe also that this is in perfect analogy with all other parts of the transaction; for the priest who sprinkled the blood of the slain heifer, the man who burned her, and he who gathered her ashes, were all rendered unclean, and were obliged to wash both body and clothes. Num. 19: 2—10. A fortiori, would he be rendered unclean, who actually sprinkled the polluted person with the water? And were this conclusion less certain than it is, reasoning on Num. 19: 2—10 alone, yet this passage, taken in connection with the usage of Philo, Josephus and Paul, makes the case perfectly plain. And if no washing was involved, but sprinkling alone, then the argument on βαπτίζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ is decisive and complete; for a man can be *purified* by sprinkling, but not *immersed*. Here, as in the case of purifying the wood in Origen, the more minute the examination of all the facts, the more certain the conclusion that βαπτίζω, in its religious use, means to purify.

12. In speaking of the baptism of fire, the Fathers regard it, not as an immersion, but as a *purification* or *purgation*; and from this use the idea of a future purgatory came. A few regarded the fire spoken of in the words, "he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire," as referring to punishment, as some do even now. But most of them regarded it as the purifying fire of the Holy Spirit. Others believed in a literal fire of purification after death, particularly Origen. In Hom. 24, on Luke 3: 16, he speaks of Jesus as purifying in a river of fire, each one who, after death and before entering heaven, needs to be purged, "qui purgatione indiget." Hom. 2, on Jer., he says: "Forsitan et Jesus baptizat spiritu sancto et igne, non quia eundem in spiritu sancto atque igne baptizet: sed quo sanctus baptizetur spiritu sancto, et is qui post fidem et magisterium Dei rursum ad scelera conversus est, cruciatu *purgetur* incen-

dii. Beatus qui *lavacrum* accepit spiritus sancti, et ignis *lavacro* non indiget. Miserabilis autem, et omni fletu dignus, qui, post *lavacrum* spiritus, *baptizandus* est igni." A little after he speaks of "peccator qui ignis indiget *baptismo*, qui combustionē *purgatur*." In his Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. 8, he says: "Ut ignis gehennæ in cruciatibus *purget* quem nec apostolica doctrina, nec evangelicus sermo *purgavit*, secundum illud quod est scriptum, *purificabo* te igni ad *purificationem*." Here, baptizo, purgo, purifico, and lavo (involved in lavacro) are all used as synonymous terms in describing the baptism of fire. If Gieseler is correct (Vol. 1., § 119, note 14), this purgation of Origen is not to be confounded with the Roman Catholic purgatory, first suggested, as he says, by Augustine. Neither the opinion of Origen or of Augustine is correct; yet they show as clearly as if true, that by the baptism of fire, a *purgation* by fire, and not an *immersion*, was meant. Clearly they had in mind the words of Malachi: "he is like a refiner's fire," and, "he shall *purify* and *purge*." These words gave rise to the expression in the gospel: "He shall purify you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." Taking the word βαπτίζω in this sense, we can clearly see how the various and erroneous forms of the doctrine of *purgatory* grew out of it. Compare §§ 9, 10.

13. In speaking of the baptism of tears, the Fathers regard it as a *purification* by tears, and not as an *immersion* in tears. The very nature of the case shows that it must have been so, and the language of the Fathers proves that the purifying power of tears did not depend on having a quantity sufficient for an immersion. Says Nilus, a disciple of Chrysostom, Λουτῆρ ἀγαθὸς τῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς προσευχῆς τὸ δάκρυον. "The tear of prayer"—not a flood, or river, or ocean of tears—"the tear of prayer is a good wash-basin of the soul." For this use of Λουτῆρ, see § 16, and the idea there given of washing the hands of the soul. So Gregory Nyss. calls tears λουτρὸν κατοικίδιον καὶ κρόνους ἰδίους δι' ὧν ἐστὶ τὰς κηλίδας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπονίψασθαι, "a domestic washing place, and fountains of your own, by means of which you can wash off the spots, or pollution of your soul." Ἀπονίπτω, as no one can deny, never denotes immersion, but commonly the washing of hands and feet. From the nature of the case then, as well as from the language of the Fathers, we are certain that they regarded the baptism of tears, not as an immersion, but as a purification.

14. The Fathers applied passages of the Old Testament commanding washing, or predicting purification, to the rite of baptism in such a way, as evinces a belief that βαπτίζω means to purify. In Is. 1: 16, is a command to wash and make clean—Heb. רָחֲצוּ וְיִצְהַר, Sept. Λούσασθε, καθαροὶ γένησθε—Vulg. lavamini, mundi estote. Justin Martyr and Hippolytus regard this as an anticipation, or prophetic injunction of baptism. Hippolytus says: Propheta Isaias Baptismi vim *purgativam* prædixit, cum ait, lavamini, mundi estote.” Cyprian, Jerome and others apply to baptism the prediction: “I will *sprinkle* clean water upon you and ye shall be clean.” Now, if they regarded βαπτίζω as a synonyme of καθαρίζω all this is plain and natural; for in one of these cases *purification* is commanded, in the other it is predicted, but in neither is immersion mentioned. The only external act alluded to is sprinkling. I desire that here may be noted the use of רָחַץ, in Isa. 1: 16. By this word all the commands for personal ablution in the Mosaic ritual are given, and to it, I remarked, § 14, βαπτίζω would naturally become a synonyme. Here is proof that it did so become. And this word always denotes washing, without respect to mode, and never immersion.

15. From the time of the clinic baptism of Novatian down to the Reformation, there were cases of baptism by affusion or sprinkling, defended on grounds similar to those stated by Cyprian (No. 5), and totally inconsistent with the idea that they felt bound by the word βαπτίζω to regard nothing as a baptism that was not an immersion. All this is plain, and easily accounted for, if they regarded βαπτισμὸς merely as a purification, to be performed in common cases by immersion, and in extraordinary cases by affusion or sprinkling. It shows that their attachment to the mode did not depend on βαπτίζω, but on a regard to general practice and its supposed significance. Constantine the Great was baptized by sprinkling on his bed. In 499, Clodovius, king of the Franks, was baptized by affusion. Gennadius, of Marseilles, A. D. 490, says, that the baptized person is either sprinkled or immersed—vel aspargitur, vel intingitur. For other clear and striking cases, see Pond, pp. 42—50; where he clearly proves that immersion was never considered as essential to baptism till after the Reformation. The bearing of all these facts on the meaning of the word is irresistible. Had it been regarded as demanding immersion when there was such a universal attachment to that mode, a

deviation would have been resisted on philological grounds ; but, though frequent and extensive deviations took place, they were never so resisted. The conclusion is inevitable—they could not be so resisted ; it was universally known that βαπτίζω, as a religious term, meant to purify, not to immerse.

16. To conclude, the idea of purification is, in the nature of things, better adapted to be the name of the rite than immersion. It has a fitness and verisimilitude in all its extensive variety of usage, which cause the mind to feel the self-evidencing power of truth, as producing harmony and agreement in the most minute, as well as in the most important relations of the various parts of this subject to each other. This is owing to three facts : 1. The idea of purification is the fundamental idea in the whole subject. 2. It is an idea complete and definite in itself in every sense, and needs no adjunct to make it more so. 3. It is the soul and centre of a whole circle of delightful ideas and words. It throws out before the mind a flood of rich and glorious thoughts, and is adapted to operate on the feelings like a perfect charm. To a sinner, desiring salvation, what two ideas so delightful as forgiveness and purity ? Both are condensed into this one word. It involves in itself a deliverance from the guilt of sin, and from its pollution. It is a purification from sin in every sense. See § 12. It is purification by the atonement, and purification by the truth,—by water and by blood. And around these ideas cluster others likewise, of holiness, salvation, eternal joy, eternal life. No word can produce such delight on the heart, and send such a flood of light into all the relations of divine truth ; for purification, in the broad Scripture sense, is the joy and salvation of man, and the crowning glory of God. Of immersion none of these things are true. 1. Immersion is not a fundamental idea in any subject or system. 2. By itself it does not convey any one fixed idea, but depends upon its adjuncts, and varies with them. Immersion ? In what ? Clean water, or filthy ; in a dying-fluid, or in wine ? Until these questions are answered, the word is of no use. And with the spiritual sense the case is still worse ; for common usage limits it in English, Latin, Greek, and, so far as I know, in all languages, by adjuncts of a kind denoting calamity or degradation, and never purity. It has intimate and firmly established associations with such words as luxury, ease, indolence, sloth, cares, anxieties, troubles, distresses, sins, pollution. We familiarly speak of immersion in

all these, but with their opposites it refuses alliance. We never speak of a person as immersed in temperance, fortitude, industry, diligence, tranquillity, prosperity, holiness, purity, etc. Sinking and downward motion are naturally allied with ideas which, in a moral sense, are depressed, and not with such as are morally elevated. Very few exceptions to this general law exist, and these do not destroy its power. Now, for what reason should the God of order, purity, harmony and taste, select an idea so alien from his own beloved rite, for its name, and reject one, in every respect so desirable and so fit? Who does not feel that the name of so delightful an idea as purification must be the name of the rite? And who does not rejoice that there is proof so unanswerable, that it is?

The philological argument is now closed. Whatever may be the interpretation of Romans 6: 3, 4, and Col. 2: 12, the question of philology must remain untouched. All that they can prove, at most, is the fact that those to whom Paul wrote were immersed, and that he deemed immersion a significant act. Neither of these do they prove in my opinion; for which I propose soon to give my reasons. But if they did, it is impossible, as we have shown, to settle the question of philology by early practice. Even if they did immerse, it was only a mode of purification; and it was baptism, not because it was immersion, but because it was purification.

[*To be continued.*]

ARTICLE III.

THE ANCIENT COMMERCE OF WESTERN ASIA.

By Rev. Albert Barnes, Philadelphia, Pa.

[*Concluded from Vol. IV. page 328.*]

THE natural sea-port of Western Asia, and the centre of the commerce of the East, was Tyre, or rather perhaps the ports of Phenicia, for Tyre was but one of them. Phenicia early grasped this commerce, and retained it until the rise of Alexandria. Sidon first rose to opulence; and then Tyre, her "daughter," better situated for commerce, soon eclipsed her glory, and became the mart of the world. I must not detail its history, or speak

of its splendor. Volney says: "It was the theatre of an immense commerce and navigation, the nursery of art and science, and the city of perhaps the most industrious and active people ever known." *Travels*, II. 210. I need scarcely speak of the voyages and discoveries of the Phenicians. They had no needle to guide them on the deep; but they were compelled to creep along the shore, or if they ventured abroad, they did it at their peril. Yet the influence of Phenicia was felt afar on the literature and prosperity of nations. From her Cadmus carried letters to Greece; and far in the west, colonies were founded that spake her language and that imitated her commercial enterprise. Carthage was a colony of hers; Carthage, that resisted the legions that conquered the world—that sent her Hannibal across the Alps to thunder at the gates of the eternal city; Carthage, that built fleets almost as fast as winds, and storms, and Roman power could destroy them. The Phenician fleets paused not here. They passed through the straits of Hercules, now Gibraltar,—and attempted to sail round the continent of Africa. Far down its coast they stretched their way, without chart or compass, until increasing difficulties and dangers compelled them to return. Not so, however, if we may credit the unbroken voice of antiquity, was it with another effort of the Phenicians to encompass Africa on the east. Herodotus (IV. 42, 43) says of Necho II. king of Egypt, that he fitted out a fleet of triremes in the Red Sea, and having engaged some expert Phenician pilots and navigators, he sent them on a voyage of discovery along the coast of Africa. "They were ordered to start from the Arabian Gulf, and come round through the pillars of Hercules into the North Sea—the Mediterranean—and so return to Egypt. Sailing, therefore, down the Gulf they passed into the Southern Ocean; and when autumn arrived they laid up their ships and sowed the land. Here they remained till harvest time: and having reaped the corn they continued the voyage. In this manner they occupied two years; and the third having brought them by the pillars of Hercules to Egypt, they related, what to me appears incredible, however others may be disposed to believe it, that they had the sun on their right hand, and by these means was the form of Africa first known." The fact mentioned by Herodotus, and which appeared so remarkable to him, "that they had the sun on their right hand," is one of those circumstances, explained by time, which go to demonstrate the authenticity of a narrative—circumstances with which both sacred and profane history abound. *We know that if*

they passed the Cape of Good Hope the sun when rising must have been on their right hand. This same voyage, if we may credit ancient history, was performed by other descendants of the Phenicians. Pliny states (Lib. II. 67, v. 1), that "Hanna, a Carthaginian, circumnavigated the continent of Africa, from Gades to the extremity of the Arabian Gulf, and wrote all the details of the voyage, which was undertaken at the period when Carthage was most flourishing, and that he founded several towns on the coast."* If this be so, then it follows that the Cape of Good Hope was passed more than 2000 years before it was discovered by Bartholomew Diaz, in 1487. These were voyages of curiosity; and they made no perceptible change in the commerce of the world. Still they show the adventurous character of the Phenician mariners. It excites our wonder that without compass or chart such a voyage should have been made. I may add here, as an interesting fact, that Cadiz in Spain was one of the colonies of Tyre; and from this country an expedition went out which discovered the new world.

The great importance of Tyre as a place of trade, and the prominence which the mention of its commerce has in the Scriptures, as well as the remarkable facts which have occurred to annihilate that commerce for ever, and to fulfil the prophecies respecting it, require a somewhat more extended notice than we have given to other places.

Of all ancient cities, Tyre was probably the most favorably situated for navigation. No situation could be more favorable for forming a navy,—situated as it was in the vicinity of Lebanon, and having the forests of Senir and Bashan also accessible. Bashan was celebrated for its oaks (Isa. 2: 13, Zech. 10: 1, 2, Ezek. 27: 6), and Lebanon could furnish a great quantity of timber, not only to be exported as an article of commerce, but to be used in the construction of ships. Ancient vessels were often constructed of fir; cedar supplied masts; while oak was used for those long and powerful oars, which were the chief instruments of navigation. "They have made all thy shipboards of fir-trees of Senir; they have taken cedars from Lebanon to make masts for thee; of oaks of Bashan have they made

* A brief but satisfactory account of the ancient voyages around Africa, and to different parts of it, may be seen in the *Ency. Geog.* Vol. I. p. 18—30.

thine oars." Ezek. 27: 5, 6. Tyre was adjacent also to fruitful countries. It was the natural *outlet* of Judea, the only port on its coast of much importance. But its chief distinction arose from the fact, that it was the port to which naturally tended the rich productions of India; and when this commerce was diverted or ceased, it lost its importance and sunk into decay. For a long time it was the place through which that traffic passed on its way to Europe; and the rich commodities that were brought by the way of Babylon, Palmyra and Damascus here found their centre.

Tyre, at one time, possessed the best harbor on the coast of the Mediterranean; and it was this fact which gave it so much importance. The change which it has since undergone in this respect, as I shall show in another part of this article, is one of the most remarkable circumstances in history, and demonstrates that the prophecies *must* continue to be fulfilled. Tyre was at first built on the coast or main land, and is commonly known by the name of *Palæ-Tyrus* (*Παλαίτυρος*), or ancient Tyre, to distinguish it from insular Tyre, subsequently built on the island. There is abundant evidence that the former was first built; though it is probable that the island was early occupied as a place of anchorage. Insular Tyre was built on an island or *rock* that was about three quarters of a mile from the coast. The passage from the coast to the island was probably in boats only, until the time of Alexander; who, in order to reduce the city, by a mole two hundred feet in width joined it to the main land. This was built mainly of the rubbish and stones of the old city, and became a permanent embankment or breakwater; and thus, it is probable, added much to the natural advantages of the harbor. Alexander was occupied eight months in reducing the insular city; and it became a subject of contention among his followers after his death. That the harbor of Tyre had uncommon advantages, is not only demonstrated by the unbroken current of testimony, but by the fact, that it so long maintained the dominion of the sea, and eclipsed every rival.

We have in the Scriptures a more full account of the traffic of Tyre than of any other ancient city; and it will throw light on our subject to consider more minutely the articles of its commerce.

The foundation of the prosperity of Tyre was laid, in part, in its vicinity to valuable materials for ship-building. "They have made all thy ship-boards of fir-trees of Senir." Ezek. 27: 5.

Senir (שֵׁנִיר) is usually supposed to be the same as *Sirion*—שִׁירִיֹן, the Phenician name for Hermon. Cant. 4: 8. 1 Chron. 5: 23. According to Abulfeda, it denotes a ridge of mountains near Damascus. In regard to the word *fir* (בְּרוֹשׁ), it is not easy to determine precisely the sense in which it is used in the Scriptures. It is probably, however, the same as *cypress*; and constituted, along with the cedar, the glory of Lebanon. It was employed for the floors and ceilings of the temple (1 Kings 5: 22, 24), and also for the sheathings and decks of ships. It was used for spears (Nah. 2: 4), and for musical instruments (2 Sam. 6: 5). Probably the word בְּרוֹשׁ was not confined to one species of timber, but was a general name denoting several kindred trees, as is the word *fir* or *pine* among us. The cedars of Lebanon were used for masts. Ezek. 27: 5. The LXX have understood the *cypress* as the tree intended. The word אֲרֵז commonly denotes the cedar of Lebanon. From the account in the Scripture it would seem that this tree was uncommonly tall (Isa. 2: 13, 37: 24), and wide-spreading (Ezek. 31: 3). The cedar of Lebanon was very large, but at some period of its growth it was undoubtedly well fitted for masts. The oak of Bashan was also used for oars. Ezek. 27: 5. Much of the ancient navigation was conducted by oars. Ignorant, to a great extent, of the art of navigation, not knowing how to take advantage of the winds, and often drifting along where they had no charts, and no knowledge of the dangers which they would encounter, they were frequently obliged to make use of oars.

Two things that with us would seem to be articles of luxury and needless splendor, are mentioned in the navigation of the Tyrians. The first is, that they made use of "fine linen with broidered work from Egypt" for their sails. Ezek. 27: 7. That finely-wrought linen was employed for this purpose occasionally, may not seem improbable, when the magnificent appearance of the barge of Cleopatra is recollected. It must have been, however, rather for show than for use. The other item in the decoration of their ships (Ezek. 27: 6) is, that "the company of the Ashurites have made thy benches of ivory, brought out of the isles of Chittim." There has been much difficulty in understanding who are meant here by the Ashurites, or what is the exact meaning of the phrase. The word rendered "company" (בֵּית) usually means a *daughter*, and why it has been translated "company," it is difficult to see. The word rendered "Ashurites" (אַשּׁוּרִים) is from אָשַׁח, *a step, going*;

and is probably here synonymous with *תַּאֲשִׁיר*, meaning *sherbin*—a species of cedar that grew on Mount Lebanon. Using the word *בַּר* in its common signification, the passage may mean, according to Gesenius, “thy benches they made of ivory (*טֶן*), the daughter of Sherbin cedars;” that is, they *inlaid* the cedar of the benches with ivory; they ornamented the seats of the rowers with ivory—a fact which is by no means improbable, though it seems incredible that they should make the benches wholly of ivory. Jarchi proposes to arrive at the same interpretation by reading *בַּר-תַּאֲשִׁירִים* as one word; and then it would mean, ‘with cedars;’ that is, “they made thy benches ivory with cedars brought from the land of Chittim.” Chittim is a name of large extent, like the word *Levant*, and is applied to the cities and coasts of the Mediterranean, without denoting any particular part. Josephus makes it Cyprus; the first of Maccabees applies it to Macedonia; the Vulgate to Italy; Bochart makes it the same with the islands around it; Jerome ascribes it to the islands of the Ionian and Ægean Seas. Any of these places may be understood as included in the word “Chittim;” and as Tyre traded with them all, there can be no difficulty in understanding that either the ivory or the box that was used, was brought from them. *Pict. Bib. on Ezek. 27: 6.*

The articles of commerce mentioned by Ezekiel, in which Tyre traded, together with the countries with which its traffic was conducted, are the following:

1. Blue and purple from the isles of Elishah.” *Ezek. 27: 7.* *Elisha* *אֵלִישָׁה* was one of the sons of Javan (*Gen. 10: 4*), and settled a part of Greece. The word here denotes a region situated on the Mediterranean, most probably *Elis*, or *Hellas*—a part of the Peloponnesus. In the Samaritan it is written *אֵלִישׁ*. It seems remarkable that the Tyrians, who were so celebrated for their own purple, should have imported the article from Elisha. But the purple of Laconia was the finest dye next to the Tyrian; and the purple cloth of that province was possibly employed because it was cheaper than that of Tyre, which was reserved for the use of kings.” *Vincent.* That this purple of Laconia was an article of luxury, is apparent from Horace:

Nec Laconicas mihi
Trahunt honestæ purpuras clientæ.
ODES, II. 18: 7.

The blue and purple referred to in Ezekiel seem to have

been used for awnings and coverings. It will be remembered that the famous galley in which Cleopatra went to meet Anthony, had an awning made with cloth of gold. According to the description of Ezekiel, the appearance of the Tyrian vessels, whether in the harbor or at sea, must have been exceedingly magnificent.

2. The inhabitants of Zidon and Arvad traded with Tyre. Ezek. 27: 8. "The inhabitants of Zidon and Arvad were thy mariners." This passage proves, that while the Tyrians were devoted to commerce, the Sidonians furnished them with mariners. Arvad or Aradus was the name of a Phenician city upon an island of the same name, not far from the coast, founded, according to Strabo (XVI. 2, §§ 13, 14), by Sidonian deserters. Its name now is *Ruad*, and the island is about two hundred paces from the continent. Compare Gen. 10: 17. Among the places which are mentioned as trading with Tyre, besides the above, were Gebal, Persia, Lud, Tarshish, Javan, Tubal and Meshech, Togarmah, Dedan, Syria, Judah, Damascus, Dan, Arabia, Sheba and Raamah, Haran, Canneh, Eden, Asshur and Chilmad. Ezek. 27: 9—25. The whole object of the enumeration of these places is, to show the countries to which Tyre traded, that is, to nearly all the known parts of the world. Most of these places are well known; and little would be contributed to the design of this article, were we to designate the others. A remark or two is all that is necessary. Tarshish here is probably the same as Tartessus, in Spain; but I shall advert to it again when I speak of the commerce of the Jews. Javan is used to denote Greece in general, perhaps Ionia in particular. Tubal and Meshech probably denote countries situated near the Black and Caspian Seas. Dedan is supposed to have been on the southern coast of Arabia; or, as Michaelis thinks, it may have been an island, or commercial town in the Persian Gulf, established by the Tyrians to secure the trade of the Indies.

3. In regard to the articles of commerce in which the Tyrians were engaged, much light may be derived from the chapter in Ezekiel above referred to. Silver, iron, tin and lead were brought from Tarshish.—From Javan, Tubal and Meshech, they obtained "the persons of men—i. e. slaves—and vessels of brass." Tubal and Meshech are supposed to be Caucasian regions, and slaves from thence have always been in the highest repute in the countries which now constitute the Turkish

empire. The inhabitants have always been distinguished for personal comeliness. The rich Turks and Persians have always filled their harems with female slaves from Georgia and Circassia. The passage before us proves, that when Tyre was at the height of its splendor, this kind of traffic was common.—Horses and horsemen from Togarmah are mentioned. Formerly, the country of Armenia—supposed to be the same as Togarmah—was celebrated for producing horses for the kings of Persia; and in later times the people have paid their tribute in horses.—Ivory and ebony are mentioned as obtained from Dedan. If Dedan here means a part of the country adjacent to the Persian Gulf, then these articles were probably obtained from India. That ebony is intended by the word *הֶבְרִים*, seems to be indubitable. The Hebrew word has passed into the *ἔβενος* of the Greeks, the *ebenum* of the Latins, and our *ebony*. It occurs only in the plural, probably, according to Gesenius, because the wood was obtained only in planks, or split into pieces for exportation. Ebony is the heart-wood of a tree called, in botanical language, *diospyros ebenum*, or the ebony tree—a native of India. Its great hardness made it an article of value.—“Emeralds, purple, brodered work, fine linen, coral and agate” are mentioned as obtained from Syria. Probably they were brought by land from the Gulf of Persia, through Syria. It is not known that they are productions of this country; but they are procured in abundance in India. The word rendered “coral,” *בִּדְבֵר*, more probably means a *ruby*. It is enumerated among precious stones, and was undoubtedly one of them.—“Wheat, honey, oil and balm” are enumerated as articles obtained from Judah. These are well-known productions of ancient Palestine; and Tyre derived no small part of its importance from its vicinity to this rich agricultural region.—“Wine of Helbon and white wool” are mentioned as obtained from Damascus. Wool was procured in the fleece, and dyed and manufactured at Tyre. The wine of Helbon—*יַיִן הַלְבוֹן*—was celebrated in ancient times. Helbon was a Syrian city—the *Χαλυβών* of the Greeks. The table of the Persian kings was supplied with this wine, and they drank no other. Strabo XV., p. 1068. The city was famous in Arabian history in the middle ages, under the name of *Haleb*. It is now Aleppo. See Bochart's *Hieroz.*, 1: 543.—“Bright iron, cassia and calamus” are mentioned as obtained from Dan and Javan. Cassia and calamus are supposed by Dr. Vincent to have been

undoubted productions of India ; and this passage is regarded by him as an important historical proof that the intercourse with India was carried on through Arabia. Cassia—קָסְיָה—was a species of aromatic bark resembling cinnamon, but less fragrant and less valuable. Like cinnamon, it was obtained from India. Calamus—קָלָמִס—was a sweet cane, or an aromatic reed, growing in marshes—the *κάρνα*, *κάρνη*, or *κάρη* of the Greeks. It was used as an article of perfume, and the Hebrews employed it in public worship. According to Pliny (12: 22), it grew in Arabia, Syria and India ; according to Theophrastus (Hist. Plant. 9, 7), it grew in the vales of Lebanon.—“Precious clothes for chariots” are mentioned as procured from Dedan. Dedan here referred to was probably in Arabia. But this verse is very obscure. The word rendered “chariots” may mean “riding ;” and the “clothes,” or garments, may have been for horsemen, for chariots or for charioteers. Whether they were manufactured in Dedan or not, it is impossible now to determine.—“Lambs, rams and goats” are mentioned as procured from Arabia.—“Spices, precious stones and gold” are mentioned as procured from Sheba and Raamah ; and “blue clothes, and brodered work,” from Haran, Canneh, Eden, etc.

This enumeration shows that a large part of the commerce of Tyre was in articles of luxury ; though it was the grand mart for all the trade of the Eastern and Western world.

In the consideration of this subject, it is natural to inquire to what extent the Jews embarked in the commercial enterprises of ancient times. With a somewhat extended sea-coast, and such a location that some part of the traffic between India and Europe must of necessity pass through their territory, it was to be expected, perhaps, that they would seek to share in the immense profits which had made Tyre so splendid an emporium. Yet the idea of engaging in foreign commerce seems never to have occurred to them until the time of Solomon ; and the plan was never extensively prosecuted after his reign. They were essentially an agricultural people. Till the time of David, they were extensively occupied in wars, and had little leisure for more peaceful employments. They shrunk from all communication with foreign nations ; even from that temporary intercourse which was needful in commercial pursuits. They were a peculiar people—designed to have within themselves all that was necessary for their welfare, and intended to be kept distinct from all the nations of the earth. Indeed, the commercial

enterprises of Solomon were a decided departure from the spirit of the national institutions. They were a part of that system of luxury and splendor and extravagance in which, unhappily, he indulged; and which was so much the object of the divine displeasure.

The accounts of the Scriptures respecting the commerce of Solomon are brief; and perhaps no other part of the Bible has given rise to so many speculations. 1 Kings 9: 26—28; 2 Chron. 9: 21. The amount of the statement is, that the port of Ezion-geber was selected; that a traffic was carried on with Ophir and with Tarshish, consisting in gold, silver, ivory, apes and peacocks.

1. The port selected was Ezion-geber. This was a city of Arabia Deserta, on the Elanitic Gulf of the Red Sea. It was selected by Solomon with a view to his securing the India trade, and as a part of the enterprise for which he had built Tadmor. The idea seems to have occurred to him, that by passing to the sea, and thence departing by vessels, it would be easier to reach the East than by overland journeys through Babylon and Persia. According to this plan, it was necessary to pass through Petra; and probably Petra derived some of its importance from this enterprise. There is now at the head of the Red Sea, a castle or fortress, called the fortress of Akaba, which is the usual stopping-place for pilgrims on their way to Meccá; though it is entirely undistinguished as a place of commerce. "In the region of Akaba," says Riippell, who visited it in 1822, "there is not a single boat or water-craft of any kind; the Arabs in fishing use only rafts made of the trunks of palm trees tied together." It could never have been a very advantageous place for commerce, and seems early to have been abandoned. Its selection was only a part of that great experiment, pursued for ages, to devise the best means of securing the rich commerce of the East. The articles which were brought by vessels to Ezion-geber, or Akaba as it is now called, were conveyed by caravans through the long valley, now known as the El Ghor or the El Araba, and which is a continuance of the valley of the Jordan, and thence to Hebron and Jerusalem.*

2. A more important, and much more difficult question is: Where was the Ophir situated to which the vessels of Solomon

* See the Travels of Burckhardt, who was the first among the moderns to discover this valley.

traded? Few inquiries have been more perplexing, and more unsatisfactory than this.* The *places* where Ophir has been sought are the following.

(1.) Arabia, particularly the southwestern part, or the country now called Yemen. This was the opinion of Prideaux, and many others. To this opinion, the objection so often urged is, in my view, unanswerable. It is incredible that a *fleet* should be fitted out with so much care and expense to convey productions by water which could have been conveyed in a very few days, and with much less risk and expense by land. The whole account in the Scriptures, indicates that the ships were fitted for a *distant* voyage. Indeed it is expressly stated that the voyage lasted three years.

(2.) The more common opinion is, that the Ophir of the Scriptures was eastern Africa. This was the opinion of Bruce, and on his map it is located a little south of Abyssinia. This opinion has also been defended by *Huet*. In support of this, he adduces seven arguments, which are drawn from the name Ophir (from which he supposes Africa to be derived); from the fact that eastern Africa was a region which produced gold in abundance, and indeed all the articles enumerated in the account of the commerce of Solomon; from the fact that various inscriptions are found in Sofala on the eastern coast of Africa, which he supposes to have recorded the voyages made by the ships of Solomon; from the facility of the navigation to that place, etc. This opinion was first broached, it is believed, by the friar John don Sanctos, who resided in Sofala. It is but justice to let the friar speak for himself. "Near to Massapa is a great hill, called *Fura*—supposed to have derived its name from Ophir—whence may be discerned a great part of the kingdom of Monomotapa; for which cause he (the king) will not suffer the Portugals to go thither, that they should not covet his great country and hidden mines. On the top of that hill are yet standing pieces of old walls and ancient ruins of lime and stone, which testify that there have been strong buildings; a thing

* Those who may be disposed to read what has been written on the subject, may consult the following dissertations in Ugolin: *Thesau. Ant. Sac.* vii. pp. 276—419; Dan. Huetti *Commentarium de navigatione Salomonis*, Martini Lipenii *Dissertatio de navigatione Salomonis*, and Johannis Christophori Wichmanshausen *dissertatio de navigatione Ophiritica*.

not seen in all Caffraria ; for even the king's houses are of wood, daubed with clay, and covered with straw. The natives, and especially the Moors, have a tradition from their ancestors, that those houses belonged to the queen of Saba, who carried much gold thence down to the Cuama to the sea, and so along the coast of Ethiopia to the Red Sea. Others say that these ruins were Solomon's factory, and that this Fura, or Afura, is no other than Ophir, the name not being much altered in so long a time. This is certain, that round about that hill, there is much fine gold. The navigation might in those times have been longer, for want of so good ships or pilots as now are to be had, and by reason of much time spent in trucking with the Cafares, as even in this time the merchants often spend a year or more in that business, although the Cafares be grown more covetous of our wares, and the mines be better known. Much time is also spent in the voyage by the rivers, and by that sea, which hath differing monsoons, and can be sailed but by two winds, which blow six months from the east, and as many from the west. Solomon's fleet had, besides those mentioned, this let, that the Red Sea is not safely navigable but by day, by reason of many isles and shoals ; likewise it was necessary to put into harbors for fresh water and provisions, and to take in new pilots and mariners and to make reparation ; which considered, with their creeping by the shore for the want of compass and experience in those seas, and their Sabbath rests, and their truck with the Cafares, might extend their whole voyage, in going, staying and returning, to three years. Further, the ivory, apes, gems, and precious woods (which grew in the wild places of Tebe within Sofala), whence they make *almaidias*, or canoes, twenty yards long of one timber, and much fine black wood grows in the coast, and is carried thence to India and Portugal ; all these may make the matter probable. As for peacocks, I saw none there, but there must needs be some within land ; for I have seen some Cafares wear their plumes on their heads. As there is store of fine gold, so also is there fine silver in Chicon where there are rich mines." These circumstances are so striking and so full of probability, and the difficulties respecting any other place have been so great, as to appear conclusive to many in regard to the situation of Ophir ; and accordingly this opinion has been embraced by D'Anville, Huet, Montesquieu, Bruce and Robertson ; and even Dr. Vincent allows that Ophir must there be sought for by those who object to Arabia.

(3.) Others have supposed that the Ophir of Solomon was in the Persian Gulf; and that the commerce extended down the Red Sea, and around Arabia to the Gulf. Calmet adopted the singular theory that Ophir was in Armenia, and that the fleet of Solomon proceeded up the Persian Gulf, and thence up the Euphrates or the Tigris as far as those rivers were navigable, in order to receive the productions of Armenia. In this opinion, he is probably destined to stand alone. Nor has the opinion that the Ophir of the Scriptures was within the Persian Gulf much to recommend it. The articles enumerated are not those which would naturally be found in the islands of that Gulf, or on the adjacent shore. The gems and spices, the precious stones and aromatics of the Indies would be the productions which would naturally find their way to the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf.

(4.) India has been commonly regarded as the country where Ophir was to be found. To this opinion the large majority of authorities refer the Hebrew-Phenician voyage. But it is almost needless to say, that there has been an almost infinite number of opinions as to the part of India where Ophir was to be found; and that scarcely two persons have fixed on the same place. But the objections to India as the country of Ophir are, in my view, insuperable. The material one is, the difficulty of the navigation. Those who have read Dr. Vincent's account of the voyage of Nearchus from the river Indus to the Persian Gulf, will be satisfied that it is highly improbable that a voyage to India was undertaken and accomplished more than six hundred years before that time. Arrian denies that any voyage had ever occurred from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf by sailing around Arabia; Eratosthenes (apud Strabo lib. xvi. xvii.) also denies that any vessel proceeding from the straits of the Red Sea (Babelmandel) had ever gone more than about six hundred miles. Strabo says that before his time scarcely twenty ships had ever dared to adventure beyond the straits into the open ocean. See Huet in Ugolin, tom. vii. p. 302.

(5.) The editor of the Pictorial Bible (on 2 Chron. 20) supposes, that no particular country is intended by the Ophir of the Scriptures; but that the term is used, like the word *Thule* in the classics, to denote some indefinite, distant region, or a certain region of the world—like the East or West Indies. In confirmation of this opinion, Tychsen, after Heeren, observes that the word *Ophir* signifies in Arabia, “the rich countries.”—To

me, however, it seems most probable that the country designated was on the eastern coast of Africa ; and to this the opinions of most writers now converge.

3. The articles of commerce which Solomon conveyed to his dominions by his fleet were the following. (1.) Gold. How it was procured or paid for, or what constituted the articles of *export* for which Solomon received this in return, is nowhere intimated. (2.) Silver—an article which he made exceedingly abundant in Jerusalem. (3.) Ivory—also, as we have seen in speaking of the commerce of Tyre, an important article. (4.) *Apes*, קופים. What *species* of those animals was imported cannot be determined. The word קוף is applied to any species of the simia or monkey race. *Why* they were imported, is not known. As they were objects of curiosity, then as now, it is possible that it was a mere matter of speculation. As Solomon gave much of his time to Natural History (1 Kings 4: 33), it may have been with some reference to that study. (5.) *Peacocks*, חופאים. It has been doubted whether peacocks are intended or *parrots* ;* and it is not very material. Both are produced in Africa and in India ; and both would have answered the purpose contemplated by Solomon. If the object was gain, they would be valuable objects of merchandise, as curiosities in the land of Palestine. If the object was the study of natural history, the fact is more interesting. Other kings and princes, we may suppose, would collect foreign quadrupeds and birds as objects of curiosity or wonder—to beautify a park or decorate a garden. But as we know that Solomon was devoted to study, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, while his main object was gain, he might have instructed his navigators to bring home, whatever they might meet with that was unusual or rare, which would serve to enlarge the empire of science. If so, the fact shows that amidst all that was splendid and luxurious in that reign, the useful was not forgotten, and that while Solomon sought to increase the works of art, he, at the same time, sought to extend the bounds of knowledge, and to diffuse an acquaintance with the works of God.

This commerce was, however, of short duration. The civil wars which succeeded the death of Solomon turned the attention of the nation away from such pursuits ; and no effort appears

* See Huet as quoted above. Comp. also Bochart, Hieroz. T. II. p. 135, seq.

to have been made to recover the advantages of foreign traffic until the time of Jehoshaphat—more than seventy years later. This prince formed a commercial treaty with Ahaziah, king of Israel, for the purpose of renewing the trade to Tarshish; but the fleet which they constructed at the port of Ezion-geber was destroyed in a storm; and the attempt was never renewed. 2 Chron. 20: 36, 37.

It is proper, in describing the commerce of Western Asia, to notice another celebrated city that was founded to secure it; I allude to Alexandria, in Egypt. Alexander, in his pursuit of Darius, was led to the northeastern part of Persia, and he terminated his career on the Hydaspes, a branch of the Indus. Here his conquests ended; and here he wept that no other world was to be subdued. He had carried his arms over the regions that had once constituted the most powerful monarchies of the earth; and had vanquished the very kingdoms which had once poured their legions on the plains of Leuctra and Marathon. But the mind of that great man was too restless to remain satisfied with his past achievements. To consolidate this vast region into one government, required not less energy than to conquer it; and without delay the work was undertaken. The commerce of the East was an object that attracted his attention, and laid the foundation for a new plan. The passage, from the place where he then was to the ocean, had never been made but once—by Darius; and Alexander fitted out a fleet under Nearchus, to attempt the dangerous way. Alexander, with his army, moved along the shore, while Nearchus and the fleet performed the voyage. It was demonstrated that the commerce of the East, instead of being borne over land, *could* be conveyed on the ocean; and the plan was formed to convey it around Arabia, up the Red Sea, and thence to Europe. The site of Alexandria was selected to aid in this purpose. The plan of a magnificent city was formed; and it shows the forecast which planned it, that, while Tyre declined, and Babylon sunk to ruin, Alexandria, for 1800 years, continued to command the commerce of India.*

This commerce, too, gave importance to Venice, Genoa, and the states and cities of Italy. Venice rose from the waves be-

* See Arrian, *Exped. Alex.* and Dr. Vincent on the Commerce of the Ancients, for a full account of the voyage of Nearchus.

cause of her convenient position between Alexandria and Europe. She maintained her pre-eminence until the direction of that commerce was changed, in the revolutions which followed the discoveries of Vasco de Gama.

This detail, perhaps dry and uninteresting, has conducted us to an important general conclusion. The great prize which was so eagerly sought by ancient enterprise, was the commerce of India,—that vast indefinite region, so little known to the ancients, stretching on without known limits, from the river Indus, comprising modern Hindoostan and China,—the land of spices, and pearls, and diamonds, and gold, and silks,—the source of all that was deemed desirable to contribute to the luxury of the West. To obtain this, caravans crossed and re-crossed pathless deserts; voyages of discovery were undertaken at imminent hazard; cities rose up amidst pathless sands and barren rocks, to afford a resting-place to the weary and heavy-laden traveller; and to secure this, too, in subsequent times, Columbus embarked on the bosom of the mighty deep, and prostrated himself on the earth with gratitude and praise, when he supposed that, by a new course, he had reached that land of splendor and of wealth.

We are now to contemplate Western Asia as presenting a different aspect; and to consider the changes which have occurred there, and the causes of those changes. We have seen splendid cities, whose size and wealth, as reported by ancient historians, almost exceed belief, and whose ruins now amaze the traveller, rise and flourish there as the fruit of a busy commerce; and it is natural to ask, why they have ceased to exist, and why, if they were destroyed by the calamities of war, they have not risen again from their ruins. To the commerce of the ancients they were, what London, and Havre, and Liverpool, and New-York, and Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati, and New-Orleans are to the moderns. Some of them equalled the greatest of these modern cities, in size and wealth—perhaps surpassed them in splendor, and stood as confident of permanency. There was as little prospect of their decay and ruin as there is now of the marts of commerce in Europe and America. In the height of their glory, however, when the caravan was moving towards them with the wealth of the East; when they resounded with the din of business and the cheerfulness of song; when splendid palaces were building, as the fruits of that commerce; when they were encom-

passing themselves with high and massive walls, and towers, and gates; and when the fleets, bearing the wealth of distant nations, were crowding around their wharves, one thing was as remarkable as it was ominous. A succession of men, clad in a humble garb, dwelling in the little territory of Judea—a country never distinguished for commerce, and cut off by its constitution from forming extended foreign relations,—a class of men without literature, or profound knowledge of international laws, were addressing these cities in language fearfully foreboding. To Tyre—that splendid commercial emporium—these foreigners said, speaking in the name of the God of cities and of nations: “I will make thee like the top of a rock. Thou shalt be a place to spread nets upon.” “They shall lay thy stones, and thy timber, and thy dust, in the midst of the water. I will also scrape her dust from her. I will make thee a terror; and thou shalt be no more. Thou shalt be sought for, yet thou shalt never be found again.” Ezek: 26: 4, 12, 14, 15, 21. To Babylon they said: “Babylon, the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldee’s excellency, shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah. It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation; neither shall the Arabian pitch tent there; neither shall the shepherds make their fold there. But wild beasts of the desert shall lie there; and their houses shall be full of doleful creatures; and owls shall dwell there, and satyrs shall dance there.” Isa. 13: 20, 21. Of Mount Seir, or Petra, they said: “I will stretch out my hand against thee, and I will make thee most desolate.” Ezek. 35: 1—4. “The pride of thine heart hath deceived thee, thou that dwellest in the clefts of the rock, whose habitation is high.” Obad. 3: 8, 17, 18. “From generation to generation shall it lie waste, none shall pass through it for ever and ever. And thorns shall come up in her palaces, nettles and brambles in the fortresses thereof, and it shall be a habitation of dragons, and a court for owls.” Ezek. 35: 3. Obad. 3. Isaiah 34: 10, 13. When these, and a multitude of similar predictions were uttered, there was the same human prospect of their fulfilment that there would be now, if uttered of London or Liverpool, of Havre or Paris, of Philadelphia or New-York—AND NO MORE.

I need scarcely say that great changes have occurred in that whole land. To the traveller, it is now a sad and lonely part of the world. The sceptre of empire has passed away. Des-

olation has spread over regions once "flowing with milk and honey." The traveller passes by day over scenes of ruin; by night he finds a damp and dismal lodging in the ruined palace of some ancient nobleman or monarch; or, more likely, lies down by his side in the tomb, and sleeps among the dead. The music that once resounded in the splendid hall, has given place to the cry of the jackal; and the gay forms, that once flitted in the mazy dance, are seen there no more. Silence now reigns, where once was the din of business; and the commerce of the world has found new channels; and these splendid cities have fallen never to rise again.

"Westward the star of empire takes its way;"

and westward, too, moves the star of commerce, and science and the arts. Civilization seems "rather to have changed its abode than to have extended its dominion." In those places where it formerly flourished most, nothing now remains but barbarism and deserts; but in lands scarce known when Babylon and Tyre were in the height of their splendor; in countries so little known as not to attract the attention of Alexander, or suggest that in the *West* he might find the world which he wished still to conquer, have arisen commercial cities that outvie all that was known in Western Asia; and in a new world, then wholly unknown, Boston, and New-York, and Philadelphia, and Cincinnati, have taken the place of Sidon, and Tyre, and Babylon, and Petra, and Carthage. The circle of science and the arts seems to be *removed*, not *enlarged*. The centre of civilization is fluctuating and changing. The grove where Plato and Zeno taught, the city where Phidias lived and Demosthenes roused his countrymen to arms, have been trodden by the feet of those who spurned the elegant arts of life; but the record of the eloquence, the philosophy, and the arts of those immortal men have found their permanent abode in the West.

I have said that the man who now travels over Western Asia, travels amidst ruins. In Babylon, should he perchance find the place where it stood, he would see a vast and gloomy pile, without order, or verdure, or comeliness. Around it, he would see a vast marsh, where no mark of culture appears. Such is the testimony of all who have visited that lonely region. "The abundance of the country," says Sir R. Ker Porter, "has vanished as clean away, as if the besom of destruction had

swept it from north to south; the whole land, from the outskirts of Babylon to the farthest stretch of sight, lying a melancholy waste.* Palmyra too is a scene of ruins. "On which side soever we look," says Volney, "the earth is strewn with vast stones, half-burnt, with broken entablatures, mutilated friezes, disfigured reliefs, effaced sculptures, violated tombs, and altars defiled by the dust." Once ten miles in circumference, now,—such is the desolation,—the boundaries can scarcely be traced and determined. The thousands of Corinthian columns of white marble, erect and fallen, covering an extent of about a mile and a half, offer an appearance which travellers compare to that of a forest. "Here," says Volney, "stand groups of columns, whose symmetry is destroyed by the fall of many of them; then we see them ranged in rows of such length that, similar to rows of trees, they deceive the sight, and assume the appearance of continued walls."

The situation of Petra I need not describe. The travels of our own countryman, Stephens, have made it better known to us than any of the ruined cities of the East. It is a city of tombs, cut from the solid rock. Its busy population has gone. The living are not there; and not a solitary being is now found there, save when the wandering Bedouin, or the passing traveller, spends a night among its sepulchres. Long its very site was unknown; and now that it is known, it is revealed, not to be raised to its former magnificence, but to excite the wonder of the world, that a city, once so splendid, should have become the scene of such utter desolation;—thus to confirm the words of the ancient prophets of God, and become a proof of the truth of revelation, engraved on the eternal rock. "I would," said Stephens, when speaking of these ruins, "I would that the skeptic could stand as I did among the ruins of this city, among the rocks, and there open the sacred book, and read the words of the inspired penman, written when this desolate place was one of the greatest cities in the world. I see the scoff arrested, his cheek pale, his lip quivering, and his heart quaking with fear, as the ancient city cries out to him, in a voice loud and powerful as one risen from the dead; though he would not believe Moses and the prophets, he believes the hand-writing of

* For an extended description of the site of Babylon as it appears at present, see an article in the *Biblical Repository*, Vol. VIII. pp. 158—189.

God himself, in the desolation and eternal ruin around him." *Incidents of Travel, etc.*, Vol. II. p. 76.

Nor need I describe Tyre. Volney shall tell what it is. "The whole village of Tyre contains only fifty or sixty poor families, who live obscurely on the produce of their little ground, and a trifling fishery. The houses they occupy are wretched huts, ready to crumble into ruins." Bruce describes it as "a rock on which fishers dry their nets." The only merchant which Tyre could boast when Volney was there, was a solitary Greek, who could hardly gain a livelihood. In one word, that whole region is now desolate, and it lies under some evident, but mysterious malediction.

What are the causes of these changes? That there must have been some cause, is past a doubt; and the answer is of more importance than to amuse an idle hour. Great principles have been developed in these changes, and important lessons taught in regard to the mode in which the affairs of the world are administered. Why, when those cities fell, did blighting pass over a once proverbially fertile land? and why, in the lapse of ages, has it never risen to its former glory? Is it destined for ever to lie waste? or, in the circling movements of civilization and prosperity, shall that land rise again and become the patron of science and the arts, while the countries, on which the light of learning and the true religion now shines, sink to night?

In suggesting the causes of the changes above described, I mention, first, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope. I have said that this cape is reported to have been passed by the ancients; but there was then no western world known to which the commerce of the East could be borne; and having been once or twice passed, the ancient navigator seemed to be contented with his achievement. The discovery of the magnetic needle by an obscure citizen of Amalfi in Italy, in 1302, gave a new direction to commerce. The power of the needle, the jealousy of the Italian states labored to conceal from other nations. But it was in vain; and this important discovery "opened to man the dominion of the seas;" and to the discoverer, if he chose to profit by it, the dominion of the world.* The great object was still to secure the commerce of India. Alexandria, for 1800 years, had enjoyed that commerce undisturbed;

* *Qui mare tenet, eum necesse est rerum potiri. Cic. ad Att.*

and the plan of Alexander, in founding the city which bore his name, had made Seleucia, and Babylon, and Palmyra, and Petra, a scene of wide desolation, and, together with the thunder of his arms, changed Tyre to a barren rock. New competitors now came into the field. Man had found out the art of leaving the shore, and of going out on the broad ocean. The mariner now felt safe whether he saw the land or not; and whether the sun shone on his pathless way, or whether he moved forward in a cloudy night. The needle pointed in one direction; and he knew the way to his home. Spain and Portugal now came into the field. Columbus launched into unknown seas, and expected to reach India by sailing to the west; and Diaz directed his course to the south and the east. The one discovered the new world, and called it INDIA;—the other reached the Cape, and called it the Cape of Storms. Yet not thus did the monarch of Portugal regard it. To his sagacious view it was the point indicating *hope*—the hope of reaching a splendid prize—and he called it the “Cape of Good Hope,” and again fitted out a fleet, which moved on to India. The great discovery was made. A new world was revealed, rich and vast, and capable of sustaining hundreds of millions of civilized men; where cities and towns might rise that would more than equal the splendor of the East; and from whose mines gold might be carried that would yet enrich the East; and from whose shores, too, there might be borne the press, and the Bible, and the lessons of science, and civilization, and law, to change the aspect of the whole Oriental world. The commerce of the East was now to be borne away upon the waves. Hence those cities which once flourished by its possession, have fallen to rise no more. And this was distinctly predicted by the prophets. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope alone would have ruined them. And *since* their downfall, causes have been at work, beyond the power of man to arrest, to render the desolation permanent. There are not on earth now, perhaps, any sites more unfavorable for commerce; and whatever changes may occur in the East, it is certain that *those* cities can never rise to their former affluence.

Petra is a city of the dead. It has not a single commercial advantage. It has no sea-port; no fertile region around it; no stream on which the steamboat may glide. Nor is there any sea-port near, which can ever make it an important place. It had its consequence only from the fact, that the commerce of

the East was borne by caravans; nor would any thing, but the destruction of ships and steamers, and the restoration of caravans, ever make Petra what it was. *Tyre*, too, is a place of ruin; nor, on the whole coast of the Mediterranean, is there a single place that would not be as commodious a haven as this once celebrated port. Robinson says of its harbor in 1830: "It is a small circular basin, now quite filled up with sand and broken columns, leaving scarcely space for small boats to enter. The few fishing boats belonging to the place are sheltered by some rocks to the westward of the island." *Travels in Palestine and Syria*, Vol. I. p. 269. Shaw, who visited *Tyre* in 1738, says of the harbor: "I visited several creeks and inlets, in order to discover what provision there might have been formerly made for the security of their vessels. Yet, notwithstanding that *Tyre* was the chief maritime power of this country, I could not discover the least token of either *cothon* or harbor, that could have been of any extraordinary capacity. The coasting ships, indeed, still find a tolerable good shelter from the northern winds, under the southern shore, but are obliged immediately to retire when the winds change to the west or south; so that there must have been some better station than this for their security and reception. In the N. N. E. part likewise of the city, we see the traces of a safe and commodious basin, lying within the walls; but which at the same time is very small, scarce forty yards in diameter. Neither could it ever have enjoyed a larger area, unless the buildings which now circumscribe it were encroachments upon its original dimensions. Yet even this port, small as it is at present, is notwithstanding so choked up with sand and rubbish, that the boats of those poor fishermen who now and then visit this once renowned emporium, can, with great difficulty only, be admitted." *Travels*, pp. 330, 331. Ed. fol. Oxf. 1738. Of *Babylon* it would be easy to show the same thing. The earth does not contain a more unpropitious site for a city than this; and whatever other places may flourish, *Babylon* is destined to be a heap of ruins.* Some other place on the *Euphrates* may rise to affluence and splendor, but *Babylon* has lost all its advantages. The steamboat may

* I refer those who may be desirous of seeing a full proof of this to the *Bib. Repos.* Vol. VIII. pp. 158—189; Keith on the Prophecies, pp. 182—237; and Notes on *Isaiah*, Vol. I. pp. 435, seq.

be launched on the Tigris and the Euphrates; the railroad may be laid across the plains and sands of Arabia—and who can tell what changes *it* may make in the affairs of men?—and Alexandria may renew its beauty and splendor. But though the steamboat and the railroad may again divert that commerce, they will not conduct it where the caravan conducted it; and the cities which owed their splendor to commerce, as it then was, have fallen to rise no more.

Men may account for these changes as they please. The *facts* are not to be denied. The result was foreseen and described. Men, claiming to be prophets of God, said how things would be. More than 2500 years ago, they described the scene as if they had been now on the ground, and were fellow-travellers with Volney, and were portraying what they saw. Their permanent records were not the result of natural sagacity. There were no causes then that tended to make Babylon, and Tyre, and Petra what they are, any more than there were causes which could be foreseen to produce the malaria in the neighborhood of Rome, or to pour burning ashes and lava on Herculaneum and Pompeii; or than there are causes in existence which can be foreseen, that will make Philadelphia or London pools of water and habitations of owls. Mere political sagacity could never, in Palestine or anywhere else, have foreseen the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, or the effects following from the use of the magnetic needle, or the changes produced by the railroad or the steamer;—nor could political sagacity have predicted the flowing in of the sands that were to block up the harbor of Tyre. The Burkes and the Cannings of the political world do not thus look into future times, and discern far on, in advancing generations, what shall be the condition—the permanent, unchanging condition—of the capitals of nations.

I have stated one cause of the remarkable changes which have occurred in the commerce of the East, and of the desolations which are now seen there. But why, it may be asked, do those desolations continue? Why do those cities lie in ruins? Why is that region, once the Paradise of the earth, now desolate? Why do not steamboats go up the Euphrates as well as the Hudson; why not swarm on the Euxine and the Caspian, as well as on Lake Erie; and why do not fleets find an anchorage, laden with the avails of commerce, along the coasts of Palestine and Asia Minor, as well as along the shores

of the Atlantic? I will state, therefore, another cause. *Liberty there is dead*; and the sceptre of despotism, paralyzing to commerce, to agriculture, and to the arts, is swayed over all that once fertile land, and it keeps prostrate the walls of its cities, and turns its fields into desolate wastes, and represses the aspirings of human genius, and bows down the bodies and the souls of men. Liberty is essential to successful commerce. The latter cannot live without the former. It must be protected at home; and it must feel that the power of a free nation, respected by the kingdoms of the world, will be stretched out to defend it abroad. There must be *safety*; there must be *stability*. But over all those lands there is now a government weak, capricious, flexible, tyrannical;—and commerce dies, and enterprise is paralyzed. Success in any enterprise depends on *stability* in the government, and in the principles by which it is administered. In commerce, as in all things pertaining to human affairs, we must know what to expect; we must be able to calculate on something definite and certain—even when there is much that is apparently fluctuating. Even the restless tides of the ocean may be depended on, and made tributary to commerce; for we know when they rise and fall. The regular monsoons—though blowing half the year against those who would seek a particular direction—may be made tributary to commerce, though they baffled and perplexed Nearchus so much; for we know what to depend on, and we understand their laws. But if the tides and the monsoons were governed by caprice, who could confide in them? So of the passions that rage in the bosom of a capricious monarch; of a government where liberty has fled; of kingdoms that are controlled by caprice. Give us the laws of the Medes and Persians, “that change not,” unreasonable though they may be, and the enterprises of men can be directed with certainty. The caravan is safe—for it will be protected. But how can it be safe when it may be plundered to support the government, or to maintain a luxurious and effeminate court? Liberty is connected with all that is good, and great, and sure on earth; and is essential to commerce. What nations are now most distinguished for commerce? Whose sails whiten the seas, and find their way to the ends of the earth? They are those which bear the flags of England and America—mother and daughter—the freest nations on the face of the globe; nations not governed by caprice, nor yet by mobs—but by law; nations, the thunder

of whose navies would be heard in the farthest part of the ocean, to protect the humblest sloop or schooner that should seek to secure a part in an honorable traffic. Every vessel that leaves our port is dependent on liberty and law at home for success ; and can be sure of success only when it is certain that, when she returns, no matter how long her cruise, the same liberty, the same morals, the same laws, the same public virtue will be found, as when the receding sail disappeared from the shore.

I could state another cause of the sad and long desolations of that once busy and fertile land—the land that once flowed with milk and honey. In one simple fact in *our* land I would find that cause. *Here* every man is secure of the avails of his labor. The ground which he cultivates is his own. The *fee-simple* to the soil makes a broad and impassable line in wealth, and virtue, and intelligence, and moral worth—in all that makes a man—between him and the tribes that roam over a savage land, or the nations that live under the caprice of a despot. Here, the harvest that is reared, the book that is made, the article of manufacture that is wrought, is *ours*. No one can seize it ; no one can tell us how to dispose of it ; no one can wrest it from us. It is ours, in such a sense, that the whole energy of 15,000,000 of freemen is pledged to defend it. He walks abroad in the conscious dignity of a freeman ; and though himself obscure and unknown, he may have *this* consciousness, that armies and navies, the sword of battle and the thunder of war would protect his feeblest rights against the world. Give but this consciousness to the wandering Bedouin ; let this be felt on the plains of Chaldea, and along the hills and vales of Palestine, and the desert would again blossom there as the rose, and the wilderness and the solitary place would be glad. It is this consciousness of protection in *our* rights, that makes us what we are ; this, that under the favor of heaven has built the cities and towns that stand so thick in our land ; this, that speeds the vessel on its way across the ocean. The want of this has strewed the Oriental world with broken pillars, and crumbling walls, and prostrate temples ; and this lost, our own land would soon be desolate.

The conclusions to which we have come in this article, are, that the commerce of the world is under the control of an intelligent, and all-wise director of events—who presides over winds and waves, over monsoons and pathless sands ; and that

it is changing its place and its form in accordance with laws which may be understood, and that the past furnishes important lessons in regard to those laws; that prosperous commerce is connected with high moral character and public virtue;—that it exists only in the spirit of liberty, and of mutual confidence; and particularly, that commerce tends to equalize all nations, and to diffuse to all the blessings enjoyed by few. On board the vessel that we send from our ports there may be the elements of all that is fitted to change the face of nations. There is science, directing its way across the ocean; there is the mariner's compass, that has produced so many changes on the earth; there is the quadrant; and there may be the press; and there may be those who are imbued with the love of liberty; and there may be the heralds of salvation, bearing that gospel to which we owe public virtue and civil liberty, to distant and barbarous climes.

I have said that the great prize sought in ancient and in modern times has been the wealth of the Indies. In seeking that prize, the New World—more rich in its native resources, and in all that contributes to human happiness than the East—was disclosed. That moment, when Columbus placed his foot on St. Salvador—supposing that he had reached the Indies—changed the destiny of commerce and of nations. With what purpose, with what heart did he come? With what feelings did he place his foot on the long-sought land? He came as a Christian. He came to give thanks to God. “No sooner did he land,” says his elegant biographer—Irving—“than he threw himself upon his knees, kissed the earth, and returned thanks to God with tears of joy. His example was followed by the rest, whose hearts overflowed with the same feelings of gratitude.” “O Lord God, Eternal and Almighty,” said he, “thou hast by thy sacred word created heaven, and earth, and sea; blessed and glorified be thy name; lauded be thy majesty, who hast deigned to grant, that by thy humble servant thy sacred name should be known, and proclaimed in this the other part of the world.” Irving's *Columbus*, Vol. I. p. 150. With these views he trod the New World; for the honor of the name of the Creator he had crossed the ocean; with a desire that the true religion should spread all over that new world, he lived and died.

Just one hundred and twenty-eight years after this, another frail bark approached the western world. It was in the cold of December—having crossed the ocean after a long and per-

ilous voyage. The storms of winter howled along the coast; the rivers and bays were frozen; the interminable, leafless forests spread before them. No light-house then told them of the place of danger or of safety; no city, no town, no sweet and peaceful village invited them to a place of repose. The smoke ascended indeed on the hills—but it rose from the cabin of the wandering and barbarous savage; and the sound of welcome was not heard on the shore. They came to the bleak and barren coast of New England. Heaven-directed, they entered—not by accident—the only place where safety then *could* have been found—where the everlasting mountains seemed to decline towards them, and to stretch out their arms far into the sea to embrace them. On board that vessel—the *May-Flower*—was the germ of this great nation—of that nation whose vessels now whiten every sea, and to whom every river and lake and bay and ocean of the world are open. Like Columbus, they came with hearts filled with gratitude to God—and on the rock of Plymouth *they* erected the altar and the cross. On board that humble bark was formed the solemn compact which has since gone into all our constitutions—and which contains the elements of liberty. They came, a race of hardy, and virtuous, and holy men; they came bearing the elements of liberty, and science, and law, and pure religion, that they might here have a home. They came with the Bible; with the love of sound learning, and of public faith and morals. Like that humble bark—with the same principles, and feelings, and views which reigned there, let our vessels—driven by the wind, or impelled by storms—visit all the world. Let them go as fit representatives of the land discovered by Columbus, and planted by the Pilgrims. Let them take the Bible, and the press; let them go to scatter the blessings of religion and liberty; let the pennant at the head of the tall mast, as she is seen on the deep, be hailed as the harbinger of all that can bless the nations. Back to Western Asia and to India; to the mouths of the Ganges, the Indus, and the Euphrates; to the Red Sea and the Nile; let American vessels yet bear the fruits, not only of our industry, but of our virtue, literature and religion. Let them carry the principles, by which all that now devoted region may be clothed with fertility; by which freedom shall visit the land of oppression; by which its cities may rise beautiful like our own, and far surpassing in moral worth and loveliness those which time has crumbled into ruins—making it again the Eden of the world.

ARTICLE IV.

SELF-CULTIVATION.

By Rev. Tryon Edwards, Rochester, N. Y.

Self-Culture : an Address introductory to the Franklin Lectures, delivered at Boston, September, 1838. By William E. Channing. Boston : James Munroe & Co. 1839.

"I HAVE a shelf," said the sententious Cecil, "I have a shelf in my *study* for tried authors—one in my *mind* for tried *principles*, and one in my *heart* for tried *friends*." Had we the first of these shelves, this volume of Dr. Channing's should at once go upon it. Though far inferior, as a literary production, to many of his works, it is one of the most excellent and useful of them all. It abounds in that somewhat rare article, plain good sense ; and is pervaded throughout, as by an elemental fire, with that uniform trait of a powerful mind—a mind made to *influence*, and *ever influencing* others—that it constantly rouses the reader to think, to *feel his own might*, and strongly to resolve, if not to do. Happy the hearers of such lectures ! Thrice happy if they act upon his counsels !

But favorably as we think of the Lecture before us, it is not all that we could wish. Self-culture, as bearing upon our *physical* system, is not even alluded to ; and "that great means of self-improvement, Christianity," the author professes to leave "untouched," because "its greatness forbids" him "to approach it" at the close of his other remarks. And in addition to these things there are some points that are not set forth with that proportion which is due to their importance, and which might well be expected even in the hasty efforts of so able a writer as Dr. Channing. With these things in view, our *first* thought was to *review* the *Lecture*. The *second* (and perhaps the more becoming, where an author like Dr. Channing is concerned) was to throw out the thoughts which the *subject itself* suggests—thus endeavoring to give that fulness and proportion to it which it so richly deserves. This last course we propose to take ;—dwelling upon the *subject* of SELF-IMPROVEMENT, or more strictly, of SELF-

CULTIVATION—often availing ourselves of the thoughts, and sometimes of the expressions of the valuable lecture before us.

The subject is one of immense importance. If language contains one word that should be familiar—one subject we should wish to understand—one end on which we should be bent—one blessing we should resolve to make our own—that word, that subject, that end, that blessing should be, in the broadest sense of the expression, *self-improvement*. This is alike the instinct of nature, the dictate of reason, the demand of religion. It is inwoven with all to which it is possible, either to aspire or to rise. It appeals to us as men—calling us to the highest and noblest end of man—reminding us that God's image is upon us, and that as men we may be great in every possible position of life. It tells us that the grandeur of our nature, if we will but improve it, turns to insignificance all outward distinctions; that our powers of knowing and feeling and loving—of perceiving the beautiful, the true, the right, the good—of knowing God, of acting on ourselves and on external nature, and on our fellow beings—that these are glorious prerogatives, and that in them all there is no assignable limit to our progress. It reminds us that each one of us is a diamond; and that while, with cultivation, we may attain our highest value and most splendid perfection, without it we shall remain in our roughness, never disclosing our own beauty or worth, never reflecting the glorious light that God is pouring around us. It impresses the thought, that we have something to do for ourselves; that knowledge and wisdom are not to be *poured* into us, without effort on our part; that we are more than mere *receptacles*; that we are to reflect as well as read or hear, to ponder what may come before us, and to think for ourselves, and judge for ourselves whether it be right or wrong, and what may be its value and its uses. Books, lectures, social intercourse, appeals from without—these may rouse us to exertion, when without them we might have slumbered for ever, unconscious of our own capacities; but they will be worse than useless if we rely on them alone, if we feel as if they were to *carry* us forward instead of rousing us to go ourselves; worse than useless if we do not *digest* what they bring before us, thus inweaving it, like food to the body, with our mental and moral life and growth. Depend upon any external means or aids without the exercise of our own powers, and we shall make them but as crutches to us, and ourselves intellectual and moral cripples, and when these are taken away, we shall fall by our own weight, and to our own injury.

But to pass to the subject. Self-cultivation may be noticed in its *prerequisites*, or what it implies ; its elements, or rather the departments for its scope ; and its *means* of growth and progress, or how we may advance in it.

I. *Its prerequisites, or what it implies.* Three things may be noticed as implied in self-cultivation—self-knowledge, self-rule, and self-formation. For each of these we have the capacity ;—each is possible to us.

1. *Self-knowledge.* This is indispensable. To know what we are is the first step to becoming what we should be. And one reason why there is so little of self-cultivation is, that there is so little self-knowledge ;—that so few ever know themselves, or penetrate or even look into their own natures. To most men, the *outward* is every thing, while the *inward* is vague and indefinite and unreal. Consciousness, that telescope of the heavens within them, is rarely used. Their highest and noblest powers, the stars of those heavens, rarely attract their attention, much less their serious thought, and they live and die as truly strangers to themselves, as they are to countries of which they have only heard, but on which they have never trod. But if we would *cultivate* and *improve* ourselves, we must inspect and know ourselves—where we are weak and where strong—where deficient and where the reverse. We must know, in short, what we are, and what we would be. Self-knowledge is the first stepping-stone to self-improvement. The next prerequisite to self-cultivation, is,

2. *Self-rule.* This, also, is indispensable to self-culture. Before we can greatly improve ourselves, we must be able to subject and govern ourselves—to bow the will and the entire life to the judgment, and at any moment to fix the attention, and direct the thoughts, and control the feelings. Like the centurion of his soldiers, we must be able with truth to declare of every faculty and power within us, that to each we say : “ go, and it goeth—come, and it cometh—do this, and it doeth it.” He that rules his spirit—that has *conquered* himself—may well be strong in the confidence that he can *improve* himself, while he that is without system, or rule, or fixed and correct habit, can never be sure of doing it ; but like the feather on the wave, or the leaf in the whirlwind, is at the mercy of every passing impulse. Connected with self-rule, or rather as a higher department of it, is,

3. *Self-formation.* Not only are we able to *know* ourselves,

and negatively to *control* and *rule* ourselves, but positively to *form* ourselves—to guide and impel our powers, and to apply to them the means and influences which shall forward their growth and might. With perfection in our view, we can more and more conform ourselves to it. This trait we can cherish or suppress ; that habit, cultivate or subdue ; this propensity, direct or eradicate. Fixing our glance on the standard before us, we *can* press toward it, gaining fresh strength by every conquest—making every attainment but the foundation of a future and a higher growth—like the steward of the parable, so using the one, or the five, or the ten talents that we have, as to gain by them as many more. Such are the prerequisites to self-cultivation, all of which are possible to us. Their very possibility makes that cultivation to us a solemn and imperative duty.

II. *The ELEMENTS of self-cultivation, or rather the departments of our nature in which it finds its scope.* To cultivate any thing, as the unfolding flower, or the tender shoot rising to the tree, is to watch it, and attend to it, and apply to it the aids and means of growth. And so to cultivate self, is to do all that we can to unfold our powers and capacities, especially our higher and nobler ones, and to make ourselves well proportioned and vigorous, and excellent, and of course happy in all things. This cultivation we may consider in its various departments, each having its foundation in some distinct department of our nature. Not that these departments are entirely distinct and independent, each of the other ;—not that they do not advance together, and each have its influence upon every other ; but noticing each by itself, the subject may be more distinctly before us.

1. *Self-cultivation should be PHYSICAL.* Accustomed as we are, to associate self-culture with the *mind* and *heart*, to some it may seem singular that the *body* should be mentioned as the *first* object of its attention. But we are physical as well as mental and moral beings ; and self-cultivation is the improvement of all that we are. God has given us the body as the residence and the servant of the soul, as the mediator between it and the external world, as that which we are to carry with us through life, and which, being purified by the touch, or at least after the process of the resurrection, may be worn for ever in glory. Every vein he designed as a channel of comfort, every sense as an inlet of joy, every nerve as a minister of delight. And more than this, he intended that by having sound and healthful bodies, we might also have sound and healthful minds.

And the latter can hardly be expected, except in the former, any more than the jewel can be safe in its case, when that case is broken and crushed about it. And yet how often do we entirely overlook and forget this subject ;—thus preparing for ourselves years of suffering, or at least greatly limiting our mental and social and moral growth. This is true, for example, of parents. This one, from mistaken tenderness, confines his child almost entirely to warm apartments ; as though the pure air of heaven were never intended to be breathed till it had been shut up within walls and heated by a furnace. That one allows his child freely, and at any hour, whatever is most agreeable to the palate ; as though the digestive system were one vast and devouring whirlpool, into which, at all times, every thing was expected to be swept, and might be with safety. That one, with an honest but mistaken desire to improve the mind of his child, permits it to be cooped up in the ill-ventilated school-room, or bent down to studies three-fourths of its time, at an age when it is all important that the chief care should be given to the physical system ;—to studies, too, which are often varied and difficult enough to task the powers of a full grown intellect. From the pride of having a superior child, he inconsiderately sacrifices its health, and of course a large share of its happiness, to its premature, precocious mental growth. And from such causes it is that we have, in modern days, so many cases of wilted and feeble and sickly children, or of remarkable and wonderful children, who grow up, by this forced and hot-bed action of the brain, to be prodigies by their second or third year, and die by the next ! And by the continuance of this neglect, as we ourselves go on in life, by ignorance and heedlessness of physiology, by the neglect of water in its purity, and of air in its freshness and abundance, and of exercise in its vigor and regularity—from stooping with the shoulders till the lungs from very friction might well become diseased—from eating at all times, and all things, and almost in all quantities—from these things is it not that there are so many cases of nervous and hypochondriac disease, and spinal and consumptive affections, and ruined digestive organs ? And is it any wonder that, from the strong healthfulness of our English sires, we have become a feeble, complaining, sickly race ;—any wonder that there are so many whose muscles are like sponges, and their nerves like aspen leaves ;—any wonder that, from the number and frequency of our diseases, our first method of saluting a friend has become

the fixed one of inquiring as to his health ;—any wonder that so many go through life, literally burdened with a body of disease and death ? At length and in earnestness could we dwell upon this point, urging its deep, and serious, and growing importance. Would that we could sound it through the land “with the voice of a whirlwind and the throat of an earthquake.” Would that we could impress it upon all, never to be forgotten, that physical health is not only the highest duty, and the greatest earthly blessing, but that it is the first and one of the most important items of self-cultivation. Well has it been said that “if the mind, which rules the body, ever so far forgets itself as to neglect or trample on its slave, that slave never forgets or forgives the injury ; but at some time will rise in fearful retribution, to smite and sting its oppressor.” Well has it been said that “it is hard to cultivate the mind and soul, if the body which contains them is in anguish or in ruins.” A sound mind in a sound body—if the former be the glory of the latter, the latter is indispensable to the former. •

2. *Self-cultivation is also INTELLECTUAL.* Man was made for thought, for intelligence, for endless mental growth. The instinctive desire for knowledge is like an ever burning fire within us ; and to every well-balanced and well-directed mind, its attainment (though paleness and sickness may come with it) is not only a *passion*, but a *rapture*.

“The wish—the dream—the wild desire,
Delirious, yet divine, to know”—

Who has not felt it, burning like a living flame into his inmost soul, and like an inspiration firing him on to all that is beyond and above him ! And, as God has given us this thirst, we are to cherish and rightly direct it. Since he has given us minds by which we are raised above the brutes, and allied to angels, it is ours to see that they do not run to waste, but that they are improved to the utmost. Especially is this true in this country, where facilities for the attainment of knowledge are so multiplied ; where every station is open to well-directed talent, no matter how humble its origin ; where our theory, like that of heaven, is to recognise no distinctions but those of talents and moral worth ; where a Franklin may rise from the printing-office to the highest rank of philosophers and statesmen ; and a Sherman from the shoemaker’s bench to the halls of congress ; and where pre-eminently knowledge is power—power for happiness—power for influence—power for good of every kind.

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And not only are we to *acquire* knowledge—this is but the food for mental growth—but we are to *use* it. We may fill our minds with facts—with mere information—as full as the shelves of the largest library; but after all, like the volumes on those shelves, we shall be dead to the world, and strangers to self-cultivation, unless, at the same time, we learn to think, and weigh, and compare, and reason, and judge for ourselves; unless all our information is so digested and used as to make us wise and judicious, as well as intelligent and well-informed. Here is the difference between two great divisions of mankind. The one only *knows*—the other *thinks*. The one looks only to details, and particular facts, and there stops; and thus is but an intellectual receptacle or channel: the other uses all these facts only as the foundation of higher and wider truths, and he is a philosopher. All the world had seen the apple fall when shaken from the tree, and seen it a thousand times; but only Newton, reasoning from the particular to the general fact, rose to the grand idea that gravitation was the mighty bond of the universe. One man reads history, or the conduct of his neighbors, to be interested in it, and then perhaps, like the parrot, to repeat, and then to forget it; another, to combine actions and events, to trace the moving causes of conduct and change, and the tendencies of society, and to gather from them all, larger and juster views of human nature, and broader and better rules of conduct. One sees every thing apart and in fragments; the other sees all as parts of one vast whole, and as a habit, rises from them to fix on general principles, on universal truths. Now this elevation and expansion of mind, and the consciousness of growing strength in it—this is one of the highest ends of mental culture. We are to gather knowledge—everywhere and without limit to gather it—and then to use it to enlarge, and liberalize, and expand our minds, and to make ourselves constantly *wiser*, that we may be *better*. And to our progress in this there is no assignable limit. There is nothing so elastic, so mighty as the mind within us. Like imprisoned steam, the more it is pressed the more it rises to resist the pressure; and the more we demand of it the more it performs. Unlike the mechanical powers, which are exhausted and spent by their own action, the power of the intellect is but strengthened by effort. Leave it to idleness and repose, and, like the sleeping sword, it will rust in the scabbard. But bring it into exercise—task it to the utmost, and it rises and gathers

strength, and rushes onward with ever-increasing force, and widening sweep—searching all the avenues of truth, gathering from them all its appropriate food, tracking the earth and scaling the heavens in search of God's footsteps, and burning with quenchless thirst for all the treasures of knowledge and truth. The more we know the more we desire to know, and the more we shall know. The more we cultivate our minds the more shall we delight in them; creating, as it were, a new world within us. The more we store them with knowledge, the more food have we laid up for their growth. The more we discipline and train them, and think and judge with them, the wiser and happier shall we be—the wider our influence for the good of others. By mental cultivation, we may make our own eagle-wings, and on them mount for ever!

3. *Self-cultivation should also be SOCIAL.* By nature we are social beings, made for the minglings of the world, ever to be in intercourse with our fellow-men, and at every contact with them to give and take impressions that are to last for ever. And to this trait of our nature we should have respect in the great work of self-improvement. We should guard against being unsocial; we should cultivate the power and the habit of expressing our thoughts, and of imparting and receiving both benefit and pleasure in social communion. If we are but mutes in society, it were as well at once to be in an asylum; and if we speak only to give pain to others, or to display our own folly, it were far better to be silent. We should, then, cultivate an intelligent, a cheerful, a sociable and a friendly spirit—the spirit of sympathy with our fellow-beings—sympathy in their employments, in their improvement, in all their joys and sorrows. We should put away scandal and suspicion, and harsh judgment, having faith in others till compelled to withdraw it. Selfishness we should subdue, and patience and forbearance cherish as the habit of life. By the look, and the word, and the deed of kindness—by anticipating the wants and studying the welfare of others—by ever seeking their happiness, and that in little things—in all these ways we should ever strew around us “the charities that cheer, and sooth, and bless.” It is a touching thought, that soon the grave will be upon all those who are dearest to us, and who are now mingling with us in every-day life; and that then all our intercourse with them will rise to the mind, either as a star of joy and peace, or as a source of the deepest bitterness and grief, and

self-reproach. And we should see to it that our social character is such, that we shall feel it to have been a blessing and not a curse to others, when they are gone from us, or we from them, for ever. To this end, then, as well as for our own sake, we should seek to unfold and enlighten, and purify the social affections—those that bind us to the parent whom we almost worship, to the brother and the sister so fondly beloved, to the family, to the friend, to the neighbor, to the land of our birth-right, to the world. Those affections we should elevate from instincts to principles, from impulses to deep and eternal attachments ; inweaving them with all that is right and faithful, and generous and true ; making them, as far as possible, like the love of God to his own children. Growth and improvement as social beings—this is alike due to our nature and enjoyment, and to our fellow-beings.

4. *Self-cultivation should also be MORAL and RELIGIOUS.* Let it be physical without this, and it does but make us finer animals, with no regard to the great end of our being. Let it be intellectual without this, and its intelligence may be perverted, like that of devils, only to blight and destroy. Let it be social without this, and it may be used, or rather abused to the vilest ends, sneering in secret at the moralities of life, and trampling them all in the dust for the sake of self-indulgence. There is too great a tendency with many to separate these things—to cultivate the physical, the social and the intellectual, while the moral and the religious are neglected. Not without reason has it been said, “that the tendency to exalt talent above virtue and religion is the curse of the age.” And for this very reason it is, that we the more need to cultivate our moral, our religious part, as the guide and the check, the perfection and the glory of our nature. Not that our religion should be, as too many seem to think it was designed to be, morose and gloomy, and divorced from common life. On the contrary, it should gather the spirit of heaven only that it may walk the more cheerfully, and gracefully, and usefully, on earth. As sacred and spiritual, and as principled it should be, as the very spirit of the Redeemer himself. But it should also be such that we can take it with us to the glorious scenes of nature or art—to the flower-garden, and to the top of some goodly hill, and in the sail over the quiet lake, and into the saloons of music, and to the galleries of the painter and the sculptor, and to the minglings of social joy, and to all those humanizing scenes where virtue holds her sway, not

merely as the generic and abstract "love to being in general," but also as the more familiar grace of "love to some beings in particular." It should be drawn not merely from "systematic treatises on theology, written in schools and garrets and cloisters, many of them by those bearing the title of bachelor in divinity, and the character of bachelor in humanity too;" but from the Bible, which is full of sympathy with common life, and which not only permits but directs us to all things which are pure and lovely and of good report—to all in social life which makes the intellect more pliant and versatile, the manners more polished and affectionate and winning, the man more human, and the entire life more joyous and blessed.

And besides all this, we should mount still higher in the scale. Truth and duty—for these we should ever and earnestly seek, that we may know the one and do the other. Every wrong propensity we should strive to subdue—every evil habit to lay aside—every good one to cherish. Conscience and principle we should enthrone within us, and ever hearken to their voice. Often should we ask as to our nature and destiny as immortal beings; and, bound as we are to a future and invisible world, and to a deathless existence, we should seek, as the gospel directs, to prepare for the scenes that are before us. Nowhere has self-cultivation so glorious a field as when she whispers of our destiny—as when she reminds us that we are to live for ever—as when she unfolds the idea of God and of duty, clearly and livingly within us; moving us to reverence and love and obey him, to hunger and thirst after his likeness, to be a blessing to ourselves and to all around us, and thus to make progress in the noblest growth whether of human or angelic natures. And never do we appear so noble, so like the bright intelligences of heaven, as when we are thus bound to God in deep and holy affection, in joyful obedience and heavenly hope; when religion sits enthroned on our brow, and pride has given way to meekness, and benevolence reigns within us, and glows in our looks, and breathes in our words, and lives in our conduct;—when our whole life is one continual process of self-elevation and improvement—when principle regulates every act, and all our plans take hold on eternity,—and when all around us feel that religion has made us nobler and better and happier. Such we may be; and to our progress here, by God's grace, there is no assignable limit. The pathway before us takes hold on eternity; and in it we may eternally ascend, rising with a holier

ardor and a swifter progress, and moving with a diviner energy for ever and for ever!

Such is a brief and imperfect glance at the various departments of self-cultivation. It should commence with self-knowledge, self-rule and self-formation; and by it we should seek to improve and perfect ourselves as physical, intellectual, social, moral and religious beings. In all these self-cultivation is possible; for in all these we have capacity for growth; and in all it is demanded by our nature, that we may be useful and happy here, and worthy of our high destiny both here and hereafter, that we may meet the high obligations which God has placed upon us, fully to rise to which, demands the highest possible perfection of our being.

III. *Some of the MEANS of self-cultivation—some of the aids to progress in it.* Here the field is well nigh endless. A brief glance is all that will be attempted.

1. *We must feel that all of which we have spoken, and even more than this, is possible.* Impossibility is the death of effort. But when a prize is before us, the possibility that it may be ours, should rouse us to the greater effort to grasp it. We are to feel then of self-cultivation, that it is not a dream, but that it has its foundation in our own natures; that others have made vast progress in it, and that we may do the same. We are not to permit our minds, like the caged-up eagle, to pine away and starve by being confined to that which is just about us and already ours; but we are to feel as a reality, that we may make progress to the very end of our being; that we may for ever be growing in the high and inspiring consciousness of constant self-improvement. Faith in our own powers, and in the possibility of their growth—faith in the power of effort—faith in God's assistance, that he will ever help us if we help ourselves—this faith, living in the atmosphere of truth, and ever catching glimpses of a distant and divine perfection, will give wings to the soul, on which she may rise for ever. We are to feel, then, as a first principle, that there is no limit to the range of our growth—no goal to the progress of the immortal spirit within us.

2. *We are also to feel that self-cultivation is important.* We are to feel that our dignity and usefulness, and influence and happiness, that our all is involved in it; that without it we are nothing; that with it we may be every thing. Well hath the philosopher remarked of man, that "if he neglecteth himself,

if he forgetteth the mighty spirit and the godlike soul within him, he stoopeth himself from the converse of angels, to the insects of a day, and the brutes that perish." And applicable to *all* is the remark made by the poet respecting *woman*, that when in her he thought he had found

The fulness of that holy light,
That makes earth beautiful and bright,

he has

——— turned and wept to find
Beneath it all a trifling mind.

3. *We must resolve upon it.* "Resolution," says another, "is omnipotent." And if we will but solemnly determine to make the most and the best of all our powers and capacities, and if to this end, with Wilberforce, we will but "seize and improve even the shortest intervals of possible action and effort," we shall find that there is no limit to our advancement. Without this resolute and earnest purpose, the best aids and means are of little worth; but with it, even the weakest are mighty. Without it, we shall accomplish nothing; with it, every thing. A man who is deeply in earnest, acts upon the motto of the pick-axe on the old seal: "Either I will find a way, or I will make one." He has somewhat the spirit of Buonaparte, who, when told on the eve of battle that circumstances were against him, replied: "Circumstances! I make or control circumstances, not bow to them." In self-cultivation, as in every thing else, to think we are able is almost to be so; to resolve to attain is often attainment. Everywhere are the means of progress, if we have but the spirit, the fixed purpose to use them. And if, like the old philosopher, we will but take as our motto: "*Higher—*for ever higher," we may rise by them all. He that resolves upon any great end, by that very resolution has scaled the chief barrier to it; and so he who seizes the grand idea of self-cultivation, and solemnly resolves upon it, will find that idea, that resolution, burning like living fire within him, and ever putting him upon his own improvement. He will find it removing difficulties, searching out or making means, giving courage for despondency, and strength for weakness; and, like the star in the east to the wise men of old, guiding him nearer and still nearer to the sum of all perfection. If we are but fixed and resolute—bent on self-improvement, we shall find means enough to it on every side, and at every moment; and even obstacles

and opposition will but make us like the fabled "spectre ships, which sail the fastest in the very teeth of the wind."

4. *We are to go to it by degrees—with patient and persevering effort.* Many, when circumstances have turned their attention to self-improvement, and while the glowing picture is before them, often make excellent and sometimes prodigious resolutions. But because they do not, as by a leap, at once become perfect, they are soon ready to give up the effort in despair. For such, for all, it were well to remember, that self-cultivation is a matter of slow progress, of patient and persevering effort, and that in little things, from day to day and from hour to hour. It is the fixed law of the universe, that little things are ever the elements—the parts of the great. The grass does not spring up full grown. It rises by an increase so noiseless and gentle, as not to disturb an angel's ear, and not to be seen by an angel's eye. The rain does not fall in masses, but in drops, or even in the breath-like moisture of the fine mist, as if the world were one vast condenser and God had breathed upon it. The planets do not leap from end to end of their orbits; but in their ever onward progress, inch by inch, and line by line it is that they circle the heavens. And so with self-improvement. It is not a thing of fits and impulses and explosions, but of constant watchfulness, and patient and unwearied effort, and of gradual and ceaseless advancement. There is no royal road to it,—no vaulting to it by a leap. Like the wealth of the miser it must be heaped up piece by piece; and then at length, like the wealth of the miser, it may almost be without limit. Like the coral reefs of the ocean, it must grow by small but constant additions; and then it will finally be like those reefs, admirable in all its parts, and rivalling the very mountains in size. Here is the secret of what are technically, and we had almost said nonsensically known as self-made men:—as if they had made themselves without means or opportunity; when the truth is, every one of them, will be found on investigation to have improved all his time, to have made the most of every opportunity, to have been making effort, and of course making progress at every passing moment. "Never to have an idle moment," was the motto of one of this character, and probably of most like him.

5. *We should reverence our own nature.* We should remember that we were made for every thing that is high, or noble, or excellent. We are to feel that our rational and immortal

nature is worth more than all the material universe, and that we may make it worth far more than it now is. We are to feel that we are *men*, and that God's image is upon us; and we are to cultivate ourselves, because we are men, and because that image is upon us—because we are for ever to exist, and because we may rise higher and shine brighter for ever.

6. *We should seek the intercourse of superior minds.* Not that we should depend on those; for our own activity and effort are essential to our progress. But we should rouse, and inform, and stimulate our own minds by frequent contact and intercourse with those whose minds are superior to our own. Many such we may find in the walks of every-day life, in the lecture-room, or the social circle. But especially may we have communion with the great, and the wise, and the good of every age, in books, where their voices echo to us down through the stillness of time. Here it is that we may hold converse with the mightiest minds of the past—with Milton, “in his glorious old age, when his thoughts, like the ravens of the prophet, brought him heavenly food;” and Shakspeare, with his lofty imaginings, and his deep knowledge of the human heart; and Bacon, with his profound and far-reaching thought, “like the old Greek poets, half sage and half seer;” and Cowper, with his sweet and tender instructions. And far more, here it is that the prophets, and apostles, and the Redeemer himself are our companions; giving us their most precious thoughts—pouring their very souls into ours—making us the daily associates of the noblest, and wisest, and best, that earth has ever seen. By the habit of well-directed reading we may shut out the present bustling world; and, as by a touch of the resurrection, may wake up from our book-shelves the dead of every age, and gather them to our companionship and instruction. And this habit, if we will but cherish it, will ever be to us, not only a strong safeguard from folly and vice, and a source of the highest enjoyment, but the sure means of self-improvement. Nothing can supply the place of books. The wealth of the Indies should not tempt us to be without them. We should seek, then, not always those that the wise recommend, because *they* have found them good, but those that best waken and rivet our attention and interest; those that best unfold ourselves, and lead us to think, and rouse us to the consciousness of our own powers. We are not, however, to depend on books, but to exercise our own judgment freely and manfully upon all that comes before

us. Self-culture no more demands the sacrifice of our judgment, than of our individuality. We are not to feel as if we were all to be cast into the same mould, and conformed to the same likeness; as if perfection could be the same to all. Each is to develop himself and perfect himself as he is, not as the imitator of others. And to do this, each must think for himself, and judge for himself, in all his readings. Otherwise, whatever the extent of his information, his character will be spiritless and tame, as if he were but a fragment of the mass, rather than an individual man. We should commune with thinkers, not to adopt all that they may say because they say it, but that we may learn to be thinkers too. In all our reading, we should cherish the art which is one of the highest attainments of self-cultivation—that of uniting that childlike docility which thankfully welcomes light from every human being who can give it, with the independent and manly rejection of every opinion which does not commend itself to our own deliberate judgment. Ever should we strengthen our reason by that of others, but never should we blindly bow to them, however high their talents or reputation. Ever should we be true—sacredly and firmly true to our own convictions; and then shall we be conscious of “a spiritual force, and independence and progress unknown to the vulgar, whether in high or low life, who march as they are drilled to the step of their times.”

7. *We must in all things and ever be intent upon it.* We are not to feel, as we are too prone to do, that self-improvement is a thing of books and studies merely, but rather as something to be prosecuted everywhere; as if life, in its every aspect, and in its every contact with us, were the intended means to it. Every condition—every position and employment of life is, as already remarked, full of the means of progress, if we will but seize and use them. Our business, our reading, our social intercourse, our minglings with our fellow-men, our political relations and duties, our joys and sorrows, the aspects of nature, the movements of Providence, and the means of grace, all bear to us the elements and means of self-development and growth. And as the digestive system lays hold on every variety of food, and makes life out of it, so of all these things will the true spirit of self-cultivation lay hold, and use them as *its* food, and make out of *them* mental and social and moral life. It is said of Sir Walter Scott, that he never met with any one—even the

most stupid servant that watered his horse by the way-side, from whom, in a few moments conversation, he did not learn something that he knew not before, and which was valuable to him. And of one of the most distinguished men of New England it is strikingly said, that "he went through life with his eyes and ears open," and that when asked how he obtained his immense information (which was such that he seemed to have almost an intuitive knowledge of every thing), he answered, that he "was ever attentive and watchful, and never ashamed to ask about that of which he was ignorant." This is the spirit—these the habits, that make the difference between the untutored savage, whether of the forest or of civilized life, and men like a Franklin, or a Bacon; and these, if they are ours, will make the sum total of life but the minister to our improvement, like the fabled touch of the Phrygian king, turning every thing, even the sands of life to gold.

8. *We must look to God's truth—to Christianity—as the highest and noblest means of self-improvement.* Never can we cultivate ourselves as we ought, unless we have respect to our entire nature—to our entire and endless existence. And in this light, as well for this world as for another, Christianity, viewed simply as a system of philosophy, is the highest and noblest, and best principle of self-cultivation and improvement. No other system so shows us our defects, or holds before us a perfect standard, or gives us the rules and means of self-improvement, or points out its true ends, or inspires its motives. No other so meets the radical defect of our nature, that of our moral depravity, or offers us pardon and spiritual renovation and strength, and the sympathies and aids of God in every divine attempt. No other so chimes in with reason and conscience, and our best affections, all of which are with us in the work of self-improvement. No other so holds us up from being weary in well-doing, and bears us onward from victory to victory, training us on earth for glory and honor, and immortality in the heavens, where, though perfect in nature and degree, we shall still, from our ever expanding natures, be improving for ever. No, it is but the voice of the highest and purest, and noblest philosophy, which tells us, that never do we live worthily of our own nature till we are Christians—till we remember that we are *men*, and act as men, and *cultivate* ourselves as men, for God's service, and for our entire existence. Let us, then, lay hold on Christianity, on true views of

our own nature, and of all our relations, as starting-points—as first principles in the work of self-cultivation; and then, in the confidence, and in the consciousness of progress, we shall become as it were new creatures. Aspiration shall ever be rising, and power ever be growing within us. Obstacles shall give way at our approach. A mighty and constant inspiration shall be upon us, and with the immortal Kepler, we shall be able sublimely to say: “*O Lord! thy thoughts I think—thy ways I follow.*” Self-improvement we shall feel to be whatever is larger than ourselves, whatever is higher and nobler and better. And for all this we shall ever be panting—to all this we shall ever be pressing onward. The ceaseless habit of looking upward, and reaching upward, to all that is above and beyond ourselves, this, in our own experience, we shall find an elevating and expanding process. Faith in our own improvement, and faith in God’s assistance, these will be with us; and the entire range of faith is one of godlike communings, and of lofty and tireless efforts. Ever shall we be acting, not merely on what we are, but on the faith of what we may and should be. And by this we shall be borne onward to all that is vast in conception, and noble in effort—high though it be as the heaven of heavens. “Perfection” will be our standard; and “higher—for ever higher!” this will be our motto—our daily principle of action. Self-improvement we shall feel to be the utmost that we can do, with all our own efforts, and all the offered aids of heaven; and that in it there is work enough for all our powers, and to all eternity. Difficulties will indeed meet us; but these are meant to rouse, not to discourage; and the more manfully we fight them, the stronger shall we grow. Weary we may sometimes be in well-doing; but the sympathies of heaven are with us, and the prospect of the end should ever cheer us. Weak though we are in ourselves, if we look to God he will be with us; and in his strength we may thresh the mountains. In his strength we may ever press onward, until, in a brighter and a better state, we shall be *perfect*, even as *he is perfect*.

ARTICLE V.

ON TYPES AND THE TYPICAL INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.

By Joseph Muenscher, Prof. Bib. Lit., Prot. Ep. Theol. Sem., Gambier, Ohio.

THE history of biblical interpretation furnishes abundant and painful evidence of the tendency, in all ages, and in every section of the Christian church, to allegorical, typical and mystical expositions of the word of God. The practice of giving to the Scriptures manifold senses, according to the fancy and taste of the interpreter, commenced with the Jews. In the earlier periods of Christianity it obtained to a very great extent; and although in recent and more enlightened times, it has received a salutary check from the prevalence of more sober and correct principles of interpretation, yet there are not wanting instances at the present day of a wide departure from those sound exegetical maxims, which are suggested by enlightened reason, and confirmed by the general tenor of the Sacred Scriptures. The imagination has been allowed, in very many instances, an unlimited range in the explanation of the Bible. Not only fanatics and visionary enthusiasts, but men of sound judgment, extensive erudition and eminent piety have permitted themselves to be led astray, and have given the sanction of their names to principles of interpretation, the tendency of which has been, under the appearance of honoring the word of God, to undermine the foundations of the Christian faith. There has ever prevailed, to a greater or less extent, among a large and influential body of biblical expositors, an apparent unwillingness that the Holy Spirit should be the interpreter of his own word, — a fixed determination to be wise above what is written, a restless desire to make the Bible, by the exercise of man's ingenuity, a more edifying and instructive book than, understood in its plain and obvious meaning, it is supposed to be. Hence the extravagant lengths to which the system of mystical exegesis has been carried, and the consequent difficulty of ascertaining, amid the multitude of senses which have been given to almost every verse of the Bible, what is its true meaning.

On the subject of *types* and *typical interpretation*, the imagina-

tion of man has not been idle, and human ingenuity has been taxed to **the** utmost to discover resemblances and point out typical relations. Ponderous volumes have been filled with types and antitypes, which, it is believed, never had any existence but in the fancy of the writers. Scarcely an individual of note is mentioned in the Old Testament, no matter what may have been his character, that has not been held up as a type of Christ or of Satan, of **the** church or the world, of the friends or the enemies of God. Hardly an ordinance or a circumstance is spoken of in the Jewish Scriptures, which has not been regarded as an adumbration of something in the Christian Scriptures. The Jewish Rabbies held that nothing would occur under the new dispensation which had not its corresponding outline in the old. Christian expositors have not only admitted the correctness of this principle, but they have gone much farther, and maintained that nothing actually transpired under the earlier dispensation which has not its counterpart under the later. Hence events, persons and things, without number, have been regarded as prefigurations. The comparison has been extended to the minutest particulars, and, in some cases, even to acts confessedly immoral and wicked. That there is nothing of exaggeration in this statement will be evident from the following examples, selected from a mass which may be found in the various works that relate to this subject.

We are told that the extraction of Eve from the side of Adam, while he was in a deep sleep, was typical of the Roman soldiers piercing our Saviour's side, while he slept the sleep of death. Abel was a type of Christ; Cain, of the Jews who crucified him. Pharaoh and the Egyptians were types of sin and Satan. All the victories of the Jews over their enemies were typical of the victories of the church over infidelity; and, of course, the various defeats of the Jews were typical of the defeats of the church and of the triumphs of infidelity. Jacob supplanting Esau prefigured Christ supplanting sin and Satan. Samson typified Christ, not only in the fact of his being a Nazarite and the success of his skirmishes with the Philistines, but his carrying away the door and posts of the gates of Gaza to the top of a hill signifies Christ's resurrection; and his attachment to Delilah was typical of the affection of Christ for the Gentile church.* The lion which met Samson in the way

* Ridgley's Body of Divinity, Vol. II. p. 204.

to Timnath was a type of Paul.* Even the adultery of David and the incest of Lot and of Ammon have been explained as types of the salvation procured for us by Jesus Christ.† Justin Martyr makes the tree of life in Paradise a type of the cross; others conceive it to be a type of the Lord's Supper. Justin also discovered that Moses with his arms extended (Ex. 17 : 12) was a type of the cross. The dove which Noah sent out of the ark was a type of the Holy Spirit sent down from above.‡ The waters of the Red Sea signify affliction and death. The strong east wind which, by its violence, drove the waters before it for the benefit of the Israelites, was a type of the spirit of Jesus. The ark of the covenant (says Witsius), being partly of wood and partly of gold, aptly represents the two natures of Christ.§ The oak on which Absalom hung by the hair of his head was a type of the cross of Christ. Hanging was itself typical of the cross; consequently Absalom, together with every Jewish malefactor, who happened, whether justly or unjustly, to suffer capital punishment in this way, was a type of the crucified Saviour.|| Theophylus of Antioch tells us that the three days preceding the creation of the two great lights (Gen. 1 : 14) were τύποι τῆς τριάδος.¶ Speaking of the sun and moon (p. 105) he says, ταῦτα δὲ δεῖγμα καὶ τύπον ἐπέχει μεγάλου μυστηρίου ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος ἐν τύπῳ θεοῦ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ σελήνη ἀνθρώπου. Innocent III. discovered that the sun which ruled the day was a type of *papal* authority, and the moon which ruled the night, a type of regal authority.** Haldane and others find in the sun a type of Christ, and in the moon a type of the church.†† The promise made to David: "I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever," has been adduced as predictive of the endless duration of the papal power, of which Solomon and even Christ himself are assumed to be types.‡‡ The tribe of Levi is

* Vitringa, Obs. Sac.

† Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. pp. 525, 531., 7th Lond. ed.

‡ Witsius on the Covenants, Vol. II. p. 208.

§ On the Covenants, Vol. II. p. 208.

|| Keach's Scripture Metaphors, Vol. II. p. 44. Horne's Introd. Vol. II. pp. 231, 532.

¶ Ad Autolycum, Lib. II. p. 106, ed. Oxon. 1684. Bishop Marsh's two Lectures on the Hist. of Bib. Interp. p. 7.

** Marsh's Lectures in Div. Lec. XVIII. p. 164.

†† Haldane's Evid. of Div. Rev. Vol. I. p. 305.

‡‡ Keach's Metaphors, Vol. II. p. 32.

asserted to be a figure of the Roman hierarchy. The universal dominion given to man by his Creator over irrational beings is declared to be prefigurative of the unlimited supremacy of the papal power.* The Hebrew monarch, Saul, whose name is interpreted to signify *death*, is a type of the moral law, which Paul terms the ministration of *death*. The period, which transpired between the anointing of David and the death of Saul, typified the time of our Saviour's ministry on earth.†

Brown, in his Dictionary of the Bible, enumerates twenty-nine typical persons, fourteen typical classes of persons, nineteen occasional typical things, twenty miscellaneous typical institutions, six typical places, ten typical utensils, fourteen typical offerings, ten typical seasons, and eight typical purifications,—making an aggregate of one hundred and thirty types; and his enumeration is far from being complete. One person, institution or event is made prefigurative of any other person, institution or event, to which it is supposed to bear even the slightest resemblance, just as may suit the purpose or fancy of the interpreter. Hence the same event is made to stand as the designed representative of half a dozen other distinct events; for no other conceivable reason than because the ingenuity of man has discovered some similarity between them. But even this is not the full extent of the evil. Some have maintained that not only all the *acts* of typical persons, whether good or bad, had reference to the antitype, but that every thing which was *spoken* by the type had a like reference. On this principle the entire contents of the Psalms have been explained as relating to Christ and the church. And all the prophecies uttered by typical prophets, which referred to the kingdoms of Judah and Israel, have been regarded as admitting of an ultimate application to their spiritual antitype the church.

Again: there are those who, not content with the types, real and imaginary, which are alleged to exist in the *Old Testament*, have advanced the opinion that on the principle of analogy we ought to expect types in the *New Testament*. By the application of this principle, it has been discovered, among other things, that the original employment of the apostles as fishermen, was

* Antoninus, Bishop of Florence, on Ps. 8: 7; Chevallier's Lectures, p. 51.

† Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 531.

typical of their profession as preachers of the gospel; and their taking many fish typical of their success in winning souls to Christ.* Such extravagant opinions are calculated to expose the whole doctrine of types to ridicule, and to lead many to doubt whether there is any foundation whatever for this doctrine in the inspired volume. And such has actually been the result. Some modern theological writers have denied altogether the existence of prophetic types; while others have either studiously avoided all allusion to the subject in their systems of divinity, or in their efforts to reduce the types of Scripture to the least possible number, have stripped persons and institutions of their typical character, which have been regarded as prefigurative by the most enlightened interpreters in every age of the church.

No valid objection, we apprehend, can be alleged against the existence of types abstractly considered. The declared connection of two persons or series of events in the relation of historical type and antitype, is simply one of the various modes employed by the Deity to convey information respecting future events, and record their accomplishment. Now, it is surely no more impossible for the omniscient God to *prefigure* events than to *predict* them. And if it is not impossible, how can it be shown to be improbable that he would avail himself of this method of imparting instruction to mankind, and of strengthening the faith of believers in the truth of his word! The only question then, is, whether, in point of fact, God has employed this method of conveying truth; in other words, whether one person or thing is taken as the representative or type of another person or thing, in the Bible? To this question, it seems to us, but one answer can be given. The perusal of the Epistle to the Hebrews is alone sufficient to convince every candid and unprejudiced mind, that the New Testament lays claim to a preconceived connection with certain events and persons recorded in the Old; and that this connection, although in some cases obscure, and perhaps in none fully understood by the ancient Hebrews, is in other instances clear and unequivocal.† The same mode of ex-

* Townsend's New Testament chronologically arranged, Vol. I. p. 143, London ed., note.

† Comp. Heb. 8: 2, 5; 9: 7—9, 23, 24; 10: 1, 9; 11: 8—10, 16.

pounding the Old Testament, which we meet with so frequently in this epistle, is occasionally employed in other parts of the New, as well by our Saviour as by his apostles. Indeed, we do not see how any one can thoroughly understand the revealed scheme of divine truth in its completeness, and perceive the intimate connection and beautiful harmony subsisting between the several dispensations of God, who overlooks the typical relation which exists between them. It is not the *principle*, therefore, of typical interpretation, which we conceive to be liable to objection, either on the ground of reason or of revelation, but the *excess* to which it has been so often carried. Hence the importance of safe and scriptural criteria by which to determine what are types and what are not, and suitable rules to guide us in their interpretation.

It cannot be doubted by those who have examined the subject with care, that the revolting extreme, to which the doctrine of types has been carried, has arisen, in a considerable degree, from the loose manner in which the word *types* has been employed by theological writers; from indistinct and confused ideas respecting their *nature*, and from the want of judicious rules for their *interpretation*. The term has been applied indiscriminately to any resemblance, real or fancied, between two things. Types have been frequently confounded with allegory, symbol, symbolical action and metaphor. It is necessary then, in the first place, that we should ascertain their true nature, and in what respects they differ from other things to which the term has been improperly applied.

The word *type* is employed, not only in theology, but in philosophy, medicine, and other sciences and arts. In all these departments of knowledge, the radical idea is the same, while its specific meaning varies with the subject to which it is applied. *Resemblance* of some kind, real or supposed, lies at the foundation in every case. In the science of theology, it properly signifies, *the preordained representative relation which certain persons, events and institutions of the Old Testament bear to corresponding persons, events and institutions in the New.** The

* Dr. John Dick defines a type to be "a person or thing by which another person or thing is adumbrated." Theology, Vol. I. p. 144. Bishop Van Mildert says: "A type is a prefigurative action or occurrence, in which one event, person or circumstance is intended to represent another similar to it, in

classical and biblical usage of *τύπος*, from which *type* is derived, is for the most part the same. It occurs sixteen times in the New Testament and several times in the Septuagint; where it corresponds to the Hebrew words *סֵמֶל* and *חֵבֶרֶת*. Hesychius, explains it by *χαρακτήρ* and *εἰκὼν*, and Cyril by *χαρακτήρ* and *υπόδειγμα*. It denotes, 1, *a mark*, or impression made by percussion or in any way. Thus, Scapula cites from Athenæus (xiii. p. 585. c.), *τοὺς τύπους τῶν πληγῶν ἰδοῦσα*, *she seeing the marks of the strokes*. In this—its proper sense—the word occurs twice in the New Testament, where it is applied to the *print* or *mark* of the nails in our Saviour's hands and feet. John 20: 25.—2. *A form, figure, image*. Polybius, cited by Raphaelius, has *θεῖον τύπον* for images of the gods: and in Herodian, L. 5. s. 11., the phrase *τὸν τύπον τοῦ θεοῦ* occurs in the sense of a painted figure of a god. By Josephus (Antiq. 1. 19, 11), the images which Rachel took from her father and secreted in her tent, are called *τύποι*. In the LXX they are called *τὰ εἰδωλα*; and by Aquila, *μορφώματα*. Philo uses *τύποι* and *εἰδωλα* interchangeably; and Josephus also (Antiq. 15, 9, 5) employs *ἀγάλματα* and *τύποι* as of equivalent import. The word occurs in this sense in Acts 7: 43. Tropically, as *form, manner*, it is applied to the contents of a letter, Acts 23: 25, 3 Macc. 3: 30; and to a doctrine, Rom. 6: 17, *τύπον διδαχῆς*. Comp. Rom. 2: 20, *μόρφωσις τῆς γνώσεως*; 2 Tim. 1: 13, *υποτύπωσις ὑγιαίνοντων λόγων*. So, Jamblicus Vita Pythag. c. 16., *καὶ ἦν αὐτῷ τῆς παιδείσεως ὁ τύπος τοσοῦτος*, *he had such a model (or form) of discipline*; and *ἔνεκα τοῦ σαφέστερον γενέσθαι τὸν τύπον τῆς διδασκαλίας*, *to render more conspicuous the form of instruction*. Macknight, Doddridge, Terrott and others understand *τύπος* in Rom. 6: 17, in the sense of *a mould*, a meaning which the word sometimes, though very rarely, has. The metaphor, however,

certain respects, but future and distant." Bampton Lectures, p. 237. Horne says: "In the sacred or theological sense of the term, a type may be defined to be a symbol of something future and distant, or an example prepared and evidently designed by God to prefigure that future thing." Introd. Vol. II. p. 527. Prof. Stuart defines a type to be "a person or thing, which, by special appointment or design of an overruling Providence, is intended to symbolize or present a likeness of some other and future person or thing." Com. on Romans, p. 234.

in this passage, seems not to be taken from the art of *founding*, as these critics suppose. The prevailing idea is the emancipation of slaves, or at least, an improvement in their condition,—equivalent or rather superior to an emancipation,—by a change of masters. Rosenmueller and Bretschneider think it signifies a *stamp* or *impression*, alluding to the doctrine as being impressed on the mind (comp. James 1: 21), a sense, however, which is not in accordance with the usage of Paul, nor does it so well suit the passage in question, as the meaning given to it above.—3. *Prototype, pattern*, after which any thing is made—applied to a building, Acts 7: 44, Heb. 8: 5. These passages refer to Ex. 25: 40, where the LXX has *τύπον*, answering to the Heb. *תבנית*. Tropically, it signifies *an example*. Phil. 3: 17. 1 Thess. 1: 7. 2 Thess. 3: 9. 1 Tim. 4: 12. Tit. 2: 7. 1 Pet. 5: 7. 1 Cor. 10: 6, 11.—4. It is applied to a person *as bearing the form and figure of another person*, i. e., as having a pre-ordained resemblance and connection in certain relations and circumstances, Rom. 5: 14, where Adam is called *a type* of Christ. This signification belongs generically to the second meaning given above; but the specific idea attached to it in the passage here referred to, is peculiar and exclusively biblical. Here, then, the biblical and theological meaning coincide. The same idea is expressed by other terms in the New Testament—as *σκιά*, Col. 2: 17, Heb. 8: 5, 10: 1, and *παραβολή*, Heb. 9: 9, which is well explained by Chrysostom and Theophylact, *τύπος και σκιαγραφία*, and by Hesychius, *πραγμάτων ὁμοίωσις*. The correlative term—that which corresponds to the type and is represented by it—is *αντίτυπος*, *antitype*. See 1 Pet. 3: 21, where the water of baptism is represented as, in a certain sense, the antitype of the waters of the deluge, i. e., it is that which the waters of the deluge were designed to typify in the work of man's salvation. According to the definition we have given, one person is the historical and prophetic type of another, when some one or more of the actions of the former designedly prefigure or adumbrate the actions of the latter. An event or institution is typical of some future event or institution, when the first has the same designed connection with the second. Some writers employ language adapted to produce the impression that they hold to a typical sense of words. Thus, Horne says that the words in Ps. 95: 11,—*they should not enter into my rest*,—“literally understood, signify the entrance of the Israelites into the promised land, but spiritually and *typically*, the enter-

ing into the rest and enjoyment of heaven.* Properly speaking, however, there is no *typical* sense of *words*. Types are not *words*, but *things*, which God intended to be significant signs of future events. "When we explain a passage typically (says Pareau), we only subjoin one sense to the words: the typical sense exists in the things."† Persons and things only can be types: the language of the Old Testament, relating to typical persons or prescribing typical things, has no double sense,—the one literal and the other typical; nor is it to be interpreted in a manner different from any other part of the Bible.

Types have not unfrequently been confounded with the moral *allegory*, or *parable*; but they are obviously dissimilar, and should be carefully distinguished. An allegory or parable is a *fictitious* narrative; a type, on the contrary, is something *real*. The former are pictures of the imagination; the latter is an historical fact. A parable, like a modern romance or novel, may be founded on fact; but historical verity is essential neither to an allegory nor to a parable. They may be, and usually are entirely fictitious. Of this nature are the parables of our Saviour, Bunyan's allegory of the Pilgrim's Progress, and Hannah More's allegory of Parley the Porter. Not so a type. This must necessarily be an historical verity. Whatever it be which is designed to prefigure something future, whether a person, thing, institution or action, the first not less than the second must have a real, and not a merely imaginary existence.

"The essence of a type," says Holden, "consisting in its fore-ordained similitude to something future, requires it to be a reality; otherwise it would want the first and most important kind of resemblance, viz., truth. Fiction may resemble fiction; one ideal personage may be like another; but there can be no substantial relationship between a nonentity and a reality. If that which is prefigured be a fact, that which prefigures it must be a fact likewise. Hence, between the type and the antitype there is this correspondence, that the reality of the one presupposes the reality of the other."‡

There are, it is true, some points of similitude between a type and an allegory. The interpretation of both is an interpretation of *things*, and not of words; and both are equally founded on

* Introd. Vol. II. p. 359.

† Interp. of the Old Test. See also Stuart's Ernesti, p. 12.

‡ Diss. on the Fall of Man, p. 313.

resemblance. The type, moreover, corresponds to its antitype, as the protasis, or *immediate* representation in an allegory or parable, corresponds to the apodosis, or its *ultimate* representation. A material difference, however, exists in the *quality* of the things compared, as well as in the design of the comparison. When, for instance, Joshua, conducting the Israelites to Canaan, is described as a type of our Saviour conducting his disciples to heaven; or when the sacrifice of the passover is described as a type of the sacrifice of our Saviour on the cross; the *subjects* of reference have nothing similar to the subjects of an allegory, though the comparison between them is the same. And though a type, in reference to its antitype, is called a *shadow*, while the latter is called the *substance*, yet the use of these terms does not imply that the former has less of historical verity than the latter.* But while there is a material difference between a proper type and a proper allegory, there may be supposed to exist a close affinity between *typical interpretation* and the *allegorical interpretation of historical facts*. The custom of giving to the incidents of Scripture, especially in the Old Testament, a secondary application to other facts, in some respects similar, for the purpose of illustration or instruction, was introduced at a very early period of Christianity, and is warranted to some extent by the authority of the sacred writers themselves. Thus Paul allegorizes the history of Hagar and Sarah, in his Epistle to the Galatians.† But this species of allegorical interpretation does not necessarily destroy the historical verity of the narrative. It by no means converts the facts into emblems. The allegorical, figurative or secondary interpretation is merely superinduced on the historical. Thus, the history of the creation and the fall of man has, by some, been allegorized for the purpose of moral instruction, who still regarded it as historical truth, and gave it a literal interpretation. "It was usual," says Holden, "in the early periods of Christianity, with the ministers of religion, with a view to excite the piety and devotion of the

* Marsh's Lectures in Div., Lec. XVII. p. 89.

† Chap. 4: 24. *Ἀτινά ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα*, "which are [thus] allegorized [by me]", i. e., accommodated for the purpose of illustration to the case of the Law and the Gospel. Philo often employs the verb *ἀλληγορέω* in the same sense. He allegorizes this very history of Sarah and Hagar, although in a different manner from Paul. Allegor. II. p. 135, 29.

hearers, to extract spiritual meanings from the sacred history. They expounded Scripture facts in a mystical or allegorical manner, which, by awakening attention, facilitated the way for a moral application to the hearts of the people. Such expositions were adopted as the best means of warming the affections and inflaming the devotion of the faithful; and they may now occasionally be employed in Christian assemblies with effect; but they were never meant to vacate the literal sense of the Scriptures. The reality of the facts was unimpeached, and was, in truth, the only firm foundation upon which their allegories were raised, and without which they would have been no better than empty fables, and baseless creations of the fancy.”*

We may then, as Bishop Marsh has remarked, *allegorize* an historical narrative, and yet not *convert* it into an *allegory*. This method of deducing spiritual instruction from particular passages of Scripture, when employed with sobriety and discretion, may be productive of no evil, provided there is no claim of divine authority for such interpretation, and no impression on the mind of the reader or hearer that the accommodated sense is the true sense of the passage. But how often are the bounds of propriety transgressed in this matter, especially by preachers of limited information? And how frequently is the caution which we have suggested disregarded? For that which is purely the work of human invention there is claimed, not unfrequently, the authority of Scripture; and the mystical or allegorical meaning takes the place of the literal and only proper meaning. Thus the Bible is converted into a mere collection of allegories.

Typical interpretation, however, stands upon different ground, and, when properly understood and explained, produces very

* Diss. on the Fall, p. 296. “Our argument,” says Berriman, “from the typical interpretation of the ancient rites, and the allegorical explication of ancient history, must depend upon the supposition of their having been literally prescribed and transacted; and in vain shall we look after the hidden meaning, if the fact, under which it is said to be concealed, be fictitious and without foundation. If the history of the creation or the fall of man be themselves supposed to be fictitious, no allegory that is built upon them can have any weight or importance.” Berriman’s Sermons at the Boyle Lectures, Vol. III. p. 767.

different effects. The relation of the type to the antitype is not a matter of fancy and human invention, but of divine authority ; and the application of the one to the other leaves the truth of history unimpaired. Many excellent commentators, we are aware, have understood Paul to assert, in the passage in Galatians already referred to, that the historical facts to which he alludes were proper types. If this opinion be correct, still it would not justify us in attaching to any portion of Scripture an allegorico-typical sense, without the express authority of an inspired writer for so doing. But the correctness of this opinion, we think, may well be doubted. Paul, in applying the history of Sarah and Hagar to the Jewish and Christian covenants, certainly does not call it a type, but merely affirms that, in giving such an application, he had allegorized the history. And if to allegorize a portion of history does not necessarily convert it into an allegory, neither does it necessarily convert it into a type. ●

Again: Types have been often confounded with mere *symbols* or *emblems*. A type is indeed a kind of symbol, but differs in certain respects from every other species. The term symbol is equally applicable to that which represents a thing past, present or future. The images of the cherubim over the mercy-seat, for example, were symbols ; the water in baptism and the bread and wine in the eucharist are symbols ; but none of these are types. A type has reference in every case to something future, and hence is virtually a *prediction* of its antitype. But there is nothing predictive in the bread and wine, or in the baptismal water. They are merely *emblems*, not types: symbols and types, therefore, agree in their *genus*, but differ in their *species*. An ordinance, however, may at the same time be commemorative and prefigurative ; it may have both a retrospective and a prospective reference, and consequently exhibit the specific character of an emblem and also of a type. Such was the case with the Jewish passover. It was partly intended to perpetuate the remembrance of the miraculous deliverance of the Hebrews from Egyptian servitude. Thus it had a retrospective reference. It also prefigured the propitiatory sacrifice of the Son of God. Here we perceive its prospective and typical reference.

Once more: The mode of conveying information by types has been frequently confounded with prophetic instruction delivered by *significant actions*. The following examples will show

what are intended by significant actions. When Ahijah was commissioned to predict that the kingdom of Israel should be taken from Solomon, he clad himself with a new garment and met Jeroboam in the way. Taking hold of the new garment he rent it into twelve pieces. Ten of these he gave to Jeroboam, to signify by *action*, as well as by word, that the kingdom would be rent out of the hand of Solomon, and that ten tribes would acknowledge him as their head. 1 Kings 11: 30. Again: when Elisha the prophet became sick with the disease which terminated his life, King Joash made him a visit and wept over him. The prophet by divine direction informed him, by means of a symbolical action, of events which were about to take place. He commanded the king to take a bow and arrows, and put his hands upon them, to indicate his war with Syria. Then the prophet placed his own hands upon the king's hands to intimate that victory cometh from God alone. He next directed the king to open the windows facing the country east of the Jordan, which was at that time in possession of the Syrians, and to shoot. The king having done as directed, the prophet said to him: "The arrow of the Lord's deliverance and the arrow of deliverance from Syria; for thou shalt smite the Syrians in Aphek till thou hast consumed them. And he said, Take the arrows; and he took them. And he said unto the king of Israel, Smite upon the ground; and he smote thrice and stayed. And the man of God was wroth with him, and said, Thou shouldst have smitten five or six times; then hadst thou smitten Syria till thou hadst consumed it; whereas now thou shalt smite Syria but thrice." 2 Kings, 13: 14—19. We have another example of the same nature in the case of Jeremiah, when, by breaking a potter's vessel in the valley of Hinnom, he intimated to the Jews the destruction of their chief city. Jer. 19: 10—13. By making bonds and yokes, and putting them first upon his own neck, and then sending them to the kings of Edom, Moab, Ammon and Tyre, he declared their subjugation to the yoke of the king of Babylon. Jer. 27: 2—8. In the New Testament the same method of conveying prophetic intimations occurs. Agabus took Paul's girdle, and, binding his own hands and feet with it, said: Thus saith the Holy Ghost; So shall the Jews at Jerusalem bind the man that owneth this girdle, and shall deliver him into the hands of the Gentiles. Acts 21: 11.

These and similar acts of the prophets have been called *typ-*

ical, and unquestionably they have a striking resemblance to such as are typical. In common with types, they are *actions* as distinguished from words; they are *symbolical* and *prophetical* actions. Hence we commonly find them classed under the head of *prophetical types*. But notwithstanding these points of resemblance, the two are not identical. The significant acts in question, were avowedly performed for a specific purpose, and with reference, for the most part, to some event or events near at hand. In every case they were *insulated* acts, and not interwoven into the ordinary transactions of the prophets' lives. Indeed they had no relation to the prophet himself; he performed them in an assumed character and with exclusive reference to future events. But *typical actions*, properly so called, arise directly out of the transactions in which the typical person is engaged. They often form a part of the ordinary occurrences of his life. The character in which he performs them is his own proper character, and not an assumed one. The acts themselves are performed without any consciousness of their prospective and prophetical reference, and the persons or events which they prefigure are remote.

It is hardly necessary to say that a type is wholly distinct from a *metaphor*. Many things, to which our Saviour is compared, are in no sense instituted with a particular and designed reference to him. He is called *a door, a vine, a foundation, a corner-stone*; but what reasonable man would hence infer that doors, vines, foundations, and corner-stones are types of the Messiah? But when our Lord is called *the Lamb of God* which taketh away the sin of the world, the assertion is much more than the application of a metaphor. It intimates a designed connexion between the lamb slain in sacrifice under the Mosaic dispensation, and the great expiation to be made in the person of the Messiah. So when Christ is called *our Passover* which is sacrificed for us, the assertion is not a mere figure of speech; but it implies that the passover, in all its circumstances, bore a designed resemblance to the death of Christ.

From what has been said, it will be perceived that *three things* must conspire to make one person, institution or action, the type of another. There must be a *resemblance*; the resemblance must have been *designed by God*, and it must have a *reference to something future*.

1. *Resemblance*. This requisite is too obvious to need illustration. Indeed, writers on this subject have generally

made this too exclusively the object of attention. Accordingly when a resemblance, real or imaginary, has been discovered between two persons or events, this has been deemed quite sufficient to establish a preordained connexion between them. In this way it is easy to see how such persons as Job, Bazaleel, Aholiab, Phineas, Boaz, Absalom, Eliakim, Daniel, Zerubbabel, Antiochus Epiphanes, the unmarried brothers of him who left his widow childless, and the hanged malefactors came to be regarded as types.

When it is said that similarity, in certain respects, between the type and the antitype, is requisite to place them in the relation of corrolates, one to the other, this does not preclude the idea of *dissimilarity* in other respects. And when the points of dissimilitude are brought under our notice, in the way of contrast, the type is called *antithetic*. We have an example in Rom. 5: 14.

2. The second requisite in a type is, that *it be prepared and designed by God to prefigure its antitype*. Similarity between two persons or things, no matter how numerous may be the particulars to which it extends, is insufficient by itself to make them type and antitype. A resemblance in certain circumstances of the history of two individuals, living at different periods, may exist without the remotest connexion between them. One person, for instance, may successfully *imitate* the actions of another. One may casually be placed in circumstances like those of another, and the conduct of the two may be very similar. Mankind are pretty much alike in all ages. Nations and empires rise, flourish and decay, very nearly in the same manner. And what is true of nations, applies to individuals. Numerous instances have occurred in history of a remarkable similarity between individuals. Yet, however close and striking the agreement may have been, it is very different from that of type and antitype. The connexion in the latter case must have been originally preconcerted and preordained by God himself. And it is this original design and preordination, which constitutes the peculiar characteristic of a type. Where this does not exist, the relation between any two persons or things, however similar, is not the relation of type and antitype.*

* Vid. Marsh's Lectures, pt. 2, lec. 6. Chevallier's Hulsean Lectures, p. 6. "To secure its purpose," says Dr. Dick, "the

3. The last requisite in a type is, *that it have respect to something future*. This feature, as we have seen, constitutes the specific difference between a type and a mere symbol or emblem. Those institutions of Moses which partook of the nature of types, are called by the apostle *the shadow of good things to come*; while the antitype is the substance. Col. 2: 17. Heb. 10: 1. The daily and annual sacrifices of the patriarchal and Jewish dispensations adumbrated the great sacrifice, which, in the fulness of time, was to be offered effectually, and once for all. The ulterior and prophetic reference was not, indeed, the only purpose for which a religious rite was anciently appointed. It might, and generally did, subserve other purposes, subordinate perhaps to this, but nevertheless in themselves highly important and beneficial. Nay, further, the subordinate purpose may have been the only one which at the time was clearly and distinctly understood by the persons who observed the rite. Many, if not most of the Mosaic ordinances, in point of fact performed the two offices of symbol and type. So far as they signified to the Hebrews any religious duties or moral virtues which they were to practise, they were *symbols*; and so far as they were divinely appointed to represent things future, they were *types*.

It is evident, from the nature of a type, as here defined and explained, that it is *a species of prophecy*. It differs from a *direct, verbal* prophecy only in this; in one case, the future person or event is *prefigured*, in the other, *predicted*. In both there is the same display of the foreknowledge of God, and of his moral government over the world. This species of evidence for the truth of revealed religion, like what is called the experimental evidence of Christianity, addresses itself rather to believers than to skeptics. From its peculiar character, it is less likely to make an impression on the mind of an unbeliever than direct verbal prophecy. It assumes—as a fact previously established—the inspiration of the Scriptures; which the objector might first require to be satisfactorily proved. But to one

type must be instituted by God, who alone can establish the relation; and it is by no means sufficient, that, between two distinct persons or events, there should be an accidental resemblance. The essence of a type consists not in its similarity to another object, but in its being divinely appointed to be a representative of it." Theol. Vol. I. p. 144.

who has become convinced of this truth, and consequently of the reality of the doctrines they inculcate, this kind of evidence is of great value. To such a one, the judicious, discreet study of the historical types of the Old Testament cannot fail to prove both interesting and edifying.

The important inquiry now presents itself: How are we to determine, whether the acknowledged resemblance between two persons or events *is designed by God?* The preordained connexion between a type and its antitype must be shown by adequate testimony. It will not answer, in a matter of this kind, to be guided by fancy or mere conjecture. Our conclusions must be based upon satisfactory evidence. What evidence, then, should be regarded as sufficient to establish a designed connexion between any two things? The following principle furnishes, we apprehend, a proper and sufficient answer to this question. *No person, event or institution should be regarded as typical, but what may be proved to be such from the Scriptures.* The correctness of this principle is, we think, established by the following considerations. The typical character of a person or thing depends on the fact of a *preordained* connexion between that and some other person or thing. The former must have been originally designed by the Deity to prefigure the latter. But no one, surely, is competent to make known to us the divine intention except God himself, or some person authorized by him. The testimony of an inspired writer, therefore, is requisite; for no other person is authorized to express the divine intention. Again; as types partake of the nature of prediction, they can have no recorded existence, except in the inspired volume; and it is solely on the testimony of that volume, that we can be apprized of their existence. Consequently, we are bound to believe in the reality of types just so far as we are warranted in doing so, by the express declaration or clear intimation of the Scriptures. And we are not justified in advancing a single step beyond the information and testimony of the Holy Spirit, the only infallible interpreter of the mind of God. This is a point of so much importance that we shall be pardoned for quoting at length from several distinguished divines, whose views coincide with those just expressed.

Bishop Marsh: "The only possible source of information on this subject is Scripture itself. The only *possible* means of knowing that two distant, though similar, historical facts were so connected in the general scheme of divine Providence that

the one was *designed* to prefigure the other, is the authority of that work in which the scheme of divine Providence is unfolded. Destitute of *that* authority, we may confound a resemblance, subsequently observed, with a resemblance *preordained*. We may mistake a comparison, founded on a mere *accidental* parity of circumstances, for a comparison founded on a *necessary* and *inherent connection*. There is no other rule, therefore, by which we can distinguish a *real* from a *pretended* type, than that of Scripture itself. There are no other possible *means*, by which we can *know*, that a previous design and a preordained connection *existed*. Whatever persons or things, therefore, recorded in the Old Testament, were expressly declared by Christ or by his apostles to have been designed as prefigurations of persons or things, so recorded in the *former*, are types of the persons or things with which they are compared in the *latter*. But if we assert, that a person or thing was designed to prefigure another person or thing, where no such prefiguration has been declared by *divine authority*, we make an assertion for which we neither *have*, nor *can* have the slightest foundation.”*

Bishop Van Mildert: “It is essential to a type, in the scriptural acceptance of the term, that there should be competent evidence of the divine *intention* in the correspondence between it and the antitype,—a matter not to be left to the imagination of the expositor to discover, but resting on some solid proof from Scripture itself.”†

Ernesti: “Those who look to the counsel or intention, as they call it, of the Holy Spirit, act irrationally, and open the road to the unlimited introduction of types. The intention of the Holy Spirit can be made known to us only by his own showing.‡

Prof. Stuart: “If it be asked how far we are to consider the Old Testament as typical, I should answer, without any hesitation, just so much of it is to be regarded as typical as the New Testament affirms to be so, and *no more*. The fact, that any thing or event under the Old Testament dispensation was designed to prefigure something under the New, can be known to us only by revelation, and, of course, all that is not designated

* Lectures, pt. 2. Lec. 6.

† Van Mildert's Bampton Lectures, p. 239.

‡ Terrott's Ernesti, Vol. I. p. 25.

by divine authority as typical, can never be made so, by any authority less than that which guided the writers of the New Testament.”*

Prof. Stowe: “In regard to types and allegories, we know of none, excepting those which are explained as such in the Bible itself. All the rest are merely conjectural, and though often ingenious, are worse than idle, leading the mind away from the truth, perverting it by false principles of interpretation, and making it the mere sport of every idle fancy.”†

T. H. Horne: “Unless we have the authority of the sacred writers themselves for it, we cannot conclude, with certainty, that this or that person or thing, which is mentioned in the Old Testament, is a type of Christ, on account of the resemblance which we may perceive between them.”‡

Chevallier: “The connection of typical events with those which they foreshow, can be determined by authority only. For unless the Scripture has declared that the connection exists, we can never ascertain that any resemblance, however accurate, is any thing more than a fanciful adaptation, and we may go on to multiply imaginary instances without end.” Again: “The error of those who suffer their imagination to suppose the existence of types where they are not, should warn us that no action must be selected as typical of another, unless it be distinctly declared or plainly intimated in some part of Scripture to possess that character.”§

Christian Observer (London): “The truth of the whole matter (viz. of types) unquestionably lies in a short compass. The interpretations of this nature, which are adopted by Scripture itself, are infallible; but when they stand alone upon the authority of human invention and imagination, or, what is sometimes absurdly introduced as the analogy of faith, they are simply fallible, and often very simple indeed. No man of common sense will pretend, on such points, to any superior inspiration or judicial authority over another. Here the right of private judgment must take its most legitimate stand. The Scriptures, no doubt, are suited to every turn of mind and taste. The very large place which the imagination occupies in the mind of man

* Stuart's *Ernesti*, p. 13.

† Stowe's *Introd. to the study of the Bible*, p. 35.

‡ *Introd.* Vol. II. p. 530.

§ Chevallier's *Hulsean Lectures*, pp. 34, 54.

cannot have been unknown to him who framed the Scriptures for man. Hence we may justly admire that ineffable wisdom which has given forth enough for the dullest and most sterile understanding of the wayfaring man, to guide him; and has superadded an abundance of most instructive and impressive analogies for every higher grade of intellect or imagination, not even refusing food to the most soaring and aerial of all minds, by the construction of narratives, occurrences and doctrines, which, with almost a miraculous closeness of application, may be made to fit into one another, and into *the analogy of faith*. It is, however, we repeat it, where these applications are warranted, and made to our hands, by the words of inspiration itself, that we deem them either positively certain or absolutely wise and safe.”*

Types have been divided by different writers into various classes, as natural, moral, historical, legal, prophetical, etc. But for several of these distinctions there is no foundation whatever. It may well be doubted whether there are properly any types which have been called *natural*,—such as the sun, the moon, the creation, the earth, etc. Those rites which have been called *moral* types, are either mere emblems, or they properly belong to the class of historical types. What have been denominated prophetical types, are merely symbolical actions. All types are prophetical; and the utility of arranging them under the heads of legal, historical, etc., seems very questionable. Chevallier, however, has proposed a classification of a different description, which, so far as the prophetical character of types is concerned, may not be without its advantages. His division is into three classes, as follows: 1. “Those which are supported by accomplished prophecy, delivered previously to the appearance of the antitype;” e. g., Moses, Deut. 18: 15; Joshua the High Priest, Zech. 3: 8. 2. “Those supported by accomplished prophecy, delivered in the person of the antitype; e. g., the brazen serpent, Num. 21: 5, 9 (comp. John 3: 14); the manna which the Israelites ate in the desert, John 6: 32, 49; the paschal sacrifice, Cor. 5: 7, 8 (comp. Luke 22: 14—16); the miraculous preservation of Jonah in the fish, John 11: 32, Matt. 12: 40. 3. “Those which in Scripture are expressly declared, or clearly assumed to be typical, after the prefigured events had taken place;” e. g., the numerous types

* Christ, Obs. Vol. XXVII. p. 236.

contained in the Levitical priesthood and sacrifices; also, Adam, Melchisedec, Joshua the son of Nun, David, Solomon, Elijah as a type of John the Baptist, etc.

It only remains that we suggest one or two rules for our guidance in the interpretation of types.

1. *The analogy between the type and antitype should not be pressed beyond the points to which revelation has extended it.* The principle on which this rule is founded is this: the relation between the type and antitype is, and must be, a *general* relation. Consequently, it was never designed to be extended to every particular circumstance. In every case, especially of typical persons, there are many things in the type which have and *can* have no place in the antitype. This arises from the fact, that the Son of God was prefigured by men subject to human passions and corrupted by sin. To regard the sinful acts of typical persons as prefigurative of Christ, seems to us little short of blasphemy. Some things, for the same reason, are peculiar to the antitype, and can have no corresponding circumstance or counterpart in the type. It is only *in certain respects* that human persons or things can shadow forth, and *that* very imperfectly, the Saviour of the world. In not a few instances, individuals adumbrated Christ, not in their private, but in their *official* character. Thus, Moses typified Christ as a prophet, lawgiver, leader of the children of Israel and head of the ancient dispensation. There may have been points of resemblance between the two in traits of private character. But as the New Testament writers have not noticed these, when speaking of the two in the way of comparison, we may presume that this resemblance was merely accidental; at any rate, we cannot positively affirm, without the authority of Scripture, that the private character and acts of the one were designed to prefigure the character and acts of the other. The Levitical priesthood and the ritual sacrifices of the Mosaic economy prefigured Christ our great High Priest, and the sacrifice of himself which he offered for sin on Calvary. Yet, there were many things in that priesthood which do not correspond to the antitype. The High Priest was to offer sacrifices for his *own* sins (Heb. 5: 3);—a circumstance not applicable to Christ (Heb. 7: 27). The Aaronic priesthood, moreover, was ἀνωφελής, weak and unprofitable,—attributes which certainly did not belong to the Redeemer. Some persons are declared to be types only in respect to a single circumstance of their lives. Thus Isaac was a type

of Christ only as regards his intended sacrifice on Mount Moriah. Jonah was a type of Christ only in reference to his remaining three days unharmed in the belly of the fish. Now, as we are not justified in pronouncing, without scriptural authority, one person or thing to be typical of another, simply on the ground of resemblance between them; so, on the same principle, we are not warranted in extending the comparison to every particular in the private history of a really typical person, merely on the ground that we can discover a resemblance. We cannot be sure, without adequate authority for it, that the correspondence in every particular was preordained and not casual. Yet, nothing is more common than the extension of the comparison in such cases to every minute particular. There is no way of avoiding this error but by strictly confining our expositions of types to those express points in which the Scripture itself authorizes us to consider them as typical, or which immediately flow from the nature of the particular relation or character, which we are taught to regard as constituting the analogy between the type and its antitype.*

2. *No doctrine should be taught as necessary to salvation which is founded solely on typical analogy.* The great and fundamental truths, of the word of God, are taught in plain and unequivocal language, and not left to be deduced from obscure and figurative passages. The typical manifestations of the divine counsels will be found in perfect harmony with these truths. The former, therefore, may be profitably adduced in confirmation and illustration of the latter. Our belief in the doctrine of the atonement, for instance, may be greatly strengthened by contemplating the fact that it was not only revealed to the fathers of our race by the clear intimations of verbal prophecy, but prefigured in the numerous sacrifices which were offered from the time of Adam to the death of Christ. But it is highly improbable that God would conceal, under the veil of types and shadows, truths which are essential to our salvation, and nowhere disclosed in plain and literal terms. No person consequently can be bound to receive, as a necessary article of faith, any doctrine which has no evidence in its support, except what is drawn from the types and shadows of the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations.

* See Coneybeare's Bampton Lectures, p. 305. Knapp's Theol. Vol. II. p. 163.

ARTICLE VI.

TOLERATION OF OPINION.

By D. Fosdick, Jr., Boston, Mass.

WERE one to reason *a priori*, toleration of opinion might seem too obvious a dictate of expediency—to say nothing of justice—not to be early adopted and sedulously maintained. However overt *acts* of opposition to the will of governments or of individuals might be treated, we should hardly surmise that a mere difference of *sentiment* could be allowed to occasion animosity and cruelty—much less the infliction of death itself. But what a picture of intolerance is the page of history! In those who have not successfully cultivated the meekness which Christ enjoins—by no means the easiest lesson of his gospel—a mere difference of views on points of subordinate importance, is apt, even now, to awaken a harshness of feeling, which, fanned by the influences of other times, would have kindled the fiercest flames of persecution. It is true the *expression* of sentiments differing from those which are dominant, may be considered in some sense, an *overt act* of opposition to the powers that be. But most cases of persecution for opinion's sake, have arisen from the possession, rather than the expression of obnoxious views—from contumacy and presumption of daring to rebel against prescribed forms of thought.

Of the religious history of most pagan nations we know but little—far less, even, than of their civil history. From what we do know, however, it is evident that all have been more or less harassed by religious despotism at home, while they have done what they could, even by brute force, to extend the worship of their gods and the use of their sacred rites. Of ancient nations, the *Romans* were probably the most tolerant in matters of religion. But they never proceeded further than to allow the worship of new gods, requiring at the same time reverential homage to the old. The Egyptian might do homage to his Serapis and Isis, if he would pay the deference which was considered as due to their gods and goddesses. The Christian, even, might have worshipped Jehovah, if he would have offered

public sacrifices to Jupiter. This, of course, he could not do; and, consequently, his religion brought upon him the most cruel persecutions. The religion of *Mohammed* was in its outset, and is now, sustained mainly by intolerant fanaticism. The sword early carried the Koran over almost half the globe; and persecuting bigotry is now ready to stifle every inquiry which would reveal the folly of Islamism. A multitude of minor religious sects have arisen among the Mohammedans themselves. Their feuds are equalled in rancor only by those which have existed among Christians. It is matter of grief, but it is most probably true, that what has been called the *odium theologicum* has never risen to such a degree of acrimony—never flamed forth with such vehemence as it has among those who profess to be the followers of Jesus. Strange, that a religion whose sum and essence is *love*, love even to our enemies, should have served as a pretence for the direst *hate*!

As early as the year A. D. 259, Christianity was declared, by the Emperor Gallienus, a lawful religion. Still it was subject to more or less molestation under various pretexts. Constantine, by publicly professing adherence to Christianity, first gave it civil ascendancy over every other religion. He issued a decree of *general toleration*,* which is of so liberal a nature as to give offence to bigoted Romanists, who have complained of it as placing Jews, Samaritans and heretics on the same footing with true Catholics. It was not long before Constantine was induced to modify his policy, so as better to suit the narrow spirit of his ecclesiastical counsellors. From this period the principle of toleration seems to have grown gradually weaker, and to have finally disappeared, until it was revived by the Protestant Reformation.

The despotic pretensions of the Popes, which obtained general acknowledgment throughout the western church as early as the eighth century, tended to crush the exercise of private judgment. The Romish hierarchy, gaining by degrees the complete control of the civil power in most Christian states, finally insisted on the infliction of death for every sentiment which it chose to brand as heresy. In earlier times, indeed, it had contented itself with enjoining penance, or at most with decreeing excommunication; but its boldness augmenting with its power, it pronounced, at length, against every deviation from the pre-

* Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. Lib. X. cap. 5.

scribed faith, the penalty of imprisonment, and, in case of final contumacy, the forfeiture of life. The horrors of the Inquisition are familiar to all. The characteristic taciturnity of the Spaniards is attributed by Voltaire, to the influence of this diabolical institution. Even the researches of the natural philosopher were restrained by ecclesiastical intolerance.

As late as the 17th century, Galileo, who, in a work on the sun's spots, had advocated the Copernican system, was denounced as a heretic. He appeased his adversaries for a season by promising not to advocate a system which was generally regarded as derogatory to the Bible. Fifteen or twenty years afterwards, however, in 1632, he published his celebrated "*Dialogue*," in which the comparative merits of the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems were ably discussed—a manifest preference being given to the latter. Though express permission to print the work had been obtained at Rome, its publication drew upon the author the severest persecution. A congregation of his enemies having examined the treatise, declared it pernicious, and summoned him before the Inquisition. After some months of imprisonment, he was forced to disavow positions which he knew were eternal truths. "Are these, then, my judges!" he once indignantly exclaimed, when withdrawing from the examination of men whose ignorance disgusted him. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Milton visited him during his confinement. The philosopher was then poor, old and blind. About the same period Descartes suffered much persecution in Holland on account of his opinions. He opposed the prevalent Aristotelian metaphysics with great boldness, and advocated the Copernican system. Voetius, a bigot of great influence at Utrecht, accused him of atheism, and even menaced him with death.

In these and many other recorded cases of persecution for opinion, it is clear that the true ground of hostility was not so much a sincere apprehension of mischief from the novel sentiments avowed, as displeasure at the independence which dared to break away from prescribed forms of thought. It was the *spirit* rather than the *views* of Galileo and Descartes which rendered them obnoxious to ecclesiastical tyranny.

France resisted the establishment of the Inquisition. And hence, we read of few instances of religious persecution in her history. But there is one which stands alone in point of horror, an eternal disgrace to human nature;—I mean the slaughter of

the Huguenots on St. Bartholomew's day, in 1572. On this and thirty days ensuing, it is supposed that thirty thousand victims were offered up at the shrine of bigotry.

Protestantism finally gained the ascendancy in many Christian countries. But even here, it is in vain and worse than in vain to shut our eyes to the workings of perverse human nature. The impartial historian must record, that no sooner was Protestantism triumphant, than it turned against the disaffected the very weapons from which it had itself suffered so severely. No wonder that some, seeing the supposed legitimate fruits of the two systems of religion to be equally horrible, were at a loss to decide which deserved the preference. English history affords ample justification of what I have just said. Fox's "Acts and Monuments," in three folio volumes, contain the martyrology of the Protestants under Catholic domination; and, by way of counterpart, Dodd's "Church History of England," also in three folios, presents the martyrology of the Catholics.

Singular it is, to notice how surely and closely religious persecution has followed religious power in its various mutations. The sufferer no sooner becomes the master, than he forgets the liberal principles he maintained in his humiliation; and partly, perhaps, from a natural, though wicked, desire of revenge, and partly from mistaken ardor in the cause of supposed truth, assumes the very character he abhorred and deprecated. Calamy has recorded, in four sad volumes, the sufferings of the two thousand non-conformist ministers under the *act of uniformity*, which was issued on St. Bartholomew's day, 1662. Much as, the French Bartholomew's day of 1572 exceeded in horror the English one of 1662, the Presbyterians did not fail to draw a parallel between them. The non-conformist divines were indeed driven to difficult straits. Several were forced to become tradesmen. Among these was the celebrated Samuel Chandler, the author of numerous literary productions, who kept a bookseller's shop in London. Opposed to Calamy's account stands Walker's "attempt towards recovering an account of the clergy of the church of England who were sequestered, harassed, etc., in the late times," i. e. during the government of Cromwell.

Of late, toleration of religious opinion has made great progress in Christendom. It is a long time since any man has been put to death for his theological sentiments, in a country claiming to be called Christian. We seldom hear of imprisonment or confiscation of estate for modes of Christian faith.

But the world—the Christian world even—has but just begun to see its way forward out of the mist of intolerant prejudice. In all the states of Christendom, excepting our own, if indeed our own may fairly be considered an exception, civil penalties or disabilities of greater or less severity are yet attached to certain forms of religious opinion.

Long after the Reformation, the principles of religious toleration, as now understood, were almost unknown, and certainly not put in practice by any community. The first English divines of much note, who advocated this cause, were Jeremy Taylor and Bishop Hall; both of whom wrote upon the subject. About forty years later, in 1689, Locke published his first letter on toleration. The second appeared in 1690, the third in 1692. They were all written in Latin and published in Holland from motives of prudence. For the same reason, Bayle's *Commentaire Philosophique*, &c., which is substantially a treatise on toleration, purported to have been written by an Englishman, and to have been printed at Canterbury, in England. In reality, it was printed at Amsterdam, in 1686. Such was the caution required at the close of the 17th century, in the most enlightened Christian countries.

It has been with equal tardiness and difficulty that toleration of *political* opinion has made its way in the world. Civil despotism has naturally striven to crush freedom of sentiment and discussion. Quite recently, indeed, censure of the government has cost many a man his liberty, his estate, and even his life, in countries which have loudly boasted of the inviolability they gave to human rights.

The invention of printing has rendered incalculable service to the world, in promoting freedom of thought and discussion. It endued the spirit of reform with resources which despotism could not annihilate. The mass of mind in Europe, during the middle ages, was like a stagnant pool. The press communicated activity to the inert waters. A commotion began which has ever since been augmenting and which will not cease till all artificial and unwarrantable restraints upon human liberty are swept away. The adherents of tyranny perceived that the results of this invention, if it were left untrammelled, would be fatal to their interests. They strove to control it therefore; and for this purpose established a *censorship of books*. By this device, they hoped to use the mighty energy of the press in bowing the necks of men, with increased servility, to the yoke

of passive obedience. But the idea was vain. The press proved a hydra. Its inherent resources transcended the utmost power of destruction which could be brought to bear upon it. Crushed in one spot, it exhibited itself with new terrors in another.

Catalogues of prohibited books were early compiled. The Spanish Inquisition issued one in 1558, at the command of Philip II., and in 1559 the Holy Office at Rome published another. At the Council of Trent, Pius IV. was presented with a catalogue of books which the members denounced as unfit for perusal, and a bull of prohibition was accordingly issued. These catalogues were called *Indexes*. A simple *Index* is a list of books, no part of which was allowed to be read; an *Index Expurgatorius* is a list of books allowed to be read, if printed with certain omissions or other alterations. This expedient of tyranny, however, recoiled upon its authority. The Protestants reprinted and diligently circulated the *Indexes*; which served the convenient purpose of pointing out the books most worthy of their perusal.

Unfortunately for the success of these *Indexes*, moreover, they did not agree with each other. Being published at different places—Rome, Naples, Venice, Madrid, Antwerp, etc.—the discrepancies between them occasioned much scandal among heretics. As the publishing of lists of condemned works was found to be inadequate to their suppression, more frequent recourse was had to the expedient already in use,—of burning them in public. This was fully as ineffectual as the former. Indeed, it promoted the sale of the prohibited books to such a degree, that the publisher of the *Colloquies* of Erasmus is said to have used strenuous effort to procure the burning of his book, and to have reaped his reward.

An amusing anecdote relating to this subject, I will here present in the words of D'Israeli; to whose "*Curiosities of Literature*," I am indebted for several facts which I have already mentioned. "Tonstall, Bishop of London (whose extreme moderation, for the times, preferred the burning of books to the burning of their authors), to testify his abhorrence of Tindal's principles, who had printed a translation of the New Testament—a sealed book for the multitude—thought of purchasing all the copies of Tindal's translation, and annihilating them in the common flame. This occurred to him when passing through Antwerp in 1529; then a place of refuge for the Tindalists. He

employed an English merchant there for this business, who happened to be a secret follower of Tindal and acquainted him with the Bishop's intention. Tindal was extremely glad to hear of the project; for he was desirous of printing a more correct edition of his version, but the first impression still hung on his hands, and he was too poor to make a new one. He furnished the English merchant with all his unsold copies, which the Bishop as eagerly bought, and had them all publicly burnt in Cheapside, which the people not only declared was a 'burning of the word of God,' but it so inflamed the desire of reading that volume, that the second edition was sought after at any price. When one of the Tindalists, who was sent here to sell them, was promised by the Lord Chancellor, in a private examination, that he should not suffer if he would reveal who encouraged and supported his party at Antwerp, the Tindalist immediately accepted the offer, and assured the Lord Chancellor that the greatest encouragement was from Tonstall, the Bishop of London, who had bought up half the impression and enabled them to produce a second."

English literature was long subject to a state-censorship; and even now, the formality, with little or none of the substance of the old inquisitorial jurisdiction, is seen in the *Licensers* and *Imprimaturs* of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. But there has never been an English statute for controlling the press,—only a decree of the star-chamber. The royal prerogative was freely exerted by Elizabeth, to suppress or mutilate works which contained any thing obnoxious to censure, in her estimation. Authors and publishers were not unfrequently adjudged to very severe penalties, and, in one instance at least, to death itself. The regular institution of licensers in England, is supposed to owe its origin to Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury. During the commonwealth, the system of literary censorship was upheld with as much rigor as ever by the very men who, before they attained the ascendancy, were clamorous for the freedom of the press. It was not till the Revolution of 1688, that licenses for the press were discontinued. While they lasted they were ineffectual. Many unlicensed books were published, and of course read with the more avidity from this very fact. Passages which were condemned to suppression on the publication of a work were often carefully preserved, and printed in another country, or even surreptitiously at home. Thus do the arts of despotism commonly defeat themselves. During the

reign of William and Mary the press was declared by parliament to be completely free, and no legal restraint has been since imposed upon it. The law of libel, however, still inflicts upon wanton defamation of character those penalties which are required by justice and sound policy.

We may properly mention, in this connexion, the unfairness and abuse with which the history of literary controversy is stained. The scholastic disputes of the middle ages were conducted with a violence and ferocity, which it almost makes one shudder to observe. Among these disputes the most celebrated was that between the Nominalists and Realists. The subject of controversy between them seems to us not very important; but the contest was then prosecuted almost as though life and death depended upon the issue. An eye-witness declares that it was not at all uncommon for parties in this literary quarrel to resort to the argument of the fist, the club, and even the sword, when they had exhausted their resources in the way of personal vituperation; so that severe wounds were a usual, and death itself not a very unusual consequence of their intolerant acrimony.

The writings of most of the principal Protestant Reformers are disfigured by coarse abuse of their opponents. Those who exclaimed stoutly and justly against the arbitrary inroads of the papacy upon the right of private judgment, were themselves, unconsciously indeed, but really infringing the same right by their uncharitable denunciations. Such is the weakness and deceitfulness of poor human nature! Next to Melancthon, Erasmus was probably the mildest of the prominent Reformers of the sixteenth century. But he was not always treated with as much courtesy as he extended to others. Scaliger, in reply to a dialogue written by Erasmus to discountenance the prevailing rage for imitating Cicero, poured out upon him a torrent of personal abuse—calling him illiterate, a drunkard, an impostor, an apostate, a hangman, a demon hot from hell! The writings of Luther, Calvin and Beza are marked by the too free use of invective. These celebrated men scruple not to call their opponents liars, asses, knaves, drunkards, lunatics, dogs, apes, devils, etc. The famous controversy between Milton and Salmasius exhibits a profusion of the same personal acrimony. Salmasius taunts Milton with being but a puny fraction of a man, a dwarf, a bloodless being of mere skin and bone, a despicable pedagogue, and with unfeeling rancor flouts his blindness by

applying to him the following line of the *Æneid*:

“*Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.*”*

Milton was not sparing of similar invective in his rejoinder. Du Moulin, a subsequent antagonist of Milton, scarcely yields to Salmasius in the virulence of his style. He compares Milton to a hangman, and says that his mental was of a piece with his physical vision. More or less of the same temper is observable in most of the controversies which have been prosecuted in later times. Seldom has there been wanting a studious effort to disparage the motives or the reputation of the adverse party. If a taunt has seemed likely to lessen the force of an argument, rarely indeed has it been withheld.

The use of nicknames is an expedient of intolerance which has proved very efficient. In general they are a condensed calumny. They are fastened upon a party with the intent of impairing its credit by enlisting against it, not reason, but prejudice. The first revolutionists in Holland were denominated by their enemies “*Les Gueux*,” the *beggars*. The French Protestants, after wearing several other opprobrious designations, at last were called by the well-known nickname of *Huguenots*; which is supposed to have originated from their hiding themselves in secret places and appearing only at night, like king Hugon, the great hobgoblin of France. At the outset of the French Revolution, the aristocratic classes bestowed upon the discontented lower orders, the derisive epithet of “*Sans Culottes*.”

The name of *Puritans* was given by way of ridicule to those stanch advocates of increased purity, the reformers of the Reformation; from whom the people of New England in general derive their origin. During the English Commonwealth the nickname of *malignant* was a stout weapon against the adherents of the old government. Before that time the opposing parties had been denominated *cavaliers* and *round-heads*. The former epithet sprang from the lordly bearing and romantic spirit of the royalists; the latter from the cropt hair of their fanatical opponents. The singular nicknames, *Whig* and *Tory*, which

* The word *ingens* in this verse thus applied involves an inconsistency with the previous epithets. There was a special appropriateness in the last part of the verse, since Milton had then lost but one of his eyes.

have undoubtedly acquired more extensive notoriety than any others recorded in history, took their rise in the reign of Charles II. of England. It is said that the name *whigs*, applied by the court-party to the Scotch covenanters, and those in England who sided with them, was taken from the Scotch beverage of sour milk, denominated *whigg*; while the republican party stigmatized the royalists with the epithet *tories*, which was the name of certain Irish robbers. It is doubtful whether the former epithet was given from a supposed resemblance in point of acidity between the beverage referred to and the dispositions of the whigs; or from a contemptuous allusion to the general poverty and meanness of their condition—sour milk being the common beverage of the indigent in Scotland.

Careful examination will show that both magistrates and private individuals have been sometimes prompted by honest intentions in their intolerance; and on the other hand, their tolerance has not unfrequently sprung from unworthy motives.

It is wonderful to observe how much evil is done with the best intentions; and how much good has resulted from the worst. Among the Romans intolerance was, in the main, a matter of state polity. Not that there were no bigots among them, whose intolerance sprang from real attachment to the superstitions of their ritual;—but those who wielded the national policy interwove intolerance with it from other than religious views. Most of the magistrates and patricians had no faith at all in the popular religion. Cicero expressed the sentiment of a numerous class, when he said that, on seeing two Roman augurs engaged in their ostensibly solemn rites, he had often wondered how they could keep from laughing in each other's faces. But it was supposed to be state policy to sustain a state-religion; and with this view Rome was intolerant to the extent already described.

It is probable that civil intolerance has been prompted, to a great degree, by the same principle in many modern nations. History shows that in all ages the pretext of religion has been given to measures really incited by political motives. The course of Charles V. concerning the Reformation was clearly marked out by secular policy, rather than the zeal which he alleged in behalf of the Catholic religion. The same remark may be made as to most of the European princes of the time, even of those who espoused the side of the reformers. Their adoption of this cause sprang, in general, from selfish aims.

The civil war between the Catholics and Huguenots in France sprang in reality from political motives. Those who kindled and controlled it took advantage of prevalent religious hostility to accomplish their own schemes of aggrandizement. James II. of England stoutly insisted on the principles of *toleration* and *liberty of conscience*, when he was striving to bring about the repeal of the test-act. But his real object was to give the Catholics the ascendancy, and thus, in the end, annihilate liberty of conscience. From the time that religious toleration was first practised by a considerable community on a tolerably impartial basis down to the present moment, it has frequently been an instrument of selfish policy in the hands of governments and individual statesmen. Holland may be considered as the birth-place of true practical toleration. The establishment of this principle attracted multitudes of conscientious and industrious dissenters of all sorts from the various countries of Europe; and wonderfully promoted the trade and wealth of the United Provinces.

I think it may be asserted with truth, that toleration of opinion has seldom been advocated from unalloyed love for it as a principle applicable to the most dissimilar and discordant sects. In a Protestant country the Catholic argues for toleration; in a Catholic country he will have none of it. The dissenter has too often been changed by prosperity into a bigot of the most exclusive character. What he once pleaded for with earnestness will then seem to him "a cursed, intolerable toleration,"—as it did to the English Presbyterians when they attained to predominance in the State.

The Protestant Reformation itself, even in the minds of its most enlightened promoters, was, to use the words of the author of *Spiritual Despotism*, "an assault, much rather upon the *Papacy*, and upon its special errors and superstitions, than upon the theory and principles of the spiritual despotism, of which the Papacy was the accidental form." It was the abuses of Popery, rather than its essential character, which led to its downfall. The worldliness of the ecclesiastics, from the highest to the lowest, the introduction of the traffic in indulgences,—such were the motives which first roused Luther to war against the Papal See. The breach, of course, grew wider and wider. When the power of the Pope was brought to bear upon him and his adherents; and when the two systems came to exist side by side in most Christian countries,—sometimes one and sometimes the other

predominant,—it could not be otherwise than that some correct notions of toleration should be elicited. Thus, liberty of conscience, so far as it was attained, was rather an incidental result, than a main, definite purpose of the Reformation.

Real intolerance, the intolerance of the heart is seldom or never seen by the possessor in its true light. It is sincere, indeed; but there can be no more hurtful form of bigotry than that of deluded fanaticism. Instigated by this spirit, men are guilty of unrighteous oppression, and verily think they are doing God service. Persecutors and persecuted, in multitudes of instances, have been alike animated with sincere zeal for what they considered the right. "There can be no doubt," says the persecutor, "that my views are correct, and that he who does not adopt them endangers his spiritual welfare. It must be a benevolent act to appeal to the temporal interest of my neighbor for the good of his soul. Therefore I am bound to try, by pains and penalties, yes, if it be necessary, by the menace of death itself, to bring him from his errors into the true faith; and if the actual infliction of death upon him will deter others from injuring their own souls by the same or like errors, does not philanthropy require the stroke?" One of the popes, in a letter enjoining all true followers of the church to ferret out heretics, and punish them with death if they proved obstinate, sustains his injunction by the following argument: "The man who takes away *physical* life, is punished with death. Now, *faith* is the source of *eternal* life; for it is written: 'The just shall live by faith.' How much more guilty, then, than a common murderer, and how much more worthy of death must a heretic be, who robs people of their faith—of eternal life!"

Such is the sophistry with which intolerance has, in all ages, deceived, or sought to defend itself. Once set up in the heart as a proper principle, it is almost impossible to dislodge it. It finds nutriment in the worst passions of human nature. When we have come to call evil good, or good evil, there is but little hope of reformation. We cannot doubt that excellent and pious men have cherished a spirit of intolerance. How far, even among the Catholics themselves, it may have been prompted by genuine zeal for supposed truth, it belongs to God alone to determine. Let us not be intolerant ourselves in considering the history of intolerance. We may denounce the principle, but it does not follow that we may universally denounce those as thoroughly wicked who practised it. A good man may,

with mistaken views of duty, be actuated by this spirit of the devil. While we estimate aright the evil influence of the deed, let us always do justice to the sincere intentions of the doer. "The heart is deceitful above all things." Of many sincerely intolerant men, it may be said, no doubt with truth, that, could they have seen the real springs of their intolerance, they would have exerted themselves as sincerely to get rid of it. Could they have seen that in truth they were cherishing a criminal disregard for the rights of others, a proud spirit of infallibility, inconsistent with the meekness that Christ inculcates,—in fine, that their intolerance was a wolf in sheep's clothing,—they would not have rested till they had acted in accordance with their new views of duty.

ARTICLE VII.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND.

IN the number of this journal for July, 1840, we attempted to give some account of the present condition of the English established church, and particularly of the views which are now earnestly promulgated by the writers of the Oxford Tracts for the Times. It seems to be a fitting and an important inquiry: What has occasioned the rise and prevalence of these peculiar views? To what causes are we to ascribe the statement and inculcation of doctrines, against which some of the best men in the English establishment so loudly and indignantly protest? How is it, that in reformed England, in a Protestant university and in the nineteenth century, dogmas should be propounded which would lead us back, as many think, to the iron times of Papal *absolutism*?

One ground of the appearance, or rather re-appearance, of the doctrines in question, is, in human nature itself. The Oxford writers are the representatives of a class of men now rapidly diminishing, that worship the Past—that fall down before the graven images of antiquity—that repose on authority and precedents, and linger among the monuments of the mighty and

the sainted dead. They are the antitypes and counterparts of thousands in the Protestant world, and of millions in the Papal, who have submitted their reason to the *dicta* of some real or imaginary great men, to councils falsely called ecumenical, to traditions turbid and uncertain at their very source, or to formulæ and creeds, not drawn up by apostolic men, but by some melancholy misanthrope, or furious bigot. We should, however, recollect, that it is *original temperament* which is concerned, at least in part. There are idiosyncrasies, or native peculiarities, over which the individuals themselves have but a partial control. Common candor demands that we should make all proper allowances. A considerable measure of this conservative spirit is, also, one of the principal elements of the English character. It is no more unphilosophical to expect, sometimes, a sudden outbreak of it in Britain, than it is, in our country, to behold, occasionally, choice specimens of democracy. The well-being of the British empire may depend on this earnest love of the Past.

Again, the perversion of the Protestant principle of free discussion accounts, in a measure, for the recent developments of the Oxford *tractators*. They have seen the evils of Dissent. They have gazed on the bitter conflicts of non-conformists, contending for the right of free discussion—for the privilege, every man for himself, of interpreting the Bible. The Wesleyan has been arrayed against the Whitefieldite, the Congregationalist against the Plymouth Brethren, and the close communion Baptist against his more liberal brother, Toplady anathematizing Wesley, and Wesley leaving Toplady to the uncovenanted mercies of God, Hall and Kinghorn measuring their weapons together, Fuller lifting up his huge battle-axe against all and several who should wilfully impugn the standard Calvinism or the primitive mode of baptism, while some old Scotch claymore was ever and anon falling upon every Southron indiscriminately, who would not canonize John Knox, or sturdily maintain the divine right of ruling elders. At this horrible braying of arms, the retired Oxford Fellow stands aghast. He is amazed that these men, who are all agreed in renouncing the apostolical succession, should so belabor and bespatter each other. The riddle is not expounded till he remembers the unsoundness of the great doctrine of the Wittenberg reformer, viz., the right, inalienable, of every man, to read and expound the Bible as he pleases. This is the Pandora's box, whence issue all forms of

mischief. This is the secret of the everlasting din of arms, the "confused noise" of dissenting warriors. The axe, therefore, must be laid at the root of the tree. The Protestant principle is radically corrupt. Men have *not* the right of private judgment. They must put their faith in the exegesis of the church. They must sit, docile learners, at the feet of their gray-headed and reverend mother. Into her hands are committed the keys of knowledge, which Luther, sacrilegiously, wrested from her. Such is the course of reasoning by which the High-Churchman of Oxford is led to denounce what he contemptuously terms the "right of private judgment ;"* or rather, such is the partial observation of facts, which leads him to repose more complacently than ever, on the loving bosom of the holy and apostolic church. The quarrels of the Dissenters have thrown him off his guard. He reasons from the perversion of a principle. He gathers up the abuses of a good thing, and on them builds his theory. When all sects, except his own dear communion, and even some *small* fragments of that, are contending with each other, as though Christianity itself were at stake, he looks around for a firm footing. He is not satisfied till he has re-affirmed more strongly than ever, that *the church*, THE CHURCH is the only authorized expounder of God's truth. Whoever sets up for himself in this perilous business of interpretation is a sacrilegious intruder. He takes hold of the ark with unconsecrated hands, and will be terribly smitten for his presumption. Thus, the disputes of the various dissenting denominations in England, we have no doubt, are a prominent cause of the Oxford development. One extreme has produced its opposite.

Another cause of the new movement at Oxford may be found in the Episcopal church herself. To a certain extent, this movement falls in with the genius of the established communion. The whole tendency of the Tracts is to exalt the authority of the bishops, to magnify their office, to show the sin and folly of resistance to their commands. Now, it is not in human nature, nor in Christian nature, unless it has received an extraordinary degree of sanctification, to be displeased with that, though it be somewhat irregular, which promotes one's own dignity and spiritual power. This circumstance may explain, in part, the silence of the great body of the bishops of the English church, or their tacit approval of the Oxford views. We

* See Eclectic Review, 1839, 1840.

recollect but two or three of the prelates who have uttered a syllable of condemnation, and one of these is Daniel Wilson, of Calcutta, who was *formerly* ranked almost among the Methodists. Why have not the bishops of Oxford and of Bristol interfered? Why has not his lordship of London looked into the matter? If the Christian Observer is to be credited, the Oxford innovations do not concern rites merely. They do not pertain to the position of the body of the minister in prayer alone, or to the number of his vigils. They trench upon the vital doctrine of justification by faith. They implicitly, if not openly, set up the notion of the efficacy of human works. They bring forward long and ingenious essays to show that there should be great reserve in communicating religious knowledge, that the proclamation of redeeming love is to be made known cautiously. In other words, the teaching of the Oxford doctors is silently undermining the evangelical system, and substituting in its place fasts, penances, painful postures of the body, reliance on tradition, and many other similar requisitions. In such circumstances, why do not the Right Reverend fathers in God utter their admonitory and authoritative voice? When cardinal doctrines are in danger of being obscured or nullified, why do not their legitimate defenders say so at once? Or, if they accord with the views propounded at the ancient university, why do they not commence a course of ecclesiastical discipline against the conductors of the Christian Observer and other similar prints, as false accusers, as those who have slandered the fair fame of their co-presbyters? The truth is, that the position of the bishops is not the most enviable. They are manifestly embarrassed, and find it to be the safer course to say nothing at all. The subject is one of extreme delicacy. They cannot condemn the Oxford gentlemen in mass, for thus they would be laying rude hands on some part of the sacred edifice which they have sworn to uphold. They cannot sanction, indiscriminately, the positions of the evangelical school in the establishment, for the founders of this school verged, in some important respects, towards dissent. They are not ready to join in the warfare which the friends of Newton, Venn, Milner and Scott are waging against their Oxford brethren, for these last are really justified in a part of their movements by the language of the rituals, and by the early or the later usages of the English church. Besides, the Tracts strenuously maintain the comfortable doctrine, that "our present bishops are the heirs

and representatives of the apostles by successive transmission of the prerogative of being so; every link in the chain being known from St. Paul to our present metropolitans.”*

Some of the opponents of Dr. Pusey and of his friends have expressed their surprise, that the doctrines in question should emanate from Oxford. Nothing, however, could be, in our opinion, less a matter of astonishment. Oxford was founded in the palmiest days of the Papal supremacy. The University was confirmed by Papal authority, and received such privileges as the See of Rome claimed the power to confer. It was mentioned in the constitutions published by Clement V., after the Council of Vienne, A. D. 1311, in company with Paris, Bologna and Salamanca. It was ordained that schools should be erected, and that all prelates and ecclesiastical corporations in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland should be taxed for the maintenance of professors at Oxford. Matthew of Paris ranked Oxford as an ecclesiastical school next to Paris, and called it the foundation of the Roman Catholic church. It is well known that this University has retained many of the features of the times of its foundation. The dust of centuries is accumulated on its walls. It has steadily resisted all innovations. It adhered with deathlike tenacity to the schoolman's logic, to the *trivium* and *quadrivium* of the good old days of Aquinas and Scotus. It is the University which had Laud for a chancellor, which hated the Puritans, which denounced, in unmeasured terms, the late Reform Bill, which, on all occasions, takes, as by instinct, the highest tory ground, which was ready to impale Dr. Hampden for his liberal opinions, which, in short, in the language of a late writer, “has experienced but few symptoms of that revival which has been manifested at Cambridge.”

The Fellows of both Universities are by statute *unmarried* men. Perhaps this is a necessary regulation. Families could not be maintained on the foundations. We do not complain of the exclusion of married incumbents.† We simply state that the regulation must have certain moral effects. Oxford is a cloistered establishment. It is shut out, in a great measure, from the social world. Its learned doctors necessarily sympathize with the tenets of “ancient Christianity,” in respect to the

* Tracts for the Times, No. 7.

† The statute at Trinity College, Dublin, requiring the celibacy of the Fellows, has been repealed during the past year.

greater purity of the virgin state. We do not deny to the Cyprians and Basils of Oxford unimpeachable morality, tenderness of conscience, and a delicate shrinking from every moral contamination. Yet having resided long in a University which has been fixed to her moorings almost a thousand years; conversant with the dim and shadowy past; reminded at every corner and in every leaf of the statute-book of a venerable antiquity; cut off, in a great degree, from the charms of social life and the living world; it is not strange that such men should idolize the fathers, and cling to the apostolical succession, and speak tenderly of monks and nuns, and advocate the re-introduction of fasts and vigils, and prayers for the dead, and cry out against the degenerate and stirring times in which they are called to live and toil. The movement is, in part, owing to the *place* where the movers live. Who would look for an apologist of celibacy in London, or an earnest defender of the divine right at Manchester or Sheffield?*

Poetry has had something to do with the new movement. Prof. Keble, one of the principal *tractators*, is a genuine child of song. His "Christian Year" was, in one sense, a precursor of the Tracts. It strowed the way with the sweetest flowers of poesy. It burnished the apostolical chain to a wonderful brightness. It intermingled and hallowed the usages of the church with the most delicate affections of the heart, and the most musical cadences of the voice. It almost beguiled the stern non-conformist into a love for the feasts and the fasts of the usurping church. As we read the soothing and mellow verses of Keble, our affections flow, involuntarily, towards the objects of his passionate admiration. We cannot stop to analyze the sentiment which is couched beneath the delicious strain. It seems like Vandalism to hunt for heresy amid the flowers scattered along by one so gentle and so loving. With the poet, we can hardly forbear to loathe every thing which would interrupt the strains of melody that seem to have been caught near heaven's door. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the volume contains not a little in which a zealous Papist would most cordially sympathize. Witness the following:

"Ave Maria! Thou whose name
All but adoring love may claim,

* Dr. Hook, we are aware, has a large congregation at *Leeds*, but Dr. Hook is a bustling man, and is not a true Oxford celibate.

Yet may we reach thy shrine;
 For He, thy Son and Saviour, vows
 To crown all lowly, lofty brows
 With love and joy like thine.*

The poetry of Wordsworth is not wholly free from expressions of the same general tenor with many in the *Christian Year*.† The general spirit is strikingly congenial with the tendencies of some of the writers of the Oxford Tracts. The poetry is meditative, calm, soothing, peaceful, utterly unallied to the noisy, forward, assuming spirit of the present times. It loves the past. Its voices linger and quiver among the Gothic aisles and towers and arches of the old cathedrals. It is full of ecclesiastical sympathies and recollections. One of the prominent effects of the immortal *Excursion* is to hallow in the reader's mind the observances of the church of England, and, in no small degree, of the church of Rome, for the English ritual is a transcript, in many respects, of that used by the earlier communion. The poet does not stop with the present life; in the *Church-yard among the Mountains*, we are carried forward to the life beyond the grave. Our dearest hopes are indissolubly linked with the solemn words of the prayer-book, words imperishably associated with the sublime cadence of the faithful poet. The same remarks, in a certain degree, are applicable to his great contemporaries, Southey and Coleridge. All have contributed, in no slight measure, to awaken a fondness for antiquity, a reverence for the noble army of martyrs, an undying attachment to what is time-worn and venerable in the church. We can trace an intimate acquaintance with their works in some of the Oxford theologians. There is a grace and a freshness in the style, a rhythm in the periods, a delicacy and a thoughtfulness in the observations, and a correspondence in the spirit, which prove that the prose writers have sat at the

* See the whole hymn, entitled, *The Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, p. 315, of the 1st American edition of Keble's *Christian Year*.

† We refer to such passages as the following, which happily are rare:

“And when the pure
 And consecrating element hath cleansed
 The original stain, the child is there received
 Into the second ark, Christ's church, with trust
 That he, from wrath redeem'd, therein shall float
 Over the billows,” etc.

feet of the poets. We think that this is apparent in some of the productions of Pusey, Newman and Keble.

It has been affirmed by some, who would rather apologize and palliate than abet and defend the Oxford views, that the aim of the authors is mainly to pave the way for a separation of the church from the state. It is supposed, that they have become disgusted with the unholy and unnatural alliance, that they loathe the impurities which it introduces into the most sacred things, that they dread the spoliation actual and threatened of a whig administration, who will go as far as they dare in reforming the church, and that feeling little hope that kings and queens and parliaments will become true and hearty defenders of the faith, they choose to abandon the connection altogether. Rather than be subjected to the supervision of the *friend* of the Hon. Mrs. Norton and of his compeers, rather than be supplied with prelates by ministers who neither fear God nor love the church, they prefer to stand on their own independent ground, leaning on the Everlasting Hills for support, and looking to no earthly Head.

We doubt, however, whether these apologists can make out their charitable supposition. The writers of the Tracts do, indeed, advert to the mischiefs of state interference; sometimes with a strong and indignant voice.* But this is not the great object of the publications. It is a subordinate affair, and but rarely adverted to, and never directly advocated. The authors state, and we have no doubt honestly, that the Tracts were published with the object of contributing something towards the practical revival of doctrines, which, though held by the great divines of the English church, at present have become obsolete with the majority of her members. The practical evils which are the subject of reiterated complaint, are the neglect of the daily service; the desecration of festivals; the eucharist

* Thus in Tract No. 12, it is asserted and proved, that the church is treated far more arbitrarily, and is more completely at the mercy of the chance-government of the day, than ever Englishmen were under the worst tyranny of the worst times. It is stated, that the three acts of election, confirmation and consecration, instead of being rendered more efficient checks than formerly, are now so arranged as to offer the least possible hinderance to the most exceptionable appointments of a godless ministry.

scantily administered; insubordination practised in all ranks of the church; orders and offices imperfectly developed, etc. We see no reason as yet to conclude that any party in the established church are meditating a disruption of the ties which connect the spiritual to the temporal power.

With respect to the progress of the Oxford doctrines at the present moment, we have but a word to say. At the date of our last advices, about five volumes had been published, including ninety numbers. The topics discussed are, in general, like those exhibited in the earlier part of the series. The periodical publications do not devote, we perceive, quite so much space to the controversy as they did in the primary stage of it. Possibly the zeal of the combatants is somewhat abated. An exception to this remark must be made, however, in relation to Mr. Isaac Taylor. This vigorous writer entered the lists about twelve months ago. The immediate intention of his researches was to lay open the real condition, moral, spiritual and ecclesiastical, of the ancient church. Instead, however, of carrying forward a multifarious inquiry concerning twenty topics of early opinion and practice, Mr. Taylor selected, in the first instance, the subject of celibacy, a subject, as he remarks, of an intrinsically important kind; one that has intimate alliances with the entire ecclesiastical system of antiquity, touching on the principles whence sprang the most ancient notions concerning the mysterious properties of the sacraments, the position and power of the clergy, and the fundamental doctrines of justification and sanctification. The sum of the whole discussion is this: That the notions and practices connected with the doctrine of the superlative merit of religious celibacy, were, at once, the causes and the effects of errors in theology, of perverted moral sentiments, of superstitious usages, of hierarchical usurpations; and that they furnish us with a criterion for estimating the general value of ancient Christianity; and, in a word, afford reason enough for regarding, if not with jealousy, at least with extreme caution, any attempt to induce the modern church to imitate the ancient church.

Mr. Taylor buckles on his armor with all confidence. We are not sure but that there is an unnecessary protrusion of his qualifications for the work which he has undertaken, and of his determination to do it thoroughly, and as no other man in England (for his language implies almost that) can do it. A little more modesty might have been becoming. There are other

men on the continent,* if not in England, who have studied the Fathers in the Latin and Greek originals as patiently and profoundly as the *patriotic* student who resides at Stanford Rivers. Nevertheless, his boasts are not empty. He opens his dusty folios with the arm of an Ajax, and reads homilies from them before his Oxford auditors, with the practical and strong sense of an Englishman. His learning is affluent, and his logic cogent. He shows remarkable skill in making the most of his quotations. He does not deal in dry abstracts, nor string together long series of barren excerpts. Every thing is made to bear on his grand design ; arguments and facts are *dove-tailed* together. Every page is vital with the writer's purposes and feelings. We do not see, moreover, how his conclusions can be resisted. We know that the apologists for the Oxford men affirm that Mr. Taylor is fighting straws ; that he is meeting an enemy of his own imagination ; and that his antagonists will assent substantially to his facts and to his conclusions. But it is easier to say this than to prove it. It is more agreeable to denounce Mr. Taylor than to refute him. Is it not the undoubted aim and tendency of the Oxford writers to magnify the fathers ; to set them up as guides in doctrine and in practice, and to place them almost on a level with the inspired apostles ? We think that every candid reader of their pages must acknowledge this. Besides, it is not mere general admiration of the fathers. Their merits are particularized and amplified. Their rites and usages are mentioned in considerable detail, and they are described as judges who must end the strife. There are expressions, not by any means obscure, in favor of celibacy. The Remains of Mr. Froude have, most plainly, this anti-social tendency. Dr. Pusey, in his letter to the bishop of Oxford, remarks, that the " preference of celibacy as the higher state is scriptural, and, as being such, is primitive." These positions Mr. Taylor controverts. He shows what Ancient Christianity is. He meets the question fairly and fully. He demonstrates that the primitive Christians cherished radically unsound opinions and followed most pernicious practices in relation to the holiness of the virgin state, thus anticipating some of the worst evils of full-grown popery. He also shows that this ascetic

* We have before us a late German edition of the Apostolical Fathers for *the use of schools* ! Who ever heard of such a thing where the English language is spoken ?

tendency had a thousand ramifications—that its baneful effects are seen over the whole field of theological tenets and rites, poisoning and blasting whatever it touched. Hence the inference is unavoidable, that the primitive church is not to be trusted in respect to doctrine or practice. Her testimony is invaluable concerning the canonical books. She ought always to be revered and loved for her noble testimonies given on the rack and in the flames. Further than this, the ancient church is but of little use to us, except as holding up a beacon-light. Hence also the further inference, that the corner-stone in the Oxford argument is knocked away. The authorities fail, the premises are unsound, and the beautiful structure must tumble to the ground.*

There is a large body of individuals in the church of England who may be termed *moderate* men. They are, in some sense, the successors of archbishop Tillotson; in other respects, they more nearly resemble bishop Jebb and his friend Knox. In theology, they are rather inclined to the Arminian school, though not, by any means, in the degree to which such men as bishop Tomline proceeded. They are in favor of missionary and other charitable movements, provided these are under the auspices of the Christian Knowledge, and the Prayer-Book and Homily Societies. They are not now hostile to the British and Foreign Bible Society, though, for the most part, they choose to keep aloof. They are men of serious feelings and of devout and blameless manners. Some of them are earnestly engaged in extending the influence of the Episcopal com-

* Mr. Taylor is proceeding with the publication of his views on the *festina lente* principle. One or two Nos. have appeared in England since the republication of the volumes by Mr. Hooker of Philadelphia. These (Oct. 1840) we have not seen. We understand that Mr. T. is pursuing the same line of argument in relation to other practices of the primitive church. One word about the style. There is a manifest improvement. The sentences are constructed much more happily than many which are found in "Despotism" and "Saturday Evening." Still there is, occasionally, an unpardonable carelessness, and a use of singular and vulgar phrases, and an artificial structure of sentences, almost allied to Teutonic involutions, with which Mr. Taylor seems to have no practical knowledge.

munion, by the erection of churches, and by Pastoral Aid Societies. They may approve some things brought forward by the Oxford divines ; in regard to others, they would wholly dissent. They strongly hope, it is to be presumed, that the discussion may soon quietly subside. They are the men, according to Mr. Taylor, who are accustomed to admire the fathers of the English Reformation on no account more than on that of their wisdom in carrying amendment just to the point where it actually stopped, and no farther, and who deprecate any sort of movement or agitation that tends to change these stanch and well-contented church-of-England men. In this class may be included the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of London.

We may mention political Churchmen as another powerful section. This includes men of various, and, in some respects, very diverse characters, such as the turbulent bishop of Exeter, Phillpots, who lately contended in parliament that the church of Scotland is not a true church of Christ ; the conductors of the Quarterly Review, who are so famous for hating Methodists and Americans ; a large number of the members of parliament, officers in the army and navy, who are serious enough to think at all in relation to such matters, and, finally, individuals like Mr. William E. Gladstone, who would deprecate any disunion of church and state, because they hope that the hallowed influences of religion may not be wholly withdrawn from political circles. They are unhappy in the frivolous and worldly-minded companies by which they are surrounded. They would feel like the arctic mariner amid icebergs, if the friendly, though cold sun of the church should wholly withdraw his shining. They have, in their minds, a glorious ideal of a Christian state, such as that which bishop Butler has so finely pictured in his analogy. They would make the national conscience a thing of reality.* They would have religion and "police" sweetly blend their influences. On this account they are opposed to the intimations which are occasionally thrown out by the Oxford school in favor of a dissolution of church and state. Such a measure would be death to their fondest hopes. It would leave them alone in Spitsbergen.

The English church, doubtless, embraces another large class,

* Hence, with admirable consistency, Mr. Gladstone has taken bold ground against the infamous attack on China by the English.

the men of no religion, the fox-hunting clergymen, the pleasure-loving gentry, the profane naval commander, the dissipated gownsman. We are inclined to think that the number of individuals in this class is proportionably much less than in the days of archbishop Cornwallis. Still, the terms of communion are such, the rite of confirmation is so often thoughtlessly administered, so miserably loose are the notions which prevail, to a great extent, on the identity of baptism and regeneration, and, in short, so close is the connection of the church with a "godless ministry," as the Oxford writer terms it, that the church will always be a receptacle of the good and the bad—of the openly and notoriously bad—of men who unblushingly break every one of the commandments of God. How can it be otherwise? There is no such thing as church discipline, according to the confession of the members of that church herself. Every church-warden, in every parish in England, is called on, once a year, to attend the visitation of his archdeacon. At this time oaths are tendered to him respecting his different duties, and, among other things, he swears that he will present to the archdeacon the names of all such inhabitants of his parish as are leading notoriously immoral lives. This oath is regularly taken once a year by every church-warden in every parish of England; yet such a thing as any single presentation for notoriously immoral conduct has scarcely been heard of for a century.*

The only remaining division in the establishment is the evangelical school. This class have had for their organ, almost from the commencement of the century, the *London Christian Observer*. This very respectable publication, which has been received with much favor in this country by men of all denominations, was edited till about 1816 by the excellent Zachary Macauley. Since that year, it has been under the charge of Rev. S. C. Wilks. It has been, in general, distinguished for candor, judgment, moderation, a firm adherence to the doctrines of the gospel, and a considerable degree of learning. Within a few years, however, there has been some change in its tone towards the Dissenters. It has lost something of that courtesy and amenity which formerly distinguished it.† It has

* Tract for the Times, No. 59.

† The editor recently mentioned, somewhat cavalierly, that it was only by accident, and at long intervals, that he happened to see a No. of the *Eclectic Review*, the *Congregational*

become a little more piquant and aristocratic in its style. It has verged somewhat towards that dignified, *non-intercourse* spirit which is not wholly unnatural in all Englishmen, but which John Newton, Wilberforce and their sainted contemporaries would have abhorred. Even the excellent bishop of Calcutta, if we are rightly informed, does not bear his honors quite so meekly as the rector of Islington did. This gradual change in the evangelical body is what Isaac Taylor means, we suppose, in the following sentence: "It is true that the modern disciples and successors of Romaine, Fletcher, Milner, Cecil, Scott and Newton have, by the sheer force of the current of church affairs, been carried towards a new position, and have been led *greatly* to modify and to *tighten* the ecclesiastical notions professed by their departed leaders." Of the relative, or the real strength of the evangelical body in the establishment, we have no means of judging with accuracy. The Church Missionary Society, one of the most flourishing charitable institutions of the day, is wholly supported by them. They are, also, prominent contributors to the treasury of the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Religious Tract Society, and other national institutions. They number among their supporters, we believe, all the East Indian bishops, also, the bishops of Chester, Winchester, Ripon, etc. Under the guidance of Wilberforce, Macauley, Buxton, Stephen and others, they have been among the most stable and earnest friends to the extinction of slavery. We do not remember many eminent literary names in their ranks. Dr. Isaac Milner occupied Newton's chair at Cambridge. The late Mr. Farish, professor of natural philosophy at Cambridge, and the present professor of Greek in the same university, Mr. Scholefield, acquired no inconsiderable reputation. Mr. Simeon, of Cambridge, was a very voluminous author. As a writer on practical religious subjects, bishop Wilson, of Calcutta, has been prominent. A few eminent men among the nobility have not been ashamed to profess evangelical sentiments, and to live a life of faith on the Son of God.

Magazine, or the Patriot. A strange and ungracious boast! The leading journal of one great class of evangelical Christians never, or but occasionally, reading the leading journals of the other great class! Ch. Obs. 1839, p. 98.

Many distinguished merchants have also contributed their money and their influence in the diffusion of these sentiments.*

* We will subjoin in a note some statistical facts in relation to the established church. Its fundamental doctrines and tenets are embodied in the thirty-nine Articles, agreed upon in convocation in 1562, and revised and finally settled in 1571. These articles are said to have been chiefly compiled from others drawn up shortly after the Reformation in 1552, in the reign of Edward VI., and which had been repealed by Mary. But though this is the state religion, all others are tolerated under certain restrictions. The only class of Christians at present proscribed on account of religious opinions are the Jesuits, and members of religious orders bound by monastic or religious vows. The ecclesiastical divisions of England and Wales are provinces or archbishoprics, dioceses or bishoprics, archdeaconries, deaneries and parishes; each of which divisions has its functionaries, who preside over the functionaries of the inferior divisions; the queen, as head of the church, presiding over all. The number of archbishoprics is two, bishoprics twenty-five, benefices 10,533, parishes 11,077, churches and chapels 11,825, population 13,897,187. The nett revenue of the different sees, as returned to the commissioners of ecclesiastical inquiry, at an average of the three years ending with 1831, amounted to 160,292 pounds sterling a year. But as a considerable portion of the revenue of some of the sees arises from tithes, the value of which has fallen since 1831, the entire nett revenue of the different sees may now be estimated at from £10,000 to £15,000 less. There is a striking difference in the income of the different sees, owing in part to circumstances connected with the original establishment of the various sees, and, in part, to the property attached to some, having, from various causes, become in the course of time much more valuable than that attached to others. Thus the bishop of Durham has a nett revenue of from £18,000 to £20,000 a year, while the bishop of Llandaff's revenue does not exceed from £900 a year to £1,300. The right of presentation, or the distribution of the patronage of benefices in England and Wales, is vested as follows;—in the crown 952 benefices; in the archbishops and bishops 1,248; in the deans and chapters, or ecclesiastical corporations aggregate 787; in dignitaries or other ecclesiastical corporations sole 1,851; universities, colleges and hospitals not ecclesiastical 721; municipal corporations 53; pri-

We will now proceed to offer some remarks on various classes of Dissenters in England and Wales. Our limits will compel us to be more brief than we could wish. In the estimation of the law, all persons are regarded as Dissenters, whose religious principles or modes of worship differ, in any degree, from the standards of the church of England. The differences, however, between one class and another, and between certain classes and the church of England, frequently depend on minute points, which it is very difficult to define.

The Methodists originated between 1730 and 1740. They are divided into two great bodies, the followers of John Wesley, and the followers of George Whitefield. The creed of the Wesleyan Methodists is Arminian. Wesley always objected to the practice of classing his followers with the Dissenters, and required them to attend the worship of the established church when they had no opportunity to hear their own preachers. Hence they might be called Separatists rather than Dissenters. The Wesleyan Methodists are very numerous, especially among the lower classes. There has always been a strong opposition to an educated ministry in this denomination. Mr. Wesley was not able to realize a favorite project for the establishment of a "Seminary for Laborers," which was made a topic of discussion as early as 1744. For a number of years there has been a strenuous debate on the subject in the Annual Conference. In 1815, certain incipient measures were resolved upon. Some of the older preachers, however, steadily resisted the project, and it was not till 1834, that the "Wesleyan Theological Institution for the Improvement of the Junior Preachers," was established. The number of resident students is between thirty and forty. The leading man among the Wesleyans is the Rev. Jabez Bunting, D. D., president of the institution, and also of the conference. The great names among the dead are Mr. Wesley, Richard Watson and Dr. Adam Clarke. Mr. Watson is highly regarded by the Wesleyans as a theologian, and Dr. Clarke as a

vate owners 5,096. More than a third of all the benefices in the country are under £150 a year; 297 are below £50 a year. There are only two livings of £4,000 a year, the rectory of Stanhope in Northumberland, which is £4,843, and Doddington in the county of Cambridge, which is £7,306. There are but three livings worth from £3,000 to £4,000 per annum. See *Macculloch's British Empire*, 1837, Vol. II. p. 410.

commentator. The learning of the latter was multifarious and discursive, rather than correct and profound. The denomination have exhibited an excellent spirit in their efforts to diffuse the gospel at home and abroad. Their missionary operations are carried on with system and energy. Many a solitary place has been made glad,—many a fierce heart in Great Britain has been tamed by them. From the general theological discussions which take place among the other classes of Dissenters, and in the established church, the Wesleyans keep nearly aloof. They are spread over almost the whole kingdom, but are particularly numerous in Yorkshire, Lancashire, Lincoln and Cornwall. The number of the followers of Whitefield is not large, except in Wales, where, in many places, they outnumber the adherents of the established church. According to Mr. Macculloch, the number of all kinds of Methodists may be estimated at about 1,200,000. The disciples of Whitefield have an institution of a mixed character, partly theological and partly literary, at Cheshunt, near London.*

The Independents or Congregationalists maintain, as the name implies, the independency of each congregation or society of Christians, and their right to elect their clergymen, and to lay down rules as to discipline, etc., without being subjected to any foreign constraint. Their origin is traced to the sixteenth century. At the Revolution in 1688, they were, comparatively, a small body; but they have rapidly gained ground since the middle of the last century, particularly at the expense of the English Presbyterians. Macculloch states the number of congregations at 1800; the Congregational Magazine, at 1840. The present number is probably about 1900. In Wales they have 374 congregations, in Yorkshire 170, in London and Middlesex 103, in Lancashire 100. The other counties in which their congregations are the most numerous are Somerset, Essex, Devon, Kent and Wilts. Under the patronage of the Independents are a number of institutions, mainly designed to train men for the ministry. The course of study, literary and theological, varies from four years to six years. The principal seminaries of this kind are the Hackney in London, with from twelve to

* The Congregational Magazine for Jan. 1836, states the number of Wesleyan Methodist congregations at 2,818; Calvinistic Methodist 427; other Methodists 666; total congregations 3,911.

twenty students; the Airedale College, near Bradford in Yorkshire, with above twenty students; the Spring Hill College, in Birmingham, which commenced operations in 1838; Highbury College, Coward College and Homerton College. The three last named are in London, and contain from thirty to forty students, on an average, each. Some of the more affluent Dissenters have been in the habit of sending their sons to the Scottish universities. London University College now opens her doors to them. The denomination are highly respectable in numbers, wealth and general character. Their congregations are made up mainly from the middle classes in society, worthy trades-people in the cities, farmers and tenants in the country, some rich manufacturers and merchants, a few gentlemen in the learned professions, and, occasionally, a member of parliament. They are honestly attached to the constitution and government of the country, though they have acquired an enviable reputation by their uniform resistance to tyranny, and by their passionate love of freedom. Some of the greatest names in English civil and ecclesiastical history illustrate the annals of the Independents. At the present time, however, they can lay no special claim to profound or various learning. Those among the living, whose works are most known in the United States, are the Rev. Dr. John Pye Smith of Homerton, author of the valuable *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*; Rev. Dr. Ebenezer Henderson of Highbury, author of *Biblical Researches*, *Travels in Iceland*, etc.; Rev. George Payne, LL. D., theological tutor at Exeter, who has written on mental philosophy; and Josiah Conder, late editor of the *Eclectic Review*, author of the *Modern Traveller*. The remarks which Isaac Taylor makes in relation to the want of scholarship among the Dissenters are, no doubt, applicable to all the sects. It is clear, as this writer well observes, that the various, but intimately connected subjects, theological and ecclesiastical, at this time likely to be discussed, all come under the common condition of involving laborious researches upon the field of Christian antiquity. But this is a field not much frequented, in our own times, by the English non-conformists of any class. It is but a few individuals, of these communions, that profess any direct acquaintance with the Greek and Latin divines; nor do the tastes of the Dissenting bodies at all favor any reference of the sort.* It should be re-

* *Ancient Christianity*, Am. Ed. p. 34.

marked, that this is not altogether the fault of the Dissenters. They have labored, especially before the repeal of the corporation and test acts in 1828, under a load of disabilities. The idea itself that they are excluded from the two great universities is exceedingly humiliating. It must operate, in a thousand ways, to depress the energies of aspiring young men in the Dissenting ranks, if it does not force them into the Episcopal communion. The great fountains of knowledge are sealed against the approach of more than three millions of the population of England and Wales. While this condition of things exists, the Dissenters *must* suffer in their literary reputation. The erection of a dozen universities, like that of London, would not remove the difficulty. It is the *character* of Oxford and Cambridge,—the slow growth of almost half the centuries of the Christian era—it is ten thousand ancient recollections which cluster around their hallowed walls; it is the substantive, real, glorious, yet invisible and intangible *reputation* of these establishments, which constitute the sum of their privileges,—which make them Oxford and Cambridge, and which are incommunicable in respect to London or Highbury, or Homerton or Exeter, even if these last could be at once and superbly endowed with charters, halls, libraries, and all other visible privileges. What would have been the effect in this country if the colleges at Cambridge, New-Haven, Princeton and Hanover had excluded from their halls, since their first establishment, all young men but those connected with one denomination? Would not the excluded sects have been famous for any thing rather than scholarship?

The Baptists are generally distributed over the whole kingdom, and comprise about 1,200 congregations. Of these, 159 are in Wales, 65 in London and Middlesex, 63 in Yorkshire, 48 in Somersetshire, and about 40 in each of the counties of Bucks, Devon, Gloucester, Hants, Leicester, Monmouth, Norfolk, Northampton, Somerset and Wilts. They are subdivided into Particular or Calvinistic, General or Arminian, &c. Many of their clergymen are educated at the academies at Bristol, at Stepney in London, and at Dr. Steadman's institution in Yorkshire. They have had three men who would confer honor on any denomination, and on any Christian country: Andrew Fuller, Robert Hall and John Foster. The denomination have largely contributed to the support of the Eclectic Review. In foreign missionary operations they were among the foremost.

The Presbyterians were very powerful during the civil wars,

and, at one time, there was much probability that the established religion of the kingdom would be Presbyterian. About the year 1700, there were 800 Presbyterian congregations in England. Since that period, they have gradually declined. At first, their sentiments were strongly Calvinistic, but, in this respect, also, they have materially degenerated. Some congregations are Arminian, others Arian, and others Unitarian. About 70 Presbyterian churches are in communion with, and adhere to the standards of the church of Scotland. These are mostly in the northern counties.* The whole number of Presbyterian churches in England in 1836, as stated in the *Congregational Magazine*, was 197. Some of them are small. Another very recent authority mentions that there are now about 120 Presbyterian places of worship in England, where the doctrines of the Scriptures are maintained and preached as laid down by the English Presbyterians of the 17th century, in the Confession of Faith and larger and smaller Catechisms.† They are frequently called Scotch churches.

The precise number of Unitarian Dissenting congregations we do not know. It must be very small.‡ The number of

* The Synod of the Presbyterian church in England in connection with the church of Scotland has five presbyteries, those of London, Lancashire, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Northwest of England and Berwick. There are, besides, the presbyteries of Northumberland, and of the Northwest of Northumberland. *New Edinburgh Almanac*, 1840, p. 358.

† Sketch of the History and Principles of the Presbyterian Church in England: London, 1840, p. 41.

‡ Among the English Unitarians, who are a studious and cultivated class, the names of Channing, Norton, Dewey, Ware and other Americans, are the names the oftenest heard, when the championship of their sect is in question." *N. A. Review*, Oct. 1840, p. 488. Dr. J. P. Smith gives no very flattering account of the religious state of the English Unitarians. He says that they have no disciplinary watching over conduct, no admission to or exclusion from communion. What is with them called the Lord's Supper is avowedly open to any and to every person who chooses to come. They reject all ordination of ministers. *London Christian Observer*, 1838, pp. 10, 12. The chapel at York, which Lady Hewley attended, and which is under the charge of the Rev. Mr. Wellbeloved, one of the most distinguished ministers of the Unitarian denomination,

congregations of Friends is stated at 396. They are to be found principally in the counties of York, Lancaster, Cumberland and Kent. Mr. Macculloch states that the sect is not increasing. Not a few of the wealthier individuals have laid aside the peculiar dress and phraseology by which its adherents are commonly distinguished. The number of Roman Catholics has rapidly increased within the present century. They are most numerous in Lancashire, particularly in Manchester and Liverpool, where they constitute a large class of the population. According to the details given in Mr. Lewis's valuable Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain, there were in Liverpool, in 1800, 4,950 Irish Catholics; in 1820, 11,016; and in 1833, no fewer than 24,156. The Irish Catholics in Manchester, in 1833, were estimated at about 30,000, and in Birmingham, they amounted to between 5,000 and 6,000. The number of Irish Catholics in London has been said to be as great as in Liverpool and Manchester. The English Catholics are most numerous in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Staffordshire and Warwickshire; and are widely scattered over Northumberland and Durham, some of the principal families of which belong to their communion. The Jews are found in most large towns in England; but by far the greatest number are resident in London. The total number may be estimated at from 12,000 to 14,000. Exclusive of the sects already mentioned, there are many others, whose adherents, however, are comparatively small.

The whole number of Dissenting congregations, of all kinds, in England and Wales, as computed in the Congregational Magazine above referred to, is 8,446; the number of congregations connected with the established church is 11,825. Supposing this statement to be nearly accurate, it shows that the Dissenting congregations are, to those belonging to the church, as 84 to 118, or as 42 to 59. Though some of the Dissenting

has now an average attendance of not more than forty or fifty persons. The chapel at Chester, where Matthew Henry once preached the words of life to crowds, is but thinly attended, though richly endowed. A chapel at Lancaster, with an endowment of about £100 per annum, is attended by about twenty persons. The chapel at Toxteth Park, near Liverpool, once orthodox, and possessing endowments, has scarcely the shadow of a congregation. *Scottish Presb. Review*, No. 24.

congregations are numerous, yet, on an average, they are small compared with those belonging to the church. In the opinion of Mr. Macculloch, the entire number of Dissenters in England and Wales does not exceed 2,700,000, or at most 3,000,000, of whom from 500,000 to 600,000 may be Catholics.

We will now bring these miscellaneous statements and observations to an end, by offering, as intimated in a previous number of the Repository, some general reflections, which have been suggested in the progress of the discussion.

It is apparent that the interests of vital piety in England are not receiving that degree of attention which they merit, and without which no other interest is safe. For proof of this proposition we need not search far. The evangelical division of the established church are not as they were in the days of Venn and Newton and Cecil. The spirituality has declined in proportion as the attention to rites and forms, or to what is exclusive in the Episcopal church, has increased. The warm-hearted piety and the catholic spirit of Wilberforce are not, we fear, fully inherited by his sons. The organs of this party find occasion gently to admonish some friends, like the Noels, who open the arms of charity rather indiscreetly, and who, in their burning zeal to spread the triumphs of the cross, leap over the ecclesiastical pale. Unhappily, some of the men of fervently pious spirit are not guided by sound judgment in their interpretations of Scripture, and run wild with millennial theories. Excellent men like Bickersteth, Henry Woodward, Gerard Noel, and others, who are truly burning lights, are patronizing notions which must inevitably abridge their influence. We do not now hear favorable reports of the increase of piety among the members of the two universities, such as were confidently promulged a few years since.* A portion of the piety, particularly at Oxford, which might otherwise have produced good fruits in the churches of the establishment, has been absorbed in the pending controversy. The religious feelings of men like Pusey and Keble, who evidently possess a truly devotional spirit, are in danger of degenerating into the pietism of Jacob Boehmen and Madame Guion. They may find nourishment to

* See Daniel Wilson's Introductory Essay to Wilberforce's Practical View.

their faith in the ascetic practices which they adopt, but the influence of their course on the minds of the mass, even of the students by whom they are surrounded, must be pernicious or negative. The spiritual discipline of Thomas à Kempis can never be revived in practical, bustling England, and in the restless, upheaving nineteenth century. The piety of the Oxford Tracts—for some of the papers breathe the tender and subdued spirit of genuine devotion—must have but small attraction in manufacturing, mining, mercantile, aggressive England. She wants more substantial, tangible nourishment.

The Dissenters are becoming a thoroughly political race. Their rallying words are liberty, freedom, down with the tithes, Pym, Milton, Hampden, Sidney. This course they do not appear to take, as forced upon them by a melancholy necessity, but they glory in it, as the most honorable path of Christian duty, as eminently congenial with the free spirit of Christianity. Hence, of necessity, piety languishes. In the fierce political debate, its life must be eaten out. The heavenly Dove flies from the realms of noise and strife. He has but little sympathy with hard words and stormy harangues. We know that the Dissenters have violent provocations. They have been contemptuously denied, for ages, some of the dearest rights which belong to them as men and as Britons. That they should express themselves decidedly, and should labor strenuously for the recovery of those rights, is not to be wondered at. Religious men cannot, however, become absorbed in political discussions, without serious injury. If a necessity exists for the course which has been taken, even by multitudes of Dissenting clergymen, it is a dire necessity. So it should be esteemed by them, instead of being justified and eulogized.

If more proofs of our position were wanting, we might refer to the languid manner in which the religious press in England has spoken of the flagrant injustice of the attack on China, and of the determination, openly avowed by at least one member of the ministry, of taking violent possession of the celestial empire. In the view of all right-minded men, out of Britain, the case is one of outrage and wrong. The English nation is a smuggler in the Chinese seas. She has, for years, carried on a contraband traffic in an article which she knows is deadly poison. And yet she is upholding her iniquitous course at the cannon's mouth. Ought not pious men to speak out? Should not the religious press lift up a voice of thunder? If the con-

science of the nation were in a healthful state, if the lords spiritual in parliament remembered their solemn responsibilities, such a tone of remonstrance would be heard, that the ministry would not dare to prosecute the nefarious business. The British people often taunt us in respect to wrongs heaped on the Indians. But *here* it has been in the face of long-continued, powerful remonstrance, and earnest and united prayer to the God of the poor and the oppressed. Our religious publications have spoken loudly and long. Honorable senators in Congress have resisted the aggressions on the Indians inch by inch. We have not, indeed, done all our duty. Still, we have not silently and tamely acquiesced in the demands of cruelty and avarice.

No one of the Christian denominations in England enjoys adequate means for the education of the clergy. There is no peculiar course of study insisted upon by the universities for theological students. At Cambridge the Gospels and the Evidences form part of the university course for all. The Norrissian professor of divinity delivers a course of lectures on doctrinal and historical theology; and a certificate of attendance on this course is demanded by the bishops, in most cases, as a condition of ordination. The competitors for Hebrew scholarships and prizes are voluntary, no attendance being required by statute. At Oxford there are no examiners formally delegated, nor is there any system marked out by the university, for ascertaining, as in the case of the degrees in arts, the requisite qualification of candidates for divinity degrees, and which shall do that for divinity which has been done for arts. The regius professor of divinity holds certain disputations in controversial theology, called *pro forma exercises*, and which were, until lately, carried on in the Latin language. Those who expect to enter orders must attend one course of lectures of the divinity professor, after they have taken their first degree. In consequence, partly, of this lamentable deficiency of theological instruction at the two old universities, the university of Durham has been recently founded, with the professed object of furnishing instruction to students in the north of England, with a view to holy orders. The same object is sought to be accomplished, on behalf of the poorer class of students in Wales, by the modern establishment of the college of St. David's at Lampeter. How far these two institutions answer their design, we are not informed. It is perfectly obvious, however, that with such slight facilities for the acquisition of theological discipline and information, the young candidate for holy orders must be poorly equipped for his work.

He may be profoundly skilled in the Greek metres ; he may make Latin verses according to the most perfect rules of prosody, while he may be totally ignorant of the original fountain of divine knowledge in the Old Testament, or the system of truth which he swears to explain and defend.

With the Dissenting clergy, the case is not much better. Most of their academies are but apologies for a Theological Seminary. The statement of one fact will amply confirm this assertion. The whole circle of arts and sciences, Greek, Hebrew, theology, pastoral duties, and the composition of sermons, are all taught by *two* persons, or at most, by three. Who can rise to eminence as a teacher in every conceivable branch of knowledge ? But without eminent teachers, there will be no accomplished scholars. Or, if an exception sometimes occurs, it will be in spite of the system of study, and not in consequence of it. Two instructors teaching that which twenty men hardly suffice to do well ! Besides, only five or six years are devoted to what are termed in this country academical, collegiate and theological studies, which here occupy and crowd nine years, if not ten or eleven. This mixed mode of study, partly scientific and literary, and partly theological, has never prospered in the United States. The attempt has been made again and again with full faith and fervent zeal, only to be abandoned in despair. Theology is a science. Adequately to master it demands three or four years of undivided and determined study. Preparation to preach the gospel will not spring up from the ground by accident. The age, the state of things in England demand that the Dissenting clergymen should be well-trained men in all needful discipline, able to meet their most accomplished opponents on equal ground. We would respectfully say to these brethren : It is time for you to change your policy. If you cannot educate your sons at Oxford and Cambridge, if you cannot break down the barrier there, then send them to the Scottish universities or to the London university. If you are unable or unwilling to do this, then transform Homerton academy into a proper *bona fide* college, and Highbury into a theological seminary, each on perfectly independent grounds, literary and theological. Instead of building up a mixed seminary at Birmingham, lay out your resources in making a strong college, and persuade a sister city to found a seminary exclusively for theology. We verily believe that such a course would accomplish more for your denominations, would give them more intellectual vigor and moral efficiency than fifty of your *hermaphrodite*

establishments, which are neither one thing nor the other. You may coldly reply that we are ignorant of your circumstances, that we speak at random, and multiply words without knowledge. We answer, that we have honestly formed our opinion from your own confessions and statements, from conversing with your ministers, and from reading some of your sermons.

The condition of scholarship in England, in some of the most important departments, is confessedly low. A late English writer attributes the want of scholarship to the character and tendency of that scholarship itself; to the character, habits and dispositions of the English people; and to the peculiar constitution of the English schools and universities. But whatever the causes may be, the fact is indisputable; in the department of ethical and mental philosophy there is no living writer of note. There has been no contribution to these sciences, of any considerable value, since the days of Tucker and Paley; for Sir James Mackintosh was a Scotchman, and Coleridge's Remains are *disjecta membra*. Loud complaints have long been uttered against Dr. Paley's system, yet no one has arisen to supply the deficiency. The most that the professor of moral philosophy at Cambridge (who dislikes Paley) promises, is a reprint of Bishop Butler's Sermons on Human Nature, with excerpts from other authors, and illustrative notes from his own pen.

In Biblical Literature, the land is equally barren. This might, indeed, be anticipated from the want of theological institutions. The Biblical Cabinet, consisting of translations from the best evangelical German commentators, has met with very meager encouragement. Bishop Marsh, the commentator on Michaelis, and Bishop Burgess, who was so strenuous an asserter of the claims of the Hebrew language, failed to excite any enthusiasm in their favorite studies. Dr. Lee, of Cambridge, is, undoubtedly, a man of eminent learning, possessing an extraordinary aptitude for the acquisition of languages; but we have not been deeply impressed by the soundness of his judgment, nor by the liberality of his views. Dr. Bloomfield, in his Critical Digest, and in his Notes on the New Testament, has shown great industry and a commendable degree of judgment, in selecting and condensing the opinions of others; but for striking exegetical talent and profound learning, we do not consider him to be remarkably distinguished, except as there are very few Englishmen—*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*—to en-

ter the lists at all. Among these very few, Drs. Smith and Henderson deserve honorable mention. The English mind seems to have no affinity to the study, or rather a positive antipathy to it. Our attention has just been called to a notice, advertising the Rev. J. Prosser's "Key to the Hebrew Scriptures," in which he strenuously argues against the vowel points! The question in regard to their utility appears still to be a disputed topic among our transatlantic brethren. They have but little appreciation yet of the vast stores of erudition (no small part of these stores well digested too) which are to be found in the German language. There is a horror, almost amounting to *Gallo-phobia*, at the sight of a book bearing the Teutonic impress.* A wretched ignorance of the true principles of biblical interpretation is prominent in the one thousand and one efforts which have been made to decipher the prophetic portions of the Bible. The theory which maintains the personal and visible reign of Christ on earth, before the millennium, embraces not a few distinguished adherents, and is said to be rapidly gaining ground; a theory which would never become popular in a country where sound principles of hermeneutics prevailed.

We make these observations in no spirit of ill-will or uncharitableness. Our English brethren are doing themselves great honor in many of the branches of natural science, and in East Indian philology. But in most of the departments of literature, common and sacred, they fall far below their old reputation, and their present capabilities. They must go to work, and master the German language, and be willing to sit at the feet of the continental scholars. Instead of crying out incessantly against German neology and mysticism, let them patiently study, we do not say the *philosophy* of the Germans, but their great histories, their profound oriental disquisitions, their learned commentaries on the Bible; and then, if they please, let them impregnate these productions with the homely good sense and sterling honesty and sober piety of England. They will be the wiser and the better, and the world will thank them.

Finally, England must educate and Christianize the swarming millions of her own poor peasantry in Ireland, in London, and in

* Two volumes from Chrysostom have just been published at Oxford, under the care of Profs. Pusey, Keble, etc. In these volumes there is no allusion to the life of Chrysostom by Neander.

her great manufacturing districts. In this way alone can she put down Chartism, and every other form of turbulent democracy. In this course only will she accomplish salutary, peaceable reforms in church or state. England has most solemn duties now to be performed at home. She has no time to waste in bickering. Her nobility and gentry, her merchant princes and her great landed proprietors have a vital and an untold interest in this work of evangelizing the whole country. Their rights will be as chaff before the whirlwind when once a million of uneducated Chartists are in motion. The universities must adopt needed reforms, and show a warm sympathy in the well-being of the whole people, if they would preserve their charters untouched and their walls undesecrated. Ministers at the altar must aspire after a profounder scholarship, a more radical acquaintance with the word of God, a deeper knowledge of the science of theology. While physical researches are pushed farther and farther, it must not be forgotten, that mental and especially moral subjects are of higher moment, and demand a more earnest attention.

ARTICLE VIII.

A NOTICE OF THE REV. DR. WOODS' REVIEW OF "AN ESSAY ON CAUSE AND EFFECT, IN CONNECTION WITH FATALISM AND FREE AGENCY:"—*Am. Bib. Repos.* Jan., 1840, Vol. III. pp. 174—193. *Ibid.* July and October, 1840, Vol. IV. pp. 217—242, and 467—485.

By the Author of the "*Essay*."

THE writer of the above mentioned *Essay* on Cause and Effect,* did not design to enter the lists in any theological or metaphysical controversy, but rather to excite other and more competent minds to engage in the discussion. As this aim has been so happily accomplished, and the matter is fairly in the hands of others, fully competent, the writer will notice Dr.

* This "*Essay*" appeared in the *Repository* for October, 1839, p. 381.

Woods' articles only so far as is needful, either to explain misconceptions, or to suggest topics for farther discussion.

A great part of Dr. Woods' remarks are based on the supposition, that the article he criticises teaches, that emotions and desires are not under the control of the will. An article on this subject in a preceding number of this work,* exhibits the writer's views more at large, and it is supposed that nothing there presented is inconsistent with any thing advanced in the Essay on Cause and Effect. The appalling deductions made by Dr. Woods, it will be seen, do not result from any thing actually presented, but merely from a misapprehension.

Most of the remaining part of Dr. Woods' criticisms are based on another misconception of the ideas expressed in the original article. But in order to present this part of the subject clearly, the writer asks attention to the following definitions and remarks, which are either expressed or assumed to be true, in the article on Cause and Effect.

Power :—a simple idea, gained when any change takes place.

Power is spoken of in several relations, as the following illustration will show. A man may have all the power and skill needful to swim, and yet may not be able to exercise this power for want of the appropriate fluid. In this case, he has power in one sense, and no power in another; that is, he has *constitutional* power, but not *actual*. But suppose the man has power to secure the appropriate fluid, then he has actual power, in case he performs a previous act, and no power if he does not. Before he performs the act he has *indirect* actual power, and after it is performed, he has *direct* actual power. In these relations, therefore, it can be asserted, that a man has and has not power to swim. He has power in one sense, i. e. indirect actual power. He has not power in another sense, i. e. he has not power, *until* he performs a previous act. This distinction between actual and constitutional power, and between direct and indirect actual power, is very important in this discussion.

Impossible signifies without power.

Impossible, absolutely, signifies that there is no power *anywhere* to make a given change. For example:—God exists. A thing cannot be, and not be at the same time. These propo-

* An Essay on the Power of the Will over the other Faculties:—Am. Bib. Repos. October, 1840, p. 378.

sitions express things which there is no power, *anywhere*, to make otherwise. The last is called a *contradiction*. The following is another example of an absolute impossibility. *Salt* is that which has power to produce a given sensation, so that, without this power, it is not salt. It is, therefore, an absolute impossibility for salt not to produce the given sensation, for that is a contradiction. It is saying that a thing has, and has not a given power at the same time, and in the same sense.

Impossible, relatively :—That is, impossible without a previous change, but possible with it. Thus it is relatively impossible for salt to produce a given sensation, when it is not in certain circumstances, though, in relation to the possible existence of these circumstances, it is possible.

Certain, absolutely :—A thing is absolutely certain, when there is no power *any where* to make it otherwise.

Certain, relatively :—A thing is relatively certain, when there is no power, anywhere, to make it different, without a previous change.

Producing cause :—That peculiar power possessed by each individual existence, which enables it, in given circumstances, to produce a change.

Occasional causes :—Those circumstances which are indispensable antecedents, in order to enable a producing cause to act.

Producing causes are of two kinds : first, those which in given circumstances have power to produce either of two kinds of change (i. e. mind), and those which, in given circumstances, have power to produce a particular kind of change, and no power to refrain from producing this kind, or to produce any other kind (i. e. matter). These last are called *necessary* producing causes.

Changes are of two kinds : first, those changes where the thing changed had power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and to produce another instead ; secondly, those changes, where the thing changed had no power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and no power to produce any other instead. The first are called *actions* of mind ; the last are called *necessary changes* or *effects*. If these distinctions are correct, then the maxim : “every effect has a cause,” would be more properly expressed thus : “every change has a cause.”

Volitions :—Changes in mind, which take place when desires are excited, and the mind decides either to gratify or not to gratify these desires.

Mind is the producing cause of volition—that is, mind is that which has power, in given circumstances, to produce the changes called volitions.

The question now in discussion :—Has mind, when desires exist, the power to decide in either of two directions, without a change of circumstances? The fatalist says, “no;” his opponent says, “yes.” Both are required to prove their positions.

Proof is that which produces belief. It is divided into two kinds, *intuitive*, or that which results from the constitution of mind, and *rational*, that which results from a course of reasoning.

The opponent of fatalism establishes his position thus: That the mind has this power, called *free agency*, is an *intuitive truth*; and this position is established by the words and actions of all mankind, which prove that they believe it, from the very constitution of mind.

The fatalist *attempts* to prove his position thus: He first assumes the following as an *intuitive truth* :—“Wherever there is a particular kind of thing as an invariable antecedent of a particular kind of change, which is an invariable sequent, the antecedent is a necessary producing cause, and the sequent is a necessary effect.” This is the major proposition. He then *assumes*, without proof, the following as his minor proposition: “*Volition to gratify* is the invariable sequent of the *strongest desire*, as the invariable antecedent.” Then follows his conclusion :—Therefore the thing changed, i. e., mind, has no power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and no power to produce any other. When, therefore, his opponent claims that free agency is established by one intuitive truth, the fatalist claims that it is demolished by another, and may say that his intuitive truth is as good as the one that opposes it. The writer of the “*Essay on Cause and Effect*” endeavored to meet the fatalist, not by questioning the intuitive maxim, which is the major proposition, but by denying the minor, and showing that the fatalist has no way to establish this proposition but by begging the question and reasoning in a circle. The writer did indeed concede the truth of the major proposition, in order to meet the argument where it could most readily be destroyed; but it was a species of hypothetical reasoning, amounting to this: “Suppose I grant your major—your minor is false and cannot be established.” In criticising the writer, Dr. Woods assumes, that the writer concedes and teaches the major propo-

sition as true. What the writer actually asserted was this:— That there is no method of proving (by a course of reasoning) that any thing is a producing cause, except by establishing an invariableness of antecedence and sequence. For, according to the writer, mind is established as a producing cause, not by reasoning, but by *intuition*. The writer might assert this, and yet not necessarily assert that *every thing* which is established as the invariable antecedent of an invariable sequent is, *in all cases*, proved to be a producing cause. Yet the writer does not wish to throw off the responsibility of advocating that maxim, as an intuitive truth; for it is believed by the writer that it can be established as such, as thoroughly as any other. Men never find such invariableness of antecedence and sequence, without *believing* that the antecedent is the necessary producing cause, and the sequent the necessary effect, and proving their belief by words and actions.

But Dr. Woods turns upon the writer and says, that according to this, the writer teaches fatalism, and brings the following cases as examples:

1. Where the writer allows, that *motives, of some sort*, are invariable antecedents of volition. But the writer made a distinction between those invariable antecedents that are *occasional causes*, and do not have invariable sequents, and those invariable antecedents that have invariable sequents, and are thus proved to be producing causes. Every volition has a desire, of some sort, as antecedent. But to make motive the producing cause of volition, there must be a particular kind of desire that has a *volition to gratify*, as the invariable sequent. For, if some desires sometimes have a volition to gratify, as a sequent, and the same desires have a *volition not to gratify*, sometimes, as a sequent, there is no particular kind of thing, as an invariable sequent to some particular kind of thing, as the invariable antecedent.

2. The other case is, where the writer concedes that, in all those cases, where the strongest specific desire coincides with the dictates of the understanding, the mind always *chooses to gratify* it. But to make this prove motives to be producing causes, *every* volition to gratify must have such a coincidence, as the invariable antecedent. This is not so;—sometimes a volition to gratify has this for antecedent, and sometimes it has not. But Dr. Woods claims that a perfectly holy mind invariably chooses according to the dictates of reason; and that, according

to the writer, this is a case of fatalism. But to establish any such invariableness as the writer concedes to be a proof of fatalism, Dr. Woods must prove, that a perfectly holy mind never chooses to gratify desires that relate to matters where reason cannot decide what is for the *greatest general good*, inasmuch as they have no bearing at all on such a question, being simply the question whether the agent shall take one kind of specific enjoyment or another different kind, either of which may be equally for the general good. This cannot be done. In reference to God, it must be borne in mind, that *his* differs from all other minds, in seeing all things and changes in one view, so that he cannot have those *successive, new* desires which pertain to finite minds. No finite mind is capable of educing a system of psychology from that eternal, infinite mind, whose great plan has existed from eternity, and who therefore is, in this respect, not the pattern of created minds. The writer, therefore, feels warranted in still claiming, that no man can establish that invariableness of antecedence and sequence between motive and volition, which fatalists claim, as proof that mind has no power to choose otherwise than as it does.

The writer now would present answers to some inquiries that have been urged in connection with this subject.

1. What is the foundation of certainty that God will not change, or do wrong?

Ans. On the writer's theory, not the fact that he has not power to decide in either of two directions, *when desires exist*, but the fact that it is an *absolute* impossibility to change the nature of things. There is no power, anywhere, that can change God's constitutional nature, so that he can either desire pain or choose without a desire. Nor is there any power that can make his choosing wrong appear to him any thing but what it would be, *pure evil*, and what he therefore has no power to desire. It is not the want of constitutional power, but the want of an *occasional cause*, which there is no power to produce, that makes it an absolute impossibility for God to do wrong.

2. Has God power to put free agents into such temptation that they have no power to choose, except in one direction? No; for this is a contradiction. A free agent is one that has power to choose in either of two directions, and he cannot have this power and yet be destitute of it, in the same sense and in the same circumstances. It is a contradiction, and therefore an absolute impossibility.

3. How then can God govern free agents so as to prevent their interference in his plans? Ans. By his control of *occasional causes*, so that at any time he can prevent a given volition, either by change of susceptibilities or change of circumstances.

4. But if volitions are not the necessary effects of motives, as producing causes, *how* can God foresee future volitions? Ans. This, God has not revealed, but he has revealed *the fact*, that he does foresee every volition of every one of his creatures.

5. What is the kind of inability which is asserted when it is said that a perfectly honest man *cannot* steal—that perfectly holy minds *cannot* lie—that the carnal mind *cannot* obey the law of God?

Ans. The phenomena described in the essay referred to, on the power of the will over the other faculties of mind, furnish the data for explaining this language.

A *governing volition* is one that, while it exists, makes it an *absolute* impossibility to have a contrary volition. It is perfect or not perfect, just in proportion as it controls and prevents all conflicting volitions.

A *perfectly* honest man is one who has a perfect governing volition to be honest, and *while this exists*, it is an absolute impossibility for him to steal; for it implies a contradiction. So a perfectly holy mind is one that has its governing volition to do right, perfect; and while this remains, it is impossible to choose to do wrong.

A carnal mind is one that is destitute of a governing purpose to obey the law of benevolence, and while thus destitute, it is *impossible* for all its specific volitions to be conformed to this law. But in all these cases, as the mind has power to form a new governing volition, it has *indirect* power to do what in the other sense it has not power to do.

On this theory man has power to do all that God requires, inasmuch as he has power to produce both the generic volitions *directly*, and the specific volitions, *indirectly*, that God requires. But so long as his generic volitions are not in conformity to God's law, it is absolutely impossible for his specific ones to be so.

6. But what is the "cause, ground, and reason," why a volition is in one direction and not in another? Why, for example, did a man choose an estate and give up the path of honesty? The cause for his choosing the estate is twofold; first, the motive, or occasional cause, which God's providence pro-

duced; secondly, his own mind, which produced the volition. But why did he not choose the honest course? Because the mind has not power to choose *both* ways, and so in choosing one, it has not power to choose the other. The answer, then, is this: "because he chose one way, and had not at the same time power to choose the other."

The writer would now refer to some other points of Dr. Woods' criticism. On p. 178, he maintains that "strongest motives" are not "a particular kind of motives." He says that desires for food, desires for property, desires for honor and the like are "particular kinds of motives," and sometimes one kind is the strongest desire, and sometimes another kind.

It seems to have escaped Dr. Woods, that the same things are often placed in different classes, according to their different relations. For example, weights are classed as heavier, heaviest; lighter, lightest, in reference to their power; and they are also classed as lead weights and iron weights, in reference to the materials of which they are made. And sometimes lead weights may be the heaviest, and sometimes iron. So of motives or desires. They are classed as stronger or weaker, in reference to their vividness; and they are also classed with reference to the objects that excite them. It must be apparent to Dr. Woods, on reflection, that the writer was correct in saying, that placing the strongest desires as invariable antecedents to the *volition to secure*, was making "a particular kind of motive" an invariable antecedent.

The writer would here remark, that there are sentences in the article on "Cause and Effect," where the writer uses the term "invariable antecedent," without specifying which kind is meant; but inasmuch as the writer had previously pointed out the distinction between such as were *producing* and such as were *occasional* causes, fair interpretation requires, that where the term is ambiguous, that sense is the true one that makes the writer consistent with himself.

On p. 182, Dr. Woods employs the term "strongest motive" with some adroitness. The plausibility of his position is made by the fact that, in common parlance, men use the term "strongest desire," or "strongest motive," to express *either* that which excites the strongest specific desire, *or* that which appears best to the reason. For example, a man says, "I wanted such a thing *the most* (i. e. felt the strongest desire for it), but I chose the other, because I thought it was *best*." Then, if asked: "Did you not feel a stronger desire to do what was best, than

to gain the other thing?" he will answer, "yes." Thus, he seems to assert that he felt the strongest desire for both, which is an apparent contradiction; but is made consistent by the fact that the term is used in two senses. In one case, it refers to the strongest specific desire; in the other, to the dictates of the understanding.

But in which sense does Dr. Woods use the term, when he asks if all men do not choose to gratify the strongest desire, or yield to the strongest motive? The following seems to decide his use of the term. On p. 182, he says: "I would inquire whether the writer is certain that it is not a law of our rational nature, that we should choose and act in accordance with that which appears to us as the highest reason, or strongest motive? If it should at last become evident that this is the law of our rational nature, then a power to act contrary to it would be a power to subvert the very constitution of mind, and divest ourselves of rationality. This seems to teach, not only that we always do choose and act according to that which appears to us as the highest reason, but that we have no power to choose otherwise. Would Dr. Woods wish to have men *not* choose in accordance with what seems to them the highest reason? And if they always do choose as reason dictates, how could they do better, and where is the doctrine of depravity?"

In regard to Dr. Woods' disclaimer, repelling the charge of fatalism, the writer would inquire if the doctrine of fate, as taught in all ages, is not simply this—that *mind* (including Creator and creatures) has no power of any kind to choose otherwise than as it does in the circumstances where it does choose? And as all changes in matter depend on mind, it is *absolutely* impossible for any event to be otherwise. Now, does not Dr. Woods teach that, in the circumstances which actually exist, mind has no power of any kind to choose differently from what it does? And is there any possible theory, except that mind *has* this power, or that it *has not*? And does not every man either agree with the writer, or else agree with Dr. Woods, in holding fatalism as it is taught by the Hindoos, Mohammedans, Stoics, Collins, Priestley and Hobbes?

Dr. Woods' disclaimer does not alter the position of things, for this reason—that there are two senses to every term he uses, of directly opposite meanings, as based on the two opposing theories. With Dr. Woods' sense to these terms, this disclaimer is a direct assertion of fatalism, as will appear by what follows. The columns below give the two opposing uses of each term.

Definitions in Dr. Woods' sense.

Free agent—An intelligent, sensitive mind, that has power to decide to secure that which excites the strongest desire, and no power to decide otherwise.

Volition—A change or decision of the mind, produced by the strongest motives, which the mind has no power to prevent or to make otherwise.

Moral agent—A mind governed by motives, as necessary, producing causes.

Accountable being—A being placed under law with penalties, and required in all cases to choose right, even when it has no power (i. e. when the strongest desire is to do wrong).

Proper subjects of law—Beings who have power to choose as they do, and no power to choose otherwise.

Blame and praiseworthy actions—Actions that are right or wrong, compared with a rule of duty, without reference to the power of the actor to choose to act differently.

Liberty or freedom of will—Power to do as we will, without power to will otherwise than as we do will.

Definitions in the opposing sense.

Free agent—An intelligent, sensitive mind, that, when desires exist, has power to decide either to gratify or not to gratify each desire.

Volition—A change or decision of the mind, when it has power to refrain from one kind of choice and to make another.

Moral agent—A mind governed by motives, so that in all cases of choice, it has power to choose differently from what it does, without change of circumstances.

Accountable being—A being placed under law, with penalties, having power in all circumstances either to obey or disobey.

Proper subjects of law—Those who have power to choose either to obey or disobey, and a knowledge of obligation.

Praise and blameworthy actions—Actions where the agent had a knowledge of law and penalty, and power in the given circumstances to choose either to obey or disobey.

Liberty or freedom of will—Power to choose differently from what we do, without a change of circumstances.

The writer would now inquire, first, whether the above is not a fair and correct exhibition of Dr. Woods' meaning, when

he uses these terms according to his theory; and secondly, whether his disclaimer, with his sense to each term, is not as direct an affirmation of fatalism as can be made? His disclaimer is as follows: "Fatalism is the opposite of the doctrine that teaches, that we are free moral agents, the proper subjects of law, under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God, and blameworthy and praiseworthy according to our conduct."

Of course, in claiming not to be a fatalist, Dr. Woods holds the affirmative of the above in *his sense* of the terms, viz.; we are "free moral agents,"—that is, we are under law and governed by motives as producing causes, so that we have no power of any kind to choose differently from what we do. We "are under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God," and yet he requires us to choose what we have no power to choose, i. e., the course of holiness, when we do not feel the strongest desire for it. We "are blame and praiseworthy according to our conduct"—that is, we deserve praise and blame for our actions when we have no power to choose to act otherwise. Let the reader decide if this is not a correct exposition of Dr. Woods' disclaimer, and if so, is not this fatalism? On p. 222, Dr. Woods seems to claim that his theory of free agency is an intuitive truth. If it is so, then Dr. W. can prove it such, by showing that the words and actions of mankind, in all ages, indicate that they believe that, whenever they make a choice, they have no power, in those circumstances, to choose otherwise. If he cannot show this, has he any right to claim this as an intuitive truth?

Dr. Woods claims that Calvin, the two Edwardses, West, Smalley, Bellamy, Dwight, Day and Beecher, and almost all the presidents and professors of our colleges and theological seminaries, and most of the ministers and Christians of all the orthodox denominations hold his theory, and are opposed to that presented in the "Essay on Cause and Effect." The writer is not acquainted with all these worthies, but is inclined to doubt the entire correctness of this claim. Is it not more probable that the greater part of these persons really hold the writer's theory of free agency, and, owing to great confidence in the investigations of great and good men, have not studied the subject *de novo*, for themselves, and, in consequence, have never supposed Dr. Woods, or any of the above writers, to differ from themselves?

On p. 241, Dr. Woods seems to consider *self-denial* as referring to the conflict that takes place whenever incompatible desires coexist, and the mind chooses that which is "most agreeable." His opponents consider real and virtuous self-denial to consist in that act of mind which decides to give up what excites the strongest specific desire, and to take that which, though it excites a weaker specific desire, appears to reason as the greatest good on the whole.

The writer is indebted to Dr. Woods for suggesting a defect in the definition of motives in the original essay. The writer gives the following as a substitute. "Motives are either excited desires, or those things that excite desires, or those susceptibilities which can be excited by objects of desire." In the former piece the writer omitted one of these senses in the definition.

In Dr. Woods' articles he quotes Edwards, Day and Whately, as sustaining his views of free agency. The writer supposes this presents three topics for future discussion.

1. Is teaching the invariableness of antecedence and sequence, between *strongest desire* and a *volition to secure*, teaching what *proves fatalism*—i. e., is the maxim assumed by fatalists as their major proposition really an intuitive truth?

2. Do Edwards, Day and Whately teach the invariableness of antecedence and sequence between *strongest desire* and *volition to secure*?

3. If it is a fact that the major proposition of the fatalist is an intuitive truth, does it not account for the perplexing mazes, apparent contradictions, and profound depths, which have been supposed to belong to this subject? Has it not been the fact, that the defenders of free agency have conceded that invariableness of antecedence and sequence between the *strongest desire* and a *volition to secure*, which (if the major proposition of the fatalist is a truth) *proves fatalism*, and then have vainly struggled to prevent the inevitable conclusion?

The writer would put what is involved in the above queries in another form.

May not the following proposition be affirmed as true? Whoever teaches that a particular class of desires are the invariable antecedents of a particular class of volitions (i. e. volitions to secure) as invariable sequents, teaches what proves fatalism; i. e., teaches what proves that mind has no power, in the circumstances when it does choose, to decide otherwise.

Suppose this is denied. Then the writer asks: How do you

prove that in the circumstances in which the balances move downward, they have not power, at the same time, to move upward? The only reply that can be given is, they *never did* move upward in these circumstances, therefore they have not the power. Then the writer asks: Why, if it is conceded that mind, in given circumstances, never did move but in one way, is there not precisely the same proof that it has no power to move otherwise, as there is that the balances have no power to move otherwise?

But if it is urged that mind is different from matter, and that it may invariably *choose right*, and yet have power to choose otherwise;—in reply the writer would say, that this is not a case where a particular kind of desire is the invariable antecedent of a particular kind of volition, as an invariable sequent. A free agent may invariably choose right, and yet there would not be that invariableness of antecedence and sequence that proves a necessary, producing cause.

Note. The writer found, after reading the criticisms on the Essay on Cause and Effect, that for want of more care either in the writer or the readers, it has been misconstrued in the following cases.

1. Where the writer uses the term “invariable antecedent,” without expressly specifying which kind is intended, though the scope of the piece fairly shows it.

2. Where the writer says that there is no mode of proving mind to be a producing cause, meaning by it, no mode of *reasoning* can prove it. It is established as an *intuitive truth*, as the writer shows, and a fair reader would consider this exception as implied.

3. The last case is made by the omission of the generic definition of producing cause. The writer, in constructing the definition of producing cause, had in view the case in hand, where the fatalist attempts to prove that mind has not the power of free agency, by an argument that makes *motive*, instead of mind, the producing cause of volition. And as this argument, not only would make motive a producing cause, but a *necessary* producing cause, the writer gave the specific definition. But afterwards, in claiming that “the mind is the producing cause of volition,” the writer did not observe, till it was pointed out, that the generic definition also was needful. The writer uses the term in the generic sense when claiming that “mind is the producing cause of volition,” and the specific sense when claiming

that fatalists support their doctrine by attempting to prove that motive is the producing cause of volition. The preceding article supplies the deficiency by inserting a generic definition as well as the specific one.

ARTICLE IX.

**EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PERFECTION, AS HELD BY
REV. ASA MAHAN, PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGI-
ATE INSTITUTE, REV. CHARLES FITCH, AND OTHERS AGREE-
ING WITH THEM.**

By Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., Prof. Theol. in the Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass.

THE attention of the religious public has, of late, been frequently called to the subject above mentioned, and much has been written and published on both sides of the question at issue between the parties. It is not my object to notice all the particular opinions and arguments which have been advanced by writers engaged in the controversy. I can promise no more than to take a summary view of the points which are regarded as of the first importance; to consider the manner in which the doctrine has been defended, and the chief arguments on which it rests, and to inquire what conclusion a candid regard to truth will lead us to adopt.

I have read several publications on the subject, particularly the Discourses of Mr. Mahan, which he had the kindness to send to me; the Letter of Mr. Fitch, and Dr. Weeks' Letter in reply; several Lectures of Mr. Finney, published in the Oberlin Evangelist; Dr. Pond's and Mr. Folsom's articles in the Am. Bib. Repository, and finally Mr. Mahan's article in reply to Mr. Folsom.* My design however is, to give the reader my reflections, and to show exactly how the subject lies in my own mind, avoiding entirely whatever might have a personal bearing. Though I must take the liberty to say, that I entertain the kindest feelings towards the writers above named, who have advocated the doctrine of Perfection. When I cast my eye over Mr. Mahan's Discourses and Mr. Fitch's Letter, I was

* American Biblical Repository, October, 1840.

gratified with the spirit of love, tenderness and devotion, which breathed in their writings, and could not but indulge the pleasing thought, that God had granted them a high degree of his gracious influence, and raised them to an elevation of Christian affection and joy, to which they had never before attained. . My interviews with Mr. Mahan, in connection with what he has written, have left the impression on my mind, that, whatever may be the natural tendency of his peculiar opinions, he himself has had the love of God shed abroad in his heart, and that the error, into which I think he has fallen, results, not from the want of Christian feeling, but from a hasty interpretation of Scripture, and a wrong method of reasoning. It is in accordance with his express desire, that I have undertaken to review what he has published on the subject; and I am persuaded that he would be far from wishing, that my personal regard to him should prevent a free and thorough examination of his system, or of the manner in which he defends it.

I begin with a general remark, the correctness of which no one will question. *When a man undertakes to sustain and propagate a novel system,—a system different from what has commonly been entertained by the best of men,—it is inadmissible for him to set forth, as a part of his system, any opinions which are held by those, from whom he professes to differ.* He may show, if he can, that the principles which are common to him and to others, when rightly carried out, involve his peculiarities, and that those who do not embrace his system are inconsistent with themselves, in holding to those common principles. He is at liberty to show, that they stop short of the mark, and must suffer loss. But can he, with propriety, mention those commonly received principles, as *peculiar to him*, in distinction from others? Can he take any advantage from them, to prove the excellence of *his* system, above the common system? Can he in any way properly make the impression that they belong to *him*, more than to evangelical ministers generally?

In this respect, I am constrained to say, that Mr. Mahan, Mr. Fitch and others have, however undesignedly, committed an obvious fault, and one which is likely to mislead incautious readers. In various instances, they exhibit certain views, and lay down certain principles, as peculiar to *them*, in distinction from others, which in fact are held as fully by others as by them. Such a proceeding is evidently unfair, and whatever advantage may seem to be derived from it, is unjust.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE GOSPEL.

Mr. Mahan represents it as a principle belonging to his system, in distinction from the common system, that God has made full provision in the gospel to render Christians "perfect in every good work to do his will." In his Discourses, p. 16, where he professes to set forth his system, in contrast with the common system, he says: "On one side" (that is, on his side) "it is affirmed, that grace is provided in the gospel to render the Christian, even in this life, perfect in every good work to do the will of God. On the other side it is affirmed, that no such grace is provided." And in the Repository for October, 1840, p. 409, where he undertakes to show in what respect he differs from others, he repeats the same thing. In his Discourses, p. 93, he says: "The only existing difference" (that is, between his views and those commonly held) "respects the extent of the provisions and promises of divine grace, in regard to Christians in this life." And when he comes, p. 129 and onward, to state more practically what he regards as the peculiar excellence of his system, in distinction from the one commonly received (such a distinction being everywhere implied), he points to this, namely: "that God has made full provision, not only for the pardon of every sin, but for the entire perfection of believers in holiness, and for every particular necessity which may come upon them in time and eternity."

Attentive readers will perceive that the idea of such a distinction, between the advocates of Perfection and others, has full possession of Mr. Mahan's mind, and is interwoven with the whole texture of his Discourses.

Mr. Fitch takes the same ground. See Guide to Perfection, for February, 1840. He states it as the first point of inquiry between him and his brethren, *whether God, in the economy of his grace, has made provision to save his people from their sins*; and he affirms it to be *his* belief that such provision is made.

Now some readers will be inclined to exclaim: What a powerful recommendation is this of the doctrine of *Perfection*! What a striking argument in its favor! We find from the writings of these men, that the doctrine has this peculiar excellence, namely; it asserts that full provision has been made by divine grace for the entire deliverance of believers from sin. How precious such a provision! How plainly taught in the Bible! And how strange it is that Christians have so long

overlooked it! How great the mistake of those who differ from these writers, and who do not believe that God has made provision for the entire sanctification of believers!

And yet it is a fact, that devout Christians and orthodox divines have, in all ages, maintained this same precious doctrine, that *full provision is made in the gospel, not only for the forgiveness of sin, but for the complete sanctification of God's people.* I might fill volumes with quotations from evangelical writers, from Augustine down to the present day, in which this grand sentiment is strongly asserted and clearly illustrated, and is set forth as the foundation of hope and the spring of effort to believers. Let any one read the practical writings of Calvin, Flavel, Owen, Bunyan, Watts, Doddridge, President Davies, Good, and numberless other authors, ancient and modern, and he will find that they exhibit this sentiment in all its preciousness. I hope to be excused, if I take the liberty to say, that no truth has been more familiar to my mind, or more zealously inculcated in my preaching and conversation than this, *that the Saviour has made provision for the entire deliverance of his people from sin; that the gospel contains a remedy for all our spiritual diseases; that there is a fulness in Christ, adequate to supply all our need.* It has been the same with others. I could name many, whom I have known personally, who have zealously preached this doctrine, and have rested upon it, living and dying, as the rock of their salvation. By evangelical ministers generally, this doctrine has been regarded as one of the grand peculiarities of the gospel. In their view, the gospel is no gospel without it. And yet I must confess that neither I, nor my brethren generally have given this great gospel truth the place which it ought to hold in our preaching. And Mr. Mahan might, with perfect propriety, have noticed this, and might have truly said, that, in many instances, it has been so far neglected, as to make the impression upon others, that it was no part of our belief. But we do believe it, and we always have believed it; and we have sincerely and earnestly published it, as the ground of hope to man. We are, I acknowledge, under particular obligations to Mr. Mahan, for holding forth this truth so clearly, and giving it such prominence in the gospel plan. And if he had labored merely to wake up his brethren to juster views of the importance of this fundamental article of their faith, and to greater diligence and fervor in explaining, confirming and applying it; his labor would have been directed

to a noble object, and would not have been in vain. But for him to say, or imply, that orthodox ministers have not believed and taught this truth,—why, he might as well say, they have not believed and taught the divine authority of the Bible. The fact is, the more devoutly ministers and Christians have studied the word of God, the more they have known of themselves, and the more earnestly they have sought the teachings of the Holy Spirit, the better have they understood the provisions of the gospel, and the more entirely have they relied upon the all-sufficient grace of Christ. I am glad to see, that, as Mr. Mahan has come to entertain more exalted views of the gracious provisions of the gospel for the sanctification of believers, he has ceased to give such prominence, as he formerly did, to the ability or free-will of man, and has expressly renounced it, as furnishing any ground of hope for sinners, or any spring of holiness to Christians, and has been brought to rely wholly on the grace of Christ, and to look to him for the whole of salvation. Luther did this, when he first emerged from the darkness of popery. William Cowper did this, at his first conversion. Devout Christians have all done this, though with different degrees of clearness; and multitudes of them have done it in as high a degree and with as much comfort, as Mr. Mahan. I have recently become acquainted with the biography of Mrs. Hawkes, a humble Christian in the common walks of life, who derived special benefit from the instructions of Cecil. And I shall here make a single quotation from one of her letters, showing her cordial reliance on the grace of Christ for the whole of *sanctification*. She says to her correspondent: “You want to know how I have been conquering *self*. Alas! I have only been fighting against self, but am still very far from being a conqueror; and I am thankful to say, as you do, *Jesus shows me my strength is in him*; and my desire is, to be as a little child. When I want to act, I go to him for wisdom and strength. If I feel anger, I run to him, and show it to him. When I feel pride rising upon any occasion, I go to him, and confess it. To him I take every sin, as it arises—every want, every desponding thought. To him I go for every good thought, every good desire, every good word and work, crying, *Lord, help me in this,—Lord, help me in the other. It is thy grace alone, that can produce any thing good in me*. What else is meant by Christ's living in me, and I in him? It is by this simple faith, that we must bring forth good fruits; and to obtain it,

we must plead the promises. How are we to be transformed in the spirit of our minds, and to be changed into his image, from glory to glory? Not by looking within, but by looking to Jesus." Now how does this differ from the views exhibited by Mr. Mahan in the following passage (Discourses, pp. 153—4). He says, just as thousands have said before: "The promises are adapted to every possible condition. They descend to the sinner in the lowest depths of guilt and depravity, for the purpose of lifting him out of the horrible pit, and rendering him a partaker of the divine nature. They meet the Christian, in a state of partial holiness, for the purpose of raising him to a state of perfect love. Now, to use the promises so as to become possessed of the blessings they proffer to us, four things are necessary: that we know our need; that we apprehend the particular promise of Christ which was designed to meet that particular necessity; that we repose full confidence in the ability and faithfulness of Christ to fulfil the promise; and that we cast our whole being upon him, for the specific purpose of securing a fulfilment of the particular promise before us. For example; the sinner is brought to feel himself to be in a lost condition. Here he is met with the declaration of Christ: *I came to seek and to save that which was lost;—and whosoever cometh unto me, I will in nowise cast out.* Let the sinner cast himself directly upon Christ, for the definite purpose of securing a fulfilment of this promise. Are you in darkness? Go directly to Christ for the fulfilment of the promise: *I will lead the blind by a way which they knew not.* Is your heart hard and unfeeling? Go to Christ and cast yourself upon his faithfulness for the fulfilment of the promise: *I will take the heart of stone out of your flesh and will give you a heart of flesh.* Do temptations beset you? Go to Christ with the promise: *who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able, but will with the temptation make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it.* Are you about to enter into new scenes, or spheres of action? Go to Christ with the promises: *lo, I am with you always; and, my grace is sufficient for thee.* In short, whatever your condition, remember that you are addressed by your Saviour with some specific promise, perfectly adapted to your case; and your life depends upon your casting yourself at once upon the faithfulness of Christ, for the fulfilment of that promise."

Now all this, which I have quoted from Mr. Mahan, is just and scriptural, exhibiting the true spirit of the gospel. And

all that is wanted is, that he should have frankly said: *this is nothing new. It is the good old way, in which evangelical writers and Christians have always understood and applied the provisions and promises of the gospel.* I could easily cite many passages of the same import, and still more striking, from Bunyan's *Jerusalem-Sinner Saved*, M'Laurin's *Sermons*, Good's *Better Covenant*, and the writings of John Newton. And I have hoped that orthodox ministers were about to give up what remains among them of a cold, abstruse, philosophical way of preaching, and to adopt more fully the determination of Paul, *to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified*, and to make him *all in all*. May the day soon come when this shall be the case universally. And let us, who differ from Mr. Mahan in other respects, be careful to profit by his remarks on this subject; and let us copy his earnestness in holding forth the all-sufficient provisions of the gospel for the entire sanctification of believers.

My aim has been to do full justice to Mr. Mahan, in holding the great principle above considered; and at the same time to show, that orthodox writers and preachers have generally held the same principle, and that, in this respect, Mr. Mahan has made no advance upon the common faith of the Christian church. Of course it must be wrong for him or any others to suppose, that holding this principle can be turned to the advantage of his system in distinction from the system commonly received by the orthodox.

But Mr. Mahan thinks that his peculiar doctrine is inseparably connected with the fact, that provision is made for the entire sanctification of believers. He believes that his doctrine certainly follows from this, and is involved in it. This, then, shall be my next point of inquiry. *From the fact that provision is made in the gospel for the complete sanctification of believers, does it follow that they will be completely sanctified in the present life?* Let us dismiss all other points till we have disposed of this. It is a matter of reasoning. And those who are accustomed to reasoning know how important it is to give a fixed attention to the point under consideration, and to be careful not to wander from it.

The question at issue may be taken up in two ways. First: *Do the provisions of the gospel, taken by themselves, certainly prove that believers will ever be completely sanctified?*

Now, if the actual and complete sanctification of believers

certainly follows from the mere provisions of the gospel for that purpose, it must be on this principle,—*that if God has made provision in the sense intended, for the accomplishment of a particular end, that end will actually be accomplished.* This is clear. For if such provision may be made, and yet the end fail of being accomplished, then we can no longer infer such accomplishment from such provision; and in order to make out a conclusive proof that the end will be accomplished, we must argue from some other premises besides the simple fact that provision is made for it.

Our question then is : *Do the provisions of the gospel for the complete sanctification of God's people prove that they will in fact be completely sanctified?*

Now, Mr. Mahan is no stranger to reasoning ; and he will, I am persuaded, bring to the consideration of this subject an active, discerning intellect, and a kind, candid heart. I shall then make my appeal directly to him. And I ask my dear brother : Has not God, in this favored land, made full provision for the comfortable support of all the inhabitants ?—such provision, that all who enjoy the other common blessings of life in an ordinary degree may, by suitable exertions, obtain such a support ? But does it follow, from such provision, that all the inhabitants will actually obtain a comfortable support ? I ask again : Is not provision made in the gospel for the salvation of all sinners to whom the gospel is published ? This, my brother, in common with others, is accustomed to teach, as a matter of great moment. But does it follow from this, that all who hear the gospel will be saved ? May not something else come in to prevent that salvation for which provision is made ? If so, then the general question returns : Can we infer from the simple fact that provision is made for the accomplishment of a particular object, that the object will actually be accomplished ?

But, my brother, who is fond of argument, will bear with me, while I take up the question in the other way alluded to. He often asserts that God has made provision for the complete sanctification of believers *during the present life.* This I admit ; and I ask him whether God has not made provision for the complete sanctification of believers during the present *day*, and the present *hour*, yea, the present *minute* ? I should think it strange if he should hesitate a moment to answer in the affirmative. A mind like his will, I am sure, quickly see what astounding consequences would follow from the denial. How,

then, does he dispose of this matter? From the fact, that provision is made in the gospel for the complete sanctification of believers the present hour and minute, does he draw the conclusion that they do all in reality obtain complete sanctification the present hour and minute? And if not, how can he draw the other conclusion, namely, that they are completely sanctified during the present *life*, because provision is made for it in the gospel? May not some other cause intervene to prevent the accomplishment of the object, for which such provision is made? And may it not hinder the accomplishment for a longer as well as for a shorter time?—for a few years as well as for an hour or a minute?

The other circumstances, such as promises, prayers, etc., which may be combined with the simple provision of the gospel, and which may be supposed to insure the accomplishment of the object, will be considered in another place. Our present inquiry is, whether, from the simple fact that provision is made for the entire sanctification of believers *in this life*, we can infer that such sanctification will actually take place? And I think I may regard it as a point agreed to on all hands, and certainly by the brother with whom I am arguing the case, that such an inference cannot be drawn.

THE ATTAINABLENESS OF PERFECTION IN THE PRESENT LIFE.

Mr. Mahan brings it forward as a question on which his opinion differs from the one commonly entertained: “whether we *may* now, during the progress of the present life, attain to entire perfection in holiness.” (Discourses, p. 15.) And in his second Discourse he makes it his particular inquiry, *whether a state of complete holiness is attainable in the present life*. He informs us that he does not use the words *attainable* and *practicable* with reference merely or chiefly to our natural powers as intelligent, accountable agents, but with reference to the provisions of divine grace. And he lays it down as a truth, which distinguishes his system from the one generally held, that “complete holiness is, in the highest and most common acceptance of the term, *attainable*.” And in the last number of the Repository (p. 409) he states it as a point peculiar to him and his party, “that we *may* render to God the perfect obedience which he requires.” But we hold to this as much as he

does, and, as I suppose, on the same conditions; that is, we *may* render perfect obedience, if we apply ourselves to the work *as we ought*, and *fully avail ourselves* of the gracious provisions of the gospel. He surely would not say that we may render perfect obedience in any other way.

I must therefore protest here, as I did in the former case, against Mr. Mahan's claiming that, as belonging peculiarly and exclusively to him and to those who agree with him, which belongs equally to others. We hold as decidedly as he does, that, in the common acceptation of the term, complete holiness is *attainable* in the present life. When we assert that a thing is *attainable*, or *may* be attained, our meaning is, that a proper use of means will secure it; that we shall obtain it, if we do what we ought; and that, if we fail of obtaining it, truth will require us to say we *might* have obtained it, and that our failure was owing altogether to our own fault. The *attainableness* of any thing surely does not mean the same thing as its being *actually obtained*. For it is very common to speak of many things, for example, the improvement of the mind, and a state of competence, as things which are *attainable*, or which *may* be obtained, but which never are obtained. The same as to the blessings of the gospel. Mr. Mahan would doubtless say, as others do, that salvation is *attainable* by all who hear the gospel; that under the dispensation of grace, any and all sinners *may* be saved; meaning, that means and opportunities are provided; that the way is prepared; that salvation is freely offered to them on the most reasonable terms; that a proper conduct on their part will secure the blessing, and that if they do not obtain it, they themselves, and they only, will be the faulty cause of the failure. When we say a thing is *not attainable*, we mean that, whatever we may do, we cannot obtain it, and that our failing to obtain it will not be owing to any misconduct or neglect on our part. It is often and truly represented, that impenitent sinners, at the judgment day, will have the painful reflection that the blessedness of heaven was offered to them, and was put within their reach,—that they *might* have been saved, but refused the infinite good.

See, now, how Mr. Mahan treats this subject in his Discourses, pp. 45, 46, and elsewhere. He says, the church and the ministry, almost universally, believe that perfection is *unattainable*. He means all who dissent from his views. And then he inquires, how Christians can aim at perfection, *with the belief*

that it is not attainable. But this is not our belief. It therefore becomes evident, that his representation is not correct, and that all the advantage he derives or seems to derive from it, is unjust.

But there is a question here which must not be overlooked. Both parties hold, that complete holiness is *attainable*. Does this prove that it is *actually attained*? Here again I shall address myself to Mr. Mahan. Do you not hold, my brother, that salvation is *attainable* by all sinners who hear the gospel? But do you infer from this, that all will be saved? Further: Do you not hold that complete holiness is *attainable* by all believers *now*, this very *day*, and this very *minute*? Doubtless you do. But your writings show, that you are far enough from thinking that all believers *are* completely holy now. If you really thought them to be so, why should you show such grief at their short-comings? And why speak, as you do, of Christians "partially sanctified?" And why labor, with such zeal, to stir them up to make higher attainments, and seek after perfection? Now, if you yourself do not think that *the actual attainment* of perfection can be inferred from its *attainableness*, can it be right for you to employ modes of reasoning which imply, or seem to imply, that you do think so?

DIVINE PROMISES.

Mr. Mahan and others place great dependence upon these for the support of their doctrine. The question which I shall now consider is, whether the promises of God, *when rightly interpreted*, do really support the doctrine.

It is hardly necessary to say that I perfectly agree with Mr. Mahan in the confident belief, that God will fulfil all his promises, taken in their *true meaning*. No one, surely, can expect them to be accomplished in a sense which they were never intended to bear. The first inquiry, then, must be, as to the true meaning of the promises referred to. The great and precious promise of the New Covenant, on which Mr. Mahan founds his fourth Discourse, is this: "I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts, and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people, etc.; and all shall know me, from the least to the greatest; for I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins will I remember no more." Mr. Mahan says, that Christ, here and in other places, promises to

believers “a confirmed state of pure and perfect holiness, such as is required in the moral law.” The moral law requires pure and perfect holiness at the present time, and at all times. We must then suppose Mr. Mahan’s meaning to be, that God here *promises* perfect holiness to believers now, and at all times. But really, my brother, how does the text just recited, containing the great promise of the New Covenant,—how does it show this? Is it certain, that God’s putting his laws in the minds of his people, and writing them in their hearts is precisely the same as bringing them to “a confirmed state of pure and perfect holiness?” Is it certain that the law cannot be written in the heart, *in some degree*, when it is not done perfectly? Is it a thing so evident that it may be taken for granted, without any proof, that there cannot be *real* obedience where there is not *perfect* obedience?—some degree of holiness in those who are not completely holy? To me it is manifest, that the above-mentioned promise may be accomplished in *different degrees*. It is accomplished in a lower degree, when God by his Spirit brings men to repent, and to render cordial obedience to his law *in a small measure*. It is accomplished in a *higher* degree, when he brings them to render obedience *in a larger measure*. And it is accomplished in the highest degree, or perfectly, when he brings them to render an *unceasing* and *perfect* obedience. And this is only saying, what is true in a thousand cases, that a good work may be done, or a favor conferred in different degrees, and that its being done in one degree does not necessarily imply that it is done in another and higher degree. It would seem that no one could mistake or doubt concerning a matter so plain as this. And yet the conclusiveness of much of Mr. Mahan’s reasoning turns upon this one point. Take the promise above recited, that *all shall know God from the least to the greatest*. I ask Mr. Mahan whether this promise has ever been completely fulfilled, respecting either the children of Israel or any other nation? If he says yes, I ask, when? If he says no, as he doubtless will, then I ask, how, on his principle of interpreting the promises, he can vindicate the faithfulness of God? Will he say, although the promise has never yet been fulfilled, it will be *hereafter*? Then I ask, why the same may not hold in respect to all the texts in which God promises to make his people completely holy? If God may be faithful in respect to the promise, that *all shall know him*, because he will fulfil it at a distant, future period, though for thousands of years it has re-

mained unfulfilled; may he not be faithful in respect to his promise, *that his people shall be made perfect in holiness*, if he fulfils it to them *a few days hence*,—that is, when they are removed to the heavenly state,—although it may not be fulfilled during the short period of the present life?

But with respect to the promise of God, that the world shall be converted and all flesh see his salvation, we may take another view. It is manifest that the promise, in the full extent of its meaning, has not yet been accomplished. But has not something been done *towards* its accomplishment? Have not multitudes, in different parts of the world, been converted to God? Has not the kingdom of Christ been extended more and more? And may not the promise, that the whole world shall be turned from sin, be intended to include not only the final event of the universal reign of Christ, but all the events of the same kind which are introductory to it, that is, all instances of the conversion of sinners, and especially of the spread of the gospel in pagan countries? And, accordingly, may not such a promise, like many of the prophecies, have a gradual, progressive accomplishment,—an accomplishment extending through a long period of time, and leading on to a complete fulfilment in the end? And if God, in his unsearchable wisdom, sees fit to accomplish his word of promise or prediction in this way, does it become us to say either that he does not accomplish it, or that he does not show his faithfulness as clearly, as if he should accomplish it at once? Unless we fall into such a train of thought as I have suggested, we shall be under the painful necessity of admitting, that the most precious and glorious promises of God respecting the enlargement and prosperity of his kingdom, have not, to this day, been accomplished in any respect or in any degree,—that they have not even *begun* to be fulfilled.

The same remarks apply to the promises of the New Covenant respecting the sanctification of believers. Take the precious promise, that Jesus “shall save his people from their sins.” And look at all believers now living. Has Jesus already saved them all completely from their sins? Is it true that, at the present time, there is no sin, no moral defilement in any of them? Mr. Mahan does by no means believe this. Has the promise, then, been *really fulfilled* in regard to the great body of Christians now living? Yes, we say, *really* fulfilled, though not as yet *completely* fulfilled:—*really* fulfilled, inasmuch as Jesus has *begun* to save them from their sins, and given them a degree of

true holiness:—but not *completely* fulfilled, inasmuch as sin, in different degrees, still dwells in them. We can take no other view of the subject, unless we hold either that the promise remains wholly unaccomplished respecting the present race of believers, or else that every true believer is now in a state of sinless perfection. But Mr. Mahan does not hold that all believers are now perfect. He considers Christians generally as very deficient in faith and obedience, and presents complete holiness before them, as an object to be *sought*, not as *already obtained*. Will he then say, that the precious promise above named has not, in any degree, been fulfilled respecting them? I think he will rather say, whatever may become of his theory, that as the gracious Redeemer “has begun a good work in them,” he has begun to save them from their sins, and so has, *in a measure*, really fulfilled the promise.

Take one promise more:—“I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you.” Let this be admitted to relate to all believers. Has it, then, been already *completely* fulfilled in respect to every one of them, so that no moral pollution remains? Mr. Mahan will say, clearly not. Has it, then, been really fulfilled in *any degree*? Certainly it has been. Their being true Christians implies, that God has made them clean *in some measure*;—that they are really sanctified *in a degree*. Now, who will say, that God may not cause his faithfulness to be seen and admired in regard to a promise, which has already been fulfilled in some degree, and to some extent, but is hereafter to have a more extensive and more perfect fulfilment?

But as this is one of the main points,—one of the hinges on which the existing controversy turns,—I am not yet ready to dismiss it. My wish is, to examine the question as to the accomplishment of the divine promises which relate to the sanctification of believers, so thoroughly, that all difficulties may, as far as possible, be removed, and that we may have no occasion to dwell on the subject again.

Come then, my brother, let us reason together a little farther on the subject before us. In what manner are we to understand the promises and declarations of God which you have so often quoted, *in regard to the time of their complete fulfilment*? We agree what the promises are, and what a complete accomplishment implies. And we agree that they will, first or last, be completely accomplished. The great, and, it would seem,

the only inquiry remaining respects the *time* of such accomplishment. To this let us give our undivided attention.

I understand your position to be, that the divine promises and declarations clearly imply, *that believers will be sanctified completely during the progress of the present life*. But is this position tenable? When the Scripture declares, that Jesus shall save his people from their sins, it certainly does not expressly declare *when* he will do it. In what way, then, do you *ascertain* the time when? The apostle says, that "Christ loved the church and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it—and that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that it might be holy and without blemish." But he certainly does not tell us, in the passage itself, that Christ will accomplish all this for the whole church during the *present state*,—that he does now, in this life, actually present the whole body of believers to himself without spot or blemish. If, then, you prove this to be the meaning of the passage, you must do it by other considerations. The apostle, in another passage, says, that "Christ gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity." But he certainly does not say, in the passage itself, that Christ will do all this for us *during our continuance in this world*. I must therefore ask again, by what other considerations do you make it out, that this is *the proper meaning* of the passage? I agree with you that in the New Covenant, God promises to give to his people all that he requires of them in his law. This was a principle which Augustine often advanced, and to which he attached great importance. Multitudes from that day to this have done the same. Indeed, this sentiment is virtually held by all devout Christians. It is wrought as an element into their faith and their prayers. But does this precious promise of the New Covenant mean, that God will work in them a complete conformity with his law, *while they are passing through the present world*? It is evident from what you have published,* that you consider this to be the proper meaning of the promise, and you often and very plainly signify, that unless believers are completely sanctified in the present life, the promise fails. But how does this appear? Because a promise is not fully accomplished at a *particular time*, does it follow that it is *never* accomplished?

* See Repository for Oct. 1840, p. 410, and elsewhere, and many passages in the Discourses.

Much depends on this inquiry ; and I pray you not to pass over it hastily. A promise was early made that a Saviour should come ; but thousands of years passed away, and he did not come. Did the promise therefore fail of its accomplishment ? God made a promise to Abraham, that he would give to his seed the land of Canaan for an inheritance. Can we say that God did not fulfil this promise, because he deferred the fulfilment for so many hundred years ? God has promised to deliver his people from all iniquity and to make them perfectly holy. And suppose that, *in the end*, he perfectly fulfils it. Does he fail to fulfil it, because he does not fulfil it sooner ? I trust that my dear brother, with whom I am so freely discussing this subject, will, after a few days more, be so happy as to be admitted into the heavenly world, and there be freed forever from all moral evil, and, through divine grace, made perfectly holy. And suppose he then looks from that blessed world upon the present state ; and suppose that, in the light of heaven, he sees (what he may not now always see) that he was, all the way through life, liable to mistakes ; and that, in his best frames, he had some remains of sin,—but was at length delivered from it, and made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light. Will he say, or think, that God failed to accomplish his promise, because he did not accomplish it sooner ? If a thing is finally done, can any one say it is not done, because it was not done before ? If we see hereafter that, according to the divine promise, the knowledge of God fills the earth, and the whole world is converted ; shall we then say the promise has failed because so long a time passed away before it was carried into full effect ?

Just look at the principle brought into view, 2 Pet. 3 : 3, 4, 8, 9. The apostle first says, that “in the last days there shall be scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, *where is the promise of his coming ? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.*”

From the long delay of Christ's coming, those scoffers took occasion to call in question the certainty of the event, and the truth of the promise. With direct reference to this, the apostle introduces the same principle as that above alluded to, and says : “Beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as

some men count slackness, but is long-suffering," etc. He delays the fulfilment of his promise, not from slackness, as some suppose, but for wise and benevolent ends. Now, when you say, or imply, that the promise of God, to redeem his people from all iniquity and make them perfectly holy, requires that he should do all this during the period of the present life; do you not overlook the principle, which the apostle represents as so highly important, and so adapted to solve the difficulty he had to encounter? God has promised to bestow upon his people the grace of perfect sanctification. But, according to the common belief of the Christian church, they are, through all the days of their life, sanctified only in part. And will you, on this account, say, *where is the promise of his grace?* If you do, I must answer you in the words of the apostle: "Beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. The Lord is not slack,"—he does not forget his promise to redeem his people from all iniquity, because he takes time for it. The difference between a day and a thousand years is nothing with the Lord. What *is to be* is, with him, as though it were *now*. If he accomplishes the promise in future time, he is as faithful and true as though he did it to-day. If Christians find themselves perfectly holy when they enter heaven, they will most surely acknowledge and admire the goodness and faithfulness of God in completely fulfilling his gracious promise, though they will remember that, through all the days and years of this imperfect life, they had to struggle against "the law of sin in their members."

You see how the matter stands. And I must beseech you, my brother, no longer to argue, from the faithfulness of God in regard to his promises, that he must completely sanctify his people during any part of the present life; inasmuch as his faithfulness will be fully vindicated, and will shine forth with infinite glory, when it is made manifest in heaven, that the gracious work has at length been finished. Neyer, then, suffer the thought to enter your mind, that we do not consider the promises as precious as you do, or that we do not as confidently expect their fulfilment. And let me now press the inquiry, whether the divine promises, *when rightly understood*, afford any support to your favorite doctrine?

As this is a point on which so much depends in the discussion, let us not be weary in examining it thoroughly. Let us

view it on all sides with the closest attention, so that we may, if possible, be sure to guard against error, and to find the truth. The truth is incomparably precious, and is worthy to be searched for with untiring zeal. Allow me then to dwell on this particular topic a moment longer. And if we should happen, in any respect, to pass over the same ground again, let us do it with increased watchfulness and care.

You have quoted many of the gracious promises which God has made as to the entire deliverance of believers from sin. Suppose now, my brother, I quote the same promises, and say, these promises plainly imply, that God will completely sanctify his people *as soon as they believe*. Suppose I say; here is the promise of God, that "Jesus shall save his people from their sins;" and this implies that he will completely save them from their sins at once, when they become believers; and unless he does this, his promise falls to the ground. And here we have the declaration of God, that Christ came to redeem his people from all iniquity; and this must mean that he will redeem them from all iniquity the very hour and minute in which they believe in him; and if they remain a single hour without perfect holiness, the declaration is not accomplished. What objection can you make to all this? Will you say, I have no right to limit the fulfilment of the divine promise or declaration to *a single hour or minute*? But why have not I as good a right to give to the divine promise *these narrow limits*, as you have to give it limits of a little larger extent? Show me what authority you have to say, the promise must be fulfilled in a year, or in ten or twenty years, or during the present life (which may not be half a year), more than I have to say, it must be fulfilled the present hour or minute. Take time to look at this matter carefully; and then bring forward the reason why you limit the fulfilling of the promise to the few fleeting days of the present life, and yet say it is not limited to the present hour or minute.

PRAYERS FOR PERFECT SANCTIFICATION.

Mr. Mahan argues much in support of his doctrine from the prayers of Christians. As to the fact that Christians pray, and pray earnestly for complete sanctification, I agree with him. It is, in my view, essential to the character of true believers.

that they should sincerely pray, that the blood of Christ may cleanse them from all sin, and that the God of peace would sanctify them wholly. And they do unquestionably desire and pray that God would sanctify them wholly during the *present life*, yea, during the *very day and hour and minute*, in which they offer up acceptable prayer. And one thing more I hold to be unquestionable, that is, that God will certainly, in the highest and best sense, answer their prayers, and bestow upon them the precious blessing of complete sanctification; yea, will do exceeding abundantly above all that they ask or think. Mr. Mahan (Discourses, p. 35) repeats the words of John: "This is the confidence we have in him, that if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us;—and whatsoever we ask, we have the petitions that we desired of him." He then adds: "Have we not here positive proof, that when we pray in faith for perfect holiness, that blessing will be bestowed upon us?" I answer, yes; it will certainly be bestowed. But *when*? He thinks it must be during the progress of the *present life*. But why such *large* limits? Why not during the *present hour*? How can he prove that God will so answer our prayers, as to accomplish the whole work of sanctification during the period of this life, any more than I can prove that he will accomplish it during the present hour? He appeals to the reader, and says: "Is it possible for us to believe, that Christ himself prayed, and taught his disciples to pray, and that the Holy Spirit inspired apostles and saints to pray for a blessing, which the Scriptures require us to believe God will not bestow upon his people?" I answer, it would be strange indeed, if any one should believe this. But what has this to do with the point at issue? For admitting, as all do, that God will certainly give the saints the perfect sanctification which they pray for, the question in debate still remains; that is, *when* will God do it? The invaluable gift of perfect holiness will be *truly* bestowed, if bestowed at all. And the prayers which Christians so often and so earnestly offer up for this blessing, will be as really and fully answered, if answered at a later period, as if answered earlier. The patriarchs longed and prayed for the coming of the Messiah. And were not their prayers as really answered by his coming after so long a time, as if he had come before? God has promised to answer the humble, confiding, importunate prayers of his children; and he certainly will answer them. Heaven and earth shall pass away sooner than one

of his promises shall fail. This is our firm belief; though Mr. Mahan charges us with affirming that we ought to offer up prayer for complete sanctification, "with the certain expectation of not receiving the blessing." It is a mistaken charge. Our certain expectation is, that we *shall* receive the blessing. But while we believe that God certainly answers the prayers of his children, we do not forget that he does it at the time, and in the manner which he sees to be best. Sometimes he answers their prayers immediately, and the blessing comes while they are yet speaking. Sometimes he grants them precious blessings, even before their prayers are offered up. Sometimes (as in the case of Paul, 2 Cor. 12) he withholds the particular good sought, and grants another of equal or superior value. Sometimes he begins to answer prayer soon, but gives not a full answer for a long time. For example; in all past ages his people have offered up the prayer dictated by Christ: "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as it is done in heaven." His kingdom has come to *some extent*, but not generally. His will has been done *truly*, but hitherto very imperfectly. We however look for the time *when* the prayer will be more fully answered in the universal prevalence of love and obedience. God sees this way of answering prayer to be the wisest and best. And when we come to be competent judges, we shall see it to be so too. And Mr. Mahan seems to have brought himself, unawares, into contact with the same view of the subject (see Disc. pp. 32, 33). He represents the two petitions above mentioned as containing a pledge that the events shall take place. But have they taken place to the full extent of these petitions? Has the kingdom of God fully come, and his will been done on earth as in heaven? Mr. Mahan says, "we have the pledge of Christ that they shall be granted, *when* asked in faith." Have they not been asked in faith? Did no one of the apostles or primitive Christians ask them in faith? Has no Christian, from the time when Jesus dictated the prayer to the present day, offered it up in faith? Has not Mr. Mahan, or Mr. Fitch, or Mr. Finney, or some other good man offered up this prayer in faith? And yet we see it not yet fully answered. What then has become of the pledge, "that it shall be granted *when* asked in faith?" Do these writers mean, that these petitions, when offered in faith, shall be answered *immediately*? If so, then they must be driven to the painful conclusion, that neither they themselves, nor any

other Christians have ever offered them up in faith. But we have been led to suppose, from their representations, that they would doubt almost any thing sooner than they would doubt the reality and strength of their own faith. And we have supposed that they must, times without number, have prayed in faith: "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as in heaven." And as they are confident that they have thus prayed, and confident too that God heareth them, "and that they have the petitions which they have desired of him;" why do they not come forward boldly, and say: "God's kingdom is come, and his will is done on earth as in heaven. We have prayed in faith for this; and God has not failed to answer our prayers. We prayed for this some time ago; and God has not *delayed* to answer our prayers. He *has* answered them; and "we have the petitions we desired of him." And whatever may be appearances to the contrary, his kingdom certainly *has come*, and his will is now done on earth as in heaven. Yes, it must be so; for God has heard us. And though the eye of sense cannot see it, the eye of faith must see, that the world is now filled with the knowledge of God; that his will is perfectly obeyed by the whole human family, and the earth converted into a paradise." What hinders them from saying this? They *must* say it; or they must say they have never prayed in faith for the coming of Christ's kingdom; or they must say, God does not answer prayer; or else they must adopt the principle which I have endeavored to defend; namely, that God often extends his answer to prayer over hundreds, and even thousands of years, accomplishing the inestimable good desired *gradually*; bestowing the blessing for which his people pray, in an *increasing measure*; and, in the end, bringing about a result, which will display clearly and gloriously, his unfailing faithfulness, in the *complete* fulfilment of his promise *to answer prayer*. If they adopt this principle, and apply it to the case in hand, they can no longer argue in support of their peculiar doctrine respecting perfection, from the prayers which Christians offer up for complete holiness, or from the certainty that God will answer their prayers. The Bible teaches that Christians ought to pray and do pray for perfect sanctification, and that God will answer their prayers, and grant the blessing they pray for. But where does the Bible authorize us to take the other step, and limit the time when God must give the answer, to *the present day*, or *the present year*, or to any part of *the present life*?

Mr. Mahan (Disc. p. 33) quotes the prayer of Christ, that all believers "may be one," and "may be made perfect in one." He says, "the union here prayed for is a union of perfect love;" which I think very obvious. He then argues, that this love will exist among believers, or that Christ prayed for what God will not bestow. The latter he does not for a moment admit. Of course he holds that this "union of perfect love will exist among believers." *Will* exist! I ask you, *when*? You doubtless remember that Christ offered up this prayer eighteen hundred years ago. And now, after fifty generations, you say, the prayer *will* be answered, and that perfect love "*will* exist among believers!" Pray, my dear brother, why don't you say, it *has* been answered,—that union of perfect love, for which Jesus prayed, *has* existed ever since Christ offered up the prayer, and *does now* exist? As to the prayers of common Christians, you may say, there is a deficiency;—they are wanting in faith, or in fervor. But you cannot say this of the prayer of Jesus. It was a prayer entirely, and in the highest degree, pleasing to God. Do you say, God *has* answered it? No. You say, he *will* answer it. And thus you virtually acknowledge that the faithfulness of God, in answering prayer, did not require him fully to answer the prayer even of Jesus, during his life, or during the life of fifty generations of his followers. You virtually acknowledge, that God may be truly said to hear and answer prayer, even the prayer of his beloved Son, though he does not fully grant the blessing desired for thousands of years. On what pretence then can you any longer maintain, that God cannot properly be said to answer the prayers of believers for perfect holiness, unless he makes them perfectly holy at the present time, or, at farthest, during some part of the present life?

One word more on this point. Prayer for any good plainly implies that the good is not already obtained. For if obtained, why should it be prayed for? The prayers of prophets and apostles for their own complete sanctification, or that of others, had a manifest reference to a *future* good, a blessing *not yet received*. Jesus prayed thus for his disciples: "Sanctify them through thy truth." They had been *sanctified* in part. What Jesus prayed for was, that they might be sanctified in a higher degree, yea, completely; a blessing which he looked upon as *future*. So the apostle prays for believers at Thessalonica: "the Lord make you to *increase* and abound in love." Their

love existed in an imperfect degree, and needed *increase*. He prayed, too, that the Lord would establish their hearts "unblamable in holiness before God, at the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ with all his saints." He prayed for a *future* good, and he fixed his eye upon the second coming of Christ, as the time when it was to be completely accomplished. Again, he prayed for believers, "that God would fulfil in them all the good pleasure of his goodness, and make them perfect in every good work, always implying, that the blessing prayed for had not yet been fully obtained. And does not every Christian feel this to be the case, when he hungers and thirsts for righteousness, and cries earnestly to God for complete sanctification? Not long since, I heard, with great delight, the fervent prayers of my brother Mahan, for the entire subjection of all the powers of the soul to Christ,—for entire sanctification. Doubtless he prays in the same manner still. And when he thus prays, he doubtless looks upon perfect holiness as a blessing *to be* bestowed upon him by the grace of God, not as already bestowed. For if already bestowed, it should be made the subject not of *petition*, but of thanksgiving. And in that case, I should expect that my brother, instead of crying to God and wrestling with God for perfect holiness of heart and life, would stand forth with devout confidence, and say: *God, I thank thee that I am perfectly free from sin, and perfectly conformed to the holy image of Christ.* But does he pray thus? And would he like to hear any other man pray thus? No. Whatever may be the speculative notions of true believers, when they come before a holy, heart-searching God in prayer, they will follow the promptings of their own humble, contrite spirits, and will beseech God to cleanse them from all sin, and make them perfect in holiness. And, however advanced they may be in the divine life, they will continue to pray thus as long as they live, always feeling, as the apostle did, that they are "not already perfect," and always reaching after it, and beseeching the God of all grace to bestow the long desired and precious blessing upon them in all its fulness.

Here I must close the discussion for the present. And in a review of the ground over which I have passed, I request Mr. Mahan, and every other advocate of "the doctrine of perfection," seriously to consider whether they have not, however unintentionally, claimed or seemed to claim various important principles as *peculiar to them*, which are equally held by evan-

gelical ministers and Christians generally ; whether they have not in this way made a wrong impression upon the less intelligent and less cautious members of the religious community ; and whether they have not thus been laboring to establish and propagate their opinions by means which are evidently wanting, I would not say in honesty, but in candor and fairness. I now very cheerfully leave them, and all who read these pages, to judge, whether any valid argument in support of "the doctrine of perfection" can be drawn from any of those points which I have examined ; that is, from the provisions of the gospel, from the attainableness of perfection, or from the promises of God, or the prayers of his people. The arguments which Mr. Mahan derives from these considerations are the principal arguments on which he rests the truth of his system. And I am greatly mistaken if these principal arguments of his do not prove to be altogether inconclusive and fallacious. And I shall be greatly disappointed if my respected brethren, who have recently advocated the doctrine of perfection, do not feel themselves bound in truth to abstain from any farther attempt to uphold their scheme by the arguments which have here been noticed.

There are several other topics introduced by Mr. Mahan, to which I wish to give a particular and respectful consideration ; but this I must defer to another opportunity.

ARTICLE X.

EXPOSITION OF ROMANS 8 : 18—23.

By Edmund Turney, Theol. Sem., Hamilton, N. Y.

THE sense of this passage depends principally upon the word *κρίσις*. Before attempting to give its meaning, we will notice a few facts in relation to the object designated, which will aid us in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion.

1. *Κρίσις* seems to designate *a definite, individual object*. The collective sense, generally assigned to the term in this passage, is unsatisfactory and improbable. Except when used to express the *act of creating*, it commonly takes, in the New Testament,

the sense of *κτίσμα*; and properly denotes a *created thing*, a *creature*. "Neither is there any *creature* that is not manifest in his sight." Heb. 4: 13. The same use occurs in Rom. 8: 39, 2 Cor. 5: 17, 1 Pet. 2: 13, Mark 16: 15; and also, we think, in Col. 1: 15, 23, Gal. 6: 15, Rom. 1: 25. The use of *πᾶσα* in verse 22 is worthy of notice. If *κτίσις* denotes the creation in general, *πᾶσα* is employed merely to give emphasis to the expression, and this verse is to be regarded as little more than a repetition of the preceding context. But if *κτίσις* designate an individual object, and *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις* denotes the *whole community** to which it belongs, we can account for the different expressions. The compound form of the verbs employed in verse 22 ought not to be overlooked. The argument of the apostle appears to be this: The *κτίσις* (the particular *κτίσις* alluded to) is at present "subjected to vanity," and is "waiting for" deliverance: nor is this surprising; "for we know that *every κτίσις—in common*—is groaning and travailing in pain until now."

2. The *κτίσις* is destined to experience *a renovation at the resurrection*. A careful examination of the passage will make this perfectly obvious.

3. The *κτίσις* has a *personal interest and participation* in the glory of the saints. It is represented as awaiting, not merely a renovation coincident with, and similar to "the manifestation of the sons of God," but the same manifestation. Besides, the apostle directly asserts that the *κτίσις* "shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the liberty of the glory of the children of God."

4. The *κτίσις* is *an object possessing life and sensation*. It is represented as longing—waiting—willing—groaning—travailing in pain. These expressions can hardly have been used in reference to a senseless and inanimate object. None but the strongest reasons should lead us to adopt such an interpretation.

5. There is a *manifest distinction* between the *κτίσις* and the *Christian*. The simple expression *καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις*, *even the creature itself*, is sufficient to show that it is distinguished from the sons of God, and is something inferior to them. A comparison of verses 22 and 23 will place the fact beyond dispute.

* *Πᾶσα* is here taken, not in the sense of *ἕκαστος*, *each*, *every one indifferently*, but as denoting an *entire class—the whole in distinction from a part*. See Butt. 127 : 6. Comp. Mark 16 : 15, Phil. 1 : 3, Eccl. 3 : 17.

We are now prepared to inquire into the particular application of this term. In what are these conditions fulfilled? We cannot understand by *κρίσις*, *the human race, men in general*. This collective sense cannot be reconciled with the supposition that it designates an individual object. And such an explanation is inconsistent with the fact that the *κρίσις* is looking forward to the resurrection for its deliverance; and is destined to participate in the glory of the saints. Will all men, indiscriminately, be “introduced into the liberty of the glory of the children of God?” And is it true that men in general are *not willingly* subjected to vanity?

For similar reasons, we cannot understand by *κρίσις* the *material universe, the inanimate creation*. The opinion, that the material universe will finally be renovated, is more a matter of conjecture than of revelation. The only passage which can be urged with any confidence in favor of this sentiment, is 2 Pet. 3: 13. But, the apostle’s particular conception of a *new heaven* and a *new earth*, we are unable to determine. Yet, no one can imagine the actual participation of inanimate nature in the glory of the children of God. And not only the description of the *κρίσις* as a sensitive object, but the peculiar subjection to which it is doomed, shows conclusively that the material universe cannot be intended. In what way the various elements and objects of nature are subjected to *vanity*—*τῇ ματαιότητι*—in any authorized sense of that term, has never been shown. Vanity, however, is not the only evil to which the *κρίσις* is subjected. *Bondage and corruption* pertain to its present condition. But how can inanimate nature be regarded as in bondage—especially in the *bondage of corruption*? Is the fact that the ground was *cursed* for man’s sake, so as not spontaneously to yield its productions, a sufficient reason for applying to it the expressive language of the apostle?

Is there any object, then, within the range of our knowledge, in which the necessary conditions of the *κρίσις* are fulfilled? Such an object, we think, is the *animal part of the human constitution—the body* (the Christian) *regarded as the subject of instinct and sensation*. To maintain this interpretation, it is necessary simply to show, that the proposed application of *κρίσις* is natural and authorized, and that it meets the exigencies of the passage.

I. Is this sense of *κρίσις* natural and authorized? It will be admitted, we presume, this use of the term is not unnatural in

itself. To distinguish the animal from the spiritual part of man, and to speak of them as distinct, is common to profane and sacred writers. The apostle frequently represents the body and the spirit as possessing desires and performing actions peculiar to themselves. He speaks expressly of the *outward* man or animal nature, as distinguished from the *inward* man or the spiritual nature. 2 Cor. 4: 16. The body, thus distinguished from the spirit, may very fitly be styled *the creature*. If the material part of the universe may be designated *κτίσις*, may we not suppose a similar usage in relation to the material part of man? In perfect accordance with this suggestion, the body of man is the only part of his constitution which God is represented as having properly created. Gen. 2: 7. A sufficient reason for this use of *κτίσις* may be found in the likeness of our animal nature to the brute creation. In mere physical constitution there is no essential difference.

But is this use of *κτίσις* sustained by other examples? This question it is not necessary to decide. If it can be shown that this application of the term is natural, and not inconsistent with its acknowledged signification, the exigency of the passage will bear us out. Does any one mistake the force of *οἰκία* in 2 Cor. 5: 1, because no instance of a similar use can be found in the New Testament, or, perhaps, in the language? Does not *κτίσις* itself, in 1 Pet. 2: 13, properly denote an ordinance or institution?—a sense unusual, if not elsewhere unknown? The apostles employed the language of common life. This use of *κτίσις*, though it may be confirmed by no Greek author whose writings are extant, might have corresponded with the “*usus loquendi*” at that time. A usage may have prevailed among Christians similar to that which is common at the present day in relation to the English term “*creature*.”

II. Do the exigencies of the passage require or sustain this sense of *κτίσις*? The sentiment of the passage appears to be closely connected with the preceding context. In verses 10 and 11, the apostle assures his brethren that even their bodies, though doomed to death because of sin, shall be restored to life and immortality, by virtue of the resurrection of Christ and the indwelling of the Spirit. In verse 13, he reminds them, that, by mortifying the deeds of the body through the Spirit, they shall *live*, in the sense just explained—in their entire nature. Comp. John 11: 25, Col. 3: 4, 5, 1 Cor. 15: 22, 1 Thess. 5: 10. He then adds: For as many as are led by the Spirit of God,

they are the sons of God. Having paused to prove this assertion, he completes his argument in verse 17: "If children (or sons), then heirs, heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ; *if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together.*" With a vivid conception of the privilege of being glorified with Christ, the apostle exclaims: For I reckon that the sufferings of the present time are of no weight in comparison with (*πρός*) the glory which is to be manifested upon us. This sentiment he wishes deeply to impress on the minds of his brethren. He is anxious to satisfy them, that, although in a suffering condition, they are destined to attain to those glorious privileges which, as the children of God, they had been encouraged to expect. The time of their "manifestation" has not yet arrived; the enjoyment of their promised inheritance is beyond the present life. Comp. 1 Pet. 1: 3—9; 4: 12, 13; James 5: 7; Gal. 6: 9; Heb. 12: 1, et seq.

The apostle proceeds to show that the inheritance of the saints is yet to be revealed, from the *present condition of their animal nature*; which, though destined to participate in their glorification with Christ, is still subjected to degradation and suffering. "The earnest expectation of the creature is awaiting the manifestation of the sons of God." Their animal nature, as it instinctively shrinks from suffering, may be represented as looking and longing for deliverance: and as its redemption is necessarily involved in being glorified with Christ, its present condition is an evidence that "the manifestation of the sons of God"—the exhibition of their real character and the revelation of their glory—is to be *waited for*—is to be realized only in a future state. "For the creature has been subjected to vanity." The animal constitution is doomed to remain, during its present state of existence, in degradation and misery—to experience the effects of sin.

It has been usual to connect *ἐν ἐλπίδι*, *in hope*, with *ὑπεράγῃ*, *has been subjected*, and to regard the intervening expression as a parenthesis; but the harshness of this construction, arising especially from the unnatural repetition of *πίσις*, seems to forbid its admission. By connecting *ἐν ἐλπίδι* immediately with *ὑποτάξαντα*, *him who subjected it*, these difficulties are avoided, and an apposite sense is secured. Adopting this construction, we may thus express the sentiment of the passage: The creature has been subjected to vanity, not willingly indeed—not without desires and indications of release, but in consequence

of one who has subjected it in hope—who has placed it in a hopeful as well as suffering condition—hope that* even the creature itself shall be liberated from the bondage of corruption—that even the animal nature shall be delivered from its present infirmities and afflictions, yea, even from the confinement and corruption of the grave—into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.

In verse 22, the apostle, to confirm his argument, appeals to a fact universally known and acknowledged: “For we know that every creature in common groans and travails in pain until now.” He has just said that the creature is at present subjected to vanity; and this subjection is involuntary. The former position is sustained by the fact that *all* creatures alike are in a suffering condition; the latter by their *groans and pangs* in this state of subjection. *Πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις* may denote all men considered merely as *sensitive beings*, and need not include the brute creation. We know, says the apostle, that all creatures in common—the saints in their animal nature as well as others—are groaning under infirmity and affliction even to the present time. The full liberty of children—“the manifestation of the sons of God”—has not yet been realized.

The state and feelings of Christians, as *rational and spiritual beings*, are next appealed to as proof that their inheritance is future. “And not only so, but even we ourselves, though we have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, *the redemption of our body.*” *Καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*, we suppose, were designed to distinguish Christians, not so much from the *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις*, as from their own animal nature. This supposition, indeed, is the only satisfactory explanation of this peculiarly emphatic repetition. Not only is the creature—the animal part of our constitution, subjected to vanity and waiting for deliverance, but even we ourselves—we in our proper persons, though partakers of the renovating influence of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption—our manifestation as the children of God—the resurrection and glorification of our bodies.

The passage, as thus explained, is invested with a peculiar

* Should the reader prefer to follow our English version in rendering *ἐν* because, it will accord equally well with this interpretation.

interest. It furnishes an additional proof of a doctrine which was once the life of the Christian church. It makes no allusion, indeed, to the longings of the heathen for immortality. It presents no splendid description of the renovation of the material universe. But it introduces a theme far more welcome to the child of God. It points him directly to his glorious destiny—to the resurrection and glorification of his body. It derives an argument for the confirmation of his faith from facts furnished by his consciousness and experience. It reminds him that he is “a joint heir with Christ,” and consequently, destined to enjoy the glory which is to be revealed. Thus he is encouraged to look beyond the grave for “the manifestation” of his real character; and the enjoyment of his promised inheritance. His very afflictions become a source of consolation, by becoming the evidence of his future bliss. He is assured, by all that is endearing in his relation to God as his Father, by all that is real in the conscious witness of the Spirit, nay, by all that is unwelcome in his present degraded and suffering condition, that he shall finally be raised in the likeness of his Saviour, and shall then participate in the glories of the heavenly kingdom.

ARTICLE XI.

REVIEW OF WIGGERS' HISTORY OF AUGUSTINISM AND PELAGIANISM.

By Professor Henry F. Tappan, New-York City.

An Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, from the original sources: by G. F. Wiggers, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Rostock, etc. Translated from the German, with Notes and Additions, by Rev. Ralph Emerson, Prof. of Eccl. Hist. in the Theol. Sem. Andover, Mass. Andover: Gould, Newman & Saxton. pp. 383.

THE history of Christianity may be taken up under two phases,—the narrative of external and visible events, and its philosophical and dogmatical history. Both are important, both are indispensable. Nor may the one be viewed separately from the other: for they have ever acted upon each other reciprocally.

cally. External events have influenced philosophies and dogmas, and the latter have influenced the former.

But the point particularly to be considered under the second phasis, and one unquestionably of the highest moment, is the connection between Christianity, taken in its utmost purity and simplicity, and the philosophies and dogmas which were abroad in the world when she made her appearance upon the theatre of humanity, or which were called up and modified upon the occasion of her presence. In this work we have to disintegrate the Christianity of Christ and his apostles from the opinions of men; and to show how these various, and often contradictory opinions were combined with the simple element of revelation, thus producing all the different forms of nominal Christianity, of sects and heresies.

The Bible is not peculiarly a book for philosophers and scholars; it is a book for benighted, erring, lost men of every grade. Coming from the purest source and on the most benevolent mission, ere we had entered upon its examination, we might reasonably expect to find it beautifully adapted to its end. Has God given a rule of duty and a revelation of truth, only to involve us in endless disputations? Has he opened to us a way of redemption, and given us a promise of eternal life, accompanied with a pressing exhortation to "lay hold" upon it; and yet, is this way enveloped in such obscurity, and this promise given so doubtfully, that we are compelled to turn away from the glory of the prize, and from the consideration of the urgency of our circumstances, in order to settle curious dogmas, and to balance nicely the "oppositions of science?"

Some of the lepers, the blind, the deaf, the halt, the maimed, the paralytic, in the days of Jesus Christ, may have been men of very curious and subtle minds, and given much to philosophical speculation; and ere they could be persuaded to avail themselves of his miraculous power, they may have thought it indispensable to determine the possibility and the modes of miraculous interposition. We find, however, that Bartimeus experienced the healing benefit, without any previous disquisition upon causes and modes: and the blind man mentioned by the apostle John, when called upon to account for the restoration of his sight, could only reply: "One thing I know, that whereas I was born blind, now I see."

These instances may be taken as a type of the whole dispensation of grace. Men of philosophical genius, taste and learn-

ing may find much to speculate about. Still, the fact is before us, that in the days of Christ and his apostles and in all subsequent times, multitudes of our race, who were destitute of philosophical genius and acquirements, have, under the simplest presentation of "Christ and him crucified," believed unto salvation. In their ignorance, or in their neglect of philosophy, they found nothing wanting to the energy of their faith, or to the strength and comfort of their hope.

The world in which we live is wonderfully and beautifully adapted to our wants and uses. The appropriation, in the first instance, is not made by men of deep science, but by men of limited attainments and ordinary pursuits. Before philosophy, with her thoughtful brow and all penetrating eye, was born; before science had measured the earth and the heavens, and weighed the winds, the mountains and the oceans, and decomposed matter into its fine and subtle elements, there was skill in agriculture and mechanical art; there were a thousand practical rules in being and in use; and nature was extensively known, and her good things enjoyed, as the gifts of a familiar and bountiful parent.

Afterwards came philosophy and science. They expanded the mind, they elevated the nature, they extended the dominion of man. But they did not disclaim the facts which had been already observed; they did not quarrel with the practical and useful rules which had been formed by a spontaneous induction. A multitude of these rules were substantially just, and were never to be laid aside: philosophy might explain but not supersede them. Others were led on from a crude to a perfected state, by nicer experiments, and more thoughtful observations and comparisons. Others were superseded by the discovery of new rules more useful. And many fields of useful and bountiful productiveness were laid open, which were unknown before.

Philosophy and science perfected art, and gave to industry a gigantic power. The new discoveries, and the more exact knowledges, while they extended and perfected what had gone before, worked into it harmoniously and benignly. The introduction of a better implement for tilling the earth, or an improvement in ship-building, or a more wholesome and palatable manufacture of bread, or a finer, warmer and more beautiful manufacture of garments, or a more convenient and nobler architecture would be benefits alike obvious, whether introduced

by laborious and unscientific experiments, or by the application of mechanical, chemical and æsthetical principles. And while these higher efforts were in progress, and before any palpable and sure result in any branch had been attained, the old, homely and useful rules and usages held sway, and produced their accustomed benefits. The rude and unwieldy plough would not be laid aside, and the earth suffered to lie untilled, because a skilful mechanic had given out that he was about to produce a more convenient implement: nor would the mariner cease to regulate his navigation by the jutting headlands and capes, and by the sun and stars, because a report had gone forth that an instrument would soon be abroad, which would enable him to sail in the dark night, and to launch away from the land into the unknown ocean.

Now, what the plain facts of nature are to men universally in common life, in all that relates to our physical and social being, the Bible is to men universally in common life, in all that relates to their spiritual, responsible and immortal being. The Bible is a plain array of facts, rules, precepts, doctrines and promises. It is of universal interest and moment, and it is given in the simplest and most appropriate language.

The incarnation of the Son of God, his miracles, his sufferings and death, his resurrection from the dead and ascension into heaven are all given clearly as facts. And so, likewise, all the teachings of Christ and his apostles consist in the announcement of facts, in the statement of truths in simple and intelligible propositions, in drawing obvious and forcible conclusions from generally admitted truths, and in urging these upon the attention of men with great earnestness and simplicity, accompanied with solemn comminations and "exceedingly precious promises."

Many of these facts and truths are mysterious in their nature; as the incarnation, miracles, death and resurrection of Christ, the mission of the Holy Spirit in regenerating, sanctifying and comforting the heart, the resurrection of the dead, and the world to come. And even many, which are more generally professed to be understood, have their measure of mystery; as the doctrine of the atonement and intercession of Christ, and of justification by faith. There are a multitude of curious philosophical inquiries which may be started respecting these truths; and we do not deny the interest and importance of these inquiries. But ere we commence these inquiries, we have the

facts and the inspired propositions in all their integrity, containing rules of duty and objects of faith and hope, in their sublime utility—bringing peace, salvation and eternal life to a sinful and lost race.

Paul's mind partook of that character which we call philosophical; and there is reason to believe that he was both philosophically and classically educated. Some of the writings of John, particularly a part of the first chapter of his gospel, may produce the same impression. We believe, however, that a philosophical aspect in the portions referred to will present itself strongly only to those who traverse the pages of the Bible on a philosophical hunt, and who are eager to find food and authority for preconceived theories. Paul and John, after all, only affirm truths upon divine authority; or where deductions are made, they arise spontaneously and obviously, and by no intricate and difficult logic. The spirit of all Scripture is conveyed in the noble declaration of John: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of life; that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you."

What is true of the writings of the apostles is true likewise, in an eminent degree, of the teaching of Jesus Christ. He, certainly, has nothing of the manner of a speculating philosopher. The only approach to a concealment of his meaning is found in his parables. The truths conveyed under these are very simple and striking, and were readily explained to his disciples when they applied to him in private, and would, undoubtedly, have been explained to any other persons who should have manifested the same interest in his instructions. This mode of teaching was at the time intended as a rebuke of the unbelieving Jews. The exposition of these parables the evangelists have given in full.

Few, comparatively, have the genius and the learning to enter upon the deep philosophical researches connected with the truths of the gospel. If there be any man, or any number of men who can enter upon these researches, with the true philosophical spirit, after a true philosophical method, and become to the metaphysical world what Kepler, and Galileo, and Tycho Brahe, and Leibnitz, and Newton were to the physical world—great and sure interpreters—then may we gain higher views of our own being, and of the being of God and his moral govern-

ment ; then, the facts and inspired propositions of the Bible, received in all their simplicity, shall become the sure foundation of an enduring philosophy, which, rising like a glorious pyramid, shall hide its top in the impenetrable light wherein God dwelleth and knoweth himself alone.

Until that day of great illumination come, there must be diverse theories and speculations, by men of diverse powers, learning, prejudices and aims. But while these theories are building up, or crumbling, and these speculations wax warm and even fierce in the conflict with mighty antagonists, do not the facts and inspired propositions remain the same ? Is it necessary that all the unlearned, or plainly educated, all men, women and children, who can find food and life and light and happiness in the gospel, should become involved in the unintelligible conflict, and be arrayed against each other by the names and fierce watchwords of sects and parties ?

Mark, friends—remember, gentlemen—that whether the Copernican or the Ptolemaic system be true, we have the same succession of day and night, the same kind presence of the heavens, the same bountiful and motherly bosom of the earth ; that whether the phlogistic or the anti-phlogistic theory be true, we can still plough and reap, and make bread from the “fat kidneys of wheat,”—that whatever may be the true cosmogony, social order and quiet duty and enjoyment exist independently of the determination of these difficult points. And so, likewise, while the metaphysical doctors of the church are involved in their complicated ontologies, theodicies, psychologies, anthropologies ; and, in the zeal and towering wrath of disputation, are hurling at each other the tortuous and lurid thunderbolts of logic ; the gospel of Christ, like a sweet lake among the green hills, lies still, calm and transparent, reflecting the light and the forms of heaven. We may all go together, the learned and the unlearned—even the conflicting doctors may go together into “the green pastures and beside the still waters.” We may intermit our inquiries respecting the foundations of these everlasting hills, respecting the causes and laws, the path and motions of the sun and the stars over our heads, respecting the sources and the inherent properties of these pure and healing waters. This light is pleasant to the eye ; this is a glorious scenery of the earth and the heavens ; the fruits of this tree of life are not forbidden ; of these waters we may drink freely. Let us ascend this green hill and sit beneath this cross. What peace ! what

beauty ! what a heavenly influence breathes here ! Here lies a wondrous telescope : let us look through it. We see the land which is afar off :—the heavenly city stands revealed.

In the world of nature, the facts were first given, and loved, and generalized into useful rules ; and philosophy came on slowly afterwards as the interpreter of the unquestionable facts. But even here the wildness of speculation often did violence to the simplicity of nature ; but then, the error did not reach our common life, and the majestic voice of nature soon silenced the voices of strange children.

But when Christianity appeared, she found old religions and philosophies, boastful of their descent, proud and stern in their pretensions ; all alike contending for the mastery, or forming alliances to make conquest and pre-eminence doubly sure. She came, not as a philosophy, but revealed herself as the face of nature upon the morning of creation, when light was first spread abroad : there were forms and objects to behold, and influences to feel and enjoy. There was undoubtedly a philosophy connected with all this. But as the sun with his light and warmth reached the little bud of earth, and opened its petals, and painted its colors, and presented its beauty and fragrance to the sense of man, without deigning to explain the curious and beautiful work ; and as the soul of man found itself in wonderful union with a corporeal body, admirably fitted to its uses, without comprehending the nature of this union, and saw a universal life working in organic nature without comprehending its interpenetration and its plastic energy ; so, in this spiritual world of Christianity, there was the union of divinity with humanity, and the communication of influences from a heavenly spirit, and the penetrating and vivifying power of a higher life, plainly given, and producing its palpable and glorious works of moral purity, beauty and order, while no explanation of the modes and conditions of this process was vouchsafed.

The first followers and adherents of Christianity received her as "little children." They were generally persons of sober minds, intelligent enough to perceive and apply facts, but carried away by no philosophical pride and enthusiasm. And while the days of persecution lasted, even the philosophical, who truly embraced the gospel, were more eager after eternal life than speculation ; as, during a siege, the philosopher will sometimes lay aside his books, or leave the laboratory, and take shield and spear in the common emergency.

But the presence of the old philosophies was soon felt. The facts and doctrines proclaimed, obviously had philosophical relations. Plato, and Epicurus and Zoroaster, as well as Jupiter, Isis and Arimanes, felt the pressure of the new religion.

First, therefore, appeared a collision between facts and truths of inspiration, and established dogmas. The affirmations of Christ and God were in conflict with the deductions of a speculative reason. This conflict began when Christ, at twelve years of age, disputed with the doctors in the temple. It continued during his life, and extended more and more after his death. Speculative philosophy rejected his miracles and denied his resurrection. Paul met it at Mars-hill when he preached Jesus and the resurrection. Paganism and philosophy went hand in hand, but they were prostrated before the facts of the gospel. Christianity triumphed, but philosophy was not extinguished. Now philosophy put on priestly garments, and became the commentator of God's revelations. Mighty tomes, under saintly names, and creeds, and confessions, bearing the broad seals of synods and councils, are the memorials of her work.

It must here be admitted that many great and good men wrote nobly and wisely; and that even those fathers, who philosophised much and crudely, made many happy expositions, gave out many excellent and striking thoughts, and spoke often in eloquent and soul-stirring exhortations. Still it may be safely affirmed, that Gnosticism, Manichæism, Platonism, and other forms of philosophy pervaded and influenced the thinking of the fathers.

There are therefore two general forms of Christianity so called. First, Christianity as contained wholly and truly in the Bible, consisting of facts narrated, and of doctrines affirmed under the authority and inspiration of God. Secondly, Christianity as presented in the creeds, and confessions, and writings generally of the Christian fathers. It is indeed assumed by the devoted adherents of the latter, that they have presented Christianity according to the just scriptural idea.

In order to determine the question thus at issue, it would be necessary to examine the writings of the fathers, together with the acknowledged creeds and confessions.

Now three results are possible. 1. The integrity of the facts and truths of the gospel may be preserved; and the additions made may consist of just philosophical principles and expositions. 2. The integrity of the facts and truths may be preserv-

ed; and the additions made may consist of the dogmas of a false philosophy. 3. The integrity of the facts and doctrines may be violated, and false dogmas may be added.

Wherever the integrity of the facts and affirmations of the gospel is preserved, ample ground for Christian union and fellowship exists, whatever may be the philosophical differences. As well might we refuse to work together by the light of the sun, or to cultivate, on common rules of agriculture, the fruitful earth, or to eat the same bread, because we differ in our theories in physics.

Next to the direct denial, or to the open perversion of the gospel, is the evil of commingling with its pure stream the various philosophies of men; and then presenting the adulterated, or at least the compound element, as that which came forth from the original source. Whether it be owing to the incapacity or imperfect discipline of the human mind, or whether the subject contains inherent difficulties, no branch of knowledge has presented so many contradictory and conflicting dogmas, and involved men in such fierce and interminable disputes as metaphysics. Now what can be more disastrous than to have all these disputes foisted into the gospel of Christ,—a religion not given to the “wise and prudent,” but unto “babes;” and not intended for the exercise of human wit, but to save the perishing sinner!

One most effectual means of bringing to an end the evils of which we have spoken, and of giving freedom to religion and to truth, is to introduce the profound and thorough study of the philosophical and dogmatical history of Christianity, into our systems of theological education. Let our students learn the origin of the numerous creeds and confessions of the church,—of the stately systems of theology,—of all these learned, venerable, and authoritative dogmas. Initiate them into philosophical history and criticism. Let them not be confined to the bare facts of external history; but enable them to penetrate into the heart of these movements. Give them the simplicity of heart, the independence of thought, the learned furniture and skill to separate pure, primitive and apostolical Christianity from strange philosophical admixtures. Could this sort of learning be more widely diffused, many a self-named defender of the faith, full of honest and fiery zeal, might be surprised to find himself, instead of an august champion for what was “once delivered to the saints,” the poor hero of a profane and stale philosophy.

Doctor Wiggers has done a worthy service in this department

of church history, by his learned, judicious and impartial "Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism." And next to him, the English public will feel themselves indebted to his learned translator, for his very spirited, graceful and lucid version; and for his ingenious "notes and additions." This work cannot be commended too highly to the attention of clergymen and theological students. The translator aptly remarks: "There are probably three classes of men who will like to read such a work as this. First, those who have been called Pelagians: for they will honestly wish to know whether they ought any longer to reject the appellation; and how far, if *at all*, they should own its justness. Secondly, those who have called them Pelagians: as they will wish to know whether, in whole or in part, they have rightly bestowed the appellation;—and whether, to any extent, it may also be applicable to themselves. Thirdly, those who have neither given nor received the name, but who would fain be better able to judge of the propriety with which it has been so currently applied and so promptly rejected, on the right and on the left." And we would add, fourthly, those who boast of the title of Augustinians; that they may know how far they are entitled to this distinction, and how far, upon serious reflection, they may be disposed to consider it a desirable distinction. Let us no longer take or give names in the dark; and although "names are things," let us learn that there are "things" which are better than their "names" purport.

The Augustinian and Pelagian controversy embraces topics which were agitated before the time of the two distinguished leaders from whom it takes its name; and which have never ceased to be agitated since their time. It does not appear, that of the earlier fathers there were any who could with justice be assigned strictly to the one form of doctrine or the other: and of the multitude of ecclesiastical writers who flourished subsequently, there was certainly a wide diversity of doctrine, bearing the same general designation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, but which, only in the case of the latter, attained to a distinctive title—that of Semi-Pelagianism.

With the aid of Dr. Wiggers—to whose authority we dare confidently appeal, and whose "presentation" we have it in our power to verify by going to the "original sources"—we shall endeavor to present a brief, but we hope a clear compend of the two systems. Departing from his order, we shall adopt one which is, in some degree, chronological.

I. THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN.

The Augustinian Theory.

Adam possessed a rational nature made after the divine likeness. This nature was highly developed, so that he was more noble, wise and excellent than any who ever came after him. He likewise possessed free will, as a power to sin or to refrain from sinning. This free will was not sufficient of itself to enable him to stand: but the aid of grace was afforded which rendered it sufficient; and yet this grace was not irresistible grace. The free will of man was one of inferior degree. He possessed the *posse non peccare*—the ability not to sin; but not the *non posse peccare*—the inability to sin. The power to do good, and the *non posse peccare* constitute the highest form of freedom. This is the freedom of God as the immutable good, of angels, and the “just made perfect.” But man, being made out of nothing, is at first an inferior and mutable good. Had Adam persevered, he would finally have attained to the higher freedom, the *non posse peccare*.

Before the fall the passions were subject to the reason. Hence there was no inordinate and evil concupiscence of any kind. “The connexion of the sexes would indeed have taken place in Paradise; but in such a way, that either no sensual passion would have been excited, or it would have been subject to the dominion of reason, and would not have risen in opposition to its dictates.”

The body which he inhabited corresponded to the purity and excellence of his mind. It was majestic, beautiful, free from disease and pain, and immortal. He did not possess the immortality of angels, and of the bodies of the risen saints. It was an immortality which depended upon the fact of his not sinning. Had he persevered in holiness, with the attainment of the *non posse peccare*, there would have been conjoined the impossibility of dying; and he would have passed into a spiritual body.

Eden was the fitting habitation of a being so holy and happy. Even the beasts were tame and gentle, and lived on the common vegetable aliment. And “if extreme old age would finally have worked their dissolution, so that human nature alone should possess eternal life; they would have been removed from Paradise, or would have gone forth, led by a sense of impending

death; so that death might happen to no living thing in that place of life."

The Pelagian Theory.

"The state of man before the fall was the same as it is now." He was a being of intelligence, free will and passions, with the ability to sin or to refrain from sinning. Then as now, his body was subject to disease and death. Hence, "the words, in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die, referred to spiritual death, i. e. sin." "The primitive state of the first man was superior only in this, that no example of sinning had yet been presented for imitation; and the first man who came into the world as an adult, had the full use of reason at the beginning," and the perfect exercise of his freedom. "Even concupiscence, which Augustine held as something evil, and as the mother of all evil, but which the Pelagians explained as a natural passion, was found in Paradise."

"Julian, a follower of Pelagius, admitted that Adam was created immortal, in the sense, that if he had not sinned, he would have obtained immortality by eating of the tree of life."

II. FREE WILL.

Augustinian Theory.

Augustine represents the will before the fall as an activity, entirely able and free to sin; also able and free to do good by the aid of grace actually communicated. Since the fall, it is an activity free only to sin, and totally unable to do good. The highest form of freedom is the *non posse peccare*.

Pelagian Theory.

In the original constitution of man, the will is an activity capable of both good and evil. In this lies its freedom; and in this "freedom to good and evil consists the superiority of the rational soul; in this, the honor and dignity of our nature." By the sin of Adam the capacity of good and evil action was neither lost to himself nor to his posterity. "Free will is as much free will after sins, as before sins." "It depends on man whether he will be good or evil." "He can even again become good when he has been bad, through his own exertions and aided by grace."

III. THE FALL OF ADAM AND ORIGINAL SIN.

Augustinian Theory.

Adam was free to sin, and he sinned. This Augustine takes as a primary fact. He does not account for the sin of Adam out of Adam himself: he was the cause of the first transgression.

Original sin is Adam's sin considered as participated in by all his posterity. Adam, as the first man, comprehended within himself his whole posterity. In the very act by which he sinned, they sinned likewise. And hence, whatever consequences affected Adam personally, affected his posterity. These consequences are condemnation to eternal death; temporal death; evil concupiscence or disordered passion in general, and sexual desire in particular—attested by the shame of nakedness; the pains of parturition; the necessity of labor, and the production of thorns and thistles; all moral and physical evils, and the loss of personal beauty. "The nature of man, both in a physical and a moral view, is totally corrupted by Adam's sin." All these consequences are penal consequences.

In this sin, Adam, and all his posterity in him, lost the ability to do good and became the slaves of sin. Even infants, although they should die while infants, are guilty, and subject to penal consequences, because they sinned in Adam.

Pelagian Theory.

Adam sinned only for himself. His sin is not original sin in relation to his posterity. Every one who comes after him is born into the world as pure and free as Adam was created, and is in a less advantageous position, only in respect of the weakness of infancy, and the necessity of growing up under the influence of sinful example.

IV. BAPTISM.

Augustinian Theory.

The subjects of baptism are infants and adults. In general baptism is indispensable to salvation. The only exceptions are cases in which faith unquestionably exists, but the rite is rendered impossible by the peculiar circumstances of the individual. Those who believed in Christ as the future Mediator, before his advent, are exceptions also. All unbaptised infants and all

heathen, as they are destitute of both faith and baptism, are lost. The damnation of infants will be of a milder form: and the heathen, who lived comparatively just and pure lives, will be adjudged to milder punishment than licentious idolaters.

The efficacy of baptism, in respect to infants, is to remove the guilt of original sin. All who are baptised in infancy, if they die before they are capable of actual transgression, will assuredly be saved. It is presumed, however, that the grace of the Holy Spirit is given at the time of baptism, for their spiritual regeneration. In the case of adults, baptism effects a complete redemption from sin, both original and actual. "Baptism, in Augustine's view, was the means, not only of obtaining pardon from all sin, but of being freed from all evil."

The Eucharist is involved in baptism; so that all the baptised are to be at once admitted to its participation. Hence it is to be administered even to infants.

In the case of infants, baptism alone is sufficient for salvation, because they are incapable of exercising faith. In the case of adults, faith and baptism are alike indispensable, unless the rite is clearly impossible. In the case of adults as well as infants, while the external rite was imperatively demanded, so that even faith could not, in ordinary circumstances, save without it; still the regeneration of the heart was effected by the accompanying influences of the Holy Spirit: but these influences were secured by the performance of the rite.

Pelagian Theory.

In the case of adults, the Pelagians affirm the efficacy of baptism no less than the Augustinians, except in respect to original sin, which the former deny. In the case of infants, there is no efficacy in baptism to the removal of original sin, because there is no original sin. But inasmuch as both parties practised infant baptism, and united in attributing to it an efficacious operation on the soul itself, it became necessary for the Pelagians to show the necessity and uses of baptism in an uncorrupted being. This they attempted, by making the extraordinary distinction between eternal life and the kingdom of heaven. To the first the infant is entitled, on the ground of natural uncorruptedness; to the second, by the rite of baptism, elevating the spiritual being to a higher excellence than naturally belongs to it. Subsequently, they conceded the object of

infant baptism to be the remission of sins, which should afterwards be committed.

Baptism, as generally expounded and practised in the church, was based upon the theory of original sin. The Pelagian dared not rebel against the authority of the church in relation to this rite, and therefore he found himself in an awkward position when he broached his doctrine. The Augustinian, on the other hand, employed the generally received notion of the efficacy of baptism as an argument for the doctrine of original sin: but then he had to meet the consequence of an indiscriminate condemnation of all unbaptised persons, heathen, infants, and even adult believers, unless the baptism of the latter were impossible.

V. GRACE.

Augustinian Theory.

By the fall, Adam, with all his posterity as comprehended in him, lost all freedom of will to the performance of good. If man, therefore, be left to rely wholly upon himself in this fallen condition, he cannot attain to any good whatever. Now, "God has *in himself* the hidden causes of *certain* acts, which he has not implanted in the things he has made; and these causes he puts in operation, not in that work of Providence by which he makes natures to exist, but in that by which he manages as he will, the natures that he constituted as he chose. And *there* is the grace by which sinners are saved. For as it respects nature, depraved by its own bad will, it has of itself no return, except by God's grace, whereby it is aided and restored." This grace or special power of God must be prevenient to every act, emotion, or movement, even the slightest, which man makes for the recovery of holiness. Hence, faith, love, the knowledge of what is truly good, the "power to will good," and every good act in particular are all dependent upon "the supernatural and immediate inward operation" of grace or these "hidden causes."

"In bestowing this grace, God has no respect to the worthiness of man—for man can have no worthiness at all—but God here acts after his own free will. By what reasons of propriety he is influenced it is not for us to decide." This grace is *irresistible*. Man cannot controvert its effects if he would; or, rather, working in his will to restore his freedom, resistance on his part is not supposable. The operation of these "*hidden causes*," or grace, does no violence to the original constitution of man, but is in accordance with it.

The grace afforded to man before the fall was the operation of the same "hidden causes," but it was then given merely as an aid co-operative, but after the fall as a power restorative.

Pelagian Theory.

Grace is of wide signification. It embraces the fact of our creation out of nothing, the endowments of reason and free will, and the dignity and manifold advantages which result from them. In the original and permanent constitution of our being, all men possess the power and possibility of doing good. By the promulgation of the law, and by the instructions of Jesus, the performance of good is rendered easier: Hence these are gifts of grace. The communication of supernatural influences is the highest measure of grace. As the Christian receives higher gifts than he who is not a Christian, so he can attain a higher degree of moral perfection. Supernatural influences are given only to him who merits them by the proper and faithful use of his natural powers. The understanding, and not the will of man, is the seat of supernatural influences. The death of Christ, the forgiveness of sin, and baptism are all likewise grace. There is no irresistible grace.

According to Augustine, human nature, in its best estate, is weak and imperfect, and requires the aid of grace, or the "hidden causes." The whole power and possibility of not sinning which Adam possessed depended upon grace. According to Pelagius, "human nature itself in which we are made is grace," and of itself sufficient to do good. Thus strongly contrasted are the two systems.

VI. REDEMPTION.

Augustinian Theory.

"The consequences of redemption extend to the soul, by freeing it from sin and its punishment, and to the body, by raising it to felicity." The power of the "hidden causes"—the supernatural, inward working or grace is the immediate efficient of the deliverance from sin with consequent glory and blessedness; but the death of Christ is the ground of the communication of this grace. The object of Christ's incarnation was not merely to suffer for us to free us from sin and the devil, and by his doctrine and grace redeem us from all imperfection; but also to inspire us by his example, to the ardent pursuit of holiness.

As to the extent of the atonement, Augustine is explicit. Christ died only for the elect. In Augustine's scheme of predestination, grace is confined to the elect. Hence, the death of Christ, which is made the ground of the communication of that grace, can contemplate only the elect.

Pelagian Theory.

"All *sinner*s are pardoned by God simply for Christ's sake; are freed merely on his account from the guilt and punishment of their sins." Thus far this theory agrees with the preceding. "But since, according to Pelagius, men are able to live without sin, and to practise virtue by their own power, so all men are not sinners; and hence the atoning virtue of the death of Christ is imparted to those only who have actually sinned." The death of Christ, however, was not superfluous to those who needed no atonement. The teaching and example of Christ, the communication of supernatural influences, and the grace of baptism would lead to a more perfect excellence than could be attained without them.

The death of Christ, as an atonement or otherwise, is not limited to any particular class or number of men. All who will may partake of its benefits.

VII. PREDESTINATION AND PERSEVERANCE.

Augustinian Theory.

"By Adam's sin the whole human race became a corrupt mass (*perditionis massa*), and justly subject to eternal damnation; so that no one can blame God's righteous decision, if none are saved." Of this "mass" "no one can be freed but he who has received the gift through the grace of the Saviour." The whole race is not only lost, but irretrievably lost, unless God interpose to save them. God, indeed, must be supposed to have power to save any number, or even the whole; for all must be saved to whom he imparts "irresistible grace."

Before the creation of the world, by an unconditional decree, without reference to human merit—for merit there was none—"God elected a definite number" to salvation. For these alone Christ died; and to these alone grace is imparted. The rest, who constitute by far the greater number, are left to perish by that just doom in which all are by nature included. "The

number of those who are predestinated to the kingdom of God is so certain, that not one shall be either added to them or taken from them." "For the salvation of the elect, God employs means."

"*Perseverance* is a special gift to the elect, which is afforded to all the elect, and to none but the elect." This gift of perseverance amounts to an "inability to apostatize." The final cause, or the reason of the salvation of the elect number, lies simply in the will of God. He has mercy on whom he will have mercy.

Pelagian Theory.

Predestination is conditional. "God designed those for salvation who, as he foreknew, would believe in him and keep his commands; and reprobated those who, as he foreknew, would remain in sin."

Perseverance depends upon the exertion of the free will: and those, who have hitherto been "saints" and "elect according to the foreknowledge of God," may fall away and be lost.

Passing over the external history of this controversy—which our author has given with great clearness, and placed in interesting points of view—as well as much other matter of deep interest—for which, as well as for the more ample details of the respective theories, and the arguments with which the great disputants met each other, we must refer our readers to the work itself, with the earnest hope that they will not forego the benefit of a careful study of so rare a production,—we shall now proceed to examine, as far as our limits will permit, these two antagonistic systems.

Philosophical systems are suggested and conditioned by human experience. But, not only is that experience which is common to man allowed to exercise an undue authority, and, from a mere condition, to be elevated to the rank of an ultimate authority over the Reason—the only source of immutable truth—national peculiarities, the temperament, education and fortuities of the individual become, at least a strongly modifying, and often the determining power of a philosophical system.

Augustine was born in Numidia, and educated in Carthage. By his temperament, derived perhaps from his native climate,

and his habits, formed amid the elegant dissoluteness of a wealthy city, he was addicted, up to the time of his conversion, in the highest degree to sensual pleasure. His mother was a woman of exemplary piety; and had, from his earliest years, labored to restrain his hot and jovial temper, and to initiate him into the Christian life.

It appears that, from an early period, Augustine was subject to severe conflicts between an enlightened conscience and his voluptuous propensities. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the full career of pleasure and ambition, and at the age of nineteen, he should have found strong and peculiar charms in the doctrines of the Manichæans; a sect who referred the origin of sin to the necessary weakness of man, arising from his union with matter, the great principle of evil. In such a doctrine, the voluptuous heart could find relief from the rebukes of conscience.

When he was released from the bonds of this sect, and, under the full conviction of moral obligation and the power of divine love, entered into the fellowship of Christ, the revulsion of feeling which he naturally experienced led him zealously to oppose the doctrines which he had once espoused. Hence one of his earliest works against this sect, was "his first book on Free Will;—a work which he afterwards completed while a presbyter at Hippo, and in which he endeavored to refute the theory of the Manichæans on the origin of evil. They derived evil from a distinct nature, which was coeternal with God; Augustine, from the free will of man." The composition of this treatise is a remarkable event in the history of Augustine. In it, he clearly exhibits the will as endowed with the power of choosing good or evil; and solves at once the question respecting the origin of the sin of the first man.

No man perhaps ever went through a severer ordeal in turning from the "carnal" to the "spiritual mind," than this venerable and distinguished man. After he had become a disciple of the "pious Ambrose," and had abandoned the Manichæans, and while he was drawn by sincere aspirations towards a higher life, "his heart was still encompassed by the allurements of honor, of gain and of sensual love. But he was recalled from the abyss of sensual delights, by the fear of death and the future judgment." After addicting himself to the study of Plato and Paul, and experiencing various conflicts, both of opinion and feeling, he comes to the period of his entire devotion to a holy

life. "Worldly concerns, it is true, had no longer any charm for him; but love still held his heart a captive. In this disquietude, and impelled by his longing for a better mode of life, he went to Simplicianus, formerly a rhetorician, and a zealous Christian, and who afterwards succeeded Ambrose in the episcopal chair at Milan. With some emotion, he heard from him the account of the conversion of Victorianus. Soon after this, a certain Potitianus described to him the life of St. Anthony, and the conversion of two high commissaries. This made the most lively impression on his heart. He betook himself to a garden, where his friend Alypius followed him, who had been present at the conversation. A violent contest arose between his sensual and spiritual nature. He knew the better; and yet sensuality and the power of habit held him a prisoner in their chains. He fell into a violent passion. He tore his hair; smote his forehead; grasped his knees. He then withdrew a little from Alypius, and cast himself under a fig-tree. A flood of tears broke forth; and he implored the divine mercy for grace. Augustine believed he heard a divine voice, calling to him in the words: Tolle, lege; Tolle, lege:—Take up, read; Take up, read. He dried his tears; rose up; went forth where Alypius sat, and where he had been reading the book of the apostle. He seized and opened it; and the first words on which his eyes fell, were Rom. 13: 13,—not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof. Now his heart was completely changed and converted to God. He went with Alypius to his mother. With joy she learned the change which had taken place in her son. Now Augustine was at rest. External things no longer troubled his heart, and he began quietly to meditate on the manner in which he should direct his future life."

There were obviously two elements co-working to form Augustine's views of original sin;—the doctrine of the Manichæans respecting the seat of the evil principle, and his own experience of the "law in his members, warring against the law of his mind." He had indeed abandoned the sect of the Manichæans, and had even written against their doctrines, on the points where these doctrines invaded moral responsibility, and that freedom of the will on which alone responsibility can be based. With respect to the origin of evil, he rejected their theory of a coeternal evil principle. But there were points in

the Manichæan doctrines which had wrought strongly in his nature, and which wrought there still. When in the wild career of sensuality he had sought to justify himself, or at least to silence the rebukes of conscience,—the weakness and the unavoidable concupiscence of the flesh presented the expedient. And now that he had engaged in a struggle for godliness and heaven, although he no longer sought to excuse the motions of sin, and hush the accusing voice within, still the very energy and painfulness of the struggle by which the spirit endeavored to master the flesh, would revive, however unconsciously of the source from whence it sprung, the idea of the vitiosity of matter. It was not difficult to make his interpretations of Scripture correspond with opinions which had worked themselves out of the two most excited states of his strongest passions,—their conquering state, and their state of being conquered; since, in addition to the strength which these opinions derived from the circumstances of their formation, they seemed to find a support in the language of the apostle. This evil concupiscence, to his consciousness, had always been working in his nature, and had at no period been introduced by his will. What he observed in himself he found verified by his observations upon others. It was therefore an inherited concupiscence.

Again: the manner in which he had yielded to its impulses, notwithstanding the instructions, prayers and tears of his mother, and notwithstanding his own frequent perceptions of the higher beauty and excellence of godliness; and, in addition to this, the fact that even while under the instructions and example of Ambrose, with strong yearnings after spirituality of mind, he found himself unable to break away from the fascinations of pleasure, but was held in a sort of compulsive bondage until the divine voice spoke to him in the garden, and, by an interposition which appeared to him almost if not altogether miraculous, gave him freedom and peace, naturally influenced his opinions respecting the slavery of the will. And here again, it is probable that the doctrines of the Manichæans, unconsciously to him, reappeared and gave their touch to the mould of his thoughts.

The evil concupiscence and the loss of freedom consequent upon it, in the long line of inheritance, necessarily brought him back to the first man. He had already made the will of Adam responsible for sin, and in doing so had made it a free will; and he had also made men universally responsible for

sin. But as the first man alone had a free will, how shall his posterity retain their responsibility, when they sin necessarily by a will enslaved to the evil concupiscence? There was but one way in which the difficulty could be evaded or removed. As each man, by a long but regular series of generations, had derived his being, with all its powers physical and mental, and all its vitiosity from Adam, so each man could be conceived of as in some sort existing in Adam. When therefore Adam sinned, the whole race, potentially contained in him, sinned likewise. The will of the individual was indeed enslaved to the evil concupiscence; but then, in Adam, by an act of the all comprehending free will of the race, he had freely sinned, and inherited a bondage of the will, a guilt and condemnation which were therefore justly his due. Having formed his theory, Augustine found many passages of Scripture which plainly affirm that we all have become sinners *through* or *by means* of Adam, and were therefore not difficult of accommodation,—particularly, as they appeared in the Latin version, the only one which he used.

Augustine's entire system finds its cardinal basis in his theory of original sin.

1. *The condition of infants, and the nature and efficacy of baptism.* The whole race sinned in Adam, and are condemned with him for the first sin: infants, therefore, are condemned; and dying, without divine interposition, are inevitably lost. This divine interposition appears in the rite of baptism. All baptised infants will be saved, if they die in a state of infancy. Adults, also, are saved from original sin by baptism, and cannot be saved without it.

Augustine, in his theory of original sin, creates an extraordinary form of guilt; and he creates an equally extraordinary form of purification to meet it. It certainly is not more difficult to believe, that the application of water in a solemn rite, should remove guilt and eternal condemnation, than that this guilt and condemnation should spring from a personal participation in Adam's sin by all his posterity. After this, perhaps, we ought not to be surprised even at the farther extension of the efficacy of baptism, so as to make it embrace the removal of actual sin and physical imperfection. In the extraordinary virtues attributed to it, we behold one form of that portentous corruption of Christianity, which, from early and small beginnings, gradually

diffused itself abroad, until the simplicity of Christ, and the sublime spirituality of his doctrines were supplanted by gorgeous and complicated ceremonies, and manipulatory devotions.

2. *Grace.* Salvation through the death of Christ is actually revealed. But how can it take effect with a race totally enslaved to sin, and without the slightest ability to good? Clearly, the work of restoration cannot begin with man, not even in the feeblest initiatory step; for he is incapable of forming the remotest purpose of returning to holiness. Salvation can take effect, therefore, only by a divine interposition: and as this interposition does not lie in any visible, natural influences, it must consist of "causes hidden" in God himself, and directly acting upon the human will and affections.

3. *Limited Redemption.* All men do not believe; all men are not saved. But why? Because, all men being unable to make any effort for salvation, God is pleased to provide salvation, and to communicate grace only to a part. The whole race, by original sin, are condemned, lost and helpless; and only those are and can be saved, whom God elects as the subjects of redemption and grace.

4. *Election.* According to Augustine, this cannot be a mere purpose to receive all, who, by making certain efforts, comply with the prescribed conditions, which conditions are within the scope of their ability: but, on the contrary, it is an absolute predestination, which contains within itself the only causal influence which can, in any manner or degree, lead the sinner to Christ. It is impossible that the sinner should go to Christ, unless he wills to go; but he cannot will to go, because he has no freedom of will or ability to good: he goes, therefore, only as God elects him to go, and gives him grace accordingly.

Let us now turn to the system of Pelagius. The origin of Pelagius and his early education are unknown. His life, as far as known, was unstained: he was exemplary in the practice of virtue, and earnest in its inculcation. The strength of human passions, the feebleness of human resolutions, and the fierce conflict between matured habits of dissoluteness and a quickened conscience, which characterized his great opponent, probably never appeared in him to a degree to tempt him to doubt the freedom of the will. Besides, he appears to have been under no prejudices derived from early associations with any philosophical sect.

Pelagius asserted the doctrine of human freedom. This ground of obligation, which Augustine admitted only in the instance of the first man, he extended to the whole human race. He erred, however, in his deductions. It is but reasonable to believe that he was driven into many extreme positions, by the persecution which he experienced. Truth requires to be quietly and securely followed. The excitation of fierce dispute, the competition and mutual abuse of parties, the arrogance of power, the obstinacy of the calumniated and trodden down, the subtleties to which the persecuted are compelled to resort, the inconsistencies and self-contradictions which fear extorts are all foreign to her sweet and quiet walks, her soft and gentle voice, and her benign and heaven-beaming countenance. Augustine and Pelagius were both acute men, and men of rare gifts. The holy walks of Truth were open to them both; and they would have met her more frequently, had they been less eager to search out each other in hot debate.

The error of Pelagius was just opposite to that of Augustine. The latter, by extending the effects of Adam's fall to every faculty of his being, was led to the denial of human freedom; and was then driven to his theory of original sin, with all its consequences. Pelagius, in dwelling too intensely upon the inherent freedom of man, overlooked the possibility of a corruption derived by natural generation, without impairing that freedom. He analyzed too exclusively one faculty of our being. This was his great philosophical error.

Man can will both good and evil. So far he was correct. But the consequence which he drew—therefore man can be good or evil—is not legitimate. Man has intelligence, and therefore he can know. He has will, and therefore he can choose and do. But it does not follow, that, because he has affections of love and hate, he can direct these affections to any object known by his intelligence and selected by his will. The intelligence may affirm what objects *ought* to be loved, and what objects *ought* to be hated; and the will may direct the whole attention to the contemplation of these objects and their qualities, and call up any known influence within its reach, that may conduce to the required affection: but the affection itself can no more be a creation of the will, than a perception of the intelligence.

It is a fact of universal consciousness, that the affections of man are, in many important points, opposed to the decisions of

reason and conscience. While this opposition exists, man cannot be called good in a perfect sense. Moral responsibility, except in the case of Adam, cannot extend to the mere fact that this opposition exists; for it was induced by his act alone. His posterity are responsible only for their personal acts,—that is, the determinations and volitions of the will, together with their involved consequences as the end or aim of the acts. A multitude of these personal acts have directly for their end or aim the excitation and gratification of desires and passions at war with reason and conscience. 'Those acts, which resist the demands of the corrupt passions, and aim to obey the reason in the acknowledgment of its supreme authority, contain the very element of praiseworthiness.

Now, let it be supposed that an individual, up to a given moment, has, in every personal act, obeyed the reason and denied his impure propensities: it is not philosophically conceivable that he has incurred any guilt on account of the mere existence of these propensities; on the contrary, his virtues have taken a nobler cast from the stern resistance to temptation under which they were moulded. But is he perfectly good? No. The evil element is within him; and therefore we know not but the next demand of conscience may be one which he shall choose to disobey. He contains perpetually within his own nature motives to transgression.

Two forms of evil are found in man;—the evil of a depraved moral sensitivity, or a sensitivity at war with reason, wherein lie motives, temptations and inducements to personal or free acts of sin; and the evil of positive acts of the free will, transgressing the law of conscience. Pelagius obtained his perfect man by shutting out of view the first form of evil, and concentrating his idea in the second. If it were not for the first, in the absolute freedom of the will, perfection would seem an easy attainment. But inasmuch as the first is continually present, until perfection is actually gained,—besides the bare possibility of sin which attaches itself to the free will,—there is the probability arising from the subjective motives lying in the sensitivity. The man is never deprived of responsibility, because he is never deprived of free will—the power of striving after self-regeneration; but the probability of transgression found in his depraved faculty, exemplified in the history of so many generations, has grown to a moral certainty. Christianity made her appearance after the long experiment of ages had been made upon

unaided human nature: she did not dispute or set aside the philosophical grounds of responsibility, and the capacity of man to choose the good and seek the highest possible elevation of his being. She assumed these; and, without waiting any longer for *what he might do*, she took up the facts of *what he had done*, and brought in a glorious and efficient remedy for the evils of which he had failed to relieve himself.

Pelagius, therefore, not only failed in his anthropological and psychological analysis; he failed also in perceiving the just relations of Christianity, considered as a system of truth, to philosophy in general, and its universal and intense necessity considered as a remedy for human guilt and fallibility. In *doing away* from human nature all fixed depravity, and in resolving the recovery of moral purity into obedient acts of will, he did away the necessity of the supernatural influences of the Holy Spirit. He indeed believed that these influences were actually given; but they were given, not as indispensable to holiness, but as enabling the Christian to attain to higher degrees of holiness than were possible without them.

He believed in the atonement of Christ for all who had actually sinned: but, according to him, there were some who had not sinned. No one would dispute the position that a sinless man stands in no need of an atonement: and the only difficulty Pelagius would have to encounter, would be to find a sinless man. An individual under his system, if convicted of actual transgression, would rely upon the atonement of Christ, just as any other Christian. His exertions for the attainment of holiness would be most energetic; and he would not neglect prayer for the Holy Spirit. If any one should profess never to have sinned, it would not appear difficult to convince him of his folly.

Under the system of Augustine on the other hand, with the same reliance upon the atonement, there would, if legitimately carried out, be a less energetic appliance of a moral discipline for self-purification.

In estimating the systems of Augustine and Pelagius comparatively, we must consider their legitimate tendencies theoretically, and their actual results historically.

1. The legitimate tendencies of Pelagianism, theoretically considered, are in some points highly dangerous. It may be granted, in Christian charity, that Pelagius was himself a good man: it must be acknowledged, also, that his representations of the freedom and ability of man are calculated to quicken the

sense of responsibility, and to rouse to great activity in duty. But, in removing the attention from an inherent depravity, and insisting upon the sinlessness of some men, and in giving the influences of the Holy Spirit only a secondary place in the work of sanctification, his system would naturally cause men to think lightly of the moral evils of the world,—encourage a false security, and lead to self-deception,—introduce a confident self-reliance, to the neglect of prayer for the Holy Spirit—and beget self-righteousness, instead of humility, penitence and faith. The historical results have but too faithfully realized the theoretical tendencies.

2. The legitimate tendencies of Augustinism, theoretically considered, have dangerous points likewise. It is impossible for any one to embrace in his convictions of personal guilt the sin of Adam. On this ground, therefore, no one can be made to realize his responsibility. If any one could be made to believe, that all his present acts of sin spring out of an inherited corruption, by necessity, and that no freedom to good remains in man, all sense of responsibility would perish, and a reckless and unbridled licentiousness would ensue. Again: could any one be induced practically to receive the doctrine, that redemption and grace are limited to an elect number, and that thus, all exertions after salvation are not only impossible to any but the elect, on account of original sin, but would be unavailing if they were possible, the hardened repose of the fatalist would inevitably ensue.

The historical results of Augustinism, however, have not generally answered to its theoretical tendencies. We cannot easily theorize away our sense of guilt, or our consciousness of freedom of will. Hence, while Augustinism was proclaiming to men their responsibility, based upon their participation in Adam's sin, of which those acts are the necessary consequences; they simply felt their responsibility, and passed by the tortuous theory, which, in seeking to explain, would have destroyed it.

Hence, again, while Augustinism was proclaiming its limited redemption, its absolute election, and the slavery and inability of the will, men, when awakened to the awful question of eternal life or death, thought only of the richness of the divine grace, and the free, universal and urgent offer of pardon and salvation through the cross of Christ; and, instead of pausing to settle metaphysically their freedom and ability, strove mightily to "enter in at the strait gate," and to "lay hold on eternal

life." And even the most orthodox preachers, when they had left the schools of theology, and came forth into "the fields ripe unto the harvest," found themselves constrained to forget their "excellency of speech" and "wisdom of words," to preach simply "Christ and him crucified," and to urge men to "flee from the wrath to come." Augustinism became thus a philosophy of the schools, and a form of doctrine, by which to test the so-called orthodoxy of candidates for the ministry; but, as if by common consent, was laid aside in the practical exposition of the gospel.

There were also in Augustinism several points, which, taken under a general consideration, and out of their strict philosophical connection, were well calculated to invigorate the Christian virtues,—such as the views taken of the deep depravity and guilt of man, of the majesty of God and the authority and purity of his law, of the efficacy of the divine grace, and the agency of the Holy Spirit; and herein lay the vitality of this system. Pelagianism, on the contrary, was calculated to draw away the attention from these points; and herein lay its weakness and its dangerous tendencies. The Bible, in opposition to Augustinism, evidently bases the responsibility of man upon his actual freedom and ability; and, in opposition to Pelagianism, maintains his depravity and his need of the supernatural grace of the Holy Spirit, for regeneration and sanctification.

In conclusion, we must advert to a cardinal error into which both Augustine and Pelagius fell,—an error which has been perpetuated to mar the beauty of Christian theology, and the peace of the church. Neither of them distinguished between the dogmas which they derived from philosophical speculation, and the facts and affirmations of the gospel; but they wove both together into one motley web. Their theology was, in part, philosophy, and, in part, gospel truth. But each claimed the authority of the Bible and reason for his whole system. The separate and distinct elements incorporated, were each made responsible for the whole. Had they been perfect philosophers, the union of the two elements would have taken place easily and harmoniously; and the two men would likewise have harmonized. But just so far as they were bad or imperfect philosophers, their theology became exceptionable and defective.

As differences in philosophical speculation are frequently immense; nay, as these speculations do even contradict each other, it follows that theologies constructed in this way must

prove essentially hostile. Thus it was with Augustine and Pelagius. And what was the result? The disputant, who succeeded in gaining the suffrages of synods and councils, had all his philosophical errors baptised into the pure light of truth, and handed down to future generations, as an awful and unquestionable orthodoxy. The disputant whom synods and councils condemned, notwithstanding the degree to which he embraced the gospel, and the philosophical truths which may have been contained in his system, was branded as a heretic, and his name and doctrines were handed down to posterity as utterly accursed and anathematized.

In subsequent ages of the church, the spirit of this controversy has reappeared. Bishops and pastors have left their simple and noble work of teaching and comforting the ignorant and miserable from the pure gospel, to deal in subtle and unprofitable points of philosophy; and have changed a system of plain revelations into an elaborate and intricate Mosaic-work of dogmas. Men of high genius, of varied and extensive acquirements, of the worthiest principles, and devoutly attached to the gospel of Christ have been subjected to the severest rebukes of the hierarchy, have been degraded, driven into exile, and loaded with popular infamy, because they chose to philosophize less, or philosophized to a better purpose than the received authorities, or, perhaps, because they halted upon a mere technicality. The unlearned, the professors in the ordinary walks of life, have been drilled into the use of abstruse forms of speech; expressing their attachment to Christianity, and affording evidences of faith to their ecclesiastical judges, from their skilful and ready use of set and approved phrases, rather than from the spontaneous outbursting of inward experiences in the language of nature, and by a pure and unimpeachable life. Even children, instead of learning the simple hosannas, wherewith they were wont to greet the presence of the Saviour, have had their mouths filled with rigid formulas of nicely-balanced philosophical orthodoxy. Honest and good Christians, who had their Bibles by heart, and who could talk, and pray, and sing, both with the spirit and the understanding, if left untrammelled, have been held in fear and hesitancy lest they should use an unlucky word that might savor of heresy. There has been both the tyranny of ecclesiastical power, and the tyranny of an artificial public opinion; and men who were entitled by their gifts to walk forth with an open brow, and to use a ready and fearless

speech, have been compelled to skulk along cautiously, and to drawl out their words in thoughtful measure and combination. The church has been distracted with logomachies; and her great lights have been forever discussing, shaping, lopping off, adding to, remodifying, attacking or defending systems of theology, while multitudes of poor men have been left in ignorance and sin. Bibles, with heavy covers and iron clasps, have been worn out in the handling to furnish texts for polemical discourses, instead of being multiplied to meet the wants of the world. We have been toiling to make truth more perfect ere we could consent to give it a universal diffusion, although Christ said: Preach it—preach this gospel which I have given you to every creature.

Men are ever ready to bow to the authority of the hoary and venerable Past. The old principles of theological construction, and the old models have been obsequiously followed. We are still teaching in our schools old philosophies under the holy name of Christianity; and Christianity amid the murky light of old philosophies. Bacon, in his review of the progress of Natural Science, under the glorious and glowing conviction of the upward growing of the noble mind of man into a purer light, a wider reach of vision, and a more intimate converse with Truth on her empyreal seat, dared to pronounce antiquity the feeble infancy of our race. As yet, there has been too faint an echo of the Baconian oracle in our schools of theology.

Might we imbibe some of the Baconian boldness and good intent, though we should fail of gaining, in high measure, his far-reaching insight, we would suggest, as we are able to conceive them, the parts of a just theological education.

1. The student of theology should receive a preliminary discipline in general science and literature, profound and elegant, that the immortal mind may be richly fed, and drawn out to vigorous exertion; and learn both to know and to trust to its high capacities.

2. The great study should be that of the Scriptures in the original tongues,—together with antiquities, sacred and profane,—and general history in its connections with the sacred narrative and the prophecies. The great aim here should be to arrive at a clear and simple knowledge of all the facts and affirmations of the Bible in all that relates to the redemption of man from the great evil under which he labors, to the duties he is called to perform, and the hopes of the glorious future which he is permitted to cherish. These facts and affirmations should

be sought out in the direct intent in which they were originally given. The object is not to chase the shadowy forms of speculations and theories, or even to dig in rich philosophical mines ; but to collect, by the purest induction, the facts of revelation and duty. We are, with Mary, to sit at the feet of Christ and learn the one thing needful. In this way, we shall find the genuine and simple Christianity of all pious hearts of all ages. We shall attain to the unity of the faith and the universal fellowship of the saints.

3. As a separate element, we would take up the study of philosophy, according to its legitimate methods, and with a spirit thoroughly independent. We would study it as we would study any other science. Here the history of philosophy ought to be introduced. Crude views arise from lazily following authorities, instead of developing one's own consciousness,—from rash and imaginative outthrows of the intelligence, instead of quiet and patient reflection,—and from picking out of theological systems the prejudices and dogmas which disputants gave out in the heat of controversy, or under the necessities of the received orthodoxy. When we have established our philosophy upon its own foundations, we may then seek for its connections with revealed truth and religious duty. This will be one of the most important parts of these studies : it will be the application of philosophy to its sublimest use.

In making this application, however, the independence of the two elements must be preserved : the facts and affirmations of revelation have their own basis, and are neither to be distorted nor supplanted ; and philosophy, having its basis likewise, is not to be hastily modified because of a supposed discrepancy between any of its doctrines and revelation. Let us steadfastly adhere to just laws and methods, and by and by the discrepancy may disappear. Galileo would have been in a gross error, had he directed the Copernican system against the truth of the Bible : the cardinals were in a gross error, to direct the truth of the Bible against the Copernican system. It is often permitted us to see only particular spheres of the great universe of truth, without comprehending the law of harmony which binds them all into one. But if we are ever to comprehend the universal harmony, we must first know what is contained in the particular spheres.

4. The history of Christianity, under the two phases indicated at the beginning of this article. Of these, the philosophical and

dogmatical history of Christianity is the chief. The external history is important, but only as the development of the other.

To our age and to our country peculiarly belongs the great work of disintegrating the pure gold of Christianity, from the dogmatical incrustations of the dark and stormy ages of the past. A vast experience has been accumulated; the old philosophies all lie open before us; every department of knowledge is gloriously advanced and of free and inviting entrance; the ancient countries throw open their rusty gates, and reveal their old memorials, and the laws and customs of early generations. We are not imprisoned in pretended citadels of truth, proudly erected by popes and emperors, and guarded by inquisitions and standing armies; we are not even held in bondage to the fear of presbyters or bishops. We tread the earth as our rightful inheritance. We find no man who can claim to be more than a man, and who is endowed with the right to dictate to us how we are to think, and what we are to believe. Truth is light and life and happiness; she is also strength, authority and might. She will defend herself; she will advance herself; she will uphold her own cause. She does not depend upon sages, synods and hierarchies. She can live without their logic, their decrees and their excommunications. Unbounded freedom of thought and investigation, she has given to every mind as its birthright; and while she commits her sceptre, made of eternal light, to no meaner hand, she graciously declares: "Blessed is the man that heareth me, watching daily at my gates, waiting at the posts of my doors; for whoso findeth me, findeth life, and shall obtain favor of the Lord." Men are ever prone to make to themselves a little world of their own dogmas, and then to fancy that it is the great world of truth. Within these narrow confines, they have the authority of their own past, of their own sages and doctors; here they confidently give their own learned expositions. Here they triumph, and vaunt themselves; here they exclaim: The world is ours,—it yields to our philosophy. But after all, this their world lies within a particular building, or a little neighborhood, or at most in a sect or party. In other buildings and neighborhoods and sects and parties, there are other worlds, with their old authorities, their sages and their doctors.

These are all alike vain pretensions. One of the great characteristics of Christianity is universality. She embraces the world of truth, and she is revealed for the world of man. We

may not, we cannot confine her to a sect or party, or lead her in chains after the triumphal car of some exclusive and proud philosophy. It is not enough that we satisfy ourselves, and meet the inquiries and difficulties of our own party. We must be prepared for all inquiries and for all difficulties. We may bring inquiries to a pause, and smooth over difficulties in the small orb of our own adherents, by appealing to authorities, and repeating the magic words of established expositions, but this does not stop inquiries in other spheres; this does not remove the difficulties of minds determined to think; this does not scatter the morning light over the broad face of the world.

Let Biblical criticism do for Christianity what legitimate and diligent investigation has done for nature—bring out to view her simple facts. And then, if we proceed to philosophize, let our philosophy be like that of Newton, the outgrowth of the facts under the light of reason.

5. Sacred Rhetoric. This is the Rhetoric of the Bible. In teaching to the people at large Bible truth, we ought to copy the methods and the style of the Bible. When Jesus Christ sent forth his disciples “to teach all nations,” he had respect to the facts and doctrines of his gospel; and if we seek for a method and style, nothing can be more simple, pure and beautiful than his own.

It would be both a curious and useful work to examine the most celebrated sermons delivered during the different ages of Christianity. The subjects would be exceedingly various. There would be discourses, scientific, physiological, psychological and ontological. There would be opinions and truths of every kind, mingled indeed with Scripture truths. There would be all varieties of style, but for the most part either a stately and florid eloquence, or an elaborate, didactic and logical stiffness and precision, or loud denunciatory thunder, and polemical satire, keen, vivid and blasting as the lightning. There would indeed be contrasted with these, other sermons constructed after the gospel models, exhibiting a rhetoric learned at the feet of Christ, or in the assemblies where the apostles spake. But we fear they would be comparatively few.

Philosophical and even polemical discussions, under certain relations, may become the duty of every minister of the gospel, as it may be his duty to act in a variety of offices: but simply as a *preacher*, he has the gospel to proclaim and nothing but the gospel,—not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, lest the

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cross of Christ should be made of none effect, but in a style so simple, and in a method so directly the reverse of a philosophical method, as to seem "foolishness" to worldly and speculative minds, which have not examined the true intent of the gospel, nor comprehended its genuine authority and power. This true intent is to "convince men of sin, of righteousness and a judgment to come," and to lead them to life and immortality by the cross of Christ: this genuine authority and power are the "wisdom of God and the power of God," manifested in the original inspirations, and the ever present influences of the Holy Spirit.

O great Head of thy Church, hasten the day, when the mitre of the hierarch and the gown of the philosopher shall be laid aside for the simple garment of salvation; and thy ministers shall go forth, without contention and in perfect love, thy lowly and faithful lamp-bearers, to fill the world with thy pure light, and thy zealous and untiring messengers of grace, to call in all the poor and wretched to thy marriage feast!

ARTICLE XII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Oxford Divinity, compared with that of the Romish and Anglican Churches: with a special view to the Illustration of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith, as it was made of primary importance by the Reformers; and as it lies at the foundation of all Scriptural views of the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. By the Rt. Rev. Charles Pettit M'Ilvaine, D. D., Bishop of the Prot. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Ohio. Philadelphia: Joseph Whetham & Son. 1841. pp. 564.*

THE far-famed Oxford Tracts, or "*Tracts for the Times*," first published in England, were, a few months since, reprinted in New-York, preceded by the promise of a large selection of other English publications in support of the doctrines which they advance. The friends of these doctrines, who are understood to be numerous in the Episcopal church in this country, as well as in England, have been zealous in commending

them to the diligent reading and reception of the clergy and laity of that denomination. "Thus," says our author, "has the controversy been forced upon those, who, while the publications were confined to the transatlantic church, and only introduced among us by scanty importations, would have been content to leave it with those to whom it especially belonged, however deeply convinced themselves, that Oxford Divinity was most justly accused."

The "*Oxford Divinity*," however, is by no means confined to the "*Oxford Tracts*." It is found in other writings of various authors, some of whom are known as leaders, others as followers, all disclaiming any association with the Oxford divines, as a school or party. None of these publications contained a full and satisfactory development of the "*Divinity*" in question. Its parts were disjointed and scattered over a wide surface, and mingled with an attractive display of other matter to which none could object. While thus diffused, no one was responsible for all its peculiarities, nor could it be met excepting at detached and disconnected points. But this embarrassment has been, in some measure, removed by the publication in England, and the reprint in this country, of "*A Letter by the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D. D. Regius Professor*," etc., addressed to the Bishop of Oxford. The object of this work,—which contains more than two hundred well-filled pages,—is to lay before the Bishop, on behalf of the author and his fellow-laborers, "an explicit confession" of their faith on the points whereon they have been accused, and especially to vindicate their doctrines from the charge of a tendency to Romanism.

Bishop M'Ilvaine examines the system as here exhibited. Dr. Pusey proclaims it as the *via media* of the church of England, "distinct from the by-ways of Ultra-Protestantism on one side, and neither verging towards, nor losing itself in Romanism on the other." By *Ultra-Protestantism*, a word which occurs with singular frequency in the works of the Oxford divines, our author understands them to mean whatever relates to religion, "negatively or positively, for or against, only excepting *Romanism* and *Oxfordism*." And this extended application of the word would seem to be justified by the use of it in Dr. Pusey's "Letter." The controversy, then, is really between Protestantism in general, or the doctrines of the Reformation, and Romanism. So Bishop M'Ilvaine considers it; and the question which he raises and makes it the object of his work to answer, is this: "Is Oxford Divinity conformed essentially to the doctrine of Rome, on the question

of justification ; or to the opposite doctrine of the standards of the church of England, and of her daughter-church in America ?” This question he meets with boldness, and after an *Introduction*, and statements preparatory to the right estimation of the Oxford doctrine of justification, and its righteousness, he proceeds, in ten chapters, to compare it with the doctrines of the schoolmen, the Council of Trent, the Romish church, and the Anglican church, on the same subject ; in the course of which he also exhibits its effects upon other doctrines and parts of Christianity. He claims to have thoroughly studied the *system*, as it is exhibited in the Tracts and the other sources referred to by Dr. Pusey. The result is a settled conviction that, whatever may have been the intention of those who maintain it, this divinity is in fact an abandonment of the distinguishing principles of the Protestant faith, and a systematic adoption of the root and heart of Romanism, from which have proceeded all its corruptions and deformities. The first step of its departure from the Protestant faith, is its rejection of that cardinal doctrine of the Reformation, *justification by faith*. This is pronounced, by Newman, Pusey and Keble, “an abuse of the doctrine of justification,”—“a real corruption,”—“another gospel.” According to their system, baptismal regeneration lies at the foundation of justification before God. An inherent righteousness, they maintain, is communicated by the sole instrumentality of baptism, and is the only ground of justification ; and for sins committed after baptism, they more than intimate their confidence in the Romish doctrine of penances and indulgences, excepting for “*mortal sins*,” for which neither Oxford nor Rome has made provision.

Such are the characteristic doctrines of that *Ancient Christianity* which is attempted to be restored by the Oxford divines. To these may be added several external forms of worship, the duty of praying for the dead, etc., all of which are in accordance with the usages of the Romish church, and have heretofore been strenuously rejected by Protestants.

In the work before us the whole system is discussed and resisted with much point and directness, and with an accumulation of proof, which shows the Bishop of Ohio to be thoroughly at home in the subject. The book is also written in a spirit of courtesy and charity which is highly creditable to the author. We cordially commend it to the perusal of all who feel an interest in the Oxford controversy, and especially to our brethren of the Episcopal church, whose Protestantism has been, and perhaps still is, not a little endangered by the

specious and learned disquisitions of the Oxford divines. While we thus express our high opinion of the substance of our author's work, we regret that our friend the Bishop has not trained himself to a more condensed style of writing. His argument is unnecessarily expanded, and the volume, we think, is much larger than was needed. It is, however, well "got up" by the publisher, and presents an attractive appearance to such as can afford to gratify a taste for handsome books.

2.—*Institutes of Ecclesiastical History, Ancient and Modern ; much corrected, enlarged and improved from the primary Authorities : by John Lawrence von Mosheim, D. D., Chancellor of the University of Gottingen. A new and literal Translation from the original Latin, with copious additional Notes, original and selected : by James Murdock, D. D. In three volumes. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. New-York : Harper and Brothers. 1839 pp. 470, 484, 506.*

The original work of Mosheim appeared in 1755. It was originally written in Latin, and such was its popularity that it was soon translated into the English, French, Dutch and German languages ; though many distinguished scholars have devoted their lives to this department of investigation, the "Institutes" continue to be held in the highest estimation. Prior to 1832, the only English translation of this work was that of Dr. Maclaine, which was published in 1764. In his preface, the Doctor admits that he has "taken considerable liberty with the author,—following the spirit of the narrative, without adhering strictly to the letter, and often adding a few sentences to render an observation more striking, a fact more clear, a portrait more finished." Indeed, his translation is no translation at all ; it is a mere paraphrase ; and the liberty taken is the more unpardonable, as he gives us no clue by which to detect the changes he has made.

Dr. Murdock has performed an important service, therefore, in offering to the public "a close, literal version,—containing neither more nor less than the original." But this is far from expressing the full extent of our obligations to him. The translator is himself profoundly learned in all that relates to the Church ; and his notes have greatly enhanced the value of the work. Indeed, we know of no single book, in any language, which is so valuable to the student of ecclesiastical history.

In preparing the present edition, Dr. Murdock has compared the translation with the original, sentence by sentence ; the

references, to a considerable extent, have been verified anew; and several topics have been subjected to further investigation.

3.—HARPERS' SCHOOL-DISTRICT LIBRARY; THIRD SERIES. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1840. 50 volumes, 12mo.

The two preceding series of this Library, the *first* of 50, and the *second* of 45 volumes, were noticed with commendation in the Repository for January, 1840. At the same date, we announced the *third series* as in the progress of publication. It has since been completed and submitted to our examination. It is truly a choice selection of books. *Fifty volumes*, the works of authors of established reputation, prepared under the eye of competent revisers and readers, printed in the most economical manner and bound in an attractive and uniform style, are no trifling possession for a family or a neighborhood. Added to the preceding series they constitute a library of 145 volumes, most of which are among the best books to be found on the same or similar subjects, for popular reading and instruction; embracing *History, Voyages and Travels, Biography, Natural History, the Physical Sciences, Agriculture, Manufactures, Arts, Commerce, Poetry, Belles-Lettres, Philosophy, etc., etc.* In respect to some of these volumes, different opinions may be formed by the best judges, and some of them might doubtless be exchanged for better works; but, as a whole, the collection is admirably adapted to its object. The enterprising publishers, aided by the counsel of the Superintendent of Common Schools of the State of New-York, and other able advisers, have thus provided, for all who will avail themselves of this selection, what the organs of no single school district could have procured without their aid, a well arranged and uniform library of the most approved works on so large a variety of the topics of useful knowledge.

The *Third Series* contains several works which we have already noticed in the Repository, viz. Keightley's History of England, 5 vols.; Murray's British America, 2 vols.; Upham's Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action; and Dick's Sidereal Heavens Illustrated. The following are the remaining volumes of the series:—Hale's History of the United States, 2 vols.; Renwick's Life of Dewitt Clinton; Renwick's Practical Mechanics; Parry's Voyages for the Discovery of a Northwest Passage, 2 vols.; Mackenzie's Life of Commodore Perry, 2 vols.; Irving's Life and Writings of Goldsmith, 2 vols.; Bryant's Selections from American Poets; Halleck's Selections from the British Poets, 2 vols.; History

of the Moors of Spain, translated from the French of M. Florian ; Lives of Distinguished Men of Modern Times, 2 vols. ; Dr. Nott's Counsels to Young Men ; Head's Life and Travels of Bruce ; Page's Life and Writings of Dr. Johnson, 2 vols. ; Potter's Political Economy ; Life and Travels of Mungo Park ; Brougham, Sedgwick and Verplanck on the Advantages of Science and Literature ; Dana's Life before the Mast ; History of Lost Greenland ; American Husbandry, 2 vols. ; History of Massachusetts, 2 vols. ; History of New Hampshire, 2 vols. ; Renwick's First Principles of Chemistry ; Renwick's Lives of Jay and Hamilton ; A manual of the Duties of Domestic Life ; Dwight's History of Connecticut ; Miss Sedgwick's Stories for the Young ; Crowe's History of France, 3 vols. ; Walter Scott's History of Scotland, 2 vols.

The influence of such a library, owned and read in the school districts of our country, would be beyond the bounds of calculation, in elevating the thoughts and promoting the intelligence and refinement of the nation. A plan so well devised cannot be too highly commended to the favor of the rising and spreading population of our great republic. It will be well if books, thus selected with care, shall be so appreciated as to take the place of much of the indiscriminate and light reading which now everywhere obtrudes itself upon the attention of the young, to dissipate and enfeeble the mind and corrupt the taste.

Several of the works embraced in this series are worthy of separate notices. Among these we would name the volumes on *Chemistry* and *Mechanics* by Prof. Renwick. But our space will only allow us to add, that we regard them as excellent elementary works, well worthy of a place in a select District or Family Library.

4.—*Essays on the Distinguishing Traits of Christian Character : by Gardiner Spring, D. D. Sixth Edition, Revised by the Author.* New-York: J. A. Hoisington. 1840. pp. 123.

This little book, we presume, is the familiar acquaintance of many of our readers. It was first published in 1813, and, as the present title-page indicates, has passed through several editions. We have read it in former years with profit, and have known it to be blessed of God in guiding inquiring minds to the knowledge of the Saviour, as well as in detecting the false dependences of the deceived. It now appears in an improved form, but with no change, as the author assures us, "except in a single page in the last Essay."

- 5.—*The Principles of Physiology, applied to the Preservation of Health and the Improvement of Physical and Mental Education: by Andrew Combe, M. D., Physician Extraordinary to the Queen in Scotland, and Consulting Physician to the King and Queen of the Belgians. From the Seventh Edinburgh Edition. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1840. pp. 360.*

The writings of Dr. Combe are too well known and too highly appreciated, to need a formal commendation from us. The work here named is perhaps the most popular and useful of his publications. More than twelve thousand copies of it have been sold in Great Britain, and a translation, in Germany, has met with a favorable reception. In this country several large editions have been disposed of. The present edition is prepared with questions and answers, at the end of the chapters, to fit it for the use of schools. In this form it has been successfully introduced into several of our best academies and other seminaries of instruction. It is gratifying to perceive the evidence afforded, by the reception of this book, that the great importance and usefulness of physiological knowledge is beginning to be properly appreciated, as an indispensable branch of general instruction.

- 6.—*A Greek Grammar, for the use of Learners: by E. A. Sophocles, A. M. Third Edition. Hartford: H. Huntington, Jun. 1840. pp. 284.*

- 7.—*A Greek Reader, for the Use of Schools, containing Selections in Prose and Poetry, with English Notes and a Lexicon; adapted particularly to the Greek Grammar of E. A. Sophocles: by C. C. Felton, A. M., Eliot Prof. of Greek Literature in Harvard University. Hartford: H. Huntington, Jun. 1840. pp. 453.*

We are glad to perceive, in the department of classical education in this country, many signs of encouragement and promise. We have scholars whose merits are acknowledged in the high places of learning in other lands: we have books which are inferior to none of their kind: we have teachers who are laying the broad and sure foundation of a thorough and finished scholarship.

These volumes we regard as among the signs of better things to come. The work of Mr. Sophocles has been placed, by the most competent judges, at the head of the numerous grammars which are now used in this country. Those who

examine it with care will be satisfied that this estimate is not rashly made. The author is a native of Greece, and has obtained a mastery over the niceties of the language, which is hardly to be expected from others. In addition to this, he has applied to the best sources for assistance, and has successfully wrought the materials which he found into his own plan. The arrangement of the book is excellent; his rules are laid down with clearness and precision; and his illustrations are happy.

In the preparation of the Reader, Prof. Felton has departed somewhat from the usual method. He has confined his selections, and we think wisely, to a few authors; and these are made with a view to excite a lively interest in those masterpieces of composition, which are the best teachers of simple and refined literary taste. He has drawn most copiously from Xenophon and Lucian. Extracts of considerable length are given from Herodotus, Thucydides, Lysias, Homer, Euripides and Aristophanes. The Notes and Lexicon, which occupy more than one half of the volume, are the fruit of a careful and matured scholarship. Prof. F. explains only those passages which need explanation. His aim is to encourage and direct the industry of the student—not to supersede it. The difficulties of the language, in general, he does not profess to solve; but he performs a more valuable service, by showing where the solution may be found.

8.—*The Dew of Israel and the Lily of God, or a Glimpse of the Kingdom of Grace: by Dr. F. W. Krummacher, Author of "Elijah the Tishbite," "Elisha," etc. From the Second London Edition. New-York: Robert Carter. 1840. pp. 262.*

This volume is characterized by many of the peculiarities of the author's previous works. There is the same rapid succession of novel and striking conceptions, the same beauty and aptness of illustration, the same sweet and tender spirit pervading the whole. It is made up of a series of discourses, addressed, more particularly, to Christians; and no one who loves the truth, in its simple and earnest presentations, can read them without manifest advantage. The name is taken from the text of the first discourse: "I will be as the dew unto Israel; he shall grow as the lily."—Krummacher is uncommonly felicitous in his expositions and illustrations of Scripture. For this reason, his writings, we think, deserve the attention and the study of those who are called to preach the gospel.

- 9.—*Life and Death of the Rev. Joseph Alleine, A. B., Author of "An Alarm to the Unconverted," etc. : written by the Rev. Richard Baxter, his widow, Mrs. Theodosia Alleine, and others. To which are added his Christian Letters ; with a recommendatory Preface by Alexander Duff, D. D., one of the Church of Scotland's Missionaries to India. From the last Edinburgh Edition. New-York : Robert Carter. 1840. pp. 275.*

The plan of this "Life" is altogether unique. It is the joint production of nine different writers. The largest and the most interesting of these fragments was prepared by the widow of Mr. Alleine. Such a biography must, of necessity, be very defective in method and unity : indeed it is not so much a continuous life as a series of sketches. Still the book may be read with great profit. It makes us acquainted with an eminently holy man. In the midst of trials, such as few have been called to encounter, his course was a lovely illustration of the quiet and humble temper of the gospel. Strongly as we sympathize with him, in his persecutions and his protracted bodily pains, a deeper feeling is excited by the contemplation of his life—that of veneration for his piety.

His "Christian Letters" occupy about one half of the volume. We know of nothing which breathes a better spirit. In the language of John Wesley, "he seems to excel in bowels of mercy, meekness, gentleness, in tenderness, mildness and sweetness of spirit, even to his bitterest enemies." Mr. Wesley does not "scruple to give these letters the preference, even to Mr. Rutherford's, as expressing, in a still higher degree, the love that is long-suffering and kind, which is not provoked, which thinketh no evil, and which hopeth, believeth and endureth all things."

- 10.—*A Book for the Sabbath : by J. B. Waterbury, Author of "Advice to a Young Christian," and "Happy Christian."* Andover : Gould, Newman and Saxton. 1840. pp. 230.

- 11.—*The Sabbath : a brief History of Laws, Petitions, Remonstrances and Reports, with facts and arguments relating to the Christian Sabbath : by Harmon Kingsbury. New-York : Robert Carter. 1840. pp. 391.*

These volumes are valuable and timely. The Sabbath is vigorously assailed from many points : its enemies are bold and resolute. Our noble system of internal improvements has become a mighty engine to effect its overthrow. Our canals

and railroads, almost without exception, desecrate the day by wholesale. In high places there is a diminished regard for the institution, and a diminished respect for the feelings of those who love its privileges. And there is a growing sentiment in the community, we fear, that the claims of the Sabbath must be compromised, and the commands of God must be reconciled to our convenience.

The first of these volumes is divided into three parts. In the first part the author presents the foundation on which the Sabbath rests; in the second, he dwells on the practical improvement of the day; and in the last, he gives a series of meditations and prayers, answering to the number of Sabbaths in the year. His leading aim is to "urge upon the church a conscientious discharge of Sabbath obligations; believing, that, when their example is right, this blessed day, if not rescued entirely from profanation, will at least exert its legitimate influence. The work makes no pretensions to great depth or learning: but the discussions are lucid, the illustrations apposite and the style uncommonly pleasing. Its influence cannot fail to be happy.

The volume of Mr. Kingsbury is exceedingly valuable as a repository of facts. If disposed, we might criticise the arrangement, and point out other defects; but we should do injustice to the author to subject his book to the rules of practised writers. Its merits are superior to those of mere style. In the first chapter, he has brought together the laws of Congress and the different States, so far as they relate to the Sabbath; the second is devoted to a detailed history of the Sunday mail question; the third and fourth are on the expediency of fearless effort, and the necessity of the Sabbath. In the fifth chapter, fifteen objections to the Sabbath are fully and satisfactorily answered. The rest of the volume contains an earnest appeal to the different classes of society in behalf of this institution.

12.—*The Family a Religious Institution; or, Heaven its Model.*

Troy: Elias Gates. 1840. pp. 204.

The author of this volume is the Rev. E. Hopkins, pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Troy, N. Y. He justly remarks, that the subject which he discusses, "from its very nature and relations, can never be divested of deep interest and profit, while the parental relation continues." "The polish of the marble will continue the same under the hands of successive workmen:" "the lustre of the gold cannot be effaced by attrition."

The leading topics of the work are, *the Family a Religious Institution, the Family Constitution, the Chief Matter of Parental Solitude, Habits of Childhood, Parental Duties and Responsibilities, on the Culture of Filial Obedience, the Season of Parental Effort, on Guiding the Affections to God, and the Family Covenant.* These are all presented with ability and interest. Many of the considerations urged upon parents are peculiarly solemn and weighty. The book cannot fail to be useful.

- 13.—*The Inquirer Directed to an Experimental and Practical View of the Work of the Holy Spirit: by Rev. Octavius Winslow, Author of an "Experimental and Practical View of the Atonement."* New-York: R. Carter. 1840. pp. 282.

This is the second of a series of works, which the author intends to publish, under the general title of "Experimental and Practical Views of Divine Truth." The first in the series appeared in 1838, entitled "Experimental and Practical Views of the Atonement;" and the third is soon to be published, by the name of the "Inquirer directed to an Experimental and Practical View of the Glory of Christ."

The subjects discussed in the present volume are, *the Godhead and Personality of the Spirit, the Spirit a Quickener, the Indwelling Spirit, the Sanctification of the Spirit, the Sealing of the Spirit, the Witness of the Spirit, the Spirit the Author of Prayer and the Spirit a Comforter.*—It is the aim of the author to present these topics in a simple, unpretending dress, resorting mainly to Scripture for his arguments and illustrations. The book is—what it professes to be—experimental and practical. No Christian can read it carefully, without resolving to be more humble and watchful in his intercourse with the indwelling Spirit.

In justice to the author, however, it should be observed, that his discussions are not superficial, because they are practical. With some of them we have been particularly pleased. We are not prepared to assent to every position which he takes. Still, the purpose and the spirit of the work we cordially approve.

- 14.—*The Works of Thomas Chalmers, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Edinburgh, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Institute of France.* New-York: Robert Carter. 1840. Seven Volumes, 12 mo. pp. 404, 420, 358, 455, 395, 420, 377.

This edition of the Works of Dr. Chalmers is designed to

include, in a uniform style, all the publications of the eloquent Scottish divine. Seven volumes are already out; two, on *Natural Theology*; two, on *the Miraculous and Internal Evidences of the Christian Revelation, and the Authority of its Records*; one, on *Moral and Mental Philosophy*—their connection with each other; and their bearings on doctrinal and practical Christianity; one, on *the Application of Christianity to the Commercial and Ordinary Affairs of Life*; and one, on *the Christian Revelation, viewed in connection with the Modern Astronomy*; to which are added, *Discourses illustrative of the connection between Theology and General Science*. The publisher is entitled to much commendation for this very seasonable and beautiful addition to our Theological Literature; for, though most of these works were before accessible to scholars, and some of them had been extensively circulated in this country, it was very desirable that the entire productions of their eminent author should be not only in all our public Libraries, but in those of professional and other gentlemen of the Christian community.

We have no partiality for the *style* of Dr. Chalmers. Nor are we prepared to adopt all his *speculations* without modification. He does not write the most perfect English. His composition wants that chaste, severe expression, which, like the simple drapery of the Roman statuary, outlives all the successive forms of a gaudier costume. He would have shown a better taste in preferring the style of Reid or Locke to that of Dr. Thomas Brown. And there may be reason to doubt, whether the very ardor, with which he urges his way over the fields of his bold investigation, is not sometimes inconsistent with those *proportioned* and *just* views, which, as they are the rarest, are also the best characteristics of moral and theological speculation. This last remark might be illustrated by reference to the Dr.'s exhibition of the *historical* argument for Christianity; and to his first chapter on Natural Theology, in which an important distinction is made between the *facts* and the *ethics* of moral philosophy. In the first case, we are almost left to overlook the immense weight of the *internal* evidence of our religion; and in the last, cannot but feel, that in the eloquent demonstration of a *real* difference, the author has pushed the distinction beyond the truth.

His unquestionable merits, however, are illustrious; they have rendered him conspicuous in a bright constellation; and will, undoubtedly, secure him a permanent place among the gifted men, whose appropriate and enviable work it seems to be, in the Providence of God, to *christianize* the English literature—to incorporate the truths of our Holy Religion with

modern science—to *sanctify* the Anglo-Saxon intellect; and, thus, to prepare the language of Great Britain for what seems to be its destiny in the future history of the world,—to become the medium of thought and influence for the greatest community of human beings that ever spoke a single dialect.

The position of Dr. Chalmers, for the last quarter of a century, has given to his powerful mind a striking inclination to a single aspect of Christianity—its relations, we mean, to the science and the cultivation of our times. And it must be admitted, that no writer has done more to recommend an unobtrusive Faith to the careful attention of the able and ambitious men who have taken the lead in modern philosophy and popular literature. Living at the very seat of modern Infidelity, and associated with the principal writers for the Edinburgh Review, who, during the present century, have given reputation to the most plausible form of unbelief with which our religion has ever had to contend, he early attracted the notice of the literary circles of Edinburgh, and of the whole English public, by his celebrated “Astronomical Discourses.” These splendid productions, though inferior, in logic and in style, to the sermons of Dr. Thompson, afterwards delivered on the same occasion, are, certainly, among the most remarkable specimens of Christian eloquence.

The tone of these discourses pervades all the principal works of the author. He appears, everywhere, intent on presenting the religion of Christ, which it was becoming the fashion to despise, as not only consistent with the other works of God, but as the grandest, and most worthy of our study, among all the demonstrations of his sublime perfections. If any thing is wanting in the severity of the Dr.’s logic, or the precision of his phraseology, there is ample compensation in the magnificence of his imagination, and the grandeur of his march over the fields of sacred and of human knowledge, upon which he was formed to expatiate by natural endowments akin to the highest order of poetic genius.

- 15.—*Chemistry applied to Agriculture: by M. Le Compte Chaptal, Member of the French Institute, etc. etc. With a Preliminary Chapter on the Organization, Structure, etc. of Plants: by Sir Humphrey Davy. And an Essay on the Use of Lime as a Manure: by M. Puvis; with Introductory Observations to the same: by James Renwick, LL.D. Translated and edited by Rev. William P. Page. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1840. pp. 360, 12mo.*

We have examined this book with much satisfaction. It contains a vast amount of practical information, and is admi-

rably adapted to the object which is sufficiently indicated on its title-page. To those of our readers who are interested in practical agriculture, it would seem that a knowledge of the principles, which have been deduced from a careful observation of the nature and results of the physical laws, must be indispensable. "It is certainly not a little surprising," as our translator well remarks, "that while so many of the useful arts have been vastly improved, and some seemingly almost perfected, by the applications of physical science, agriculture, though immeasurably the most important of all, should still be in a state of comparative rudeness; and its operations but too generally conducted with scarcely the smallest reference to the natural laws." Yet a competent knowledge of the principles of physical science is easily attainable, and their applications may be readily understood by the practical farmer of ordinary capacity. Let any one who doubts this read *Chaptal's Agricultural Chemistry*, with the Essays incorporated with it in this volume, and his doubts will be dissipated; he will find himself in possession of a large number of facts and principles, of the usefulness of which, no one, unacquainted with them, can form the most distant conception.

- 16.—*Bacchus: An Essay on the Nature, Causes, Effects and Cure of Intemperance. By Ralph Barnes Grindrod. First American, from the Third English Edition. Edited by Charles A. Lee, A. M., M. D. New-York: J. & H. G. Langley. 1840. pp. 528.*

We regret that we have not had time to read this book entirely through. We have, however, read enough of it to be convinced of its immense value as a book of facts and principles on the subject of intemperance. It is a "*Prize Essay*," called forth by the offer of a *hundred sovereigns*, by the "New British and Foreign Temperance Society," and we honor the vote of the "Adjudicators" who awarded it the *premium*. We fully accord with the opinion expressed by the American editor, that it is probably the most complete and satisfactory publication, on the subject of which it treats, to be found in any language. It is divided into *six parts*, the leading topics of which are the following:

I. Nature and characteristics of Intemperance,—its history,—its history in connection with religion,—intemperance considered in a national point of view,—and its effects on the moral and intellectual powers.

II. The moral and physical causes of Intemperance.

III. History of Intoxicating Liquors,—Nature and combinations of Alcohol,—Adulterations of Intoxicating Liquors.

IV. General effects of Intemperance on the human system,—Nature and operation of Stimulants,—Diseases produced by intoxicating liquors,—Effects of alcohol on the brain and nervous system.

V. Fallacy of popular objections,—Means of removing habits of Intemperance in individuals.

VI. Intemperance of the Hebrews,—Intemperance of the primitive Christians,—Means employed in various ages and countries to remove Intemperance,—Intemperance in a legal point of view, and in the relation it bears to the civil rights of society.

Under these several heads the author has accumulated a rich variety of information, accompanied with discriminating and cogent reasoning. The American editor, Dr. Lee, besides a number of notes illustrative of the several parts of the work, has much increased its value by an *Appendix* of more than fifty pages in support of its main positions. It is hardly necessary to add, that we earnestly recommend the perusal of this volume to all who desire to understand their duty, and the reasons of it, in respect to the exciting and absorbing subject of Intemperance.

17.—*Anti-Bacchus: An Essay on the Evils connected with the Use of Intoxicating Drinks. By Rev. B. Parsons, of Stroud, Gloucestershire, Eng. Revised and Amended, with an Introduction. By the Rev. John Marsh, Cor. Sec. of the American Temperance Union. New-York: Scofield & Voorhies. 1840. pp. 360.*

This work, like that named in the preceding notice, was a competitor for the prize offered by the New British and Foreign Temperance Society. It gained the vote of one of the *Adjudicators*, the other two giving the premium to the work of Mr. Grindrod. *Anti-Bacchus*, however, though agreeing in its main principles with *Bacchus*, was judged to be sufficiently different to warrant its publication. It is divided into eight chapters, and treats of the extent and evils of Intemperance,—Fermentation, Alcoholic Drinks, Nutrition, etc.,—History of Inebriating and Unfermented Drinks,—the sentiments of Scripture respecting Wines,—Water-drinking,—our duty and consequent prospects.

A leading object of Mr. Parsons was to show that total abstinence is not at variance with the word of God. For this purpose, he says, "I examined every text of Scripture in

which wine is mentioned; I inquired very minutely into the laws of fermentation; into the character of the grapes, and the wines, and the drinking usages of antiquity. The result of these inquiries was, that I came to the firm conclusion that few, if any, of the wines of antiquity were alcoholic. I examined Homer, Aristotle, Polybius, Horace, Virgil, Pliny, Columella, Cato, Palladius, Varro, Philo-Judæus, Juvenal, Plutarch, and others." Again he remarks: "From a careful examination of the word of God, we find, that in no single instance, can it be proved that it has mentioned intoxicating drinks with approbation," etc. We are not prepared to admit the entire correctness of our author's expositions either of Scripture or of the principles of chemistry, in respect to the "wine question." But we have no space to enter upon the discussion in the present notice. Our readers may expect a review of this book, from an able hand, in a future No. of our work.

18.—*Memoir of Mrs. Hannah More; with Notices of her Works, and Sketches of her Contemporaries: by Thomas Taylor, Esq., Author of "The Life of Cowper," "Memoirs of Bishop Heber," and of "John Howard, the Philanthropist."* Second Edition. London: Joseph Rickerby. 1838. New-York: Robert Carter. 1840. pp. 434.

It is the privilege of few to be more useful with the pen than was Mrs. More. Her writings were uniformly popular in their cast, while they were always faithful to the interests of religion and of truth. For more than half a century, she distributed, with a lavish hand, the treasures of her cultivated and versatile, yet chastened genius; and now that she is dead, her works are fulfilling her benevolent desires in every part of the world.

The plan of this volume is somewhat different from the previous memoir of this remarkable woman. The author "has endeavored to give a brief, yet complete and faithful detail of Mrs. More's life; to exhibit the features of her mind, as they are reflected from her own productions; to trace the steady growth of her Christian character, and the progressive development of her Christian principles, till they attained maturity; and to show the happy influence which Christianity had on her mind, prompting her to pursue, with untired perseverance, for a number of years, amidst the most vexatious hostility, a course of most vigorous effort to benefit the human family."

In executing his plan, Mr. Taylor "has collected his materials from all the published and unpublished records of Mrs. More, that he could avail himself of." Frequent extracts from her letters are introduced; but he has given much less prominence to her correspondence than it received from Mr. Roberts.

The chief excellence of the book consists in its giving so full and instructive an account of Mrs. More's religious history. Seldom have the pleasures of the gay, the smiles of the great, and the admiration of the learned been exchanged so willingly, as in her case, for the calm and retired walks of habitual benevolence. And seldom, too, has the piety of any individual commended itself so universally to the respect and confidence of all classes. The contemplation of such a life cannot fail to be useful. We rejoice, therefore, that Mr. Carter has made arrangements to furnish this work, in its neat English dress, at so reasonable a rate.

19.—*Exercises for the Closet, for Every Day in the Year: by William Jay, Author of "Christian Contemplated," "Family Sermons," "Prayers," etc. Two volumes in one.* New-York: Roe Lockwood. 1840. pp. 274, 330.

This is a handsome reprint of a work which was originally published in 1828. It was intended particularly for those "who love and practise retreat; who wish not only to read the Scriptures alone, but to observe their beauties and advantages, who, while they neglect not their own meditations, are thankful to derive help from others, and often exclaim, 'a word fitly spoken, how good is it!' who wish to be in the fear of the Lord all the day long, who would not have their religion a visiter, but an inmate; who would speak of divine things not by a kind of artificial effort, but out of the abundance of the heart; and who know how much it conduces to our sanctification to keep the mind filled with good things, not only as these will exclude base intrusions, but will be sure to leave somewhat of their own tinge and likeness behind." Of the success of the author in executing his design, we have no occasion to speak. The Christian public, in England and America, have pronounced an unanimous verdict in his favor. Such was the popularity of the "*Morning Exercises*," that his *Evening Exercises*, as a companion to the former, were called forth in 1831. Both works have passed through repeated editions.

- 20.—*The Heart's Ease, or a Remedy against all Troubles ; with a Consolatory Discourse,—particularly directed to those who have lost their friends and dear relations : by Simon Patrick, D. D.* New-York : D. Appleton & Co. 1841. pp. 320.

This was one of the earliest productions of a man, who was equally respected, in his day, for his learning and his piety. The Epistle Dedicatory is dated 1659. Dr. Patrick was then the incumbent at Battersea,—a living which he received from the family of Sir Walter St. John. In 1689 he was made Bishop of Chichester ; in 1691, he was transferred to the see of Ely. His death occurred in 1707, in his 81st year. He published a number of sermons, tracts against Popery, etc. ; but his Commentary on the Bible gave him more celebrity than any thing else.

The present volume is all that it professes to be,—*a remedy against all troubles*. It brings together, with great felicity, the numerous motives to contentment and submission which may be drawn from reason and the Bible. It is characterized—but not inelegantly—by some of the peculiarities of the 17th century. Though somewhat quaint, the style is easy and graceful. The typography of the volume is worthy of all praise. Nothing more beautiful, we presume, has ever issued from the American press.

- 21.—*The Biblical Cabinet ; or Hermeneutical, Exegetical and Philological Library* : Edinburgh : Thomas Clark. 1839. Vol. XXIV. pp. 407.—1840. Vol. XXV. pp. 369.

Several of the former volumes of the Edinburgh Biblical Cabinet have been noticed in the Repository with commendation. It is a work of high value in the departments of learning named in its title, and we are happy to perceive, by the receipt of the above volumes, which have lately reached us, that the enterprising proprietor is encouraged to continue its publication. These two volumes are worthy of a place in such a library. The first,—Vol. XXIV—is entitled, *Sacred Dissertations on the Lord's Prayer : Translated from the Latin of Herman Witsius, D. D., Prof. of Divinity in the Universities of Utrecht and Leyden : with Notes by the Rev. William Pringle, Auchterarder*. It is a series of learned dissertations on prayer,—its advantages and necessity,—preparation of the mind for right prayer,—gesture in prayer,—stated hours of prayer,—the Lord's prayer,—its address and several petitions.

Witsius was a very learned and eminent divine of North Holland, who lived and published several works of great merit during the last half of the seventeenth century; among which were the "Economy of the Covenants,"—"Dissertations on the Apostles' Creed,"—his "Egyptiaca et Decaphylon," etc. He lived to an advanced age, and left a reputation for learning and piety, which have commended his works to the diligent study of divines and biblical scholars to the present time. Vol. XXV bears the following title: *Principles of Interpretation of the Old Testament; translated from the Institutio Interpretis Veteris Testamenti of John Henry Pareau, Prof. of Orient. Lang. in the University of Utrecht. By Patrick Forbes, D. D., Prof. etc., King's College, Aberdeen. Vol. II.* This, too, is a work of sterling worth to the biblical student. Besides the labors of the learned author, it contains a Treatise by the Translator on the structure and study of the Hebrew language, and an appendix illustrative of the principles of interpretation advanced by the author, which add much to the value of the volume.

22.—*History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent. By George Bancroft: Vol. III. Third Edition. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1840. pp. 468.*

The above is the comprehensive title of the great work which has been undertaken by Mr. Bancroft, and the first three volumes of which are now completed. These volumes, however, are furnished with an additional title, with which they may be separated from the whole work and bound by themselves. It is as follows: *History of the Colonization of the United States.* This portion of the work is now concluded, and our author announces, at the close of the volume now before us, his intention, if sufficiently encouraged by the "favoring opinion of the people," to go forward and write the *History of the American Revolution*; the great drama of which he considers as opening with the attempts of France and England to carry into effect the peace of Aix la Chapelle. "At the very time of the congress of Aix la Chapelle," says our author, "the woods of Virginia sheltered the youthful George Washington, the son of a widow. Born by the side of the Potomac, beneath the roof of a Westmoreland farmer, almost from infancy his lot had been the lot of an orphan. No academy had welcomed him to its shades, no college crowned him with its honors: to read, to write, to cipher—these had been

his degrees in knowledge.—And now, at sixteen years of age, in quest of an honest maintenance, encountering intolerable toil; cheered onward by being able to write to a schoolboy friend, “Dear Richard, a doubloon is my constant gain every day, and sometimes six pistoles;”—“himself his own cook, having no spit but a forked stick, no plate but a large chip;” roaming over spurs of the Alleghanies, and along the banks of the Shenandoah; alive to nature, and sometimes spending the best of the day in admiring the trees and the richness of the land; among skin-clad savages with their scalps and rattles, or uncouth emigrants, ‘that would never speak English;’ rarely sleeping in a bed; holding a bear-skin a splendid couch; glad of a resting-place for the night upon a little hay, straw, or fodder, and often camping in the forest, where the place nearest the fire was a happy luxury;—this stripling surveyor in the woods, with no companion but his unlettered associates, and no implements of science but his compass and chain, contrasted strongly with the imperial magnificence of the congress of Aix la Chapelle. And yet God had selected, not Kaunitz, nor Newcastle, not a monarch of the house of Hapsburg, nor of Hanover, but the Virginia stripling, to give an impulse to human affairs, and, as far as events can depend on an individual, had placed the rights and the destinies of countless millions in the keeping of the widow’s son.”

With this beautiful description, our historian closes his third volume, and from this point, proposes to commence, in the next, his history of the causes and progress of the war of the Revolution, and the independence of the United States, achieved by our fathers, not for themselves, and their posterity only, but for the world.

The former volumes of this admirable work, were noticed in the Repository for January, 1839. From a cursory examination of the present volume, we do not hesitate to believe that it will fully justify the high opinion which we then expressed of the value of Mr. Bancroft’s labors, as an American historian. His opportunities of research have been ample, his views are philosophical and comprehensive, and his style chaste and attractive. To our readers, we earnestly recommend his work thus far, as a most valuable contribution to the literature of our country and the age. To the author, so far as our opinion may have weight with him, we would say, we have no doubt that all who have read his volumes, on the Colonization of the United States, will wait with anxiety the appearance of his proposed work on the American Revolution. We trust it will not be unnecessarily delayed.

23.—*The Life of Alexander Hamilton. By his Son, John C. Hamilton.* New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1840. Two Volumes, pp. 430, 563.

The monument erected, in the grave-yard of Trinity Church, to the memory of Hamilton, is a marble pillar,—broken off, as if by violence, several feet below the height proportionate to its massive dimensions. So the rising pillar of his greatness was broken by a violent death; and as the stranger looks in vain, at the base of his monument, for the fragment which is apparently gone from its top, so it will be well if his biographers, in handing his name down to posterity, shall succeed in diverting the attention of all readers from the painful story of his decease. It is with Hamilton, that we are concerned, as the patriot, the companion of Washington, the brave General and the incomparable Statesman. In these relations his name will endure among the brightest ornaments of American history. It is intimately associated with the great events which preceded the war of the Revolution, with the protracted struggles of that war, with the achievement of our country's independence, with the formation of the Constitution of the United States, and the administration of its government during the period of its early and doubtful experiment. During the whole progress of these eventful changes, he was second to no one of his compatriots in the wisdom and weight of his counsels, the efficiency of his action and the influence which he exerted in laying the foundations of the permanent prosperity of our country. "Hamilton," says Guizot, "must be classed among the men who have best known the vital principles and fundamental conditions of a government,"—"a government worthy of its mission and of its name. There is not in the constitution of the United States an element of order, of force, of duration, which he has not powerfully contributed to introduce into it and to cause to predominate."

When it is considered that "the wealth of nations is their illustrious few," it is not a little surprising that the biography of one so distinguished has been so long delayed. The preparation of such a work, however, had been committed to several gentlemen of distinguished abilities, who, from various and sufficient causes, failed to perform it, until it has devolved, by common consent, upon his son, a gentleman well qualified for the undertaking. The two volumes already published contain a sketch of Hamilton's early life, and the progress of his opinions through the period of the Revolution, until they were matured and nobly defended in the convention

of 1787, in Philadelphia, when the present Constitution of the United States was formed. The work thus far is a history, not only of Hamilton, but of his *Times*. It is a history of the Revolution, and of the Constitution. The mass of information which it contains, and the documents which it preserves are highly creditable to the diligence and careful research of the author. It is written in a chaste and perspicuous style, and may be regarded as one of the most intensely interesting, as well as important publications of its class, which has ever appeared in our country. We shall wait with solicitude the completion of a work so well begun, and thus far, so successfully prosecuted.

We are happy to add that the mechanical execution of this valuable work is in the best style of the New-York press.

23.—*The Flag Ship: or a Voyage around the World, in the United States Frigate Columbia; attended by her Consort, the Sloop of War John Adams, and bearing the Broad Pennant of Commodore George C. Read. By Fitch W. Taylor, Chaplain to the Squadron.* New-York: D. Appleton and Co. 1840. Two Volumes. pp. 388, 406.

To make the circuit of the world is a much less wonderful achievement than it was in the days of our fathers. Yet the accomplishment of such a voyage is an event of no little interest, even in our times. It is of course attended with many hazards and a great variety of incidents, and affords an opportunity, to the literary voyager, of acquiring much useful information. The materials, therefore, gathered by our author, during his late voyage in the *Columbia*, must be supposed to be ample for the composition of a book at once entertaining and instructive. We were accordingly glad to hear the announcement of these volumes, by Mr. Taylor; and the beautiful style of execution, in which they have come from the hands of the publishers, has more than equalled our expectations. They contain also a considerable variety of interesting information, which will be valued by intelligent readers. But our author, we think, has unhappily failed in the symmetry of his work. His object appears to have been to recommend religion, and the cause of missions, to the favorable regard of the more refined circles of the worldly and the careless. But the perfection of art, for such a purpose, would be to conceal the indications of art. This principle, Mr. T. has not sufficiently regarded. While, therefore, we approve of his general object, and take pleasure in acknowledging

that the "Flag Ship" is not destitute of specimens of fine composition, we cannot refrain from remarking, that the mingling of light matters, and mere prettinesses, with the grave and solemn subjects of a portion of his narrative, and the exuberance of attempted ornament, with which his style is loaded, are real incumbrances, and detract not a little from the value of the work.

25.—*Elements of Chemistry, containing the Principles of the Science, both experimental and theoretical ; intended as a Text-book for Academies, High Schools and Colleges: by Alonzo Gray, A. M., Teacher of Chemistry and Nat. Hist. in the Teachers' Sem. Andover, Ms. Andover: Gould, Newman & Saxton. 1840. pp. 360.*

The design of the author in preparing this compilation is stated in the Preface. "As experience has shown that most of the text-books in general use are either too profound on the one hand for those who are commencing the study, or too superficial on the other for those who wish to obtain more scientific knowledge of the subject, he has been induced to attempt to compile a work which should be better fitted for elementary instruction." He thinks that teachers of Chemistry would be more successful, if they were to pay more attention to the principles of the science and less to its details. In this opinion we fully concur: and hence approve of his plan of giving greater prominence to the imponderable agents and the non-metallic substances, than to other parts of his work. It ought not to be inferred, however, that the book is made up of dry discussions and perplexing technicalities: numerous experiments and illustrations are introduced, which the teacher, with a very simple apparatus can repeat.

"In the arrangement of the imponderable agents, the phenomena of common and voltaic electricity and electro-magnetism are classed as effects of one agent, electricity. In the arrangement of the simple substances, each, with its combinations with those previously described, is presented to the student, in such order, that but one substance with which he is unacquainted is to be studied at the same time. The Salts occupy a separate chapter, in the arrangement of which, Turner's Chemistry is made the basis."

The book is written in a clear, lucid style; and it preserves a happy medium between too great a display of technical learning, on the one hand, and an obviously superficial view of the subject on the other. As an elementary treatise, we have no doubt of its utility.

ARTICLE XIII.

RECENT LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

The philosophical and theological works of Daub are in the course of publication; Marheineke and Dittenberger are the editors. Though "less original and independent than Schleiermacher," he holds a high rank in Germany. He belonged to the Hegel and Schelling school of philosophy.—A new edition of Tholuck's Commentary on Romans is soon to appear. There has been a recent edition of his Hebrews; and he has lately published an excellent work on Christian Devotion.—Neander has another volume of his Church History in the press.—A Compend of Dogmatic History, from the pen of Baumgarten-Crusius, has recently appeared.—The publication of Prof. Bopp's Glossarium Sanscritum is begun.

The arrangement of the Lectures at Halle for the current semester—Oct. 19 to April 3—is, in part, as follows:—

Encyclopedia and Methodology of Theolog. Study, Tholuck.—Hist. and Crit. Introd. to the Old Test., Gesenius.—Books of the Old Test. to be explained. Job, Gesenius. Psalms and other poems, Rödiger. Isaiah and Ecclesiastes, Tuch. New Testament.—Matthew, Mark and Luke, Tholuck. John and Acts, Wegscheider. Corinthians and Hebrews, Niemeyer. Philippians and Ephesians, Tholuck. John's Epistles, Wegscheider. John (Gospel and Epistles) Peter and Jude, Daehne.—Church History, Guerike, Daehne and Thilo.—Survey of Theology, Guerike.—Dogmatic Theology, Müller and Wegscheider.

At Berlin the arrangement is, in part, as follows:—Introd. to the Old Test., Hengstenberg and Vatke. Archeology of the Old Test., Benary.—Books of the Old Test. Genesis, Benary. Psalms, Uhlemann and George. Isaiah, Hengstenberg and Vatke. Job, Peterman. Sufferings and Resurrection of Christ, Hengstenberg. Matthew compared with Mark and Luke, Neander. Romans and Galatians, Philippi. Paul's short Epistles, Twisten.—Church History, Erbkam. Dogmatic History, Neander. History of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Uhlemann.—Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Althaus. Introd. to Philos., Kahle. Anthropology, Steffens. Anthropology and Psychology, Gabler. Psychology, Trendelenburg and Beneke.—Hist. of Ancient Phil., Gabler. Hist. of Kant's Phil., Trendelenburg.—Universal History, von Raumer. Hist. of Antiquity, Müller. Rome, E. A. Schmidt. Greece, W. Ad. Schmidt. Middle Ages, Ranke.—Universal Geog., Ritter. Ancient Geog., Müller.

In the July No. of the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, published at Halle, we have the number of students in the several Universities. At Berlin there were 1607; at Bonn, 600; Breslau, 629; Giessen, 404; Göttingen, 693; Halle, 606; Heidelberg, 701; Jena, 484; Königsberg, 392; Leipsic, 287; Marburg, 941; München, 1545; Würzburg, 442.

In the same No. of the same journal, we find the following statement of the attendance at the *Prussian* Universities, in 1829 and 1838. The reason of the decrease is not given.

	1829.	1838.
Whole number of students	6049	4480
Native	4874	3687
Foreign	1175	793
Theolog. (Prot.)	2182	1168
“ (Cath.)	881	411
Law, etc.	1848	1044
Medical	613	909
Philosophical	573	930

Greece.

The University at Athens is prosperous. It has 10 students in theology, 137 in law, 30 in medicine and 55 in philosophy; whole number 232. Its professors are arranged as follows:—In Theology the prof. ord. is Apostolides; extraord., Kentogonis.—Law, ord., Rallis, Herzog, Maurokordatus; honor., Argyropoulos, Pellikas, Feder, Soutzos.—Medicine, ord., Leokias, Vouros, Kostis, Olympios, Damianos; hon., Lebadios, A. Rallis, Treiber.—Philosophy, ord., Schinas, Domnandos, Gennadios, Venthyllos, Ross, Bambas, Philippos, Ulrich, Negriss, Vouris, Landerer; hon., Manonsis; extraord., Fraas.

United States.

The long expected work of Dr. Robinson and Rev. E. Smith, on Palestine and the Countries on the South, is in the press. It is drawn up from the original diaries, and is copiously illustrated by Dr. Robinson. It will be published in the spring, in three volumes; and will previously make its appearance in England.—The second volume of Dr. Nordheimer's Hebrew Grammar will be ready for delivery the first week in January. From a cursory perusal of some of the sheets, we are persuaded that it will be an important addition to Hebrew Literature. Our readers may expect a review of the work in the next No. of the Repository.—Prof. Turner, of the Episc. Theol. Sem., New-York, has a Commentary on Genesis in the press.—Prof. Bush's Commentary on Exodus, in two volumes, may be looked for in March.

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SECOND SERIES, NO X.—WHOLE NO. XLII.

ARTICLE I.

THE STUDIES OF AN ORATOR.

By Samuel Gilman Brown, Evans Professor of Oratory and Belles-Lettres, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.

ELOQUENCE has ever been honored. Men have admired and praised him who, by argument or persuasion, has been able to excite and guide the minds of great masses of people. The orator has stood side by side with the poet. Rhetoric, unfortunately, has held a more precarious position,—a position alternately of undeserved fame, and of unmerited neglect. At one period it embraced, within its dubious limits, all science, all literature, all that was necessary for the complete education of the scholar. At another, it paid, for a too ambitious empire, the heavy penalty of degradation and entire neglect. Some remnants of dishonor have clung to the art, even until the present time. Where criticism begins, eloquence has been thought to end. Rhetoric,—its opponents have said,—is adverse to the highest eloquence, or at least, not exactly congenial with it. It is a lifeless art ; it does not teach us to contemplate beauty in a supple, living body, but, with scalpel and forceps, to examine the mechanism of the dead. In the midst of thrilling music and graceful motion, it tells us that the music and the motion were made by contracting or dilating the glottis, by swelling or expanding a muscle. The name is significant ; and while elo-

quence is a synonym for all that can persuade and excite, rhetoric is a synonym for mechanical rules; and the rhetorician is one, who, forgetting the subject, is intent only on the form and drapery of the subject: one who would construct a perfect man, wanting only a heart and vitality.

Perhaps we owe it to the practical disposition of our countrymen, who can devote little time to matters which even border upon speculation, that these ideas have not obtained much notice with us. Let us hope that another reason is, that we have a clearer insight into the nature and objects of rhetoric, and a more correct definition of its boundaries.

Doubtless the mere rhetorician is seldom an orator; still more, the age of rhetoricians has seldom been the age of orators. Rhetoric loses its beauty and fitness, advances beyond its limits, when it aspires to command, not to assist the speaker. Depending upon analysis, it must, of course, succeed the oratory which it analyzes. It clearly has no legitimate authority which it does not derive from the spoken or written word. Not till after orators and poets had moved and persuaded men, did rhetoricians inquire how they did it: and if ever the art pretends to reproduce, by mechanical means, the effects which originally came from vital powers, it becomes empirical and worthless. "The power by which poetry is poetry,"—and must we not also believe that the power by which eloquence is eloquence?—"is beyond the reach of analysis." Life is always incomprehensible. I know that I raise my arm; I know that the blood circulates; but the principle of life eludes my subtlest researches. I can make an automaton that shall raise *his* arm, and pump a crimson fluid through his leathern veins, but he will remain an automaton still. Rhetoric, like every critical art, will rather guide one in the old track than mark out for him a new one; correct his faults, rather than inspire virtues; teach the speaker to avoid bombast or obscurity; polish his rough and ungainly angles, and render him an interesting and attractive speaker: but if he have not the spirit within him, it never can make him eloquent.

Yet, to affirm that the study of the art is incompatible with its exercise, is to deny the existence of an orator since the days of Aristotle and Quintilian, to invade the hitherto inviolate pre-eminence of the Grecian and the Roman, to uncrown and depose the kings and priests of eloquence in every age. If obedience to rules be an evil, the evil might, we hope, be lim-

ited to those upon whom, unfortunately, the mantle of the rhetorician has fallen. Let them, if need be, restrain themselves by technicalities and formulas, cramp their limbs with fetters, and mince their steps according to mathematical admeasurements, while the scholar, leaving the schools, as no longer needful for him, forgetting the rules, but not the spirit of the rules, shall walk forth among living men, and do, with a free heart and a strong hand, such work as he may find to do.

Eloquence, though, like poetry, gushing out from the fountains within, owes more than its sister art to study, to earnest, protracted effort, with which mediocrity may rise to honorable estimation, and without which, even genius may remain unnoticed. Rather, however, than assert the value of an art which, I hope, needs no formal defence, I would suggest, as briefly as may be, some of the studies most important to an orator.

The orator can attain to no very high eminence without a mastery of the resources of language. His speech must be "obedient, dexterous, exact, like a promptly ministering genius." His words must not only be appropriate, but the best. They must "trip like nimble servitors to do his bidding." His style must be pliant. He needs a majesty of diction which shall not dishonor the loftiest thought,—a plain sobriety, suited to vulgar narration,—a playfulness which may gracefully dance about the gayest subject,—a power of indignant rebuke or of elegant jesting. It is not enough that thought be clear and precise. The masters of language do not protrude the idea, meager and bald, but introduce it, vigorous in itself, surrounded by a company of kindred thoughts. Every word has a power to evoke, from the shadows where they have slumbered, a host of images and dim recollections; and, by all this host attended, the main idea moves on. A thousand chords of the human heart are attuned in unison; and if one be struck the others vibrate. Nothing in the use of language more decidedly marks the power of genius, than the ability to bring out the hidden harmony of the instrument. It is not difficult to detect, according to this suggestion, a prominent cause of the different degrees of vividness, which two men shall give to *apparently*, I cannot say *really* the same thought; and while some have a surprising facility in attenuating every idea which they chance to fall upon, others,—and they are the models of the writer,—have as marvellous a power of expanding and enlivening the most ordinary thought. Strip the thought of its graceful robe, and you wonder where

its virtue lay. Truly, it lay not in that bare frame-work which the skeleton-seeker developed, but in the life and motion which he overlooked; not in the plain obvious meaning, but in its rich suggestions. The magnificent prose of Milton is deprived of its glory if it be translated into other words. Milton is gone, and another is come. A faultless prose style is held to be the last attainment in language,—more difficult than a facility in metrical composition, where the jingle of the rhyme assists in a favorable choice of words, and excuses an imperfect phrase. By common consent, the number of great writers may be included in a short catalogue. Genius will not insure a power over words. The thoughts of the writer may be great, but who will be the better, if he cannot give them a ready and forcible utterance?

Were it demanded, it might be shown how those, in every age, whose musical, vigorous speech we most admire, have labored to obtain the desired excellence; with how much toil Milton gained a mastery of the “artifice of language;” with what critical care ‘he built up the lofty rhyme;’ how Petrarch returned to his sonnets, day after day, to alter a single word, or make a trifling change in the arrangement of a line; how Virgil revised, corrected, remodelled his verses, like a “she-bear”—to use his own comparison—licking her ill-formed offspring into shape; how relentlessly Demosthenes disciplined his words, how carefully he chose his figures, how diligently he moulded them. But these things are on record.

Of all the studies which affect the style, common consent seems to place the ancient languages in the first rank. The ancients elaborated their composition with a care to which the moderns are strangers. One cause of this among the Greeks, may be found in that peculiar love of the beautiful, which, as a redeeming virtue, pre-eminently characterized this inquisitive, artful and restless people.

It did more than almost any other virtue to elevate the character of the nation. Like a kind genius, it hovered over every philosopher, poet, orator, historian. It imparted amenity to a character, which, without it, would have been brutalized by war; guided the pen which wrote the *Œdipus Tyrannus*, the *Prometheus Bound*, the *Symposium* and the *Anabasis*; gave birth to temples, such as no other people ever reared; to statues, the fragments of which are the wonder of the world. If, in another country than their own, the traveller lights upon a structure of singular elegance, a statue of faultless symmetry, he is told that

Grecian architects fashioned the pillars, that Grecian sculptors moulded the limbs : and if, as at Pæstum, he discovers the remains of ancient temples, simple, majestic, beautiful,—unknown to history, reverently visited by Augustus as antiquities of unknown date, standing, then as now, grand and solitary in the midst of the deserted campagna,—the antiquarian will tell him that a Grecian colony came, no one knows when, departed, no one knows wherefore, and left, in the rude material of the country, these solemn and imperishable memorials of their existence and their genius.

It is not very surprising that a people, whose remote and unimportant colonies, thus carried with them the tastes of the rugged little territory whence they sprang,—a people, daily receiving the silent influence of the purest exhibition of art, of art consecrated to religion, of art embodied in the fearful and sacred forms of their divinities, and in temples which have long outlasted the superstitions which once they adorned,—a people accustomed, from choice or necessity, to the most generous display of unrivalled ability in eloquence and song, whose knowledge was not stored in books for reference, but living in the memory,—it is not very surprising that such a people should have been quick to notice the faults of the orator and actor ; nor, on the other hand, that he, whose first object it was to move or delight the public, should have spared no severity of discipline to obtain *their* favor, in whose praise lay his own immortality.

Latin authors, however different from the Greek in other points, are the same in respect of a careful polish and severity of style. What can surpass the gorgeous panoply with which Cicero invests his thoughts ? the playful adroitness of Horace ? the terse and comprehensive narration of Sallust ? The literature of the ancients bears the same impress as their art. It is the wonder of ancient sculpture, that it seems to have been finished with the chisel, without the aid of rasp or file. It is the wonder of ancient composition, that, to a niceness obtained only by the most assiduous labor, it adds the utmost boldness and freedom. In literature, as in art, there is the same simplicity and unity, the same purity of ornament, springing, like wild flowers, spontaneously from the bosom of the argument ; in fine, “ perfection in elegance, proportion, grace and dignity.” Their perfectness was the result of unrelenting discipline, and suggests to us the means to be used for attaining to

the same excellence. The ancient writings are models of that restrained, simple, severe method of composition, appropriate to men who are conscious of the value of their thoughts, and certain that their worth will one day be recognised. We find in them a fitness of part to part, and of the whole to the object to be attained: a self-denying restraint which never allows the orator to show himself, but only his subject,—which compels him to avoid every thing, however pleasant in itself, if it interferes with the single great end, success. There is an earnestness which will not allow the speaker to play *about* the subject. He is bound to a course where he will gain little credit for style, for action, for grace. His only fame is the fame incident to untiring and successful exertion.

With a view to the same object,—the cultivation of the power of language,—another study suggests itself, most agreeable to the English student. The old English writers have done more than any others to show us the richness of our inheritance in our own tongue. The ambitious painter seeks his inspiration and his pattern, first in nature, then in the works of Raphael, Titian and Guido. The sculptor studies form in the unrivalled antiques, and, for expression, adds the works of Michael Angelo. The architect measures the Parthenon, and St. Peter's and York Minster. So, in painting with words, in shaping and applying the living stones of a language, should the artist come with zeal and affectionate reverence to the schools of the best writers. It is true, indeed, that "to write in the real manner of Jeremy Taylor requires as mighty a mind as his;" but who would not hope, by daily and familiar intercourse, to rise above himself, and approach, in some degree, nearer the serene elevation of that exalted spirit?

We cannot know of what our language is capable, until we see what it has done. Not, indeed, so rich and pliant as the Greek, not quite so majestic as the Latin, not so musical nor so flexible as the Italian, standing midway between the rigid preciseness of the French and the liberty of the German, depending upon the contribution of foreign languages for the increase of its curious store, it yet offers us a combination of excellencies, which it were wiser to use than to disregard, a copiousness which few know how to exhaust; a pliancy which will adapt itself to almost every elevation or depression of the subject; in its Latin derivatives, an elegance and grace which will satisfy the taste of the most refined and sensitive, and in its Saxon

frame-work, a manly dignity and strength, a stern and honest vigor pre-eminently fitted for clear-sighted men,—active rather than meditative, earnest in doing rather than in speculating.

I fear that in the enthusiasm for foreign languages, the dignity and richness of our own are too little prized, and its best writers too little studied. The facility, with which a knowledge of the tongue competent for ordinary purposes may be acquired, prevents that exertion which alone can secure the highest excellence. The older writers, laboring with a healthful spirit, in an age when there was less eagerness in matters of immediate practical utility and more in the development of the spirit, less earnestness in the sciences and more in theology, in questions of church polity and probably of civil government, less possibility of immediate literary popularity, and, consequently, a patient waiting for the revelation of truth, less influence of public anonymous criticism, and a freer display of individual tastes and peculiarities—these writers give us the fresh impress and image of their own minds; and, in so doing, have left models of a variety of style and thought, which it will be difficult to equal, almost impossible to surpass. “It is the existence of an individual idiom in each,” says one who read them and loved them, “that makes the principal writers before the restoration the great patterns or integers of English style.”

There have indeed been writers, in our own age, and in that which is just past, who, for every excellence, fall nothing short of the choicest models. But they, for the most part, careless of the thin, vicious stream of modern ephemeral productions, have drunk from the deep, still fountains of the older writers. I have sometimes thought that he, who attempts to guide another to our earlier authors, may, with slight change, say as Milton did of his own plan of instruction; “I will straight conduct you to a hill-side, where I will point out the right path of a virtuous and noble education, laborious, indeed, at the first ascent, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects and melodious sounds on every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not more charming.”

It is questionable whether our language, since the restoration, has not lost more in vigor, than it has gained in smoothness. The writers before the revolution were, indeed, tempted to twist the gnarled stock of our tongue into the manifold forms of the ancients; and the result was not grace, but uncouthness. Yet they produced a variety which we dare not attempt;—a

variety, better, in spite of its occasional harshness, than the tame formality of later times. Give us, if it be necessary, their inversions, their ponderous words, even their obsolete phrases, if in no other way we can get back again their simple dignity, their copiousness, their vigor, their rich, mellow thought. It may be that future writers will seek to unite the sterner virtues of the former age, with the milder ones of our own. Indeed it *is* so. Some of the first living orators are beginning to use those Saxon *forms*, which, not half a century ago, would have been received with universal condemnation. True, the elder writers are confined to a range of grave subjects—and in oratory, to the productions of the pulpit; but in all of them there are so *many* virtues, such earnestness and sincerity, so much that concerns man as *mun*, so much that affects our highest interests,—the wisdom of the Proverbs, the poetry and philosophy of revelation, truths which

‘Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing,’

that, the use of language apart, they afford just the instruction and discipline suited to the dignity of an independent and thoughtful man. The orator may not, like the elder Pitt, learn by heart the sermons of Barrows, nor like the younger, read Spenser till he is charged with reading nothing else; but he should not fail of familiar acquaintance with the great and good minds of the seventeenth century.

The orator should carefully study his models. It is not very necessary, indeed, to learn the rules of “Parliamentary Logic,” as laid down by their author, famous for his single speech. It may not be very important to know that he ought to “hesitate, and appear to boggle when he comes to the premeditated and finest part of his speech,”—“to catch at some expression that shall fall short of his idea, and then seem to hit at last upon the true thing,”—“to watch his opportunity, and speak after a person whose speaking has been tiresome;” but it is worthy of his careful regard to detect the habits and character, the studies and pursuits of those who have been most eloquent. We would, if possible, discover the causes of their success from the history of their lives, the circumstances of their speeches, and their manner of conducting the oration. And here, as in art, the choicest models seem voted, by acclamation, to ancient times. Other and more meager languages; other orders of society, the

progress of society, and, most of all, the invention of printing, have diminished the power of the orator by narrowing the sphere of his labor.

For these reasons it may be, that none can ever, in point of authority and honor, dispute the pre-eminence of the ancients. But with the change of times have changed the functions of the speaker. If knowledge be not now, as formerly, propagated mostly by public speaking, if deliberative eloquence have lost something of its importance and sincerity in the strict discipline of parties, the law demands pleaders wiser and more sagacious than ever, and the pulpit has opened a field entirely new. The free institutions of England and America have produced orators whose fame is bound up with that of their country. The deliberative eloquence of the last seventy years has afforded us models in oratory, on the whole, inferior to none the world ever saw. The times were stormy. Long wars, rapid and dangerous revolutions, questions of intense political, social and moral interest excited the public mind. In one hemisphere, a nation emerged into independence from a long, dubious and exhausting struggle. In the other, the bulwarks of national existence were to be reared, in the hearts of the people, against the gigantic scheme of the greatest of generals, against the more insidious, but not less dangerous attacks of false principles in government and religion.

In England, Lord Chatham was the leader of that splendid band, whose names are everywhere familiar. At present, there remains in that country one very remarkable orator—remarkable for energy, for sarcasm, for argument, for burning thought, for almost every oratorical virtue. The stream of his eloquence gathers strength at every interruption, deviates and hesitates not a moment, or only for a moment, to bury all opposition under the accumulated weight of sarcasm and invective. With few exceptions, these great orators have practically recommended the study of the ancients, and of the old English writers. They have made them their familiar study, have carefully translated them, have committed them to memory. I have mentioned some of Chatham's studies. His celebrated son, three years before his early entrance into public life, is said to have possessed a more thorough, certainly a more ready knowledge of the classics, than most who have devoted to them a life of toil. No living man has more earnestly recommended, by precept and by example, the study of the Greek and Latin orators, indeed, of the orators of every age, than Lord Brougham. The oration for the

Crown is said to be almost at his tongue's end; other orations he has translated; the writers and speakers of modern times he has critically analyzed,—of older times, carefully studied, and reaps his reward in a more thoroughly Saxon, and, which is saying the same thing, a more vigorous style than any orator of his age.

I have suggested some of the minor studies of the orator: for of inferior consequence they certainly are, when compared with those that tend more directly to discipline and invigorate the mind. No beauty of style, no fine arrangement of argument will avail, if the argument itself be feeble.

No man needs a greater variety of knowledge than the public speaker; for no one can use more. Not a branch of literature but will yield him some fruit; not a science in the whole circle but will minister to his wants; not an isolated fact but will find some vacant corner, waiting for its ornament or support. Other things being equal, the power belongs to him whose memory is a storehouse of knowledge. He has an illustration for every new phasis of truth; every principle he embodies in a living form; every decision has its precedent; of passing events, with their manifold relations, he finds the germ or the symbol in other events which have happened elsewhere.

First among those studies which more directly affect the substance of a speech, stands the philosophy of the mind. The orator should know the nature of his species, his own nature. No other study can so fully and harmoniously develop his mind. Nothing is so interesting to man as man. He is not a lifeless, valueless being; his thoughts do not die as soon as uttered; his spirit ceases not its being to-day, or any day when he ceases to appear on earth. Other studies may afford the orator a novel and interesting source of illustration, but argument might have availed without it. They may give him knowledge of the utmost importance in an emergency; but the emergency will occur but once in a lifetime. A knowledge of himself is interwoven with every transaction.

He needs the study for its *discipline*. He needs it to inspire him with self-confidence. No study demands more subtle and patient thought, a greater power of abstraction, or more careful investigation. Nowhere else is such cunning sophistry to be detected, or fallacies to be more carefully watched. As mind is above matter, so is a true knowledge of mental science, a higher step in our intellectual progress, than a knowledge of physical

science. The material world is the object of our daily contact. Every sense brings in from it some intelligible information. But the soul demands a kind of study to which we do not readily submit. Though within us, it eludes our notice. We cannot fasten upon it; we cannot analyze it; we cannot decompose it. Its ethereal essence mocks our instruments. It affords the orator the most appropriate kind of discipline. Every successful artist must be acquainted with the instruments by which he works, and with the material *upon* which he works. If the chemist can have no hope of success without an acquaintance with the alkalis and gases, nor the sculptor without a knowledge of the marble and the chisel, much less has he, who would influence mind, a chance of success, if he be not familiar with the powers of mind. He deals not with matter which can be subjected to experiment, with fixed lines, with acids or earths, but with living men, active like himself, prejudiced, ignorant. He must know the nature and power of these spiritual weapons which will allay turbulent passions, remove prejudice, blunt the edge of ridicule, convince the obstinate, persuade the unwilling.

There are two powers upon which the success of the orator mainly depends; the power of reasoning and the ability to move the passions. He must convince or persuade. His argument must be enlivened by fancy, his fancy restrained by truth. Some speakers, studiously avoiding all warmth of feeling, unfold their subject with a beautiful felicity of demonstration, which will not allow a reply. They force assent. They weave close the tissue of the argument, till the careless opponent finds himself, unawares, bound in meshes which he can neither escape nor despise. It is said of an eloquent casuist of ancient times, that the gates of the eternal city were closed against him, lest, by ill directed argument, he should corrupt the youth. The sophist of our day puzzles the honest man by subtle though worthless reasoning, from the evils of which the heart only, stronger and truer than the head, may save the timid victim; but the heart cannot save him from a disturbed and fearful existence. Let not the orator despise that power, by which he can bind his opponent, by which he can successfully untwist from his own limbs the chains of false argument.

A study of the mind affords an appropriate *kind* of knowledge. We are told that when the great revolutionary orator of Virginia, in one of the unpromising vicissitudes of his early life, became joint owner of a shop, he was not so intent upon selling his small

wares to the needy countrymen who came for a weekly supply, as in prompting and listening to their discussions, or in working upon their feelings by tales of wonder and sorrow. This was the school in which he studied. Here he learned the secret which gave him such unheard of mastery over his audience,—the power to petrify them with fear, to make their cheeks burn with indignation, or to be suffused with tears,—the power of sweeping along with him, in one impetuous torrent, jury and court.

The orator must know himself; for his own heart is the epitome of every heart. He would move the crowd,—he must seek to move himself. He inquires after the character of men, and, for an answer, unrolls the mystic scroll of his own heart, and reads it there. Others are but the reflection of himself, with the shades a little brighter or darker. In his most secret spirit are inclosed the dispositions of the world. Circumstances, occasion, education have wrought some change in the development,—a blessed spirit, it may be, has guided his destiny, has cherished the good, has repressed the bad; but if he examines with patience and sincerity, he will recognise in himself the elements which have variously unfolded themselves in others. Whence but from this comes the value of the *γνωθι σεαυτον*?

He who is master of the *secrets* of his own bosom is master of the secrets of others. He who confidently trusts the suggestions of his own heart, fearlessly rests upon them, careless of timid proprieties—he it is who will make his way directly to the hearts of others. He bears with him the true charm at which all the environments of conventional reserve will fly asunder. Men are in search of reality, however they suffer themselves to be cheated by phantoms; and many a time have they sat unmoved amidst a grand display of what, according to the rules, ought to have been eloquence, and have melted down at a homely but honest story, at an artless appeal, which they knew was not eloquent, or rather which they thought nothing about. Let a man but exhibit the elements and essence of his own character, and he is sure to find in his fellow men an ear to listen, and a heart to sympathize. Even if an opinion be erroneous, it will be respected, if it come from the heart. We prefer rather to fight with a real fiend, than an intangible phantom. The thought that comes honestly from the soul, we feel bound gratefully to receive. We will not trample a true diamond under our feet because it is not of the largest size.

The study of mind enlarges the grasp of the mind. "Acuteness in little things is sometimes attended with incapacity as to great." The faculties are plastic. Habitual intercourse with small things reduces the intellect to corresponding dimensions. Familiarity with great things rarely fails to evolve its powers to the utmost. It is the characteristic of some orators that they do not produce an impression by a single stroke, nor by the exaggerated development of a single mental power ; neither by wit alone, nor by rapid and conclusive argument, nor overpowering declamation ; but rather by an aggregation of good qualities,—by richness, grandeur and dignity of thought, fertility of illustration, and a just and full exhibition of truth. The works of the greatest orator are remarkable for this virtue. We are disappointed, if we seek for beautiful clauses, which, without much harm to themselves, or much injury to the oration, may be taken as a specimen of his manner, or to adorn an album. A fragment from the cornice of the Parthenon would give a fuller notion of the majesty and symmetry of that matchless temple, than a loose figure or clause from the Philippics, of the power of the distinguished Greek. Each thought in the orations is bound in intimate union with every other thought. The whole evolves itself from the germinal idea, as a tree from its seed. We have not a disconnected catalogue of facts, but a living chain of discussion and argument. It was not the comparing Æschines to "old sprains and fractures, which again become sensible when any new malady has attacked the body,"—not the invectives against "that miscreant," "that abject scrivener," "that vile player,"—not the taunts of "low origin," "menial services," "clamorous howling,"—not the narration of his own public services,—not the oath by the souls who fought at Marathon, at Plataea, at Salamis, at Artemisium,—not that earnest peroration, that solemn prayer, that daring imprecation of vengeance,—no one of these emphatic particulars alone vindicated his own innocence, and banished his rival : but the combined impression of all, acting on minds wrought up to high excitement by still other arguments, other invectives, other prayers.

I can mention but one other favorable influence which the study of mental philosophy will have upon the orator,—its revealing to him the knowledge of *principles* ; not of isolated facts, but of the hidden causes of the facts. It will make him familiar with those laws, in accordance with which all truly great actions will be found, by obedience to which alone, all great and useful

reforms must be effected. The day of conflict in the world is not past. The disturbed waters have not yet found their level. Society will undergo changes. Old things will give place to new, the new, perhaps, yield again to the old. The world of mind is even now something like the world of matter during the long birth-day of our earth. Happy he, who, in the tumultuous changes which must come, shall have some fixed star to guide his perilous course. Happy he, who attempts to guide the minds of the people, if his feet be planted on a rock in the clear light of heaven. Oh, if we could but seize the true principle, and reconcile the conflicting elements in society, in morals, in religion! Oh, that one might do in the moral sciences, as Newton did in the natural sciences, when, as was finely said of him, "by the aid of a sublime geometry, as with the rod of an enchanter, he dashed in pieces all the cycles, epicycles and crystal orbs of a visionary antiquity, and established the true Copernican doctrine of astronomy on the solid basis of a most rigid and infallible demonstration."

Ad istinction has been taken—is it not a true one?—between the orator and the debater. The debater is familiar with the arts of parliamentary discipline, has learned the signs and artifices of the place, judges as by instinct of the temper of the house, seizes the happy moment for urging the question, is dexterous and successful in attaining his object, but that object may not be a generous nor a wise one. His influence does not extend far beyond the occasion which called it into existence. His virtue is audacity in attack, courage in action, skill in defence, elasticity in defeat. It is not so much the deep forethought and broad plan of a wise general, as the devices of a cool, ready, active, fearless partisan. It is the virtue of Marion compared with the virtue of Washington. I cannot but think that the orator moves in a higher sphere. If he would exert an extensive influence, he must possess that true philosophy which will give unity to his multifarious acquisitions, afford him a central point, about which he may move in his appointed orbit.—In this consisted the immense superiority of Burke over his great rivals and coadjutors. Fox argued as well, debated better; Sheridan poured forth as rapid, if not as copious a flood of illustration and invective; Pitt equalled, perhaps excelled him, in sarcasm and lofty declamation; but in profoundness of thought, in gathering from the amorphous mass of disjointed facts the law in virtue of which great events were produced, in separating the

true and important from the accidental and worthless, in disclosing the principles of political action, and the rules which ought to govern the nation, there is none of his gigantic contemporaries but must do him homage. These, and others like these, are the virtues which make him still the oracle of British statesmen,—of statesmen everywhere. His speeches, sometimes indeed “too refined for his hearers,” sometimes too warm for their excitement, yet oftentimes as effective as any ever delivered, are the great store-house of political truth. It is true that the accused governor-general confessed, perhaps honestly, certainly very adroitly, that “for half an hour he looked at the orator in a reverie of wonder, and during that space actually felt himself the most culpable man on earth.” It is true that the refined and intelligent assembly, not unaccustomed to the display of oratorical ability, was shaken throughout, that men were convulsed with horror and affright, that women sobbed and screamed and fainted. It is also true that men have judged that orator the wisest man of his time,—his genius, prophetic; his political knowledge, boundless. In all matters with which he was conversant, his place, as has been well remarked, is “among the first three.”

There is another study, so congenial in its influence with that just mentioned, that I suggest it here. History has been called the “letter of instructions which the old generations write and posthumously transmit to the new,—the message which all mankind deliver to every man,—the only *articulate* communication which the Past can have with the Present.” It teaches us the wisdom and folly of our race,—of ourselves; for we are only wiser or less foolish than our fathers, because we are their sons and not their progenitors. In all matters of policy, we know the effect of measures only by experiment. It is given to an age, to a nation, to develop fully the operation of certain principles, in order that the next age, and other nations may be wiser. It was necessary that our fathers should have been driven from the house of bondage, in order that their sons might rejoice in the inheritance of freedom. It was needful that the privy council of Scotland should have enacted, “that, whereas the *boots* were the ordinary way to explicate matters relative to the government, and that there is now a new invention and engine, called the *thumbikins*, which will be very effectual for the purpose and intent aforesaid,—the lords of his majesty’s privy council do therefore ordain, that whenever any person shall be, by their order, put to the torture, the said boots and thumbikins,

both shall be applied to them, as it shall be found fitting and convenient." This was needful in the 17th century, that the privy council in the 19th century should allow examination by the oaths of witnesses alone. It was needful—sad necessity—that a race of doubters should arise, that a whole nation should cut itself loose from religion, in order that men might feel that faith is better than skepticism, that government cannot safely divorce itself from religion, and, it may be, in order that the same people might some time return to a firmer, wiser belief of the truth.

History is the chart of the deliberative orator. It reveals to him the quicksands and rocks where the hopes of empires have been wrecked. It reveals the sources of prosperity, the sources of misfortune. To him who can read it, it offers the suggestions of two hundred generations. It bids us beware of the follies of dead nations. To every individual it offers, somewhere among its records, encouragement to great and good deeds. Would the orator rouse the patriotic self-devotion of his countrymen? History tells him, that among the granite mountains of a small European confederacy, a man was found, who, in a perilous contest, dared to make a path for his comrades, by gathering "a sheaf of Austrian lances" into his own bosom; that, in virtue of this generous self-sacrifice, the name of Arnold of Winkelried has become famous the world over; and that for this, and other deeds like it, Switzerland is a larger country than Russia. Would he speak of the permanency and life of truth? He reads how the sun went down on Egypt and the East, and men slept, while it arose on awakening nations in Italy and England; he reads the oft-told story, how the philosopher recanted with tears, and the world moved still. Would he tell of the direful effects of oppression? He recollects how the pent-up elements lay simmering together for a thousand years, till they burst off the incumbent mass, and overwhelmed nations. Would he show that revolutions are not productive of evil alone? He recollects that sometimes the new order of things has at last proved better than the old; that the volcano is a safeguard against the more destructive earthquake; and that over the lava torrent there spreads out at length a warm and rich soil. Would he tell of liberty unrestrained by moral sentiment, unprotected by law? He reads of a great nation, recoiling from its own frightful image, and rushing for protection, as far as was possible, to the bosom of the power it had just madly hurled to air.

It is from an ignorance of what has been, that men commit so

many mistakes, and that the same error, after a larger or smaller cycle, returns again, like the forgotten fashions of our fathers.

I said that the study of history, in giving the knowledge of right principles, is congenial with the study of mental philosophy. It is chiefly valuable indeed, as a record of the actions of human thoughts and human passions. It would be of no great worth, if it did not cast light into the dimness of the future, as well as irradiate the past. Events which history relates, do but embody the ideas which produced them. Changes in society are not made by chance: men do not move in revolutions, as boys make bonfires, to dance about the smoke and flame. Whenever a great sect has arisen, whenever a great revolution has been produced, it has been at the command of opinions prevailing in the community.* “At the commencement of the French Revolution, in the remotest villages, every tongue was employed in echoing and enforcing the almost geometrical abstractions of the physiocratic politicians and economists. The public roads were crowded with armed enthusiasts, disputing on the inalienable sovereignty of the people, the imprescriptible laws of the pure reason, and the universal constitution, which, as rising out of the nature and rights of man as man, all nations alike were under the obligation of adopting.”

Man acts according to his belief. He believes in alchemy; and, with haggard visage and wasted sinews, toils in dark caverns, in the vain hope of transmuting the worthless into the precious metals. He believes in a fountain which gives perpetual youth; and straightway—such is the record of history—embarks for unexplored lands, searches with an energy which commands respect in spite of the folly, and pushes on his rugged pilgrimage with an enterprise worthy of the best cause. He believes in the insufficiency of his own judgment in matters of religion, in the divinely appointed supremacy of the priesthood, and, for centuries, commits his conscience and his faith to his spiritual advisers. He believes that the Bible is the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, that he may and must examine it, and immediately he produces the reformation.

The subject upon which I have just touched, in its connection with the duty and discipline of a great orator, is, in itself, too ample a theme for this occasion. I leave it, with these hints, and pass to notice the last study which I am allowed to

* Coleridge's Statesman's Manual.

suggest,—the study of *poetry*. I might perhaps more truly say of *art*;—for painting, statuary, architecture and music cultivate those emotions which the orator needs, and are themselves governed by the same principles which govern him. Other studies may be peculiarly appropriate to different professions. The preacher feels his need of mental philosophy; the political speaker, his need of history; but all need the discipline and emotion produced by poetry. Knowledge is vain; of little avail profound investigation, the soundest judgment, the most subtle logic, if there be wanting a power to vivify the cumbrous mass of knowledge, to give a present reality to the past, and to abstractions, a body and a shape.

The materials of the orator are, in many respects, those of the poet,—their objects are different. Both seek the language of strong feeling; both avoid the terms of abstract science; both paint to the bodily eye; both demand the aid of the emotions; both aim at strong impressions. Beyond this, they differ. The poet seeks to please, and instructs only that he may please: the orator seeks to convince, and pleases only that he may convince or persuade. The poet does not give a labored dissertation on the effect of a use of supernatural agencies and deep mystery in poetry and on the power of a sense of guilt, but he tells you a story of the ancient mariner,—the skinny hand,—the glittering eye,—the islands of ice,—the slimy sea,—the dying men,—the living man whose curse it was to live, the only living soul on the wide, wide sea,—the splitting, sinking ship,—the painful pilgrimage. The orator does not speak of unjust legislation, but of the Boston Port Bill. He does not tell you of the powerful foe, the skilful, unfriendly prince; but of Hyder Ali and his army hanging, for a while, like a cloud upon the declivity of the mountains, before it pours down its torrent of devastation and wo into the smiling Carnatic.

If the orator be a philosopher, he must for the time divest himself of the habits which long reflection has induced, and, clad like a little child, be content carefully to lead the blind in the path to wisdom. He must unweave the splendid and intricate tissue of knowledge, and patiently teach the unlearned how to reconstruct the fabric. The technicalities, so dear to him from long acquaintance, or because they express precisely his ideas, must be abandoned. Technical words are good, but not for the orator. Dark, unmeaning and repulsive are they to common ears, as the cabalistic terms of a conjuror. The

metaphysical poet may be a poet to the few "*smitten* with the love of song;" the metaphysical orator may please and instruct the metaphysician; but to the majority, both will speak in an unknown tongue.

Poetry cultivates the imagination. The province of the imagination is not to separate truth from error, but "to render all objects instinct with the inspired breath of human passion." It does not demand if things be true independently, but if they be true in their relation to other things. It does not discover, but enliven. It melts together, into one burning mass, the discordant materials thrown into its crucible. Like the colored light of sunset, it bathes in its own hue whatever it touches. Discarding technical rules, as from its nature averse to them, it adapts means to varying circumstances, and seizing upon the *hearts* of the audience, in aid of belief or in spite of belief, binds them in willing captivity. It annihilates space and time, brings the distant near, draws together the past and the future into the present. It warms the heart of the orator. He then speaks because he feels, not in order that he may feel. The influence flows from within, outward,—not from without, inward. It tears the orator from considerations of himself, bears him above himself, above rule, criticism, apology, audience, every thing but the subject. The orator stands like an enchanter, in the midst of spirits that are too mighty for him. He alone could evoke them from the dark abyss; but even he is but half their master. He alone can demand the secrets of futurity; but then he can speak only the words that they give him. He inspires others only as he is inspired himself.

Logic is necessary for that severe form of speech, which carries power in its front, and, by its very calmness, and repression of earth-born passions, seems to belong to a higher sphere. It must form the bone and muscle of an extended discourse. Imagination clothes the skeleton with beauty, breathes health into the rigid muscles, lights up the eye, loosens the tongue, excites that rapid and vehement declamation, which makes the speaker to be forgotten, the subject and the subject only to be thought of, betrays no presence of art, because in fact art is swallowed up in the whirlpool of excited feeling. Besides, there are truths with which logic has no concern; "truths which wake to perish never;" truths to be directly apprehended, as well as truths to be proved; feelings as well as facts. Love and passion and fear laugh at demonstration. "Logic," says one, "is good,

but not the best. The irrefragable Doctor, with his chains of inductions, his corollaries, dilemmas, and other cunning logical diagrams and apparatus, will cast you a beautiful horoscope, and speak you reasonable things; nevertheless, the stolen jewel, which you wanted him to find you, is not forthcoming. Often by some winged word—winged as the thunderbolt is—of a Luther, a Napoleon, a Goethe, shall we see the difficulty split asunder, and its secret laid bare; while the Irrefragable, with all his logical roots, hews at it, and hovers round it, and finds it on all sides too hard for him.”

Poetry not only offers us the language of emotion, but produces emotion, and emotion elicits thought. It has been well remarked of the great English dramatist, that he has been true to nature, in placing the “greater number of his profoundest maxims and general truths, both political and moral, not in the mouths of men at ease, but of men under the influence of passion, when the mighty thoughts overmaster and become the tyrants of the mind which has brought them forth.” Then the mind rushes, by intuition, upon the truth; scorns subtle and useless distinctions; disregards entirely the husk, seizes and appropriates the kernel. Emotion in the speaker produces emotion in the hearer. You must feel, you must sympathize with him. Your mind darts, with the speaker’s, right through the textures which cover up the subject, and grasps the heart of it. How deadening are the words of some passionless men. Like a dull mass of inert matter, their lifeless thought stretches across the path of your spirit. Different, indeed, are the words of another, to whom has been given some spark of ethereal fire. His words become to you a law of life. They start your sluggish spirit from its dull equilibrium, and its living wheels shall thenceforth move whithersoever the spirit that is in them moves. Rarely has been found that combination of qualities necessary to the greatest orator,—dignity, enthusiasm, wit, the power of sarcasm, the power of soothing, philosophy which does not despise imagination, imagination which does not spurn the restraints of philosophy.

The great orator must be a great man,—a severe student in broad and deep studies. He must thoroughly know his materials, his models, the history of his race, and most of all, the heart within him. Then shall he have power to struggle in the noblest contest,—that of mind with mind, for the noblest object,—the well being of his race.

ARTICLE II.

THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF GOD.

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DIFFERENT methods of proof are applied to the great foundation of all religion, natural or revealed—the *fact of the existence of God*. Among these are some of the noblest productions of the human intellect; while a large proportion of the whole subserve the cause of theological science, with more or less efficiency. The present age has somewhat abounded in works of this nature; some of which will go down through future generations, as monuments of the pious research and deep thinking of our times.

It is, however, no part of our present object to examine and decide upon the comparative merits of works on Natural Theology; nor to attempt any new form of argument; nor to adduce any additional proof from new sources. An inquiry of greater importance and of a deeper nature is contemplated; and which, though essential to the soundness of all processes of proof, has very seldom received a distinct and formal investigation. Our design is to examine THE NATURE AND GROUND of all argumentation on the proof of the existence of God; that we may be able to estimate the force and conclusiveness of any process of demonstration, which shall be adduced by human reason. No argument is to be appreciated solely by its logical precision and exactness, but rather from the nature and ground of the argumentation itself; and to this last, far less than to the first, it is believed, has attention been directed in the various methods of proving the being of God. We assume to ourselves nothing but a capacity to see and feel the importance of such an investigation, while the merit and benefit of the attempt are left to be tested entirely by the issue.

Every proof of the being of God, aside from direct revelation, must come under the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* forms of argument. The mental discipline and habits of different persons will modify the degrees of conviction which they will feel from these distinct modes of reasoning; but from neither can the mind draw any sound and steadfast conclusion, until it has had

a clear and full perception of the nature of the argument and the ground on which it stands. To aid in this last particular is the sole object here proposed. We shall confine our attention in this article to the *a priori* form of argument.

I. *The nature of the "a priori" argument.* In general, it is the process of deducing conclusions from original and direct intuitions.

In one branch, it includes objects of sense, or any existing thing, which, in its agency or influence, is a cause producing changes or effects; and the *a priori* method of reasoning is the deduction of conclusions from the known inherent properties and powers of this given thing in itself. It is thus an argument from cause to effect; and is possible only as, by a direct knowledge of the inherent nature or power of the cause, we can see in the cause the specific effects, which must be produced in a given direction and manner of action. By one who knows directly all the inherent properties of heat, all the laws of combustion must be perfectly and *a priori* understood; and thus, antecedently to all experience, he may infallibly predict the effect of the application of flame to any combustible material. His conclusions are not at all empirical: in the very nature of the cause he sees the certainty and necessity of the effect.

It is important to discriminate the distinctions in the nature of all *a priori* from all *inductive* reasoning. Induction is the collection of many facts under one category, and from these facts deducing a general law or principle. For example, when heat is applied to a particular metal, as iron, we discover that the iron is expanded in bulk. It is again applied to silver, and we find that heat expands silver. It is successively applied to other metals as far as opportunity offers, and the same phenomenon occurs in all—the metals are expanded. By repeating the experiment on a great variety of metals, we feel warranted ultimately in deducing a general conclusion as a principle—heat expands all metals. The experiment may extend to all the multiplied forms of matter; and since the application of heat to every variety of material organization produces the same result, we come at length, with the same confidence as before, to a still more general deduction—*heat expands all bodies*.

Now the inquiry, as the test of inductive reasoning, is: Why are we warranted to extend our general law beyond the specific cases of experiment? Why do we feel a confidence in the general principle that heat expands *all* bodies, when we

have actually applied it to but very *few* of all the bodies of the material universe? The answer is: Because we have carried our experiments far enough to create a conviction, that we have learned an inherent power or property of heat as a cause; and thus, from the uniformity of nature, or an intuition of the reason that like causes always produce like effects, we conclude that the application of heat to all bodies will invariably produce their expansion. This is safe reasoning for all practical and scientific purposes, after a sufficiently wide induction of facts; but it can never be absolutely conclusive, except within the very limits of the experiment. The next experiment might give a different fact, and thus utterly subvert our general principle; and the only ground of confidence that such will not be the case, is because, from our many experiments, we feel a strong conviction that we have found a real, permanent property of heat, inherent in its own nature, and that, as a cause, it will thus always produce the same effect when applied to any new bodies.

All our experiments have been directed solely to this end, that we might learn the power and properties of the thing as a cause; and as we were not competent to gain this knowledge by direct inspection of the thing itself, we have been obliged to seek for it through an induction of its many uniform effects. The process of inductive reasoning—on the use and successful recommendation, though not the invention of which, rests so much of the deserved fame and honor of Lord Bacon—is still only an expedient for relieving the weakness and darkness of the human mind. Instead of penetrating directly to the inherent properties of any thing as a cause, that we may foresee what, in given circumstances, it will effect—which our limited powers will not permit us to accomplish—we are forced to resort to a long and patient induction, and ultimately deduce our general law, with a confidence precisely proportioned to our conviction, that we have inferred from its many observed effects, the truth in relation to the permanent inherent properties of the cause. This is the nature of inductive reasoning in the case of efficient causes.

But suppose that, prior to this long experiment and induction of facts, there is, by direct and immediate inspection, a knowledge of all the powers and properties of heat: we are then ready, at once, and with a certainty infallible, to declare its general laws, and predict its specific effects in given conditions.

We need no experiment here, the use of which is to enable us to infer those very properties which we have much more perfectly obtained by direct knowledge. Before all experiment, out of the cause itself, by direct inspection and knowledge, we deduce the effect of its operation. The a priori form of argument from cause to effect demands, therefore, in its very nature, a direct knowledge of the inherent nature and properties of the cause; and in all cases of such knowledge, the conclusion to the effect is certain and infallible. When we know all that a cause is, we know all that a cause can do.

But in this aspect of the a priori argument, it is plain that there is nothing which can render it available to finite beings, as a method of proof for the existence of God. We never can, by direct inspection, thus infallibly know all the powers and properties of any cause, that we may a priori predict what effects it will produce. It is true we may, by our own consciousness, know much of our own minds as a cause, and can say in many things that intelligence and free-will have such a nature, and such powers; and we can, from direct consciousness of these powers, predict in many cases what the effect will be antecedently to experiment, or at least what may, and what may not be required of free beings; but we can never make the consciousness of our own powers as a cause, any ground for deducing the existence of other things, not the effect of our causation, and least of all, a ground for an a priori argument of the existence of God. And still more effectually are we precluded from any such use of the a priori argument in relation to the being of God, from the very nature of our idea of God. We can never take any original cause and see in its action the existence of God as a result; thus making God an effect, which is a subversion of the very idea of God. Nor can the ground of God's existence in himself be brought so completely under the cognizance of any finite mind, that in it, as an eternally efficient agency, he shall see the being of God necessarily and eternally sustained.

It would, therefore, be vain and absurd to attempt to apply this kind of a priori argument to the proof of the being of God. It would demand that a finite mind should thoroughly grasp the grounds of infinite and absolute being; or, the absurdity of making God an effect, the existence of which we are attempting to prove by knowing the nature and properties of the previous cause. But a second branch, and one which is strictly

a priori, is the process of deducing conclusions from ultimate principles or absolute truths. Although an ultimate principle partakes in nothing of the nature of an efficient cause, by the knowledge of which we might also know the certainty of its effects; yet, our reason may perceive that a particular conclusion is true as a deduction from that ultimate principle, as clearly as if it were a literal effect, efficiently caused by the principle. A logical deduction from an ultimate truth is, therefore, as legitimate a form of reasoning, as that of deducing effects from efficient causes.

The nature of this branch of *a priori* reasoning, in distinction from the *inductive*, is seen in the following facts.

A person may, by actual experiment in mensuration, take the diagram of a triangle as drawn before him, and learn that the sum of its three angles equals the sum of two right angles. He may proceed to draw another triangle of different dimensions, and again, by actual measurement, find the same result; and thus, by going through this process with a great variety of triangles—rectangular, isocles and scalene—and finding the facts the same in all, he will, as in the case of the application of heat to bodies, feel warranted ultimately in deducing a general principle, and say that this is the general law of all triangles—the sum of their three angles equals the sum of two right angles. And if we had no other ideas than those derived from sensation and from reflection upon the experience of sense, this would be the only method in which we could possibly reason in geometry. We must get our general principles in mathematics by induction, precisely as we do in natural science; and all *a priori* reasoning would be excluded, because of our inability to discover the inherent nature and properties of the triangle; as it is excluded from natural science, because we cannot know the inherent powers and properties of physical causes.

But it is not with man in relation to a triangle, as it is in relation to heat, as a cause. He has the faculty of seeing in the very nature and properties of the triangle itself, that the sum of its angles equals the sum of two right angles; and from one triangle, he can demonstrate, without any experiment, that thus it must be in the case of all triangles. He has the power of rational intuition, and can see absolute truth, and comprehend ultimate principles. It is a faculty sublime, mysterious and awful—separating him forever in *kind*, and not merely in *degree*, from the animal, and capacitating him for the high desti-

nies of moral accountability, and thus allying him to angels, and giving him, in this particular, the image of God his Maker. The possession of this faculty evinces its high distinction from all with which the animal is endowed, in this very point of *a priori* reasoning. The beaver reasons from general laws, derived from facts of sense, when he constructs his dam, and builds his dwelling, always adapting his results, with great skill, to changing circumstances, and is, in no mean degree, an inductive philosopher. But thus far and no farther. God has denied him the power of seeing ultimate truths, and of drawing deductions from absolute principles: hence he can never reason *a priori*: he can never educate himself, nor separate himself from the chain of cause and effect in which he is bound, and stand forth the free arbiter of his own moral destiny, under law, and amenable to a righteous tribunal. Multiply and magnify all the powers he has, in kind, to an indefinite extent, he is but an animal still, and can know nothing of the absolute, the necessary, the universal. He wants that faculty which capacitates him to see those truths, which, in their own light, are self-affirmed, independent, immutable and eternal. Man has this power; and the habit of discriminating it from all else with which he is endowed, is worth all that is claimed for it, and far more attention than is given to it. And these ultimate truths, which are seen to be necessary in themselves, and universal verities, independent of all power, or will, or efficient causation, are the elements of all *a priori* reasoning. It is only in this particular that an *a priori* argument can be applied to the proof of God's existence. We must take some truth which a rational intuition determines to be *necessary* and *universal* in its own nature; which is itself above all proof, and, as cognized by the reason, stands upon its own absolute ground,—and from this deduce, by a longer or shorter process, the equally necessary truth of the being of God. The ultimate truth which we assume must involve the fact, and make the existence of God a perceived necessity.

This, then, wherever it can be applied, is a valid and conclusive form of reasoning. It takes a truth seen to be necessary and universal in its own nature, and from this deduces other truths, farther removed from immediate intuition, but which, because logically deduced from necessary truths, are themselves as necessary as the absolute data from whence they are derived. The argument, therefore, from its very nature, proves every

thing if it proves any thing. So far as it can be applied, it makes the conclusion necessary in its own nature, and its non-existence an absurdity. If it can be applied to the proof of God's existence, and just so far as it can be made logically to reach, it proves God a necessary being—necessary, not because, as there are effects, so there must be a first cause, but necessary in his own nature, because a necessary deduction from an absolute truth, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as necessarily and eternally existing.

It is in this point of view, that the argument a priori has been so highly appreciated by many. They have supposed that they had discovered some proper method of applying it to the proof of the being of God; and as, in its nature, it is so conclusive when properly applied, they have valued and extolled it, and frequently relied upon it to the exclusion of all other sources of proof. The conclusion logically deduced is as valid and necessary as the absolute principle; and as they are convinced that their deductions are logical, they rest in full conviction, without farther research. Speculative minds, habituated to deal with abstract truth and elementary principles, are the most deeply interested in this form of the argument; though some of the highest names in this list of thinkers place no reliance upon it. The latter distinctly perceive the strength of this mode of reasoning where it can be applied; but they suppose that they also see the impossibility of so applying it as to bring a rational conviction of its conclusiveness. The form of the argument they admit to be good, and there may be absolute truths which involve the necessary existence of God; but no human mind can rise high enough to grasp these truths, or reach far enough to deduce the conclusion. The ground is safe, but too high for us to gain: the logical elements are too sublimated for any human, or perhaps angelic intellect to control. Though we dissent from the opinion, that this form of argument is utterly beyond all human powers, it does, unquestionably, demand the highest energies, and involve some of the severest processes of logic.

It is proper here to remark, that the celebrated and powerful work of Dr. Samuel Clark—“*The Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*—” though designed to be “as near to mathematical as the nature of such a Discourse would allow,” and though frequently referred to as an exhibition of an a priori argument, is only in a very limited degree made to depend

upon ultimate and absolute truths. The very first position, that "something must have existed from eternity," is deduced from no intuitive knowledge of the inherent nature of any efficient cause, nor from any ultimate principle in itself necessary and universal; but is inferred directly from an *effect* assumed to be such, and then reasoning from the existence of the effect to the existence of a cause, by a direct inversion of the *a priori* form of argument. The first step in his process is: "*Since something now is, 'tis manifest that something always was, otherwise the things that now are, must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely and without cause, which is a plain contradiction in terms,*" etc. It is not meant, by any means, that this is not conclusive reasoning; but only that it is not *a priori* reasoning. By it we can never prove the existence of God as absolutely, but only as relatively necessary. Inasmuch as something else exists, therefore, and on that account, it is necessary that something should have existed from eternity. And if we admit this thing, which has existed from eternity, to be God, his existence is not an absolute necessity, because the existence of the effects is not an absolute necessity. We can conceive that all these effects might never have been, or, that they might now be annihilated, and thus cease to be, in which case the very ground for the necessity of God's existence must fall away. It is a necessity grounded upon a contingent fact, and not upon an absolute principle, which cannot but be, and is thus universal and necessary in its own nature.

Nor is it meant that Dr. Clarke misunderstood the nature of an *a priori* argument, and thought this to be such. For though he designed his treatise to be "as near mathematical as the nature of the Discourse would allow," he doubtless saw the necessity of something besides rigid *a priori* reasoning to carry conviction to those minds to which his work was directed. And in his "Answer to a seventh Letter, concerning the Argument *A Priori*," he says: "That there is, and cannot but be one, and one only, such first cause, author and governor of the universe, is, I conceive, capable of strict demonstration, *including that part of the argument which is adduced 'a priori,'*"—thus showing that only a "*part*" of his argument was deemed *a priori* by himself. It is not until the third conclusion, embracing "*self-existence,*" or "*necessary existence,*" that he introduces an *a priori* argument, and gives the following distinct intimation of his changing the form of reasoning by saying:

“When we are endeavoring to suppose that there is no being in the universe that exists necessarily, we always find in our minds, (*besides the foregoing demonstration of something being self-existent from the impossibility of every thing being dependent,*) we always find in our own minds, I say, some ideas, as of *infinity* and *eternity*, which to remove, i. e. to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe, to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms.” He thus expressly removes his ground of reasoning from “*things dependent,*” and which are effects, to *ideas, which to remove, is a contradiction in the very terms,*” and which are thus ultimate and necessary truths. He here uses the *a priori* form of argument, and continues it for the purpose of proving the *necessary existence—eternal existence,*—and the *omnipresence* and *unity* of God. But he expressly departs from it in the proof of God’s *intelligence*; nor is it resumed again directly in the remainder of the discourse. This justly celebrated work, however less or more conclusive it may be deemed, should not be characterized as, in general, an “*a priori*” argument for the existence of God.

Having thus before our minds the *nature* of the *a priori* form of argument, we proceed,

II. *To look at some of the more prominent methods of its use, in order to find the real ground of its validity.*

The schoolmen, from the time of the celebrated Anselmus, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the 11th century, were much occupied with the proof of the existence of God by *a priori* reasoning, and sought to give the argument its most direct and conclusive application. It was revived in the 17th century by Descartes, and received all the advantages of his powerful mind, and the influence and splendor of his great name; and has since been followed up, each in his own way, more especially by Leibnitz, Wolf, etc. in Germany, Clarke in England, and Cousin in France. Kant examines the argument, and deems it inconclusive; and thus feels no conviction from its application. His reliance is placed entirely upon an argument derived from the fundamental principles of morality, as exhibited in the nature of man, and the government of the moral universe.

But, without reference to names, the following are some of the modes of the argument in its most general form. We adduce them here as illustrations of its application to the proof of the being of God, and also to develop, more clearly, the

necessary assumption which is included in every a priori argument.

First.—It is possible that the *most perfect* being exists. But real existence is a perfection, and necessary existence the highest perfection, and must belong to the most perfect being. And therefore as the most perfect being has necessary existence, he does necessarily exist.

In this form of the argument the *possibility of the most perfect being* is put as an ultimate principle, or absolute truth, which needs no proof, but is self-affirmed and undeniable; and from this it is attempted to deduce the necessity of the *actual* existence of the most perfect being. But a close examination of the argument will detect a non sequitur, unless it be assumed, that the necessary *idea* of the most perfect being is itself a ground of conclusion for the real existence of the most perfect being. The possibility of the most perfect being is ideal in the major proposition—and the including of “necessary existence” in the most perfect being in the minor proposition, must be ideal also,—and thus the conclusion to the “*real* existence” of the most perfect being is fallacious, without the assumption, that the necessary *ideal* is a valid ground for inferring the *real* or *actual* existence. All that the syllogism can logically give in the conclusion is the *possibility* that the most perfect being, including necessary existence as an attribute, does exist; and now to draw the farther conclusion that he *really* does exist, it is necessary to assume, that the necessary *idea* of its possibility is conclusive for its *reality*.

Secondly.—It is possible that there is a being whose existence is *eternal*. But unless such a being *now* exists there cannot be an eternal being: therefore an eternal being now really exists. Here too is a fallacy of precisely the same nature as in the former case, except upon the same assumption—that a necessary *ideal* is conclusive for a *real* being. The possibility of an eternal being is *ideal*; the necessity of *present* existence, in order to *eternal* existence, is only *ideal*; thus, all that we can distribute in the conclusion, is, that the *idea* of present existence is necessary to the *idea* or possibility of eternal existence. To draw the conclusion of *actual* existence, we must assume that the *necessary idea* is a sufficient ground for it.

Thirdly.—It is possible that there may be an *almighty, self-existent* being. But every thing which is possible must have some ground for its possibility; and there can be no ground for

the possibility of such a being but his real existence. What can be a ground for an almighty, self-existent being, but such a being itself? There must, therefore, be a really self-existent, almighty being.

Here again, we have the assumption of more in the conclusion, than belongs to the premise, unless we understand that what is *ideally* true necessarily, is also *really* true necessarily. The possibility of an almighty, self-existent being is ideal, and the ground of this ideal possibility is the idea of its reality; this necessary *idea* of its reality is the only warrant we have, therefore, for deducing its necessary, *actual* reality.

In the above cases we have predicated, as ultimate truths, the possibility of the real existence of the *most perfect* being, an *eternal* being—and an *almighty, self-existent* being: and we might continue, in the same way, with every thing in relation to God, which may be assumed as a necessary idea, and thus an ultimate truth; and, in the same manner, deduce the actual from the possible, the real from the ideal; but in all cases, we shall be obliged to make the same assumption, that what is a necessary truth in the *idea*, must also necessarily exist in the *reality*. The very essence, therefore, of all purely a priori reasoning on the being of God is contained in this short and simple proposition: *the necessary idea of God involves the necessary existence of God.*

That this is the essence of Clarke's a priori argument is clear from the following declaration: "We always find in our minds some ideas, as of infinity and eternity; which to remove, that is, to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe, to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes exist only by the existence of the substance to which they belong. Now, he that can suppose eternity and immensity—and consequently the substance by whose existence these modes or attributes exist—removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two and four."—*Being and Attrib.* Sec. III.

The same also is true of Cudworth; who says, speaking of these universal truths or necessary ideas: "For there is an absolute impossibility in this assertion, that these essences of things and verities should be, though there were no substantial entity or no mind existing. For these things themselves must of necessity be either substances, or modifications of substance;

for what is neither substance nor modification of a substance is a pure nonentity. And if they be modifications of substance, they cannot possibly exist without that substance whose modifications they are; which must be either matter or mind: but they are not modifications of matter as such, because they are universal and immutable; therefore they are the modifications of some mind or intellect, so that these cannot be eternal without an eternal mind. And those do but deceive themselves in the hypothetical assertion, that there would have been these universal verities though there had never been a God; neither considering what the nature of God is, whose existence they would question or doubt of, nor what those *rationes* and verities are, which they would make so necessarily existent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing; for that which begets so strong a persuasion in their minds that the *rationes* of things and universal verities are so necessarily eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing else but an inward, invincible prepossession of the necessary existence of God, or an infinite, eternal and omniscient mind (that always actually comprehends himself and the extent of his own power, or the ideas of all possible things) so deeply radicated and infixed in their minds, as that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it though they endeavor it never so much; but it will unawares adhere to them, even when they force themselves to suppose the non-existence of God as a person, whose idea they do not clearly comprehend; that is, the force of nature is so strong in them as to make them acknowledge the thing, when they deny the word. So that the true meaning of this phenomenon is nothing else but this, that God is a being so necessarily existent, that though men will suppose the non-existence of him and deny the name, yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves and confess the thing."

Im. Mor. Book IV. Ch. 4. Sec. 9.

So also Cousin: "You are a finite being, and you have the necessary idea of an infinite being. But how could a finite and imperfect being have the idea of one perfect and infinite, and have it necessarily, if one did not exist? Take away God, the infinite and the perfect, and let there be only man, the finite and imperfect, and I shall never deduce from the finite the idea of the infinite, from the imperfect the idea of the perfect, from humanity the idea of God; but if God, if the perfect, if the infinite exists, then my reason will be able to conceive them.

The simple fact of the conception of God by the reason, the simple idea of God, the simple possibility of the existence of God implies the certainty and necessity of the existence of God." *Psych. Henry's Transl.* p. 266.

If then the position, *that the necessary existence of God can be inferred from the necessary idea of God*, be not true, the whole *a priori* argument is fallacious and illogical. How can it be sustained as true and solid?

In answer, we will first give the argument in its direct and positive form. Every idea—applying the word both to conceptions from sense and the intuitions of reason—involves an operation of the mind in relation to some object of thought. But objects of thought cannot be created by the mind from nothing. They are cognized only as existing things before the mind, or, as brought in upon the field of consciousness. As the eye can see nothing, by its own energy, where nothing is, but must, in order to vision, have some real object of vision presented; so the mind has no power to form ideas from nonentities, but must have all the elements of its ideas before it as existing realities. Thus, every simple idea must have its archetype in some actual entity and reality of being.

Where then the mind has *necessary* ideas, or the intuitions of necessary truths, as in the case of all ultimate and absolute principles, these rational cognitions are a proof of the necessary existence of their archetypes. An idea without a reality is an idea of nothing; and a necessary idea without the necessity of its real archetype is an absurdity. Now the idea of God is a necessary idea, in the various forms of the infinite, the eternal, the perfect, the absolute cause, etc. The mind cannot exist, as a rational, active mind, without a development of this idea in some of its forms; and, in the possession of the idea, there is the consciousness that that, of which it is an idea, is universal and necessary. The eternal, for instance, is an idea which the mind of every person must have as the correlate to limited time; so that if he have the idea of the limited, he must also have the idea of the eternal. And while, in relation to the limited, he knows that it possesses none of the attributes of necessity or immutability, in relation to the eternal, he knows that it cannot but be. Even if he conceives of the idea as dropping from his mind, and even from every other finite mind in the universe, he knows that still the eternal—an unbegun and an unending—is a reality which it is impossible should be annihilated. Its

non-existence cannot take place by the universal loss of all idea of it; and thus the necessary idea must involve the necessary archetype of that idea.

So also of all the *a priori* ideas of the self-existent, the independent, the omnipresent, etc. They are all the necessary ideas of the human mind; and come with the conviction that all minds, which exercise any rational thought, must have them in more or less distinct development; and, moreover, that the entities, of which they are ideas, are necessary, and cannot be annihilated. And these entities can never be mere forms or empty *phantasmata*; but are, as Cudworth says, "the most unbending and uncompliant, the most necessary, firm, immutable and adamant things in the world." And as they are realities thus immutable, they prove that the absolute being, in whom alone they have their ground of existence, is himself a most necessary and immutable being. Thus the actual existence of the absolute God is necessarily involved in our necessary idea of him.

But, still farther to convince the mind, which falters and hesitates from the tenuity of these pure intellections, we add a corroborative form of the argument, in obviating the difficulties which arise. It may be thought, that this arguing from the idea to the reality cannot be valid, inasmuch as,

1. *It does not accord with fact.* We have many ideas for which there are no archetypes in existence. We form the idea of a phoenix or a centaur, while there never were such existences.

To this it is replied, that while it is admitted that the complex whole of such ideas never had any existing archetypes, yet all the elements of these complex ideas are, and must be realities, as actually given to the mind through the senses. The mind cannot create a single new element; it can only combine old ones into new forms. Having the different elements as realities, the imagination and fancy can arrange and combine them into new modifications indefinitely, or limited by nothing but the rule of permutation of quantities. But the whole work of the mind is exhausted in the act of combination, and can never go beyond the materials given to it from existing things through the senses. This answers the difficulty from the supposed fact; but this is not all. These elements, which are combined by the mind into various forms and given to it by the senses, are by no means invested with any of the attributes of necessity and universality. They are but material effects; and

may be conceived as annihilated, or as never having been caused. Their non-existence is no absurdity. But not so with the existence of absolute principles. Not so with the ideas of eternal, infinite, self-existence, etc., as elementary in the absolute idea of God. These are all necessary in their very nature, and are cognized as uncreated, enduring, changeless realities. The mind can neither create nor annihilate them. They stand forth independent of will or power.*

2. *As the idea and its archetype are not identical, they may exist independently of each other; and thus the idea may be without the archetype.* It cannot therefore be inferred that because the idea is, therefore the reality is.

To this we answer: Whether the idea and the archetype be identical or not depends upon the fact of the personality or impersonality of the intuitive cognition of ultimate truth. Does the mind get the ideas of these necessary truths by its own personal action—as in the case of material objects—through the senses? If it does, as is assumed by Kant, then it is true, as above, that the idea and the archetype are not identical; but the archetype is a distinct existence, external to the mind, and the idea is the subjective cognition of the archetype by the mind's own action. But if it does not, as Cousin maintains—and the necessary or ultimate truth is given to the mind by another agent, like any truth of inspiration, and thus this agent is emphatically “the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,”—then they *are* identical, and the idea is but the archetype itself, brought within the field of the mind's own consciousness, by the revolving of that absolute sphere which is the immutable ground of all necessary truth.

* “But it may be I still deceive myself when I say, that the idea I have of *extension* supposes an object actually existing. For it seems that I have ideas which do not suppose any object. I have, for example, the idea of an enchanted castle, though no such thing really exists. Yet, when I consider the difficulty still more attentively, I find there is this difference between the idea of *extension* and an *enchanted castle*; that the first being natural, i. e. independent of my will, supposes an object which is necessarily such as it represents: whereas the other, being artificial, supposes indeed an object, but it is not necessary that that object be absolutely such as the idea represents, because every will can add to that object or diminish from it as it pleases.”—*Regis. Metaphys. Lib. 1, P. 1. cap. 3.*

If the last position be the truth, the whole ground of the objection, as above given, is at once annihilated, and the idea is not merely an inseparable existence with the archetype; but is itself the archetype seen in its own absolute and eternal ground of being. Nor would the settlement of this inquiry bear alone upon the point before us, but upon the establishing of the possibility of any and all a priori and transcendental cognition; and would go more directly and effectually to the settlement of some of the most important and fundamental questions of human knowledge, than perhaps any point of mental philosophy now agitated. It would meet the speculations of Hume, in his higher skepticism of all knowledge of a God—just where the clear counter speculations of Dr. Reid met both Hume and Berkely, in their skepticism of the knowledge of an external world—by the affirmation of a direct and immediate knowledge. All conflict with the skeptic in relation to the being of a God, or with the affirmed atheist, when followed fully out to its issue, will inevitably come upon the ground of this inquiry; and, by deciding it, we shall decide how we are to combat the peers of skepticism in their very heights;—either with Kant, by taking the side of the *personality* of our rational cognition of ultimate and absolute truth, and then urging against them a *faith*, based upon all probabilities in its favor and nothing opposed to it, or with Cousin, by taking the ground of its *impersonality* or direct inspiration, and thus overwhelming them by the conclusiveness of *absolute knowledge* which is grounded upon immutable necessity. And verily, there is no way of annihilating, by human reason, the last refuge of the philosophical skeptic, but by obliging him, with the first, to feel the *folly* of standing against all probabilities, with nothing to support him, or, with the last, to feel the *absurdity* of standing against the verities which are based in absolute necessity. Now this would be the only way to *annihilate* the difficulty as above stated; but it may be most effectually *obviated* by a cheaper and easier effort. For admit, as the objection contemplates, that the archetypes are not identical with the ideas; still it would by no means follow that we can have the idea without the archetype. The shadow is not identical with the substance; but it cannot be without the substance:—the effect is not identical with the cause; but it cannot be without the cause. And thus, the idea may not be identical with the archetype; and yet it may be true, that there can be no idea with-

out an archetype. Even if one can be conceived as existing without the other, it is the idea only which can be conceived to have non-existence. The mind may lose the idea, i. e. it may be conceived as having fallen from the mind's consciousness; but the archetype, the absolute truth, cannot cease to be. If then we have the necessary idea of God, although that idea be not conceived as an inspiration of himself by himself, it would still be seen that the idea, when possessed necessarily, implied its antitype in his necessary being.

3. *The idea of God may be evolved from our own being, and can thus be no ground for a deduction that God really exists.*

This is denied as a matter of fact or possibility. The idea of the *indefinite* may be evolved from our own being, but not the idea of the *absolute*. These ideas are as distinct as any two the mind can possibly have. We may expand and augment, in imagination, the attributes which we possess, to an unconditional extent, and thus get the idea of the *indefinite*, or the *unconditionally unlimited*—a progression but never a completion. Here, however, is no idea akin to the absolute, the entire, the complete and perfect God. It is only an indefinite expansion of yourself, and not even an approach to the idea of the absolute entireness of an eternal being. If there were no other idea but that of an augmented finite, at the utmost it would be finite still, and could never give the idea which the mind actually has of an infinite God, in his absolute wholeness and entireness of being. Besides, by no indefinite expansion of self, can the mind possibly obtain the elements of *universality* and *necessity*, which now inhere in the idea of all ultimate truths, and with which our idea of the absolute God is invested. This expanded self can always be conceived as being or not being—as now and not at another time—as never having been, or if as once having been, not now, or not hereafter. But not so with the absolutely eternal, which is universally and necessarily in being.

The ground of the a priori argument is then entirely untouched by this objection; for it would be a mere *petitio principii* to say, that because you can get the idea of the indefinite by expanding yourself in imagination, you can, therefore, get the necessary idea of the absolute, without its possessing a real being.

4. *If the real existence of God is as necessary as its idea, then the denial of his existence ought to appear to be as great an ab-*

surdity as the denial of any idea of God. But evidently, this is not the fact. There is no atheist but must admit that he has the idea of God, and that it would be an absurdity to suppose that his idea of the eternal could ever consist with his idea of the annihilation of the eternal. But still he feels no such absurdity himself, nor do others in relation to it, that he denies the real existence of an eternal being. But this absurdity ought so to be felt, if the reality is as necessary as the idea.

To this it is replied, that the absurdity is in truth as great in one case as in the other; but the intuition of one is not as direct and immediate as the other. The denial of the necessity of the most complicated demonstration in Euclid, is, in reality, as great an absurdity, as the denial of one of the first axioms in geometry. But, because the axiom is a first and immediate intuition to all minds, and the conclusion of a complicated problem is a remote intuition, reached only in the process of a series of intuitions, the denial of the truth of the last, cannot appear, to ordinary minds, as absurd as the denial of the first. So with the existence of God. The *a priori* demonstration is reached only by a process of deductions from the necessary idea; and thus, while the last may be clear to all, and its denial a manifest absurdity to all, yet the steps in the demonstration may prevent many a mind from seeing the absurdity of denying the conclusion. Here, then, is really nothing to militate against the conclusion, that the necessary being of God follows from the necessary idea of him. And such, I think, may be affirmed of all the difficulties that can be presented. They can be obviated, and shown to be irrelevant, and thus, while they leave the direct argument unimpaired, they go farther, and, as they can all be obviated, they give corroboration to the positive proof.

Having thus, with some care, examined the *nature* and *ground* of the *a priori* form of argument for the being of God, it remains to consider,

III. *The extent to which it can be conclusively applied in proof of the being of God.* We would here estimate the value of this mode of reasoning by itself, disconnected from any other. We may hereafter see its great use in combination with another form of argument; but here we fix our eye singly and solely upon the pure *a priori* form, as applied to the proof of the existence of God. And we shall find that its conclusiveness is weakened, and the limits of its application circumscribed,—

not so much, and perhaps not at all, from any defect in the argument itself,—but altogether from the weakness and incompetency of the human mind to give to it the full scope and efficacy of its own inherent power. This difficulty of application will be found,

1. In an obscure and partial apprehension of the ground on which the validity of the argument rests. We deem the ground of the argument, in reality, safe and solid. And this, not merely in the point that a logical deduction from a necessary truth is conclusive, as in all mathematical reasoning, but in the more specific point, that necessary ideas involve the necessary existence of their archetypes, and thus, that they have a necessary ground of being. A necessary idea, with nothing as its object, ground, or archetype, is, in our view, an absurdity. In the divine mind, the idea must itself be the archetype or ground of the reality—the exemplar, from which, as evolved from his efficient causation, all material and spiritual forms and modes of existence must have their origin. But in the *finite* mind, the idea must be either an acquisition or reception, i. e. either taken by the mind's own action, through some medium,—as in sensation,—or, given by direct display, impartation or inspiration to the mind's own consciousness, from the ground of all being itself,—as, perhaps, in all rational intuitions of ultimate truth. But, in either case, the idea will be valid for the existence of its object. In the first, the verification of the reality of the object, from the idea, will be on the ground of an absolute *faith*—a conviction in which all probabilities meet with no conflicting contradictions. In the second, the verification will be on the ground of absolute *science*—a perceived necessity, immutable and ultimate.

But, though this be the case in reality, the conclusiveness of it will be impaired in most minds, for this reason,—that the principle, which is the ground of all conviction, will be obscure in the conception, and thus be divested of the attributes of an axiom or first truth, clear and self-affirmed in its own light. Of course, any deductions must be unsatisfactory to such minds in exact proportion to the partial and obscure apprehension of the principle from which they have been derived. Some minds, originally or by exercise, may be so acute and far-reaching in their intuitions, as to be able at once to perceive, that the problem of an exact square of the circle, is an absurdity, or the fact of a perpetual motion, from material elements;

located in a material universe, is an impossibility. They may thus lay down, as first principles in their reasonings, what, to ordinary minds, would be a remote conclusion, found only after a long and labored process of demonstration. And so, in the use of the principle of the *a priori* argument for the being of God, it is a clear and distinct necessary truth, and thus a first truth in the reasoning, to some minds, and therefore all logical deductions are to them conclusive and convincing; but to most, the obscurity of the principle must forever vitiate the conclusiveness and validity of this form of demonstration.

2. In the case of those, however, to whom the ground of the *a priori* argument is plain, there will be a higher difficulty. Their inability to take a position, where they can perceive a necessary idea for every divine attribute, will oblige them to stop short of a full demonstration.

Eternity, immensity, necessary existence, etc., may perhaps be taken at once by the mind, as first truths, seen to be necessary and absolute in their own nature. The necessary existence of the objects or archetypes of these necessary ideas may thus, at once, be deduced from them. Omniscience and omnipotence may, perhaps, be necessary truths from omnipresence and self-existence; but if they are, the clear idea of this necessity is certainly a much higher intuition than that of the necessary ideas of eternity and immensity; and only in proportion as the necessity of the idea is clear, is the deduction to the necessity of the reality conclusive.

The ultimate idea of *right* is necessary and universal. The mind perceives a necessity in connection with this idea; and though to many minds it may be obscure, yet, to others it is as clear and immutable in its necessity as that of any absolute truth in mathematics. The necessary existence of some absolute ground of moral rectitude and perfection is thus a logical deduction. Now to this, it may be, that moral freedom or intelligent choice is a necessary adjunct; but if it be so, it will demand far higher powers of intuition to see the necessary idea and thus infer the necessary reality of such an existence.

So the attributes of *benevolence* and *wisdom* may have, and doubtless really do have, a ground of necessary being in God. But, aside from all effects in which God's wisdom, skill and benevolence appear, it must certainly be a most difficult and perhaps impossible position for either man or angel to attain, where, in its own absolute ground of being, it shall be seen

that the ideas of benevolence and wisdom are necessary ideas, making the real existence of absolute wisdom and benevolence necessary.

It may be that there is a position where every perfection, natural and moral, shall be seen to be necessary, and investing the idea of them with as clear a necessity as in the case of eternity or immensity, but it is not too much to say that no human mind, while in the flesh, *has* stood in this position, or, perhaps, that there never *will* be such an attainment. Yet until that position is found and taken, the simple a priori argument will fail, from the limited powers of those who use it, to give the full demonstration of every attribute essential to the absolutely perfect God.

3. A greater difficulty still remains—that of attaining to a necessary idea, so comprehensive as to include every necessary perfection in the existence of a necessary, absolute unity of being.

A priori, it can be demonstrated that there can be but one eternal being, and but one omnipresent being, and but one self-existing being; and it may be, and probably is true, that there is a position where the necessity of all these attributes, having one common ground for their existence, is plainly and necessarily perceived. It is probably true that there cannot be an eternal being, existing separately and in a different ground from an omnipresent being, or an omnipresent from a self-existent being, and so on for every divine perfection. There would thus be a position for the necessary idea of the necessary unity of all perfection in one absolute ground of being; and thus, in that position, the conclusiveness of an a priori argument would be full and clear. But it is not probable that any human, and perhaps not probable that any angelic intellect ever occupied that awfully sublime position. It would be to fix the full gaze upon the great centre of all being and perfection, and seeing how every necessary truth, in full circle and sphere, hung, immutable and eternal, on that one absolute, primary, and elementary point of all existence.

The a priori argument therefore for the being of God is perfect in its *nature*, and valid and conclusive in its *ground* of argumentation, but limited and circumscribed from the limited powers of the human mind in its *application*. “We are not straitened in” *it*, but we are straitened in our own *powers*.

ARTICLE III.

THE AGONY IN GETHSEMANE.

Matth. 26: 36 46, Mark 14: 32—42, Luke 22: 39—48, Heb. 5: 7, 8.

By Rev. Lewis Mayer, D. D. York, Pa.

NONE of the passages above referred to contains a full history of our Savior's agony: each of the three Evangelists has omitted some things which the others have recorded; and all are very brief. The passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews is but an incidental notice of that mournful scene, introduced for another purpose; namely, to show how Jesus was touched with the feeling of our infirmities, being tempted like as we are, before he was made perfect by the things which he suffered, in order that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people.

From Matthew we learn that Jesus prayed three several times. "He went a little farther, and fell upon his face, and prayed, saying, O my Father," etc.—"He went away again the *second* time, and prayed, saying, O my Father," etc.—"And he left them, and went away again, and prayed the *third* time, saying the same words." Mark makes mention only of two successive acts of prayer; but indicates that he knew of a third, where he says: "And he cometh the *third* time, and saith unto them, Sleep on now, and take your rest," etc. Luke considers all these three acts as one prayer, inasmuch as the subject matter of them all was the same, and speaks as if Jesus had prayed once only. The three Evangelists appear to have had the same design; namely, to convey to their readers an idea of the intensity of the Lord's distress; but they compass it in different ways. Luke alone notices the agony, the bloody sweat, and the appearance of an angel from heaven strengthening him; Matthew and Mark alone record the change which appeared in his countenance and his manner, the complaint which he uttered of the overpowering sorrow of his soul, and his repetition of the same prayer. All agree that he prayed for the removal of what he calls *this cup*, and are careful to note, that he qualified his earnest petition by a preference of the Father's will to his own. In Matthew he is made to say:

“Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt;”—in Mark: “Nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt;”—in Luke: “Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done.” In the several accounts which they give of his prayer there are verbal differences; but the prayer is substantially the same in all. This difference in words shows that they were intent only on substantial, and not on verbal accuracy; and that, in our interpretation of them, their language must not always be closely pressed.

The first two Evangelists have laid the scene of this deeply interesting event in a place called Gethsemane. In Luke it is at the Mount of Olives. John passes over the agony, but speaks of the Lord's arrest, which immediately followed it in the same place, and describes it as taking place in a garden to which Jesus had often resorted.* From all these we learn that Gethsemane was a garden situated at the Mount of Olives, within a short distance from Jerusalem, where Jesus was accustomed often to spend the night with his disciples.

The season of the year was in the full-moon, after the vernal equinox, which, in Judea, immediately preceded the harvest. The occasion of the Lord's presence in Jerusalem was the festival of the Passover. It was the practice of Jesus to repair to Jerusalem with his disciples, at each of the three great festivals,—the Passover, the Pentecost, and the feast of Tabernacles,—in obedience to the law of Moses, which made it the duty of every man in Israel to spend these sacred seasons in the holy city, and to join in the solemnities which were there celebrated. We find him also in the temple at the feast of Dedication,† which was not of divine, but of human institution,—being appointed by Judas Maccabeus to commemorate the dedication of the temple after the recovering of it from the Gentiles.‡ Upon which we may observe, by the way, that a sacred season which serves a pious end, though appointed only by human authority, may have the Lord's approbation.

During these festivals it was the custom of Jesus to spend the day within the city, and at the temple, in teaching the people, whose instruction in rational piety their ordinary teachers, the Pharisees and Scribes, had sadly neglected. In the evening he retired to Bethany, or to Bethphage, upon the Mount of Olives,

* John 18: 1, 2.

† John 10: 22, 23.

‡ Josephus Antiq. B. XII. c. 7. § 6, 7. 1 Maccabees 4: 36—56.

or to some other place in the vicinity of the city ; but he chose, it seems, most frequently, to spend the night in the solitude of Gethsemane. Here, remote from the noise and pressure of a crowded city, he could enjoy, without disturbance, the communion which he sought with his heavenly Father, and give the freest indulgence to the pious feelings which the recollections of the day inspired, in meditation and prayer. To him these duties came as a relief from his daily employments ; and nowhere does he appear to have found so much enjoyment as in solitary intercourse with God. In the morning he returned to his labors in the city at an early hour ; and, sometimes at least, he came fasting and hungry, and willing to content himself with any thing for a meal which Providence threw in his way.*

It was now the night in which the Jews ate the paschal lamb, to commemorate their deliverance from the bondage of Egypt, when the destroying angel passed through the land, and slew the first-born of every family, but spared the dwellings which were marked with the blood of the lamb upon which the inmates were feasting within : an institution that was designed, at the same time, to prefigure a greater salvation by the intervention of a nobler blood. In the earlier part of this night, Jesus also ate the passover lamb with his disciples ; and, at the close of that solemnity, he instituted the new sacrament of the bread and wine, as a memorial of himself, and of his love in laying down his life for the salvation of men. It was here that his grief began. The traitor sat with him at meat, polluted with the basest ingratitude, meditating his dark design, yet, with bold hypocrisy, sitting among his friends. When Jesus beheld him, "he was troubled in spirit, and testified and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, That one of you shall betray me."† Judas perceived that his treason was known, and withdrew. After his departure, Jesus, knowing the errand on which he went, and the manner in which he would return, took the bread, and brake it, and gave it to them, and said, "Take, eat : this is my body which is broken for you. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it : for this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many, for the remission of sins. This do in remembrance of me." By this solemn act, he designed to impress upon their minds the certainty that he would

* Matth. 21: 17, 18.

† John 13: 21.

die by the shedding of his blood: so certain was it, that they might regard the deed as though it were done: "My body," said he, "*is* broken; my blood *is* shed." What Jesus felt when he uttered these words, we cannot tell; but we have no doubt that his heart was full, and though he maintained his self-possession, more than ordinary feeling was visible in his countenance and in all his manner.

His disciples did not apprehend his meaning, though his words were plain, because their minds were prepossessed with the belief "that Christ abideth forever,"* and, consequently, that Jesus could not die: but they understood that he meditated a separation from them, that some mysterious and dreadful catastrophe was approaching. This apprehension distressed them, and sorrow filled their hearts.† It was, therefore, the purpose of Jesus to comfort them, and to fortify their minds against the coming trials: and with this design he addressed to them those discourses which John has preserved in the latter part of his gospel, and which are so full of the most precious consolation to every child of God, when perplexed with doubts, or alarmed by fears. In these discourses, his attention appears to have been absorbed by the situation and wants of the disciples, who loved him, and who were in distress; his thoughts and his affections are wholly turned to them, and he speaks of himself only so far as their safety and their comfort demanded it: it is here that his heart is opened to us, and that we have a view of its tenderness, its compassion, and all its kind affections.

After these addresses, when he saw that his disciples were composed, and were settled in the belief "that he was come forth from God," he considered his work on earth as finished. He closed his ministry, therefore, with a most solemn, and tender, and filial prayer, in which he besought the Father to vindicate his honor as the Son of God under the dark clouds of reproach that were soon to cover him, and, commending to his care and protection those whom he would leave in the world: "He lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come: glorify thy Son, that thy Son may also glorify thee." *The hour is come.* It was the hour of his great conflict with death, and hell, and all the powers of darkness: an hour that was fraught with infinite interests to the human race; when every thing depended on the manner in which he would acquit

* John 12: 32—34.

† John 16: 6.

himself in the awful strife ; when he would seem to the world, perhaps to angels, to sink forever ; and when there was special need, that the Father should own him as his Son, and give evident signs, that he was indeed the beloved one of God. This prayer shows, as every thing in his previous history shows, that Jesus was fully conscious of his destination, and aware of the fearful measure of suffering which the Father had appointed for him. Yet, he is calm and collected, and unmoved in his purpose to submit. There is no complaint ; no wish is betrayed that he might be spared ; all he asks for is, that his honor should be maintained ; and this he prays for only, that he might also honor the Father, by the successful accomplishment of his purpose of mercy to save the fallen children of men : “ Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may also glorify thee.”

When he had ended this prayer, he went forth with his disciples over the brook Cedron, and entered the garden at the Mount of Olives, to which he was accustomed to resort, and where he knew that Judas Iscariot would soon come with his band to seek and betray him. Here a mysterious change came over him. The night was far advanced, the world was wrapped in sleep, and a profound silence prevailed. The moon shed her pale light upon the scene, and nature appeared in her beauty, like one that is lovely but sad. The stillness invited to rest, after the exhausting activity of the day ; but though the disciples slept, Jesus did not rest ; his mind was the seat of oppressive thoughts, and of feelings that were unutterable ; and the surrounding scene was adapted only to increase his dejection. When he had entered into the garden he requested his disciples to sit there, while he went farther to pray. “ And he took with him Peter, and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and very heavy. Then saith he unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death : tarry ye here, and watch with me. And he went a little farther, and fell upon his face, and prayed, saying, O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me ; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt,” etc.

“ My soul is exceeding sorrowful,” etc. *My soul*, by a common Hebræism, is put for the personal pronoun, *I*. *I am exceeding sorrowful unto death.* Περιλυπός ἐστίν ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἕως θανάτου. Περιλυπός is from περὶ and λύπη, *surrounded with sorrow, wholly filled with sorrow.* He was oppressed with a sorrow that exceeded whatever he had felt before ; a sorrow unto

death; a sorrow overpowering and insupportable, which, if not alleviated, must soon eventuate in death. His distress was manifest in his countenance, and in his whole demeanor: he began to be sore amazed and very heavy, as Mark expresses it: *ἤρξατο ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν*; which Doddridge paraphrases: "He began to be in very great and visible dejection, amazement and anguish of mind."

In this deep distress he sought relief in prayer. For reasons which are not explained, he wished to be alone while he prayed, and therefore commanded the majority of his disciples to remain near the entrance of the garden, while he went onward a little way; but desirous, at the same time, to have some of them to be witnesses of his conflict, he took with him Peter, and James, and John, in obedience to the law of Moses, which provided that by the mouth of two or three witnesses every matter should be established.* The same favored three were sole witnesses of his transfiguration, and of the resuscitation of the daughter of Jairus. But from these three also, he presently withdrew for the purpose of prayer: he went a little farther, according to Luke, about a stone's cast; near enough, therefore, to be seen and heard by them, yet alone. The other disciples, who were at a greater distance, were permitted to indulge in sleep; at least, no other command is mentioned as given to them, than that they should sit there, while he went to another place to pray; but these three were directed to watch with him, and to pray for themselves. The reason assigned for this watching and praying was, that they might not fall into temptation. The injunction was given, therefore, not for his own sake, but for theirs; he chose to be solitary in his conflict, and to bear his burden alone; but if they had watched with him, while he was agonizing in his distress, they would have witnessed the greatness of his sorrow, and the filial manner in which he demeaned himself under its pressure; and his great example would have fortified them against the temptation to which they so easily gave way, when they forsook him and fled, and when Peter even denied him before the servants of the high priest. The same reason would have been equally good for the watching and praying of all the disciples; yet eight of the eleven were left at a distance, out of sight and hearing, and received no such command. The reason of this,

* Deut. 17: 6. Matth. 18: 16.

perhaps, was, that Jesus expected less from them, than from these three, and did not think proper to lay upon them a command which he had no hope that they would obey.

His prayer was short, but fervent; full of feeling, but rational; characterized by a filial trust in his heavenly Father, and a perfect resignation to his will: "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." Mark's account is: "He prayed that, if it were possible, the hour might pass from him. And he said, Abba, Father, all things are possible to thee; take away this cup from me: nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt." According to Luke, his words were: "Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done." These are the different versions which the several Evangelists have given in Greek of the words spoken by the Lord, in the Syro-Chaldaic, or, as it is called in the New Testament and in Josephus, the Hebrew. That Jesus prayed in the Syro-Chaldaic appears from Mark, who gives us his first word—*Abba*—*Father*, and then proceeds with his own translation: "Father, all things are possible unto thee," etc. It is manifest from their diversities, that their translations are not literal, but free, and were designed only to convey the sense, and not the words of the prayer. Neither, perhaps, has recorded all that Jesus said; but each has given, in his own way, what struck him most forcibly, and appeared to him to be the substance of the prayer. With regard to his posture in praying, Matthew says: "He fell upon his face, and prayed;" Mark: "He fell on the ground and prayed;" Luke: "He kneeled down and prayed." The three say substantially the same thing: he kneeled, and, bending forward, rested his face upon his hands on the ground. This posture was indicative of the greatest earnestness, and of the deepest humiliation before God, and was assumed by the ancients only when they prayed in their greatest affliction.

When he rose up from prayer, and came to his disciples, he found them asleep: and waking them, he said to Peter: "What, could ye not watch with me one hour? Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." He was evidently affected by finding them asleep; for his words indicate both surprise and regret. The expostulation is addressed particularly to Peter, because he had; more than the others, professed a most ardent devotion to Jesus,

and had so recently declared his readiness to lay down his life for him ; yet now, in his Master's utmost need, he fell asleep, though one hour had not yet passed since they had entered the garden, and had been exhorted to watch with him. Luke says, they slept for sorrow. They were exhausted with grief, which every thing they saw was adapted to deepen ; and wearied nature sought repose in sleep. When the Lord waked them, he saw that they were conscious of the impropriety of their sleeping at such a time, and cordially willing to obey his injunction, but wanted the power to give effect to their good intentions. He was touched with their sincerity, and kindly made their apology for them : " The spirit, indeed, is willing, but the flesh is weak ;" there was a willing mind to do what he desired, but the material frame, in its exhausted state, was unable to support their good purposes.

Having exhorted them again to watch and pray, he went away the second time and prayed, saying : " O my Father, if this cup may not pass away except I drink it, thy will be done." Mark says : " And again he went, and prayed, and spake the same words ;" that is, the same in substance ; for they were not exactly the same as before. His repetition of the same prayer, shows that he had yet obtained no relief ; and his words, as they are given by Matthew, indicate that his hope, that the cup would be removed, had now grown fainter. In his first prayer, he expressed a hope that this might be done, as well as a doubt whether it could ; for he says : *If it be possible, let this cup pass from me.* In his prayer as given by Mark, this hope is founded upon the divine omnipotence : " Father, all things are possible to thee." Inasmuch as all things are possible to God, he conceived that this also might be possible, though he did not see in what way it might be so. But in this second prayer he says : " O my Father, *if this cup may not pass away except I drink it*, thy will be done." This change in the terms of his prayer indicates, that, though he still entertained the same hope, it was passing away from him, and the prospect before him was growing darker.

Neither did this second prayer bring the relief he sought. He came again to his disciples, and found them relapsed into the sleep from which he had so lately roused them ; " for," says Mark, " their eyes were heavy ; neither wist they what to answer him." He waked them the second time ; but finding them confused, and in no condition to be profitably admonished,

he said no more, but left them, and went away again the third time, and prayed, saying the same words. This passing to and fro, returning to his disciples, and going again to repeat the same prayer is evidence of the utmost anxiety and perturbation of mind. No relief was found for him in heaven, when he prayed; and no comfort was obtained from men, when he returned to the friends whom he loved. There was a hiding of the Father's face; the heavens seemed as brass, and his prayer appeared fruitless: the darkness thickened around him; and, as it grew, the perplexity and anguish of his soul increased. His third prayer was, therefore, like a conflict with despair. "And being in an agony, he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was like great drops of blood falling down to the ground." The Greek *ὡς εἰ θρόμβοι αἱματος*, may mean, not that his sweat was mingled with blood, but that it stood upon him, and fell to the ground, like blood, in large, clammy drops. Whitby has shown, in his comments on the text, that both Aristotle and Diodorus Siculus have mentioned bloody sweats, *αἱματώδη ἰδρώτα*, and *ὄνσις ἰδρώτος αἱματοειδὺς*, as things not unknown; and he remarks, that he sees no reason why this might not be so great an agony, as to force blood from the capillary vessels to mix with the sweat. On the physiological question, involved in this inquiry, I am unable to say any thing; but taking the words of Luke in their lowest sense, the fact which they state is abundant evidence of extreme anguish of mind. The night was cold; for we find the servants and officers, soon afterwards, kindling a fire in the palace of the high priest to warm themselves. The distress must therefore have been terrible which could, in such a night, and in the open air, produce so copious a perspiration from the pores, that his sweat stood upon his face, and fell to the ground, in drops, like clotted blood. This was, indeed, an awful conflict, and tremendous must have been the temptation with which Jesus was assailed, and against which he was contending.

It was, doubtless, here that an angel appeared to Jesus and strengthened him. Luke does not say that the disciples saw the angel, but that he appeared to Jesus. It seems, at first view, as if he meant that the angel appeared before the distress of Jesus had reached this extremity; for, having mentioned the angel's appearing to him and strengthening him, he adds: "And being in an agony, he prayed more earnestly," etc. But he cannot mean that Jesus fell into this agony, and prayed

more earnestly now, after the angel had appeared and strengthened him ; but that, when he saw the angel, and was strengthened by him, he *was* in an agony, and *was* praying more earnestly than he had prayed before. This I take to be an indication that, though Luke speaks of the prayer as one, he was aware that it consisted of more than one act, and had learned that in the several successive acts, the Lord's distress and earnestness in prayer increased, until it became, at last, a perfect agony ; and his meaning is, that, in this extremity, the angel was sent from heaven with the Father's answer to his prayer, and brought the relief which his situation required.

Here the question arises : What was the cause of this agonizing and overwhelming distress ? Jesus himself intimates it in his prayer : " If it be possible, *let this cup pass away from me.*" It was the cup which the Father had appointed for him. But what does he mean by *this cup* ? I can only understand him to mean that death which the Father had appointed that he should die—the death of the cross—with all the attending circumstances which aggravated its horror ; that scene of woe, which began with his arrest in the garden, and was consummated in his death on Calvary. Doddridge, in his Family Expositor, and others with him, think that he means the bitter anguish and distress which he was now actually suffering. But if the cup was the cause of that distress, it was not the distress itself. If, moreover, that bitter anguish and distress was a cup which the Father had appointed for him, it was a cup which he was all the while drinking, and which he drank to its dregs, while he prayed. But the cup, respecting which he prayed, was one that was then before him, which he had not yet taken up to drink, and which he desired, if it were possible, that the Father should remove. This could be no other than that scene of suffering upon which he was about to enter, and which began when Judas Iscariot appeared with his armed band. So Jesus himself explained his meaning, when, rebuking the forwardness of Peter, who had drawn his sword and smitten the servant of the high priest, he said : " Put up thy sword into the sheath : the cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it ?" * The cup, therefore, was still before him after his agony in the garden, and he was just then about to drink it : consequently, it could not be the anguish and distress which he had

* John 18: 18.

suffered there. So also the passage in the epistle to the Hebrews explains the meaning of his prayer: "Who in the days of his flesh offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, *to him that was able to deliver him from death,*" etc. There can be no doubt that the sacred writer has reference, in this passage, to the scene in Gethsemane. It is from him we first learn that the prayers of Jesus, on that occasion, were uttered with strong crying and tears; and by him we are informed, that the object for which he prayed was a deliverance from the impending death. It is therefore certain that this deep and awful distress of Jesus arose from the contemplation of the horrible death which was now before him.

Jesus had long since been familiar with his destination to be made a sin-offering for the human race, and had looked forward to this hour as the appointed termination of his earthly ministry. At the age of twelve years, he knew that he ought to be employed in the affairs of his heavenly Father, and was surprised that when his parents missed him in their company, as they returned from Jerusalem to Nazareth, they should search for him anywhere but in the temple: "How is it," said he, "that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"* In the course of his ministry, he taught his disciples, that he was not come to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.† He spoke of his submission to death as his own voluntary act, done in obedience to the will of the Father: "No man taketh it (my life) from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father."‡ He repeatedly foretold the manner and the circumstances of his death, saying that he must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the chief priests and elders and scribes, and be killed, and be raised again on the third day; that he would be rejected, delivered over to the Gentiles, spit upon, crucified, etc.§ And in the institution of the holy supper, he gave a most impressive and affecting lesson of the certainty that his body would be broken, and his blood shed for the remission of sins.

When he looked forward to this destination, as the hour was

* Luke 2: 49.

† Matth. 20: 28.

‡ John 10: 18.

§ Mark 10: 32—34. Matth. 16: 21 17, 9—12. 20: 17, 19. John 12: 32, 33.

approaching, a chill of horror sometimes came over him, and found expression in external signs of distress. At one time he said: "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name."* But on no occasion did he exhibit any very striking evidences of perplexity and anguish. He was usually calm and collected, and if at any time he gave utterance to feelings of distress and horror, he still preserved his self-possession, and quickly checked the rising desire which nature put forth, to be spared from so dreadful a death. In his last address to his sorrowing disciples, he spoke with deep feeling and solemnity, but with perfect calmness. In his prayer at the close of his ministry, nothing is more manifest than a meek and quiet resignation to the Father's will: "Father, the hour is come: glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee." He did not ask to be spared; but that the Father should vindicate his honor from the reproach, so shocking to every virtuous mind, of being reckoned among the vilest malefactors. And, finally, he took no care to avoid the traitor, whose purpose he well knew, but went to the place where he anticipated that Judas would seek him; he went with a settled purpose to submit to the impending stroke; and as he went, he warned his disciples again of the mournful catastrophe which was at hand, and was soon to scatter them like the flock whose shepherd is fallen.

It is, therefore, hardly to be supposed that the near approach of his sufferings, awful as they were, apart from every thing else, could alone have wrought so great a change in the mind of Jesus and in his whole demeanor, as soon as he had entered the garden. It is true, indeed, that the nearness of the wo, which he had hitherto viewed in its approach at some distance, was adapted to give a violent shock to his feelings; but the mind of Jesus was not easily shaken; and in this case his anguish and terror were too great to be explained by such a cause. It is manifest, therefore, that something more than the cross was now before him, and that he was now placed in a new and hitherto untried situation. I have no hesitation in believing that he was here put upon the trial of his obedience. It was the purpose of God to subject the obedience of Jesus to a severe ordeal, in order that, like gold tried in the furnace, it

* John 12: 27. Compare Luke 12: 49, 50.

might be an act of more perfect and illustrious virtue : and for this end he permitted him to be assailed by the fiercest temptation to disobey his will, and to refuse the appointed cup. In pursuance of this purpose, the mind of Jesus was left to pass under a dark cloud, his views lost their clearness, the Father's will was shrouded in obscurity, the cross appeared in tenfold horror, and nature was left to indulge her feelings, and to put forth her reluctance.

It is certain that Jesus desired, and desired most earnestly, that, if it were possible, and if it were the will of his heavenly Father, the cup should be removed, and that he put up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, to him who was able to deliver him from death. It is certain, therefore, that the mind of Jesus was now not clear upon these points.

It appears farther from the passage in the Hebrews, that there was something connected with the cross that Jesus feared. The words are these : " Who, in the days of his flesh, offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, to him who was able to deliver him from death, *and was heard in that he feared :*" *Εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνλαβείας*,—literally, *heard from the fear*. This phrase I take to be a Hebraism, the *constructio prægnaus* of the Hebrew verb, like that in Psalm 22 : 21 : " For thou hast heard me from the horns of the unicorns," i. e. thou hast heard me *so as to deliver me* from the horns of the unicorns. *Being heard from the fear*, i. e. *from the thing which he feared*, must therefore mean, being heard so as to be delivered from that which he feared. He was however not delivered from death : " though he was a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered." There was, therefore, something distinct from the death of the cross, but connected with it, which was the object of his fear ; something which multiplied and enhanced the terrors of the cross, and was the chief cause of the strong desire he entertained to be saved from that death, if it were possible, and consistent with the will of God.

What that was which was at this time connected, in the mind of Jesus, with the death of the cross, and which excited in him so distressing a fear, the sacred writers have not explained, and we are, therefore, left to conjecture respecting it. Perhaps the following considerations may shed light upon this subject, if they cannot be received as a satisfactory explanation.

Jesus knew that the salvation of the world was laid upon

him ; that he was to be the sin-offering for the human race ; that his death was to be the atonement for the sins of men ; and that, in all its attending circumstances, it was to be a tremendous death. He knew that he must die, as he had lived, without sin, or his death could not atone for the sins of others ; but if the extremity of suffering should so far prevail as to provoke him into impatience and murmuring, or into a desire of revenge, this would be sin : and if he should sin, all would be lost. If Jesus knew all this, and if these thoughts had possession of his mind before he entered into the garden, they must have borne upon him with much more oppressive weight, when the moment had arrived in which all that he had before contemplated was to be realized by actual experience. If the thought now arose, that, though his nature was unpolluted with inherent depravity, it was possible that he should sin, and if the fear was joined with that thought, that he might be overcome in that heavy trial, there was, in this thought and in this fear, a sufficient cause to produce all that mental agony which he exhibited in Gethsemane ; and the same cause, superadded to the horrors of the cross, was sufficient to create the desire which he felt, that this cup should be removed.

A pious and holy man may look calmly upon death in its most terrific forms, and may endure it with silent resignation, or even with joyous triumph ; and such has been the case with many Jewish and Christian martyrs. But the pious and holy man has not a world's salvation laid upon him ; the pious and holy man is not obliged to be absolutely perfect before God ; the pious and holy man knows, that if he sins, he has an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous ; and he is the propitiation for his sins ; and not for his only, but for the sins of the whole world. If he is entrapped in sin by some overpowering temptation, he can still be saved by the efficacy of the Saviour's death, and all the pious with him. But nothing of this consolation could be presented to the mind of Jesus ;—if he should sin, he must sink forever, and the world with him ; there was no other Saviour ; and all that he saw before him was a dark abyss, eternal ruin and infinite despair.

Here, perhaps, it will be objected, that I do not speak of Jesus with becoming reverence when I suppose him capable of sinning ; that he was not a mere man, and that as the God-man he could not sin. This objection, however, notwithstanding its apparent piety, is certainly ill-founded.

1. It might be as well objected, that, as the God-man, Jesus could not hunger and thirst, could not become weary, nor fall asleep, could not be sore amazed and very heavy, could not suffer and die.

2. If Jesus could not possibly sin, his will was not free. His obedience then was not voluntary obedience, and, consequently, was not virtue. He was, moreover, not constituted like to his brethren in all things except actual sin and sinful nature, nor like to the first man in his primeval integrity. His holy life could then be no example for us, and could afford no encouragement to us to imitate him; neither could the apostle urge upon us, as he does in the epistle to the Hebrews, that "we have not a high priest who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, though without sin;"* for what would his temptations amount to, if there was absolutely no possibility that he should sin?

3. Though, in the person of Jesus, God was manifested in the flesh, his union with the Godhead was not such as to change his humanity. The received definition of this union forbids us to mix and confound the two natures. If Jesus is like unto his brethren in all things, sin excepted, he is as really and perfectly a man as he would be if there were no such union; and as such he shares with us all the infirmities which are essential to human nature. Neither must it be supposed, that, by virtue of this union, the human nature was throughout the mere instrument of the divine, and that all the agency of Jesus was the agency of the indwelling Deity; so that Jesus did nothing whatever, and could do nothing, except as the Deity wrought in him. In his prayer he distinguishes his own will from the will of God, and expresses an apprehension that what he wished and prayed for, in that instance, might not be what God was willing to do: and so, indeed, the fact proved to be, for the cup was not removed; and the apostle says: "Though he was a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered." The Godhead could act, and did act without the intervention of the man Jesus, and the man Jesus could act, and did act, without the intervention of the Godhead. It was the Deity that spoke in him when he taught, and that wrought in him when he performed miracles; for this he expressly and repeatedly declared;

* Heb. 4: 15.

in all such cases as did not transcend the natural powers of a highly gifted and most holy man, he was left to himself, and acted or suffered as a man. The main design of the union of the Godhead with him seems to have been to confer dignity upon his person. It did confer upon him an infinite dignity, and thus imparted to all that he did and to all that he suffered, an infinite importance and value. But this design did not interfere with his free agency. He was constituted, with regard to his moral power, like the first man, and was fitted to take his place as the second Adam, and to repair the ruin which the first had introduced: as the first fell in his trial by transgression, so the second overcame by obedience. Like Adam, Jesus was subjected to a trial; like him, he was assailed in that trial by a temptation: the former was tempted to eat the forbidden fruit; the latter to refuse submission to the death of the cross.

The great trial of Jesus took place in Gethsemane, where the cup was placed before him, and his final decision was to be made either to drink it or not drink it. It was here that the temptation assailed him to spare himself, and to desire that God would spare him. All the circumstances were made favorable to this temptation, in order that it might exert upon him its utmost power: a cloud and darkness came over him; his view lost its wonted clearness; the will of the Father was obscured; the horrors of the cross rose up before him in their most appalling forms; his consciousness of the possibility of sinning awoke; the fear, that he might be overcome by such terrible suffering, and might sink forever, started up in his mind, and filled his soul with dismay and terror, and with a sorrow that could not be borne. It was nature in Jesus that, in these circumstances, shrunk back from such a scene of wo, and raised up the desire to be saved from such a death; and in the strength of these feelings was the power of the temptation to refuse the appointed cup.

The deportment of Jesus under this heavy trial was inexpressibly dignified, and set forth, in a clear and beautiful light, the great principle of piety and virtue that held possession of his mind. There was no stoical pride, that hardens itself against nature, and refuses to bend before God or man, by confessing that it is in pain. While he claimed to be the Son of God, he gave free vent to the feelings of nature in a tender complaint of the deep sorrow of his soul, and in pouring out his anguish in tearful and repeated prayer. But he did not, according to

the custom of that age, rend his garments, and cast dust upon his head; he did not beat his breast, and utter incoherent outcries. There was a calmness in the midst of his terror; all that he said was collected and rational, deeply imbued with filial reverence toward his heavenly Father, and with kindness toward his disciples; and in all his prayer, in his utmost distress he desired only to be heard, if it were the Father's will: "Not as I will, but as thou wilt."

The first principle of Jesus was, that the will of the Father must be done. "I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me."* This principle, was the main spring of all his acting, directing every thought every desire and every volition. To do his heavenly Father's will was his meat and his drink:† when weary and hungry, if an opportunity of this kind came in his way, he forgot the demands of nature, and declined the meat which was offered to him. Nothing appeared to him beautiful, nothing valuable, or worthy to be desired, if he saw not in it a conformity to the will of God; and nothing, therefore, appeared to him as presenting any motive at all to deviate from that will.

This principle was now assailed, and its strength in the mind of Jesus put to a severe trial, by the sufferings which he was required to undergo. He was required to lay down his life for the salvation of sinful men, who deserved to die; to submit, like a criminal, to a public execution, under the sentence of the civil judge; to die by crucifixion—the most torturing and most ignominious punishment to which criminals could be adjudged; a punishment to which only the vilest criminals were condemned—to endure at the same time all the scorn and insult which ingenious malice could invent, or brutal wantonness inflict; to suffer every species of maltreatment that could increase the pains of death, and the weight of that reproach by which his heart was to be broken.

Death in its mildest form is abhorrent to nature; reproach and disgrace are more painful to the virtuous mind than death. But such a death as that which was appointed for Jesus might well fill the mind with chilling horror, and call up a strong desire to be spared. This natural desire Jesus felt. It was strengthened by the fear which arose, that he might be driven by the extremity of suffering, into an act of transgression, and

* John 6: 38.

† John 5: 20.

might thus fall, and the world with him, beyond the reach of hope. It was still increased by the thought, that it might be possible that the Father should accomplish his purpose without such a sacrifice, and might therefore save him from so great an anguish. It was farther encouraged by the obscurity and doubt in which the question seemed now to be, whether the Father really demanded this sacrifice from him. And it was raised to its greatest power, by the thickening of the darkness in which he was enveloped, and the growing distress that overwhelmed him.

Here was a conflict between the principle of self-love, or, what is the same, the desire of happiness, and the principle that the will of God must be done. Jesus cherished his self-love as an original principle of all intelligent natures, which is always virtuous when it is subordinate to the love of God. But it did not even occur to him, that he might cherish it a moment in any case, where it would not be in accordance with the Father's will. In his greatest agony, his prayer was still: "Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done." The first parents of our race transgressed, when their temptation was immeasurably less than this of Jesus, and, by their disobedience, brought sin and death upon the world. But so perfectly did the principle, that the Father's will must be done, possess the mind of Jesus, and so invincible was its power, that even these temptations could not shake it. Neither the tortures of the cross nor its dreaded ignominy, nor all the aggravating circumstances of it, nor even the apprehension that he might sink under the weight of his sufferings, appeared to him to furnish a motive to disobey. If it seemed that in obeying he must sink into hopeless ruin, he saw that in voluntary disobedience there would be a worse ruin, while the Father would be dishonored by it. His purpose was, that, if he perished, he would perish in honoring the Father by obedience. The conflict was awful: every muscle shook; every nerve trembled; the blood, perhaps, quitting its wonted channels, mingled with the copious, clammy sweat at every pore; but Jesus stood firm in his purpose, unmoved like the rock amidst the furiously dashing waves, in all the wildness of the storm, still saying, in his deepest anguish: "Father, not as I will, but as thou wilt."

It was now that an angel appeared from heaven, strengthening him. Here it must be admitted to be evident, that Jesus was not supported in his trial by his divinity. He was tried

as a man ; not as the God-man. When nature was exhausted by the fierceness of the conflict, relief was brought from heaven by the ministry of an angel ; not by the internal manifestations of the indwelling Deity. The angel, doubtless, brought the Father's answer to his prayer, and strengthened him by the message which he delivered. The message was consolatory : it at once lighted up his mind and dissipated his perplexity and terror. The cup was not removed, but he was heard so as to be delivered from his fear. The dark cloud had now passed over, the mind of Jesus recovered its wonted clearness, the Father's will was plain, and the distressing fear was no more. Now Jesus ceased to pray ; he rose from his last prayer, calm and resigned, and went forth, in obedience to the Father's will, and drank the cup ; and from this time, he suffered whatever men chose to inflict, like the lamb that is led to the slaughter, and like the sheep that is dumb before its shearer, and openeth not its mouth. Had not the agony in the garden preceded, and had not Jesus afterwards, when another cloud was upon him, given vent to his feelings in the heart-rending cry : " My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me," we might suspect that he was not like other men, and that he felt no pain ; but in those hours of darkness he showed that his nature was human ; and his silent submission now could only be the effect of his exalted virtue, which submitted without complaint or reluctance, when he saw with clearness that such was the Father's will.

This voluntary submission to the death of the cross, in obedience to the will of his heavenly Father, is that illustrious act of obedience by which the Son of God has saved us. Of this act the apostle speaks in his epistle to the Philippians, where he says : " And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him," etc.* This is the act of obedience, which the same apostle opposes to the disobedience of Adam, in his epistle to the Romans : " As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation ; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience, many were made sinners ; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous."† By this great

* Ch. 2: 8.

† Ch. 5: 18, 19.

act of obedience it was, that Jesus made atonement for sin, and repaired the ruin of the first transgression, and reopened to us the way to God, and made peace between heaven and earth, and restored to all who receive him that blissful immortality which was lost by the fall.

Oh for this love, let rocks and hills
Their lasting silence break ;
And all harmonious human tongues
The Savior's praises speak.

When Jesus had received by the angel the Father's answer to his prayer, and the fearful agony was past, he came to his disciples the third time, and finding them again sleeping, he said to them: "Sleep on now, and take your rest," etc. This is according to the common English translation. But that Jesus did not mean that the disciples should now sleep on and take their rest, is evident from what he immediately adds: "It is enough ; the hour is come ; behold the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners. Rise up, let us go ; lo he that betrayeth me is at hand." In these words he tells them plainly that there was now no time for sleeping and taking rest: the die was cast, and they must arise and go with him. Some commentators think that Jesus said these words in a taunting way, meaning that, inasmuch as they would not be persuaded to watch with him, they should now sleep on and take their rest, if they could, when the enemy was at hand. But the mind of Jesus was not in a frame for taunting and irony: every thing in this part of his history indicates tenderness, meekness and love; and it is in accordance with such a state of his feelings, that we must interpret his words. I prefer, therefore, that interpretation which understands them interrogatively, and makes them mean: "Do ye now, at such a time as this, sleep on and take your rest?" This is Luther's translation: *Ach, wollt ihr nun schlafen und ruhen?* Ah, will ye now sleep and rest? This sense agrees with the connection, and is doubtless the true one.

The words: "Arise, let us go," some infidel may choose to represent as an exhortation to flee, and a proof that Jesus wished to escape, and would have fled, if it had been in his power. It is sufficient for an answer to this objection to turn to the gospel of John, where we read: "When Jesus had spoken these words, he went forth with his disciples over the brook Cedron, where was a garden, into which he entered, and his disciples. And Judas also, which betrayed him, knew the place ;

for Jesus oftentimes resorted thither with his disciples. Judas then, having received a band of men, and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns, and torches, and weapons. *Jesus therefore, knowing all things that should come upon him, went forth and said unto them, Whom seek ye?* They answered him, *Jesus of Nazareth.* *Jesus saith unto them, I am he.* As soon then as he had said unto them, *I am he, they went backward and fell to the ground.* Then asked he them again, *Whom seek ye?* And they answered, *Jesus of Nazareth.* *Jesus answered, I have told you that I am he.* If therefore ye seek me, let these go their way," etc.

This passage is plain without a comment. We learn from it whither it was that Jesus meant to go, and meant that his disciples should go with him: it was to meet Judas with his band, and to deliver himself into their custody. He wished his disciples to go with him, that they might see that his surrender was voluntary, and that, though he submitted to be bound, he had power to protect them still. I will only remark, that, when the band had heard Jesus say, *I am he*, and had felt the power of that simple word in the sudden impotency which came over them, as they went backward and fell to the ground, they did not at first venture to touch him, after they had risen up again, but began to lay hands on his disciples; nor was it until he had commanded them to leave his disciples unharmed, and had placed himself before them the second time, with the same words, and they had found that they were not again smitten to the ground by what he said, that they dared to lay their hands on him. Where then is the shadow of evidence of a desire on the part of Jesus to escape? Every circumstance proves the perfect voluntariness of his submission to the sufferings which he endured. There was in his deportment, in that trying moment, a dignity worthy of the Son of God. He first gave an illustrious proof that the power of God was with him, and then submitted to be bound, to be mocked and spit upon, to be condemned and crucified; and suffered it, without resistance or complaint, because such was the will of the Father in heaven.

The question has also been asked: How did the evangelists know what occurred to Jesus in the garden, and how could they give the very words of his prayer, when Jesus was alone, and all the disciples were asleep? I shall not insist here, on what I have before remarked, that the evangelists have not given us the very words of his prayer; because that would not

meet the whole of the objection. My answer is: The disciples were not *all* asleep. The text says only, that Jesus found the disciples sleeping, but does not say he found them *all* sleeping. This language could be used if two of the three were asleep: and even if the word *all* were used by the sacred historians, it would still be in accordance with the oriental usage, and with the popular style of these writers, to make the same exception. Matthew and Mark, for example, tell us that, when Jesus was apprehended, *all* the disciples forsook him and fled.* Yet both these evangelists presently afterwards say, that Peter followed him afar off. And in John's gospel we read: "And Simon Peter followed Jesus, *and so did another disciple*. That disciple was known to the high priest, *and went in with Jesus into the palace of the high priest.*"† The word *all* is therefore not to be understood, in this instance, in its strict grammatical sense. So we are told by Mark and Luke, that, on the evening of his resurrection, Jesus appeared to the *eleven*, who were assembled together.‡ But from John we learn that Thomas, one of the eleven, was not then with them.§ Consequently there were only ten; and the first named evangelists say *the eleven*, because that was the designation of the body of the apostles after the defection of Judas, and do not think it necessary to remark that one of the number was wanting. So also here, one of the three disciples may have watched with Jesus, whilst the others slept. That one, we may suppose, was John, *that disciple whom Jesus loved*. He does not appear to have left his master's side, as long as he was permitted to be with him, during his heavy trials. He leaned upon the bosom of Jesus while he lived, and stood by his cross when he died; and it is hardly probable, that his ardent affection and deep sympathy would permit him to sleep, when his beloved master was in an agony of distress, and desired that he should watch with him.

If John was the only one of the disciples that saw the agony of Jesus, we might expect that he would have recorded it, rather than the other three. This, no doubt, he would have done, if he had written before them. But as he wrote long after them, and found the record in all the three, and was satisfied with what they had written, he omitted it, as he did also many other facts which are found in them. This I take to be

* Matth. 26: 56. Mark 14: 50.

† John 18: 15.

‡ Mark 16: 14. Luke 24: 33.

§ John 20: 24.

one among the internal evidences that John had seen and read the other three gospels, before he wrote his own, and that one of his objects was to supply the most important matters which they had omitted. Hence, we have in John the history of the washing of the disciples' feet, and the last discourses of Jesus, and the prayer with which he closed his ministry, and several facts connected with his crucifixion and his resurrection, all which are not in the other evangelists; but have not in him an account of the agony in Gethsemane.

It may be asked again: How John, if he was awake, could see, at the distance of a stone's cast, the drops of sweat, as they fell from Jesus, and could tell what they were like? To this I answer: John did not see those drops of sweat at the distance of a stone's cast. The Lord's agony seems, indeed, to have increased at each successive prayer; but there was already, as we have seen, a deep distress and anguish from the beginning; and John may have seen the drops of sweat falling from his face when he had returned to his disciples the second time, or when he was going the third time to repeat his prayer. Or, why may we not suppose, that during his last prayer, when his distress had risen to its utmost height, and before the angel came to his relief, John seeing him in so great an agony, his sympathy overcame him, and brought him to the place where Jesus was? If he said nothing to him, it was because Jesus was absorbed in his grief and his prayer, and his own feelings, heightened by what he witnessed there, were too strong for utterance. Neither could he see a possibility of contributing any thing on his part to sustain his beloved master under so great a woe: relief he saw must come from heaven, if it came at all; and he withdrew in silence as he had come, to mourn and pray alone, and to watch from a distance the issue of this tremendous conflict. It was then that an angel came to Jesus with an answer from the Father, and strengthened him; and John saw that, in all this mysterious darkness, he was still the Son of God, the beloved of the Father.

ARTICLE IV.

PREACHERS AND PREACHING.

By Professor Henry P. Tappan, New-York.

RELIGION embraces the proper direction and regulation of our whole responsible being—our thoughts, purposes, volitions, affections, words and actions—in our relation to God. Ethics embraces the same in our relation to man. They are thus distinguishable, but are not in their nature separable: for he only can estimate aright his duty to man, who has first viewed himself in his relation to God; and he, who aims faithfully to obey the law in relation to man, cannot lose sight of God.

Religion has made its appearance in our world under three forms. First. The religion of nature. Secondly. The religion of revealed law, of sacrifices, and of typical representations. Thirdly. The religion of grace. These three forms do indeed, in some degree, and under some aspects, belong to every age of the world; but they have each a period of peculiar and marked manifestation.

The religion of nature is given first of all, in the mind of man,—in the perceptions of his reason, in the laws of his conscience, and in his moral affections. Here, he knows God, he knows truth and righteousness, and he knows his own immortality. In the world without—the heavens above, the earth beneath, the great and wide sea, the regular stepping of nature, the grandeur and the beauty, the sweet and pleasant influences pouring around in myriad streams, all that meets eye and ear and smell and taste and touch—the mind, preconstituted and prepared and richly furnished, finds an answer to itself. The religion, written within, has its corresponding writing without. The God, known within, hath his glorious manifestations without—the beauty, the majesty, the harmony and the benignity known in our deep thoughts, are abroad in the whole creation; and we are taught that He, whose finger has written his great truths and his holy laws upon our minds, sits upon the heavens as his throne, and the earth is his footstool.

Had man remained a pure being, this religion of nature, continually developing with the progressive development of

his being, would have been his whole religion—a rich and perfect religion—bringing him nearer and nearer to God, in still increasing knowledge, in more beatific vision, in more free and childlike fellowship. There could have been nothing wanting to all the ends and enjoyments of religion.

When man became a sinner, and depravity was lodged in his being, and perpetuated from generation to generation, then was first instituted the religion of revealed law, of sacrifices and typical representations. This religion existed under some form, from the sacrifice of Abel, down through the patriarchal ages, until its perfect institution under Moses. Its aim was threefold :—by an external annunciation to call up in the darkened conscience the great law originally written there ; to propitiate the divine favor in temporal relations and affairs ; and to lead forward the eye of faith to a great propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world.

The third form of religion—the religion of grace—was introduced by Jesus Christ. It brings in the great propitiatory sacrifice which reconciles God to man ; provides the influences which regenerate our nature ; and reveals faith, hope and charity. This is our religion. It is our privilege to live under the most glorious manifestation of God to man. Indeed we combine the three. The religion of nature is restored to us, purified and resplendent, under the benign Sun of Christianity ; the religion of revealed law, of sacrifices and types, is ours ; for we have the law, under a perfect exposition, and we have it again written in our hearts ; and we have all that the old sacrifices and types shadowed forth and pointed to, in the cross of Christ.

The religion of nature required for its services no visible ministry and no formal rites. It was the spontaneous and constant homage of the pure heart to the ever present God.

The second form of religion, for its solemn and numerous rites, required a numerous and well-ordered priesthood. They offered the sacrifices and made the intercessions in behalf of the people. The priest, as a priest, was strictly and solely a minister of the temple service.

The prophets, through whom God gave his law—announced his purposes ; inculcated truth ; gave his specific commands ; uttered his promises or his threatenings, and revealed the future—were a distinct class of men. The whole volume of the Old Testament, at least all that is didactic and prophetic,

was, with the exception of the books of Ezra, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, written by men who were not of the priestly order. Moses, Samuel, David, Solomon, Isaiah and Daniel were not priests. Priests were indeed called to the prophetic office, as in the case of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, but it was evidently a new and additional office. The prophetic office was the higher office of the two. It was special, and given only to men of high and extraordinary virtues. Those endowed with it were sent directly from God, and were admitted into a near and most peculiar intimacy; God spoke with them and showed them the symbols of his ineffable glory. They were the great and inspired teachers of the world. While the priest could not of right be a prophet, the prophet could of right be a priest; accordingly we find Samuel and Elijah offering sacrifices. Before the Mosaic economy was instituted, the prophet and the priest were the same. Upon the introduction of this economy, the priesthood became a distinct class, but the prophet lost none of his original official capacities. A similar distinction of offices, whatever may have been its origin, obtained among the heathen. The priests served in their temples. The sybils served in no temples and were prophetesses. The great doctrines of natural religion, and systems of ethics were taught by sages and philosophers, led on by the force of reason, or illumined by some ray of inspiration which found its way to them from the glowing peaks of Zion.

Now when we come down to the third form of religion, what offices do we find here? The priestly office ceases under Christianity to be attached to any mere human being. We have no more priests, because we have no more sacrifices. Jesus Christ was the last priest appointed of God—our great “High Priest;” and “because he continueth forever, hath an unchangeable priesthood. Wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them. For such a high priest became us who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, as those high priests, to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the people’s: for this he did once when he offered up himself.” Jesus Christ was both the priest and the sacrifice; and he is now the intercessor in the court of heaven. All the preceding priests and sacrifices ended and were merged and fulfilled in him.

Romanism professes still to have priests, and consistently, because Romanism professes daily, in the mass, to renew the offering of Christ's crucified body. But we, who believe that Christ, "now once in the end of the world hath appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," know of no more offerings, and require no more the priestly service in the rites of our religion.

The only spiritual office wherewith men are endowed under Christianity is that of prophet and teacher. The office is one, although it has two forms.

The first form was presented only in the apostles and the first teachers of Christianity. Inspiration and prophetic vision were the distinguishing characteristics of this form. They were appointed to write the gospel, to determine the canon of the New Testament, and to constitute the Christian church. Their office was similar to, or rather identical with that of the prophets of the Old Testament.

After the apostolical period the office appeared only under its second form. Inspiration and prophetic vision ceased, because they had done their work, and the teacher of Christianity, the preacher of the cross of Christ alone remained. The first form included the second; but the second did not include the first: the inspired apostle and prophet was a teacher or preacher of the gospel; but only the first teachers were prophets.

It is as a simple preacher of the gospel that the apostle speaks, 1. Cor. 1: 17: "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel." He is here holding up to view the cardinal aim and characteristic of his office. The administration of baptism he did not deny to be proper and important—he practised it: but to proclaim truth, to preach the gospel of the kingdom of heaven—this was the grand object for which he was sent from kingdom to kingdom, from city to city—through perils manifold, and for which he counted not his life dear unto him.

This office of teacher or preacher has been perpetuated in the church. It is an office demanded by the wants of the world. Without it the gospel is a "treasure hid in a field," and the world cannot be evangelized. "How can they hear without a preacher?" The last command of Christ was: "Preach the gospel to every creature;" and by the men bearing this office, the command is fulfilled.

This office receives various designations in the New Testament. The twelve immediate followers of Christ were called "apostles," or "the sent," because they were *sent*, or commissioned of Christ, in an eminent sense. The preachers of the gospel, generally, are called "presbyters" or "elders," on account of the gravity and dignity of their office. Again, they are called overseers or bishops, because their duty is to *watch* over the church. Thus it is said,—Acts 20,—that Paul "sent to Ephesus and called the elders of the church," and charged them: "Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers* (or bishops) to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood."—They are also metaphorically styled "shepherds," or "pastors," in beautiful allusion to the gentle, fostering and benignant character of their office. "Servants," or "ministers" is another term used to characterize them. They are God's servants, because doing his work. They are the servants of the church, because rendering to it the most sacred and important services, like Christ, who "came not to be ministered unto, but to minister."

But is there no difference of rank among these preachers? None.—"Jesus called them unto him and said: Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."—This passage is decisive.

The argument which is drawn from the constitution of the Jewish church in favor of different grades of ministers in the Christian church, fails utterly; because the high priest, the priest, and the Levites are all merged, as we have seen, in Christ himself. Their office related to expiatory sacrifices: Christ, in his great and perfect expiation, was the end to which they all referred; and having made this expiation once, "he taketh away the first, that he may establish the second;" and human

* Greek ἐπίσκοπος, Latin *episcopus*—literally an overseer—gives Saxon *biscop* or *bisceop*, and thence Eng. *bishop*. This word is generally rendered bishop in our version. See Phil 1: 1. 1 Tim 3: 2. Tit 1: 7.

What a contrast between Jesus of Nazareth, the man of sorrows, the Lamb of God, with his twelve humble followers, and the haughty prelates in gorgeous array, who claimed, in after ages, to represent them! What a contrast between the little flock, whom he blessed under its simple primitive organization, and that complicated mass of orders and ceremonies which claimed to be the Holy Catholic Church! We cannot believe the first to be the germ of the last. From such a meek, lowly, pure and divine beginning, we cannot perceive how these vain dignities, this insatiate pride, these glories of the world could be evolved.

We admit that there are exceptions to the picture we have given. Particularly in the church of England do we find glorious exceptions. No one can venerate more deeply than we do the great and good men who, whether as humble curates, or as archbishops of Canterbury or York, adorn her ecclesiastical annals. But we distinguish between the excellence of the men and the ecclesiastical organization under which they flourished. They were so elevated in their wisdom and piety above all the ambition and vainglory of the world, that they could meet unharmed even that which they found consecrated in the church. But here, as well as in the Romish church, the distinction of church orders, of clerical rank and ecclesiastical jurisdiction have worked their devastations. The monarch placed at the head of the church, the bishops holding their seats in the house of lords, the right of bestowing benefices lodged in noble and influential families, the pluralities and sinecures, the careless admission of the incompetent to sacred orders, the tithe system, with starved curates and pampered prelates, are all opposed to the severe purity, the divine majesty, the separation from worldliness, the meekness and self-denial of the religion taught by Christ and his apostles and exemplified in their lives. Here the same element of evil is apparent. The minister of Christ feels the presence of an ecclesiastical rank and power higher than that which pertains to him as a simple preacher of the gospel. On the one hand, he is awed and controlled by a visible authority, and his attention is diverted from the high commission which he has received under the seal of the Son of God. On the other hand, there is a higher dignity tempting him to indulge the restlessness of ambition, and presenting him something else to glory in, besides the cross of Christ.

The Episcopacy, in our country, exists under less ostentatious forms. It is modified by the influence of our civil and social institutions, and by the character of our people. It presents also a pure faith and a pious clergy. But even here it obviously contains in its very nature peculiar temptations to worldliness, display and personal ambition. Its services are decent and solemn—its prayers beautiful, affecting and appropriate. We differ not here materially. But in setting up its bishops over the presbyters, who in the New Testament form one body; in making a legitimate clerical office to depend upon episcopal ordination, and a legitimate church organization to depend upon the ministrations of a clergyman episcopally ordained; in endowing one order of men with such high and peculiar authority—there is a departure from the noble freedom, and the wise humility which so strongly characterize the Christianity of Christ and his Apostles.

Secondly: The Hierarchy with its three orders is inconsistent with the charity and high aims of the gospel.

Its character is decidedly exclusive of the claims of all others, to be comprehended within the church of Christ, except those included under its own organization. According to its cardinal principle, no one can be a minister of Jesus Christ, to preach the gospel and to administer the ordinances of his church, who has not received ordination from the order of bishops: and no body can be a church of Christ which is not episcopally constituted. It follows from this that the thousands of clergymen of other denominations with their congregations, although they preach the gospel faithfully, purely and effectually; although the Holy Spirit is given and multitudes of souls converted; although the fruits of Christianity abound in holy living and the works of beneficence; although they are sending abroad missionaries and taking no small part in the work of evangelizing the nations—still they are not the ministers and churches of Jesus Christ! It would seem that this so called divinely constituted church is, after all, no special favorite; and those who depart from its canons not heinously guilty,—since the Great Head of his church bestows gifts and graces, and high marks of approbation upon the dissenting body, no less than upon the body claiming apostolical pre-eminence.

We appear in defence of no particular sect, but in defence of Christianity herself, when we resist this claim of any par-

ticular body to be exclusively the church. Christianity is a great system of truth—a great means of redemption—to enlighten and save the world. She is like the sun, whose light no nation, nor even planet can monopolize and claim to dispense, as his particular and favorite almoner, by means of curiously constructed reflectors and through certain regulated and defined mediums; but who shines forth from his own exhaustless fountains of splendor, through the wide universe, and warms and brightens every object that turns up to him a willing face, whether it be the broad disc of a revolving world, or a little flower by a running stream, in a far off wilderness, where no foot hath ever trod. Or it is like a broad, deep and pleasant river, rolling its waters through many provinces, and which no one of them all can dip up and retain and dispense to the others at pleasure; but of its own mighty strength, it holds on its way resistlessly, diffusing fertility and beauty on either shore, from where it first collects the mountain streams down to the great ocean in which it rests. Wherever the truths of Christianity come, whatever be the instruments, there she is, with all her inherent power, and her store of blessings. Wherever these truths are received and trusted in, and made to appear in a spiritual life, there she has accomplished her end. She has won a soul from death to life and immortality, and made joy in heaven.

Thirdly: The three orders of the Hierarchy are not required for the offices of Christianity. The temple service required the high priest, the priests and the Levites. But our Great High Priest having finished his sacrifice and passed into the heavens all that remains to be done is, to “preach the gospel to every creature,” accompanying it with those two beautiful and simple ordinances, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, which make up the whole ritual of Christianity. There is plainly here no duty which does not fitly belong to, and which may not be conveniently performed by presbyters. And in ordaining and inducting candidates into the office of the Christian ministry, “the laying on of the hands of the presbytery,” whose members claim, likewise, to be bishops, appears as solemn and as suitable to the end proposed, as the imposition of the hands of one man claiming to belong to a higher order.

History does not show that the churches organized under the Episcopate have been wiser and purer than those organized

under presbyters. On the contrary, the greatest corruptions of the church, the most violent contentions, and the most flagrant abuses have appeared under the Episcopate.

When I speak of denominations not under the Episcopate, I include the great body of the reformed church. In our country, I believe, all the denominations but one, acknowledge no order higher than the presbyters: for although our Methodist brethren have their bishops, they are thus styled only in designation of an office specially conferred upon them, and not as possessing a distinct and higher ministerial rank than their brethren.

The blessings of the gospel, we admit, are not confined to those portions of the church who adhere to the primitive doctrine of the parity of the ministry. But where, under the Episcopate, do they more abound? Where, more justly, than among the mountains of Scotland and New England, is the song of the prophet recalled: "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth!"

The apostle Paul, in a passage already quoted—1 Cor. 1: 17—not only points out the peculiar office of the Christian ministry, namely, to preach the gospel; but he also designates the manner of preaching it: "Not with wisdom of words"—and this thought he expands in the following verses and chapters. In the beginning of the second chapter he is very explicit: "And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech, or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. For I determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified—and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power."

Paul was addressing a church in a Grecian city: and in the Grecian cities there were schools both of the Philosophers and of the Rhetoricians. The "excellency of wisdom" refers to the former: the "excellency of words" to the latter. Most of this philosophizing was vain, idle and Epicurean, as well as refined, subtle and attractive. The noble philosophy of Plato was never popular. The system of the Rhetoricians was dazzling indeed, but false and hollow. They made unbounded

pretensions, but imposed mere artificial rules which embraced a flourish of declamation, without mental discipline or any genuine eloquence. Now Paul came not to amuse them with subtle and curious speculations, but simply to preach "Christ and him crucified."—He came not to charm the ears of a false taste with wordy harangues and mellifluous intonations, but to give a plain message, whose simple import was so majestic and glorious that it defied and frowned upon the popular tricks and antics of oratory. And he did this "lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect;" lest the attention of his hearers should be diverted from the doctrines of salvation, and the cross of Christ fail of its great end.

Christianity is not in any sense, or in any degree, a system of formal philosophy. It contains neither fables nor subtle and strange dogmas. It conveys truth under striking facts and beautiful examples. It presents truth with a living countenance, a speaking voice, a warm heart, a benevolent hand, and *going about doing good*; "I am the way and the truth and the life," says Christ. It indeed contains mysteries, but they are, like all the mysteries of God, sublime and glorious, and connected with rich practical benefits. There is no greater mystery to me than the sun. What is the substance of his orb? What feeds his inexhaustible light and heat? What is the nature of light itself, and by what force is every ray carried directly onwards in space, travelling eternally, except it meet a reflecting or absorbing surface? O sun, I know thee not! thou art to me, like every other star of light, "a beauty and a mystery!" I know not *what* thou art; but I know *that* thou art; thou risest every morning to give me light, and settest every night to give me repose; thou travellest through thy vast circuit and bringest the pleasant succession of the seasons; thou art, to me, God's most palpable and glorious minister of blessings! I know not *what* thou art in thyself—and I may never ascend thy empyreal seat to gain a nearer vision—but I know thy benign influences and effects—I know that I cannot live without thee! And so likewise these orbs of moral and spiritual truth, which move together in the gospel system, are at a sublime height above my feeble vision—I see them, I know that they are, I experience their gracious, healing, heavenly influences—they are to me "life and immortality." I believe in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, although the Divine Being is to me an orb of brightness whose intense

centre I cannot penetrate. Like Moses in his vision, we see but the far off sweeping skirts of this glory—we feel its vivifying and enriching power; and the goodness of the Lord passes before us. It is paternal mercy, redeeming love, ineffable consolation, joy and peace—and this suffices us.

The cross of Christ, the humiliation, the incarnation, the suffering and death, the heavenly high priesthood may be as mysterious to me, as the deep and clear fountain which bubbles up from the cleft in the rock, from generation to generation, sending out its pure and sweet waters, but they are no less palpably a benefit, and they are a fountain of life in an infinitely higher sense. Reason does not reject mysteries. Reason believes in mysteries upon sufficient evidence, and no evidence to reason is higher than the undoubted affirmation of the Infinite God, and the existence of benefits which can be traced to these mysteries alone.

Now, when we take up the work of preaching the gospel, are we to make these facts and mysteries, these commands, warnings, exhortations and “exceedingly precious promises” the mere occasions of philosophical speculations?—are we to frame systems of metaphysico-theology upon them, arrogant and formidable? Are we to take them, by violence, as the vehicles of our Manichæism, Gnosticism, Peripateticism, or even our Platonism? Upon the cross of Christ shall we nail our parchment rolls, and change the blood-stained symbol of salvation into a sign-post of the “excellency of” our “wisdom?” God forbid. We are to preach the facts, mysteries, promises and precepts of the gospel, without the glosses of our philosophy—with no ambitious aim—with the simplicity, directness and dignified earnestness which characterized the Great Author of our religion and his apostles—that “if by any means we may save some”—a style of preaching which although it seem “foolishness” to the “disputers of this world,” will, to the souls seeking salvation, be “in the power and demonstration of the Spirit.”

I do not undervalue philosophy; I may rather be suspected to be one of its devotees. But I wish to preserve it in its fitting relations, and its due subordination. And if I ever undertake philosophical investigation, in respect to biblical truth, my aim shall be to disintegrate the simplicity of revelation from the philosophies which have been heaped upon it. When philosophies of all sorts have for ages been erecting their towers

of strength and naming them after the "stronghold" of Zion ; and have been inscribing Scripture texts all over their banners—then of necessity we may be compelled to seek out, by legitimate methods, the true philosophy, which is the harmony of all minds as well as the principle of all God's works ; that we may beat down these frowning and boastful fastnesses of error, and release the gospel from its long imprisonment, to go abroad again, as free and simple as when Paul carried its banner, exclaiming, "I have determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified."

We have seen how the doing away of the equality of Christ's ministers, and the introduction of the higher orders of the church, corrupted its polity, and led on those vast evils which blacken and sadden the pages on which are recorded the acts of nominal Christianity. Akin to this is the history of dogmatical Christianity.

For the ministers of Christ to aim to be any thing more than preachers of the cross, of equal rank, and unambitious pastors of the flock, was one form of error. For the professed preachers to preach any thing besides the doctrines of the cross—to foist into the system of truth, revealed from heaven, their own inventions—to know any thing besides Christ and him crucified, was the other great and pregnant form of error. They began to exist together—they co-worked together—they advanced together—they sustained each other, and they devastated the fields of truth, by the tares which they sowed. The evils which the apostle deprecated, which began to work in Corinth, but which he successfully opposed, and of which he forewarned the church in those memorable words: "For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine ; but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears ; and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables,"—these evils appeared even before the apostolical sun had set. He who has read the history of philosophy and church history together, finds no difficulty in tracing the multifarious and conflicting doctrines of the professors of Christianity to the schools of philosophy. He who has examined the specimens of sermonizing, which have come down to us from the different ages, as well as the theological writings in general, finds them a mixed and motley web, of Scripture facts and affirmations which may be called the golden threads, and speculative dogmas, acute or

crude, ingenious or monstrous, gathered from Plato or Aristotle, Zoroaster or Manes, from the Gnostics or the Bhudists and these are the threads of various and strange colors and materials. Such are a vast proportion of the writings of the schoolmen—the subtleties of Duns Scotus, and Magnus Albertus Beatissimus, and a multitude of others.

What prevailed in the days of our fathers is not extinct in our day. A blessed change has indeed come over the church, and is still in progress. But Arminianism, and Pelagianism, and Calvinism, and Hopkinsianism, and Antinomianism, and Emmonism, and Taylorism, and Coleridgeanism, and Transcendentalism, and Old and New Schoolism, and Perfectionism, and other *isms* are rife in the land. What is the origin of these discussions? Whence spring these warring opinions? We find not their names in the gospel. Do we find all the opinions they represent, in the gospel? One thing is certain, that, in these conflicting schools, gospel truths are not at war with each other. Let a philosophical critic examine them, and he plainly discovers the opposing elements of different philosophies. Multitudes of people who have never studied philosophy and who care nothing about it, and who, if you take them upon the plain facts, affirmations and duties of the gospel, are perfectly agreed, are nevertheless divided into alienated parties, respecting consecrated technicalities, and the artificial precision of elaborate confessions. They dispute about words because they are old and favorite words, when they all alike have the older and better things. They give each other foul names upon verbal or philosophical differences, which are unintelligible alike to the unlearned, and, alas! to not a few of the learned disputants.

While discussions are waxing louder and louder—methinks I hear the voice of the apostle, like a clear, harmonious trumpet, call to draw us away from the battle—"Now I beseech you brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that you be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment." And how shall we effect this? Let each minister bear in mind, "Christ sent me to preach the gospel." This is my rank, this my office. I am to preach it—"not with wisdom of words" or "excellency of wisdom and speech"—not in view of my philosophy, or in support of my party; I am to preach it as it is given me from

the pure fountain of truth—and in the meekness, plainness, and earnestness of one endeavoring to “save a soul from death.” A return to the apostolical models, this, this will bring in the cure, and breathe upon us the balmy breath of peace.

It is to be remarked how the apostle is continually referring to the “cross of Christ,” or to “Christ and him crucified.” This alone he glories in—this alone he determines to know and preach. It is not difficult to discern the reason. The “cross of Christ,” or “Christ and him crucified” presents us the substance of the gospel. The aim of God in sending his Son was not to institute a splendid hierarchy, nor to establish proud and learned schools of philosophy—nor even to teach the most useful sciences and arts: there was but one aim, a sublimely simple aim—“to seek and to save the lost.” All the divine institutions and arrangements are made for this end. The truths revealed are revealed for this end. The ministers and agencies ordained, are ordained for this end. The rites and ordinances given, are given for this end. No part of the gospel plan is adapted for mere scientific purposes, for the uses of the world—or for amusing or profound disquisitions; but all is for salvation—for immortality and life. Hence he who reads, or hears, or professes, and enters upon the practice of, the gospel, can consistently do so only for this end. And so likewise he who preaches the gospel, or takes any measures for its dissemination, can lawfully have no other end in view. It is not for the cause of Apollos, or Paul, or Cephas, but for the cause of Christ alone. O could we thus take and use the gospel, it would indeed be “peace on earth, and good will towards man.”

Look at our missionaries. Of different sects, they are still united in preaching the great central doctrine of the cross of Christ. The enemy is so numerous and active that disagreement with each other becomes treason to the common cause. Would we but consider it—there are the same imperative reasons for our agreement at home.

The representation we have given of the ministerial office, assigning it one grade, separates it from the love of power and the competitions of ambition. The representation we have given of the manner of preaching the gospel shuts out from it the ambitious displays of learning, the pomp, profundity and brilliancy of philosophical discussion, and the studied elegancies of oratory. But is it thence an office of low grade, and of duties affording little scope to the human mind? There

could not be a greater mistake than such an inference. We cannot conceive of a nobler and loftier office than that of a prophet of God, sent to convey his messages to men. And next to this is the office of repeating these messages by divine commission likewise. Moses and the prophets, Christ and his apostles, and all faithful preachers of the word, in this point of view, form one holy and glorious fellowship. Ministers of the gospel are of one rank, because in the nature of the case they cannot be of different ranks. They are all alike consecrated to a duty which elevates them to a position the most sacred to which man can aspire.

If the work of the ministry were one of mere toilsome benevolence—a teaching of little children or of those as ignorant as children—an active administration of relief to the poor and sick and distressed, of every degree—a mere repetition of a few simple elements of truth, connected with the salvation of the soul, it would be the most honorable and desirable employment of man—it would discipline the soul more worthily and effectually in all its nobler and spiritual faculties—it would yield in the very performance of its duties, the most substantial rewards of inward peace and blessedness, and would secure the glorious hope of the high and immortal destiny of those “who turn many to righteousness.” And the work of the ministry does embrace what is here mentioned.

But in addition to all this, the system of truth contained in the Bible, and all its facts and mysteries are so rich and sublime, so uplifting to thought, that he, who dwells amid them, seems to stand in the vestibule of the presence chamber of truth, where he is surrounded with a divine radiance, and enjoys glorious and beautiful prospects, and his ears are filled with the whisperings and echoes of knowledges about to be revealed, and he is waiting in momentary expectation of the call to enter in.

There is also no science or true philosophy, or genuine literature, which is useless to the candidate in preparation for the ministry, or which he may not cultivate advantageously, after he has entered upon it, if he but do so wisely, and use it by right appropriation. The strongest and most cultivated intellect may find none of its powers or gifts useless here. It is an office of heavenly dignity, of heavenly employments and of privileges which cannot be estimated. It is an office too of responsibilities whose solemnity and moment we cannot exaggerate.

Let the reader, if he have taken upon himself this sacred office, pause here, and think of what is committed to him! He is God's ambassador.—He is Christ's minister.—He is sent of the Holy Ghost.—He bears the word of life.—He has the cup of salvation in his hand.—He is laboring for the redemption of the soul—to persuade men to flee from the wrath to come, and to lay hold upon eternal life!—"Who is sufficient for these things!" From the depths of penitence and grief for his deficiencies and unworthiness—in the solemn apprehension of this great trust,—let him attend to the sublime charge of Paul to Timothy: "I charge thee, therefore, before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing, in his kingdom; preach the word; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine."

ARTICLE V.

THE BIBLE AND ITS LITERATURE.

By Edward Robinson, D. D., Prof. of Bib. Lit., Union Theol. Sem., New-York.

THE following article was prepared for delivery before a popular audience, on an occasion,* which of course permitted only a very general outline of the great subject under review. For this reason, several of the topics, and some of them important ones, could be little more than barely enumerated. With this explanation it is now submitted to the public in this form, as intended to present an outline of the nature, the extent, and the importance of the studies embraced under the general appellation of *Biblical Literature*.

This term, in its general acceptation, and as here employed, embraces all those branches of learning, which bear upon the study, the illustration, and the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. The object of the department is to train up able and

* The inauguration of the author as Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New-York, Jan. 20, 1841.—EDITOR.

faithful interpreters of the Word of God. And as the Word of God is the corner-stone of all Christian Theology, so the study and interpretation of that Holy Word, must of right be regarded as the first and fundamental branch of all theological education.

Upon this foundation, Scientific Theology next rears her superstructure of doctrines, and points out their relations and adaptedness to the elements of the human mind and character; and then Practical Theology comes in to show how all these truths and doctrines may be brought home with the greatest power to the heart and conscience of mankind. These are the three great departments of Christian science,—Exegetical, Doctrinal, and Practical. But as all these, again, derive life and vigor from the light of experience, reflected from the pages of history as it recounts the dealings of God with his people in every age, and shows how the truths of the gospel have been promulgated and received; and the doctrines of the church proposed, adopted, modified, or rejected; so the History of the Church has naturally come to occupy a place as the fourth branch of theological science; not less important and essential than the other three, to every complete system of theological instruction. Such, in fact, is the system upon which all Protestant Schools of Theology in our own or other lands, have usually been founded: first, the study and observation of the Scriptures; next, the scientific arrangement and proof of the doctrines thence derived; and afterwards, the practice and application of the science with its general history. The time has gone by in our country, theoretically at least, when this order was reversed; when the Bible was appealed to merely to supply an illustration for the preacher, or to furnish proof-texts for a system of doctrines already drawn out from the storehouse of human reason.

It has ever been the glory of the Protestant Faith, that it has placed the Scriptures where they ought to be, above every human name, above every human authority. **THE BIBLE IS THE ONLY AND SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH AND PRACTICE.** Such is the fundamental maxim upon which Protestantism has ever rested; and will rest, so long as the truth of God is duly honored. In this maxim we have the very germ and essence of the glorious Reformation, whose seed was sown by Wickliffe, in the fourteenth century; its rising shoots nourished by the blood of Huss and Jerome of Prague in the fifteenth; and its growth brought to

maturity and its fruit ripened in the sixteenth, under the vigorous training of Luther and Melancthon. What was it that first led Wickliffe to question the dogmas of the Romish church? The study of the Bible. What led Huss and Jerome of Prague to cast off the authority of Rome in matters of faith, and press forward in the path which conducted only to martyrdom? It was the Bible. What gave to Luther his chief power, and enabled him to establish the triumphs of the Reformation on a sure and permanent basis? It was his version of the Bible, which brought divine truth into immediate contact with the mass of mind among the common people. It was no longer a human interpreter, standing between God and the people to tell them what the Lord had said; but it was God himself speaking to the people themselves, and bringing his own truth directly home to their hearts. It was good seed sown in good ground; it sprung up and bore good fruit; and the spirit of the Reformation, which before had been smouldering for centuries, with only occasional flashes of light, now burst forth and shone with a steady and unquenchable splendor. Where the Scriptures were translated and venerated as the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, there the Reformation was established; and the limits within which this veneration of the Bible prevailed, are to this day the boundaries of Protestantism.

The maxim which we are considering, has usually been received as a self-evident truth throughout the Protestant world. Fifteen years ago, there probably could hardly have been found an individual bearing the Protestant name, who would have thought of calling it in question. But at the present day, a tendency has arisen in a portion of the Protestant community, directed primarily against certain levelling efforts to break down the external power and dignity of the church—a tendency which ascribes to a portion of that church a supremacy which she herself has never heretofore claimed, and exalts her to the dignity of the church primitive and apostolic, having authority over the faith and consciences not only of her own members, but virtually of all Christendom. It results as a main principle directly from this tendency, and we now hear the doctrine warily advanced, that the Bible must be interpreted by the church; or, in other words, that the authority of the church is above that of the Bible. Thus, so far as these views shall become current, there is danger, that the separating wall may again be built up between the truth of God and the mass of

mankind; that the gigantic efforts of the present time to disseminate the Bible throughout all lands, shall go for nought; and that a portion of the Protestant church, verging in self-defence to an unhappy extreme, may strive to overthrow the fundamental and essential principle, on which she has hitherto reposed, as on an immovable basis.

But why should Protestants thus cast away the very foundation of their liberty in Christ? Why build up again a separating wall to divide them from the truth and love of God? The Protestant maxim has in all ages been the watchword of Christian liberty; and the abandonment of it, the signal of spiritual thralldom and darkness. The manifestation of this principle in the Reformation, was but a return to it after a long night of oblivion; it had already shone forth with equal power and splendor in the still greater renovation of God's church under the ministry of the Redeemer himself.

When Christ appeared on earth, "the Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses' seat,"* and had enveloped and obscured the light of divine truth in the Old Testament by their traditions. Theirs was then the authority of the church; they had made themselves the interpreters of Scripture to the people; and on their dictum hung the significance of the law and of the prophets. Against this assumption of authority, Jesus set his face at once and for ever. In one of the earliest of his public discourses, the Sermon on the Mount, he declares to the assembled multitude by several examples: "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time," that ye should do so and so; "but I say unto you," that this authority is nought.† On another occasion he exclaims: "Thus have ye made the commandment of God of no effect by your tradition;" and then he proceeds to inveigh against them in the language of Isaiah: "This people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoreth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. But in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."‡ In like manner the great apostle of the Gentiles sets at nought the authority of Jewish tradition: "Why then," he exclaims to the Colossians, "as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, after the commandments and doctrines of men?"§ And again, in a strain of strong invective against

* Matt. xxiii. 2. † Matt. v. 21, seq. ‡ Matt. xv. 6—9.

§ Comp. Mark vii. 6—13.

|| Col. ii. 20—22.

“vain talkers and deceivers, especially they of the circumcision,” he directs Titus to “rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith, not giving heed to Jewish fables, and commandments of men, that turn from the truth.”*

Nor were all these declarations merely negative; serving only to contradict the authority of the Scribes and Pharisees and their traditions. It was not the object of the Saviour and his apostles to overthrow one mass of error in order to set up another in its place. They never claimed themselves to be interpreters of the Word of God to others. That Holy Word was free to all; it was known and read of all men; and to it Christ and his apostles ever appealed, against the objections of the Jews, as the supreme authority, before which all human cavils must be dumb. Yea, even the opponents themselves were to be the interpreters and judges. “Search the Scriptures,” says our Lord, “for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me.”† The apostles, too, in their preaching, appealed always to the Scriptures, enforcing the study of them upon their hearers; and it is recorded as a trait of nobleness in the Bereans, to whom Paul and Silas preached the gospel, “that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so.”‡ They went not to the Scribes and Pharisees, as the authoritative expounders of the Scriptures; but searched for themselves, in the light of God’s truth and with the aid of his Spirit, which is ever vouchsafed to those who seek aright. The same great principle is inculcated by Paul, when in addressing Timothy, he reminds him, “that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus;” and then proceeds to enforce the thought more generally and strongly: “All Scripture is given by inspiration of God; and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.”§ This, according to the apostle, is the fruit of the Scriptures to those who search them for themselves; and thus become rooted and grounded in the Christian faith. He says not one word of their being interpreted by or according to the authority of the church.

* Tit. i. 10—14. † John v. 39. ‡ Acts xvii. 11.

§ 2 Tim. iii. 15—17.

Indeed, the only occasion on record, in which the apostolic church, as such, exercised an authority in any way paramount to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, was in the final decision of the great question relative to the binding power of the Jewish ceremonial law upon Gentile converts. Many of the Jewish Christians still venerated their ritual, and believed that other converts should be subject to its ordinances. This tendency Paul labored long and vehemently to counteract, as contrary to the spirit of the gospel; and at length the authority of the assembled church and elders at Jerusalem was called in, to determine between the opposing views. This they did; not of themselves, but as the ambassadors and representatives of Christ, expressly acting by inspiration from on high: "For it seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things."* Thus was abrogated in form the Jewish ceremonial law; not by the church acting on its own authority, but from the authority of Christ himself. Their decree was neither an interpretation of Scripture, nor a tradition claiming to be of equal weight with Scripture; but it was a part and parcel of Scripture itself, resting upon the same divine authority and sanction, and promulgated under the direct influence of the same Holy Spirit.

The main argument of the church in every age, in favor of its assumed authority, has been the fear lest "the unlearned and unstable should wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction." Such was already the complaint of Peter in respect to the epistles of Paul and other Scriptures; yet he suggests no interposition of ecclesiastical authority to prevent such a result. He merely exhorts those whom he was addressing, to greater caution not to fall from their own steadfastness, seeing they were thus forewarned.† And why should more than this be necessary? Because a few of the "unlearned and unstable" abuse their liberty, shall that liberty be wholly taken away from the steadfast and the intelligent? Far better were it for the church, for her ministers and her members, to instruct and enlighten these "unlearned and unstable," and so bring them willingly to the truth; and not at once to shut them up in the prison-house of human authority.

Let me not be misunderstood. I am not calling in question the propriety, nor even the necessity of creeds and confessions.

* Acts xv. 28. See the whole chapter. † 2 Pet. iii. 15—17.

I hold that every religious community has a right to prescribe the system of doctrines, conscientiously drawn from the Bible, which shall be the bond of its existence and the condition of membership. It follows as a matter of course, that when a member discards, or acts contrary to, the profession he has made, such a community has the right to call him to an account, and even to exclude him from its pale. But it does not follow, nor can it ever be justified, that where there is merely a conscientious difference of opinion in respect to Scriptural doctrine, denunciation and persecution should be let loose upon their prey, or an individual be injured in his good name, or deprived of civil or social rights and privileges. This can never be otherwise than wrong in itself ; directly opposed to the great and fundamental principle of Protestantism ; and contrary to the whole spirit and tenor of the gospel of Christ.

Having thus brought out to view the character and foundations of the great Protestant principle relative to the Bible, let us now trace it as applied to theological education. It follows from it, as I have already had occasion to remark, that the Bible must be the basis of all Christian theology. Our present inquiry, therefore, will have for its object the various subsidiary branches of study, which are essential for every one who would aspire to the character of an able and thoroughly furnished interpreter of the Holy Scriptures. Let it be borne in mind that only of such am I here speaking ;—of interpreters who may understand and explain the Word of God, not merely in things pertaining to our duties and destiny as immortal and accountable beings ; for on these points the Bible is so plain, that he who runs may read, and even in the most imperfect translation presents enough of divine truth to make all men wise unto salvation. But I speak of interpreters who may likewise enter into the full spirit of the Bible in all its other parts ; in its bearings upon the history and antiquities, not only of the Jews, but of the whole human race ; who may be able to clear up difficulties, illustrate what may seem obscure, and make the Scriptures in some degree as plain and simple to mankind now, as they were to the people to whom they were first addressed.

In this last remark lies the main clue, which is to guide all the efforts of the interpreter. The revelation of God's truth was made originally to the Jews, a people peculiar in their lan-

guage, their modes of life, their laws, their manners and customs, their habits of thought and feeling. Perhaps in all the civilized world it would be difficult to find a nation, presenting in all these particulars a stronger contrast with ourselves. Yet to them the Scriptures were addressed, in their own tongue, and with a perfect adaptation to their character and circumstances. God addressed himself to them, intending to be understood; and he spoke in such a way, that he was understood. He spoke to Jews in the language and manner of the Jews; and as one Jew understood another Jew, so they all understood that which God uttered to them in the same tongue. Now if we too would comprehend the Scriptures fully, we must place ourselves in the situation of the Jews; hear as they heard, and understand the language as they understood it; while for the sense, especially of prophecy, we have the additional revelations of the New Testament, and the history of God's dealings with his church and with the world for many centuries later.

What then is requisite, to enable us as interpreters to stand in the position of the Jews, and at the same time grasp the further advantages resulting from the experience of centuries? The proper answer to this question resolves itself into a variety of particulars, and covers the whole ground embraced by our present inquiry.

I. The first requisite, which indeed lies at the basis of all accurate study of the Bible, is an acquaintance with the original tongues in which it has come down to us; the Old Testament in Hebrew, with a few passages of Chaldee interspersed, and the New Testament in Greek. The necessity of learning both these languages is now universally acknowledged, wherever the importance of a thorough study of the Bible is prized; and every Theological Seminary in Christendom, which makes provision for instruction in the Scriptures, takes them up in these original tongues. It would therefore be here a waste of time, to dwell upon the importance and necessity of a regular philological study of these languages; for this is included in the very idea of a thorough critical knowledge of the Scriptures themselves. To think of such a knowledge of the Bible, to be obtained through the medium of any translation, is preposterous. The well qualified interpreter must be able himself to sit in judgment upon all translations, by comparing them in letter and in spirit with the originals. We all know how dif-

difficult it is to find an exact and yet spirited translation, even from one kindred language to another ; as from the French or the German into English ; but this difficulty is very greatly enhanced, when the version is to be from a language so totally diverse, as is the Hebrew, from our own or any other occidental tongue.

Some minds are ready to admit the importance of studying the New Testament in the Greek original, but entertain doubts as to the propriety of a like study of the Old Testament in the Hebrew. True, the New Testament is the charter of the Christian dispensation and of our Christian hopes ; and as such occupies a higher and more important place in its bearings on theological education. But it is founded upon, and presupposes, the existence and binding obligation of the Old Testament ; and neither its precepts, nor its doctrines, nor its language can be fully understood, without a like thorough knowledge of the latter. The question resolves itself into another, viz. Whether the Christian interpreter shall confine his studies and his acquaintance with the Scriptures, simply to one portion of the Bible ; or extend them over the whole ? If the reply be, as all will admit it ought to be, that he should embrace the *whole* Bible ; then the importance of an acquaintance with the Hebrew tongue, rests upon the same grounds as the study of the Greek.

Nor is an adequate study of both these tongues the labor of merely a few weeks, or months, or even years. They are both to us dead languages, no longer spoken in this form ; and therefore no longer to be learned by daily intercourse with those to whom they are vernacular. Herein lies at once a great drawback in respect to time and accuracy ; and also the necessity of a great increase of labor and minute attention. Especially is this the case in relation to the Hebrew ; since apparently the greater portion of this language itself is utterly lost. Almost its only remains are contained in the Bible ; and even these are naturally only fragmentary. Take now any single volume in the English language, not larger than the Bible ; and how imperfect would it be as the representative of our tongue ! The speech of common life would be almost wholly wanting ; and of many peculiar words, phrases, and constructions, which go to make our language what it is, what a multitude would not be found ? or, if found at all, would occur but a single time, and thus be in themselves unintelligible or anomalous. Just so with the Hebrew language as exhibited in the Bible ;

it is imperfect, and of course often obscure ; because the means of comparison and illustration from other parts of the language, are wanting.

For this reason, the labor and difficulty of a critical knowledge of the Hebrew are greatly enhanced, by the necessity of appealing to other kindred tongues, in order to supply, in an imperfect manner, the deficiencies arising from its incompleteness. The scholar who would possess this power, must make himself master of the Chaldee and Syriac dialects ; of the noble and widespread Arabic ; and, to some extent, also, of the Samaritan, the Ethiopic, and the corrupt Rabbinic. He must pursue his devious way throughout all these tongues, in search of analogies and correspondences, to illustrate the forms and meaning and construction of many Hebrew words, for which there exists no other testimony. To the like end, he must examine the ancient versions of the Old Testament, in the same and other tongues ; and when he has done all, he can perhaps in many cases arrive only at an uncertain or merely probable result. All this may well make out the main labor of a whole life ; and such, indeed, has ever been the fact in respect to the giants of Hebrew literature, whether they lived in former days, or still adorn our own. The Hebrew with its kindred dialects, and the subsidiary branches of study necessary for its complete illustration, have sufficed to occupy their best hours and best years, by day and by night, from early youth to late old age.

Nor is the case very dissimilar with the Greek language of the New Testament. This, too, is but the fragment of a peculiar dialect in the wide field of Greek philology. True, we have here the aid of all the branches of the classic Grecian language and literature, in their poetic youth, their Attic manliness and vigor, and their later decline. We have, too, all the results of ancient and modern research in regard to Greek philology ; while the idiom and character of the language are far more accordant than the Hebrew with our own. The Greek, too, in an altered form, is to this day a spoken language. Yet all this neither suffices for the illustration of the idiom of the New Testament, nor does it supersede, even here, the necessity of an acquaintance with the Hebrew tongue of the earlier Scriptures.

The language of the New Testament is *the later Greek, as spoken by foreigners of the Hebrew stock, and applied by them to subjects on which it had never been employed by native Greeks.* After the disuse of the ancient Hebrew in Palestine, and the ir-

ruption of western conquerors, the Jews adopted the Greek language from necessity; partly as a conquered people, and partly from the intercourse of life, of commerce, in colonies, in cities, founded like Alexandria and others, which were peopled with throngs of Jews. It was, therefore, the spoken language of ordinary life, which they learned; not the classic style of books, which has elsewhere come down to us. But they spoke it as foreigners, whose native tongue was the later Aramaean; and it therefore could not fail to acquire upon their lips a strong Semitic character and coloring. When to this we add, that they spoke in Greek on the things of the true God, and the relations of mankind to Jehovah and to a Saviour—subjects to which no native Greek had ever then applied his beautiful language, it will be obvious that an appeal merely to classic Greek and its philology, will not suffice for the interpreter of the New Testament. The Jewish-Greek idiom must be studied almost as an independent dialect; and its most important illustrations will be derived from the idiom of the Old Testament, especially as exhibited in the version of the Seventy and the Apocrypha, and from the cotemporary writings of Philo and Josephus.

The volumes of controversy which have been written in former centuries, upon the character of the idiom of the New Testament, may at the present day be safely left out of view in a theological education, except as matters of history. Even in this view, they are important chiefly as showing by what crude theories and slow advances, the human mind and human learning often arrive at truth. The principle virtually laid down was, that as God spoke to man in Greek, he could employ only the most pure and perfect Greek; and therefore the idiom of the New Testament must be accounted as one of the purest models of the Greek language. It was here overlooked that God spoke to man only in the language of those whom he addressed; and that therefore to judge of this language, we must look to the character and circumstances of those who spoke it. These were at the time a conquered, and, in some respects, already an abject people; and their dialect of the Greek, in comparison with the language of Greece itself, was much like the dialects of the Jews at the present day in modern lands, unpolished and corrupted by foreign words, idioms, and forms.

Enough has been said to show, that a proper acquaintance with the original tongues of the Holy Scriptures, the very foundation of a critical study of the Word of God, is not to be

gained by a few slight efforts, but requires years of diligence and toil. It is not, indeed, to be desired, nor would it of course be possible, for every student in a Theological Seminary to go over the whole ground here pointed out; but it is incumbent on every such student, to be sufficiently prepared to understand and profit by the labors of the many and great minds who have trod this course before him, and whose efforts have been directed to make plain the way to those who should come after them.*

II. The power of studying the Scriptures in the original languages having been thus acquired, it becomes important to take a general survey of the wide field to be cultivated, and of the methods and means by which the labor may be accomplished with the greatest facility and success. For this end, a branch of biblical science has sprung up within the last century in Germany, which has hitherto found its way slowly and with difficulty into the English language, and has as yet been fostered by very little original effort in that tongue. It is called "Introduction to the Bible;" and the object of it is, as the name imports, to introduce the learner to the best methods and means for prosecuting the study of the Scriptures. It takes the Bible as it is, as the Word of God; the evidences of its divine

* It is gratifying to mark the progress of this department of biblical learning in the United States, since its revival five and twenty years ago, chiefly through the exertions of the Rev. Professor Stuart, of Andover. That it is not now on the decline, is apparent from the fact, that besides the six editions of Professor Stuart's Hebrew Grammar, and two of that by Professor Bush, not less than fifteen hundred copies of Dr. Nordheimer's Grammar have been sold since its publication in 1838. Of the translation of Gesenius' Lexicon, also, published in the autumn of 1836, more than two thousand copies have been sold in this country, besides several hundreds ordered for England.—It may not be out of place likewise to remark, that England is now indebted to America for many other of her elementary books in the same department. Both the Hebrew and Greek Grammars of Professor Stuart have been republished in that country, as also the translation of Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar. The Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament, by the author of these pages, has also been brought out there, in three rival editions, and two abridgments.

origin and inspired character being left to another department of theology ; and proceeds to point out to the student the proper topics and order of his inquiries. It thus becomes either General or Particular.

The former, or General Introduction, comprises a description of all the various manuscripts and editions of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, and their comparative value. It enumerates the various ancient versions, their authors, their dates, the circumstances of their composition, and their importance to the biblical student. It details the efforts which have been made to obtain a correct text both of the Old and New Testaments, the sources and character of the various readings, and the general principles on which such researches must be conducted. It touches also, in general terms, upon the character of the language and style ; on the history, chronology, geography, and antiquities, of the Jewish people. In all these branches, it names and characterizes the best books to be consulted. It gives, too, the history of the sacred volume itself ; the manner in which it has been revered and studied in different ages ; and the various external forms and divisions in which it has appeared.

Particular Introduction, on the other hand, ~~takes~~ takes up, first, the main portions of the Scriptures, as the historical, poetical, prophetic, or doctrinal books ; and discusses the characteristics common to each division ; and then proceeds to treat of each particular book. It inquires into the time when it was written, its author, its subject and object, its style and manner ; and aims, in short, to afford all the information, which may enable the learner to read and understand each book and chapter of the Bible, in the best and most perfect manner.

This branch of biblical study has ever appeared to me one of great importance ; and particularly adapted to interest the minds both of the learned and unlearned. Its purpose is to tell all that is known about the Bible as a sacred volume, and to point out how every one may best read and understand it. All this would seem to be capable of very popular application, and would be especially appropriate for the youth of Bible classes and Sabbath schools, as a means of exciting and fixing their attention, and leading them forward in their biblical course. It is, indeed, matter of surprise, that so little account has as yet been made of this department, both in this country and in England ; there having appeared in this branch, so far as I know,

not more than a single original work of importance in the English language; and not one of a character adapted to popular instruction.

III. After this general survey of the whole field of biblical study, let us now bring under review more particularly the several branches. Of these, one of the first in place and importance, is the Criticism of the Biblical Text, by which we are taught to judge of the accuracy and authenticity of the Bible as it has come down to us. It is well known that the text of the common editions of the New Testament was fixed by Erasmus, on the authority of the few Greek manuscripts to which he had access; and that since his day, the collation of numerous other manuscripts, many of them older and better than those of Erasmus, has brought together a mass of various readings, differing from those of the common text, and sometimes of higher authority. It is the part of Biblical Criticism to compare and sift these readings, and to determine which of them, by weight of evidence and authority, is entitled to a place in the genuine text. The same science applies, in a similar manner, to the Hebrew text of the Old Testament; in the manuscripts of which, notwithstanding the vaunted care and exactness of the scribes and the Rabbins, vast numbers of like various readings have been found to exist.

The time, however, has gone by, when this accumulated mass of various readings, in both the Testaments, was an object of dread or suspicion to the learned or unlearned. The optimism of the external form of the Bible has been laid aside; and it is now known and felt, that in the process of transcription or printing, by uninspired men, the Scriptures are not less liable to the occurrence of slight mistakes than other books. Such are, for the most part, all the various readings, both of the Hebrew and Greek Testaments; and it is a fact long well established, that not one of these affects a single article of faith or practice, unless in the very slightest degree.

In this country, we have no biblical manuscripts, either known or yet to be brought to light. We have no vast libraries, where the dust of ages has accumulated; beneath which we might hope still to find treasures of antiquity. In Biblical Criticism we must rest satisfied with the materials collected by Kennicott and De Rossi, on the Old Testament, and by Mill, Wetstein, Griesbach, and others on the New. Still, it is in our power to make ourselves acquainted with the principles by

which they have regulated their inquiries and their decisions ; we have the same materials which they possessed, and can in some degree put the accuracy of their results to the test. Further than this, we are hardly called upon in this country to go ; because we cannot appeal to the ultimate sources. There is something in the very aspect and external appearance of a manuscript itself, which goes far in aiding to form a judgment as to its readings. Thus, if I may speak from my own feelings, the bare inspection of the controverted passage in 1 Tim. 3 : 16, "God manifest in the flesh," in the famous Alexandrine MS. preserved in the British Museum, affords more decisive and satisfactory evidence as to the reading of that manuscript, than can be drawn from all the varying testimony extant upon the subject.

IV. Another preliminary object of attention is the branch now known as Biblical Hermeneutics, or the Theory and Rules of Interpretation, as applied to the Scriptures. The actual application of these rules is Interpretation itself, now often called Exegesis. It may at first be difficult, for one not versed in Biblical Literature, to perceive the necessity and importance of this branch of study. The principles of interpretation are as old as the creation ; and are instinctively impressed upon our nature, the moment we begin to employ language as the representative of thought. The child comprehends its mother ; and the mother finds no difficulty in interpreting the prattle of her child. We all interpret instinctively and involuntarily, when any one addresses us ; and the reader is even now in the full practice of every principle of interpretation, while he dwells upon these lines.

Why then should it be necessary to draw out these principles into rules, and make a theory and science of what in itself is so practical and instinctive ? We might reply, and with entire propriety, that it is interesting and important to bring out and exhibit in one general scientific view, the principles on which the human mind acts in this, as in so many other cases ; that this indeed is one of the most important aspects of the science of mind ; inasmuch as it respects all our intercourse with each other as intelligent beings. Still, the formation of rules to be applied to the interpretation of common discourse or of books on ordinary subjects, would certainly be in great part a matter of supererogation. Yet we find, that this science is of great importance in the legal profession ; where the due interpreta-

tion of the words of a law often requires the nicest skill and a train of profound reasoning. So it is in the Bible. The Scriptures are the Word of God, and reveal his holy law; they are in a language not our own, and which exists only in a fragmentary form. Hence the frequent necessity of applying all the various principles which can be brought to bear, for the elucidation of what might otherwise remain incomplete and obscure.

But in respect to the Bible, there is another aspect in which the science of Hermeneutics becomes of still more definite application and practical importance. This is presented by the question so often raised: Whether, after all, the language of the Bible is to be interpreted and understood on the same principles, and in the same manner, as that of other books? *A priori* there would seem to be no reason why the sacred volume should form an exception to the general rule. God speaks to men in the words of men; and means either to be understood, or not to be understood. If the former, then his language must be received and interpreted according to the innate fundamental principles of all human interpretation. If, on the contrary, he did not mean to be understood, then he has used the ordinary words of human language in a sense different from their ordinary and natural meaning; and has spoken one thing to the ear and eye, which all could understand, and another thing in a more hidden sense, which none could understand. I speak not here, of course, of parables and allegories, which are common to all writings human or divine; but more particularly of the poetical and prophetic parts of Scripture.

Here, in ancient times, Jewish interpreters were accustomed to suspend mountains of sense upon every word and letter of the Hebrew text; that is to say, the words were held to mean, not only what they would naturally express in their ordinary acceptation; but also every thing else, which the fancy of the interpreter might choose to attribute to them. This tendency passed over from the Jewish Rabbins to some of the fathers in the early Christian church; and has been transmitted down in a greater or less degree even to the present day. This is the *double* or *deeper sense*, of which even now we hear so much; and which, as it seems to me, rests on an imperfect apprehension of the force and character of divine truth. Besides, if we admit more than a single sense, except in obvious allegories and parables, how are we to decide upon this second meaning;

which, by the very supposition, is *hidden*? By what rules or instinct are we to interpret plain and intelligible language, so as to bring out this deeper hidden sense? And being thus hidden, how are we to know, whether it is the *true* meaning? Why may not another just as well bring out a different hidden sense? And how, if there be one hidden meaning, can we determine that there is not a second and a third and a fourth, all equally hidden, and just as much concealed under the plain language, as that which we propose? If all this be so, what barrier can we set up, indeed, against the interpretations of a Cocceius, or the dreamy reveries of a Swedenborg? I know of none.

In short, viewing the subject under every aspect, I must hold that any system of interpretation, which departs from the plain and obvious meaning of the language of Scripture, rests upon a wrong foundation, and is fraught with danger to the mind earnestly seeking after divine truth. It converts the Word of God into a book of riddles; such as were not uncommon in ancient times; and, more than all, it saps the fundamental principles, which regulate our conduct as beings capable of a mutual interchange of thoughts by means of language. It makes God profess to speak to us in the language of man; and yet takes his words out from the application of the rules, by which alone we understand or are understood, when speaking with each other.

It is on this ground, especially, that an attention to the principles and rules of Hermeneutics, becomes of high importance to the biblical student.

Thus far my remarks have had respect to the general method and principles of biblical study. Let us now survey, for a few moments, some of the more important sources, whence that information which must constitute the means and materials of the interpreter, is to be derived.

V. Among these, Biblical History occupies an important place. The Old Testament is itself the chief history of the Hebrew nation; for the early narrative of Josephus, the professed historian of his people, is drawn mainly from the Bible, with the addition of various particulars derived from traditional and doubtful authority. The Pentateuch indeed is the foundation of all human history, as well as of the Jewish; and brings down the narrative of that people to the eve of their establishment in the Promised Land. Every subsequent part of the

Bible, whether it be history, or poetry, or prophecy, gospel or epistle, refers back both to the Pentateuch and to Hebrew history in later times ; and is absolutely unintelligible without an acquaintance with the facts there related. Thus far, the Bible is its own best interpreter,—the only storehouse where the facts are all laid up.

But there are also in the Scriptures frequent allusions to the history of other nations besides the Jews. Egypt and Ethiopia, Persia and Assyria, Babylon and Phenicia, play no unimportant part upon the pages of the sacred record ; and an acquaintance with the facts of their history not only serves to illustrate the Holy Scriptures, but greatly to strengthen their authority. Indeed, no stronger testimony to the truth and authenticity of any ancient document can ever be expected or required, than exists in behalf of the Bible upon the walls of the vast temples of the Egyptian Thebes. We find there, for example, Sheshonk, the Shishak of the Scriptures, sculptured as a colossal figure with his name annexed, leading up rows of Jewish captives to present them to his god.* In this respect, the active spirit of the present age, in deciphering the sculptured monuments and writings of antiquity, is at the same time bringing out the strongest and most incontrovertible evidence, in behalf of the authenticity and claims of Holy Writ. And it is perhaps not too much to expect, that the illustrations and confirmations which have thus flashed upon us from the deciphering of the hieroglyphic writings, are but the precursors of others, to be yet developed from the wedge-formed inscriptions of the ancient Medes and Persians.

Not less in general importance to the interpreter, is the history of the Jewish people and the neighboring nations, during the interval of time between the Old Testament and the New. This whole period had a paramount influence in forming the character of the later Jews, and shaping their opinions on theological and moral subjects ; and all these require to be well understood, in order to comprehend many of the allusions and much of the teaching in the New Testament, and judge of its force and adaptation to times, circumstances, and persons. In like manner, an acquaintance with the general history of the time of Christ and of the apostolic age, is absolutely essential for understanding the scope and foundation of their instruction and doctrines ; and the history

* 2 Chron. xii. 2—9.

of the primitive church during the same age, serves to clear up much that must otherwise remain "hard to be understood," in the writings of the great apostle of the Gentiles.

VI. Intimately connected with the History of the Hebrew people, are their Antiquities so called, Ecclesiastical, Political, and Domestic. In respect to the Bible, it is perhaps an acquaintance with these, which constitutes the main and most essential qualification of the interpreter. It is this kind of knowledge, which, most of all, places him in the position of the Jews themselves; enables him to think as they thought, feel as they felt, judge as they judged, and understand as they understood. Indeed, allusion to these varied topics, is interwoven in the very texture of every page and almost every paragraph of the Bible.

The Ecclesiastical Antiquities have relation to the whole constitution and ritual of the Hebrew church under the Old Testament; to develop and establish which, as well as to sustain and purify them, was the primary object of a great portion of the Hebrew Scriptures. The New Testament indeed abrogates the ancient ceremonial law; but in order to know what is thus abrogated, we must first know what once existed; and be able to mark the distinction between that which, as the spirit, is of permanent obligation, and that which, as the letter, has been done away. We must learn too what came in place of these former institutions; and what was the constitution imposed upon the Christian church, its sanctions and its ordinances.

In the Political Antiquities of the Hebrews we are to look not only for a perpetual commentary and illustration of the sacred text; but also for the source of much that exists in modern legislation. The very peculiar character of a people governed by a theocracy; a nation of which God alone was king; needs to be well understood, in order to embrace the full meaning of much of the Old Testament. In the New Testament likewise, the situation of this same people, pining under the galling yoke of foreign dominion; and all the complicated particulars of its government and administration under a foreign master; must constantly be taken into account, in order rightly to apprehend the language of the sacred writers.

But that branch which comes home most of all to "our business and bosoms," and introduces us most completely into the very sanctuary of Hebrew life, is their Domestic Antiquities. These show us their household and family arrangements, their

manners and customs, their business and actions, their daily life and walk. These serve more than all else to bring us to a close *personal* acquaintance with that remarkable people; they enable us to be present with them in their houses, at their meals, in their affairs; to see them with their wives, their children, and their servants; in their rising up and lying down; in their going out and coming in; in short, in every thing relating to the persons and employments of themselves and families. Without an acquaintance with all these particulars, the interpreter can never be thoroughly furnished for his work. Whatever may be his qualifications in other respects, he can never enter fully into the meaning and spirit of very much of the sacred text.

It is greatly to be regretted, that this last branch, the Domestic Antiquities of the Hebrews, is just that which has been most neglected. There are perhaps books enough on the Jewish ritual; but I know of only a single important work in the English language, and that a translation, which gives any thing like a complete view of the domestic life and manners of this people.

VII. It is not necessary to dwell here on the importance of a knowledge of Biblical Chronology. This is perhaps the branch of biblical learning, which of all others has been most readily acknowledged, and most extensively and ably cultivated in the English tongue, as is testified by the distinguished names of Usher, Newton, and Hales. Yet, after all, the difficulties are by no means wholly cleared up; and many of the results as to dates, can be regarded only as conjectural estimates. Hardly any two of the chronological systems agree throughout. Even in regard to the times, in which the several books of the New Testament were written, there exists great diversity of opinion and statement. All this does not affect, however, in the slightest degree, the question of their authority; it serves only to show that the biblical student has before him no light task, while he delves in the mists of gray antiquity, in search of some faint traces, which may serve as landmarks in the course of times and seasons.

VIII. A branch of biblical study which has excited comparatively little attention in English literature, and yet is one of great interest, is Biblical Geography. While geography in general, both historical and physical, has been cultivated with great success in England and in our own land; while the classic soil of Italy and Greece, and even that of India, has been

traversed and described by multitudes; while we have treatises from the highest names on the geography of Herodotus, and other ancient profane writers; the geography of the Holy Scriptures has remained unsettled and unexplored, and even the physical features of the Land of Promise are to this day in a great measure unknown. Strange as it may appear, even the efforts of British science in behalf of navigation, have not been extended to this quarter. While even the polar regions have been traversed and explored; while the results of exact surveys and soundings are laid down in the latest charts of the Red Sea, and those of the coasts of Asia Minor and Northern Africa; the coasts of Syria and Palestine, that land of the earliest history and deepest interest, have never been surveyed, and cannot be given on any map, on the basis of astronomical observation or scientific measurement. As the theatre of recent naval war, it is to be hoped that these coasts may no longer thus remain a reproach to nautical science.

Another strange fact appears in the history of biblical geography. I mean the circumstance, that of all the multitude of pilgrims and travellers who have thronged the Holy Land for the last five centuries, not one of them has gone thither with any reference to the geography of the Scriptures, or made the slightest preparation to qualify himself for instituting researches, or forming a judgment, on subjects falling within this important department. At least nothing of the kind has appeared before the public. The travellers have often been acute and observing men; but they have never inquired, in respect to the Holy Land, what was already known, or what was unknown; what was certain or uncertain; what was forgotten, or yet to be sought out. Hardly one has ever yet travelled with a sufficient knowledge of the Arabic language, to collect information for himself from the people of the land. The consequence has been, that travellers have mostly only listened to and reported the traditions and legends of the foreign monks; and no one has ever thought of seeking after what might yet remain among the common people.

These monastic traditions began early to take root and spring up; and as ages rolled on, they flourished more and more luxuriantly. The centuries of the crusades added to their number and strength; and then, and in later times, a mass of foreign tradition, which had thus foisted itself upon the Holy Land, spread itself over Christendom, until it has come to be received

almost without doubt or question. Yet it frequently contradicts the express testimony of the Scriptures or of Josephus ; and is, in fact, in itself worthless, unless when supported by collateral evidence. In looking down through the long period that has followed the labors of Eusebius and Jerome, in the fourth century, it is interesting, though painful, to perceive, how the light of truth has gradually become dim, and at length often been quenched in darkness. It is certain, that in the long interval between Eusebius and the crusades, very much was forgotten by the church, which still continued to exist among the common people ; and in the subsequent period, the progress of oblivion has perhaps been hardly less rapid. Even within the last two centuries, so far as the convents and travellers in Palestine are concerned, I fear the cause of sacred geography can hardly be said to have greatly advanced.

Yet there can be no doubt, and I speak from personal experience, that there does exist among the native population of Palestine, the Arab Fellâhs of the villages and hamlets, a species of tradition, which is destined to throw great light upon the ancient topography of the land. I mean *the preservation of the ancient names of places among the common people*. This is a truly national and native tradition ; not derived in any degree from the influence of foreign convents or masters ; but drawn in by the peasant with his mother's milk, and deeply seated in the genius of the Semitic languages. Such names still exist in every part of Palestine ; and we ourselves, in travelling through regions both visited and unvisited, were enabled to collect many such, of which apparently there has been no written mention since the fourth century.

We all recognize the benefit and importance of a knowledge of geography, in reading the current works of the day, and even the newspapers. Of how much higher importance must it then be, for the due understanding of the Scriptures ; in which the physical and topographical features of the country are so distinctly and definitely traced out, that we, like other travellers, found the Bible to be the best, and only accurate guide-book in the Holy Land. The delineation of a place or region on plans and maps, aids exceedingly to render definite our impressions of events ; but how much more distinctly and vividly do they stand out before the mind, when we ourselves have been present in the very spots and scenes. I never felt the full force and energy of the eloquence of Paul, until I stood upon the Areopagus

in Athens ; nor the definiteness, and beauty, and power of the biblical history, until my feet had trod the courts and fields where God of old had-dwelt ; where the Saviour of the world had lived, and taught, and died ; where patriarchs, and prophets, and holy men had walked and held converse with the Most High. It was with an absorbing and exciting interest, that we thus visited these spots ; it was almost like communing with those holy men themselves ; and served, in a high degree, to give us a deeper impression of the reality and vividness of the Scriptural narrative, and to confirm our confidence in the truth and power of the sacred volume.

IX. Connected with the physical Geography of a land, is also its Natural History ; and allusions occur on almost every page of the Bible, to the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, as they exist in Palestine. Here, too, the interpreter is often at fault, for want of full and specific information. The animals of the Holy Land have never been thoroughly investigated ; nor its botany explored ; nor its minerals and geological structure scientifically examined. The leading geologist of the continent of Europe once remarked to me,* that he had long sought in vain for specimens of the limestone around the holy city ; and the *Elah* or terebinth of the Hebrews, has, until recently, remained as undetermined among botanists, as the unicorn of the English version is still unknown to the zoologist.

X. Another important source of information for the interpretation of the Bible, and the only one which time permits me further to mention, may be termed the History of Interpretation. Under this branch I must here include the efforts and results of all former interpreters of the Holy Scriptures ;—a wide and fertile field, in which abundant fruit has been produced, both good and bad. The earliest documents of this kind are to be found in the literature of the Jews themselves ; since the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, the version of the Septuagint, as well as the history and philosophy of the Jews, are all imitations of, or founded upon, their inspired writings. Of the same class is the vast mass of tradition and direct interpretation, collected in the Talmuds, and the labors of the later Rabbins. Here is a mine never yet fully explored, which is probably destined yet to yield, along with much rubbish, not a little ore, for the use of

*Leopold von Buch.

the biblical interpreter. Then follow the ancient versions into various tongues, and also the comments of the Fathers and of interpreters in all subsequent ages; to whose numerous tomes we might almost apply the hyperbolical language of St. John, that "even the world itself cannot contain the books that have been written." Yet amid all this mass of literature, besides the many treasures of commentary, most volumes have some grains of wheat mingled with much chaff; and these it is the duty of the interpreter to seek out, and transplant to a kindlier soil, and cause them to grow and flourish in his Master's field.

XI. We have thus passed in review the main branches of study, which go to make up the department of Biblical Literature, and furnish the sources and materials, from, and with which, the interpreter is to illustrate the Word of God. A due acquaintance with all these may be said to comprise his *objective* qualifications; being such as are drawn from without himself. As to what relates to the inner man, the disposition of the mind, which we may term his *subjective* preparation, I would remark, that all external aids and qualifications will be in vain to the interpreter, without the spirit of prayer, and of humble reliance on the divine assistance. Without this spirit, the human heart and human mind are of themselves prone to wander from the truth in divine things, and to set up human judgment and human authority, above the revealed will of the Most High. The ancient Jews clung to the *letter* of their law, which they understood better than we; but they failed to imbibe its *spirit*. So the interpreter of Scripture, who rests merely on the support of human learning, will abide in the letter, while the spirit must ever remain beyond his comprehension. "The natural man," says St. Paul, "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, seeing they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual, judgeth all things." The truth here propounded by the apostle, applies to the interpreter as well as to the hearer of the Scriptures; and unless he can stand the trial, even 'though he might speak with the tongues of men and of angels; though he might have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; yet without the spirit of love, he would be nothing,' and his teaching become only as "sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal."

It may be asked, Why this spiritual frame of mind should be necessary for the interpretation of the Bible, more than of any

other book ? We may reply : Because it is the main object of the Bible to describe and to inculcate just this spirit and this spiritual frame ; and, therefore, if the interpreter do not possess it ; if he do not know it in his own heart and experience, how can he appreciate and explain it, as it lies upon the pages of Scripture ? How can he, who has no ear nor soul for music, sit in judgment upon the thrilling productions of the mighty masters of harmony ? How can he, who has no taste nor talent for mathematical science, soar with Newton and Laplace through the regions of unlimited space, and trace out, with them, the laws that bind together the remotest worlds, as they float in the realms of ether ? Just so “ the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him.” He that would discern and teach the things of God, must himself be taught from on high.

In reviewing the foregoing remarks and illustrations, we might be justly led to exclaim : “ Who is sufficient for these things ! ” Certainly no one person within the limited space of human life. But we are bound at all times to survey the whole field of our labors, that we may know where to choose our portion, in order to labor with effect, and direct our efforts to the best advantage. Various parts of the field have already been ably tilled by eminent scholars and servants of the Lord ; and we must be sufficiently prepared, to be able to enter in, and profit by the fruits of their labors. This every one of us, who begins a course of theological education, can do, and every one is bound to do. We are bound to employ our best powers and faculties, and improve every opportunity, for acquiring such a knowledge of every branch of Biblical and Theological Study, as shall make us, first, well qualified interpreters of the Word of God ; and, secondly, the faithful heralds of this word and gospel-message to our fellow-men.

It is not, indeed, the object of a course of study in a Theological Seminary, to render the pupils all at once accomplished scholars ; but rather to sow the seed and nourish the shoot, which may hereafter of itself grow up into a noble and firmly rooted tree. The aim is simply to impart the rudiments of a professional education, and to point out the proper way and means, and materials of study, by which the learner may hereafter, through his own efforts, with God’s blessing, arrive at a higher and more important standing and influence, as a teacher in the church of Christ.

Yet I would fain hope that the time is not far distant,—and this hope I would desire to press upon the consideration of the friends and patrons of every Theological Seminary,—when the multifarious and important subjects embraced in the Department of Biblical Literature, will not be left, as now, to the teaching and direction of a single individual. One of the most essential branches, indeed, does not belong at all to a course of theological education, and ought not to form an object of elementary study within the walls of such an institution. I mean an acquaintance with the Greek and Hebrew languages. This, indeed, is admitted at once in respect to the Greek; and a previous knowledge of it is a matter of requisition in every Theological Seminary. The Hebrew rests upon precisely the same grounds; there is in it nothing of theology; it is a merely philological acquirement; yet it is not now, perhaps, demanded for admission into any seminary of our land. Still, the time thus spent in the study of it, is so much time taken away from the proper objects of such an institution; and I, for one, can never conscientiously cease to feel, and to press upon others, that a certain previous acquaintance with this language, ought to be made a condition of enjoying the privileges of every seminary for theological education.

The literature and interpretation of the Old Testament embraces a wide and difficult range of studies, entirely distinct from those belonging to the New. Nor are these latter in any degree less extensive or difficult, though of a different character. Each of these clusters of science furnishes occupation enough for the life and labors of any individual; and this is known and felt wherever theological education has been fully carried out. In all the Theological Faculties of Europe, a separate department has charge of the Old Testament, and another of the New. The same feeling of the importance and necessity of such an arrangement, has already introduced it into some of the older seminaries of our own country; and I would indulge the hope, that in due time, the example may everywhere be followed.

ARTICLE VI.

REMARKS ON THE LITERARY AND ECCLESIASTICAL CONDITION OF SCOTLAND.

THE general character of the people of Scotland is well known. The physical features of the country are a fit emblem of the robust and unyielding spirit of the population. No community in Europe has presented a more determined opposition to every kind of foreign influence, especially such as has threatened to mitigate the characteristic sternness of manners, or the rigor of orthodoxy. In every department of study and of action, this strong national peculiarity has showed itself. An undying hold upon "Christ's crown and covenant" nerved the arm and tuned the voice of the Cameronian, as he sent up from a hundred ravines his shout of defiance, or his psalm of thanksgiving. The same iron hardiness is now scaling the fortresses of Afghanistan and thundering against the battlements of St. Jean d'Acre. The Presbyterian General Assembly will sooner incur the hazard of driving from her ranks a large secession of her ablest champions, or her most devout presbyters, than yield one iota of that which, in her opinion, makes the kirk the glory of all lands. Even in the halls of science, there is, in many respects, a tenacious adherence to what the Scotchman of yore fondly cherished. All the ports of the country are closed against the importations of any Teutonic novelties, either in philosophy or exegesis. Parkhurst's Lexicon still maintains its ascendancy, and the Hebrew Testament, *without* the points, is yet the grief and annoyance of the young licentiate in theology. In morals and manners too, the Caledonian stiffly adheres to the precedents of antiquity. In the temperance reformation, the poor, despised Irish are far in advance of their northern neighbors. The Scotch are men of strength to mingle strong drink,—equally expert in constructing systems of mental philosophy and bowls of good whiskey-punch.

However, with all this unnecessary rigidity, with all this reluctance to reform what is obviously untenable and mischievous, we still love the land of the Covenanters. A thousand delightful associations cluster around her glens and her moun-

tains. We are glad to fasten our eyes on a national character which is permanent, as well as pure. Honored be the country which has withstood the torrent of German neology and Parisian licentiousness. Cut off she indeed is from the polite circles of London; she is removed from being a kingdom; her regalia are now empty things, kept for a show; but she has, what is far better, the Bible and the Catechism. Her parish schools are worth ten thousand fading diadems, and, we had almost said, ten thousand Jameses and Marys, like those who once wore them. Honor to the people that would not bow down before the waxen images of Rome; that was not terrified by the High Commission of Charles I.; that never succumbed to the atrocious persecution inflicted by the ordained tools of Charles II.; and that welcomed with an outcry of joy the subversion of the Stuarts, and the accession of the House of Orange. We delight to recall the illustrious names which adorn the Scottish literary and ecclesiastical annals; Knox, "who never feared the face of man," and the prototype of much which his church and country have since been; the Erskines, ather and two sons, not decorated with literary honors, but men of holy life, of steadfast purpose, and eminently meet for the inheritance of the saints in light; and the Livingstons, the Bostons, the Rutherfords, the Gillespies, the Willisons, whose memories wear an amaranthine freshness. In other connections, we might enumerate two of the great triumvirate of British historians; and four or five honored and never-dying names in intellectual science; and two or three of the children of sweetest song, who have given an immortality, throughout the civilized world, alike to obscure tradition, to local scenery, to uncouth metres and a barbarian accent. Genius, pouring itself out on the soil where it was nurtured, and hiding itself in scenes and stories exclusively national, has won a more lasting fame than genius employed in writing the history of continents, or speculating profoundly on the universal nature of man. Adam Smith created, not an era in political science, but political science itself; still, great as are his merits, the Cotter's Saturday Night will outlive the Wealth of Nations. The philosopher speaks coldly to the practical understanding; the plough-boy poet addresses the heart of man in all the stages of its development.

We now proceed to inquire, What are the prominent causes of these marked peculiarities in Scottish character? To what

are we to attribute the boldness, the strength, the intelligence, the decided reputation for virtue and moral power, which have, for centuries, distinguished the inhabitants of North Britain? In the facts and considerations, which we shall adduce as an answer to these interrogatories, we shall accomplish the main purpose of the present essay.

In the first place, the climate, and the physical features of the country have, unquestionably, exerted an important influence. Scotchmen, if they should live at the sources of the Indus, would be Affghans; if in the fastnesses of Circassia, Koords, sleeping under the black tent, or waylaying the luckless traveller; or, if on the Green Mountains of New England, independent Christian yeomanry. Mountains and floods, mists, roaring torrents, silver lakes, precipitous crags, the unceasing dash of the ocean, beating on the hard rocks,—all such things become the elements, or the occasions of intellectual and moral power. They act, inevitably, on the hearts and the minds of the beings who are conversant with their sublime and beautiful phenomena. Who could sail, as Sir Walter Scott did, around the waters that wash three sides of the country, and not receive permanent impressions? Even Dr. Johnson, phlegmatic as he was, and a cordial hater of all Scotchmen, except his obsequious biographer, revealed something like poetic enthusiasm, when he journeyed to the home of St. Columba. This influence of material objects is not inconsiderable in any circumstances. The Arab, in his boundless desert of sand, is linked in affection to the few and the burning objects with which he every day meets. The dazzling column of sand reminds him of his dear birth-place, and of the long succession of Sheikhs, who have come in and gone out before his tribe. How much greater must be the effect of natural objects in a northern and mountainous region, especially if these objects be associated with stirring events in the national history! Here was the glen, that sheltered William Wallace from his foes. There stood a hut, in which the outlawed Bruce found an asylum. Deep in that cavern, where the crystal water bubbles up, the Covenanter's infant was baptized, and on that little knoll the aged elder was gathered, not to his fathers, but to his final rest. In that narrow vale, how often has the death of Jesus been remembered, when his disciples met in trembling and fear, or in joyful thanksgiving over some great deliverance! The pious Scotchman, like the wanderer to Padan-Aram, comes to holy ground,

—places where his ancestor wrestled with the angel of the covenant, or hastily caught up, with the weapon of defence in one hand, the emblems of a Saviour's dying love.

We may suggest, in the second place, the fierce political and ecclesiastical contests, which marked the whole period of the history of Scotland up to the accession of James VI. to the throne of the United Kingdom, and even still later, as one of the causes in the formation of the character of the people. The country was, almost without intermission, the scene of the wildest anarchy, or of the most grinding oppression. The blood of kings, nobles and peasants flowed, for ages like water. Shakspeare's *Macbeth* is hardly a work of imagination. It is nearly overborne by facts. "A man's foes were they of his own household," was strictly verified; the clan had more than an Indian's scent for the blood of its neighbor. The civil history of no nation in Europe is less grateful to the philanthropist than that of Scotland, for several centuries. William Wallace perished on the scaffold. James I., an accomplished prince, was murdered by his nobles. The insufferable tyranny of James III. excited a rebellion, in which he was defeated and slain. James IV. fell at Flodden. The hostility of his granddaughter, Mary Stuart, to the Reformation, occasioned discontents which terminated in the rebellion of her subjects, her own flight to England, and her subsequent execution. The union of the two crowns, in 1603, was not the harbinger of peace. Even after the Revolution of 1688, and the union of the monarchies in 1707, the waves of discord were not hushed. The partisans of the Stuart dynasty twice rose in rebellion against the house of Hanover. In these political disturbances, the ecclesiastical fortunes of the people were closely interwoven; or rather, as we shall find in the sequel, the affairs of government were often identical with those of the church. These stirring events, this unceasing excitement could not, of course, be without effect on the character of the actors. The Scotchman was nursed in storms both physically and morally. His life was a hard discipline. The stronger elements of his nature were necessarily brought into active play. The tempestuous passions found full scope. Feats of daring became the end of his existence. To murder a noble, or to break a royal sceptre was familiar sport. The dreadful butchery of the battles fought in Scotland attests the physical courage, and the ex-

asperated temper of the combatants. The remembrance of these days of old has not perished in Scotland. The same stern characteristics are still, in a measure, exhibited. The present generation sometimes show the "stuff" of which their ancestors were made. A passion for wrangling, a dogged tenaciousness of opinion, an inability to distinguish between the substance and the shadow, and even the protrusion of uncomfortable epithets are not now unknown in Scotland. Dugald Stewart, characterized as he was for the most gentlemanly and conciliating demeanor, manifested somewhat of the national temperament, in the controversy caused at the proposed election of Prof. Leslie to the chair of natural philosophy in the university of Edinburgh. In the famous dispute respecting the circulation of the Apocryphal Scriptures on the part of the British and Foreign Bible Society, the people of Scotland rose as one man, and cut off all connection with their southern fellow-Christians. The Caledonian hills were made to ring with denunciations of the uncanonical books, and of those who would circulate them in the Papal countries. The doings of every General Assembly, that have fallen under our notice, contain striking developments of the national propensity in question. Scenes are sometimes exhibited, and language is employed which would hardly be tolerated in the House of Commons, or in an American House of Representatives, and which lead us back to the wrathful harangues and the scurrilous dialects of the Bothwells, Murrays and Knoxes of Queen Mary's day. A living theological writer, occupying a high station, and who has acquired considerable notoriety, uses epithets which should seem to have been culled from "the Monstrous Regiment of Women,"* or from the vocabulary of the tolbooth of Edinburgh. American ecclesiastical courts have borne witness to some choice specimens, not only of rigid Scotch orthodoxy, but of a temperament not the most amiable, and of language not very courteous.

We remark, in the third place, that to the early and general establishment of parochial schools, Scotland is largely indebted for her intellectual superiority, and her commanding station among the communities of Europe. The importance of this subject must be our apology for dwelling upon it at some length.

* The title of one of John Knox's publications.

In early times, the monasteries contained the only seminaries of education then known in Scotland. If any schools existed in the larger burghs, they were under the patronage of some religious house. Long prior to the Reformation, there seem to have been such seminaries, where Latin was taught. There were also common elementary institutions, called "Lecture Schools," which afforded instruction in the vernacular tongue. As early as 1494, the Scotch Parliament enacted, that all barons and freeholders, "who are of substance," should put their oldest sons and heirs to the schools, from the sixth or the ninth year of their age. After the Reformation, the establishment and maintenance of schools became an object of constant and anxious attention on the part of the Protestant clergy. In the First Book of Discipline, composed in 1560, it was recommended that every parish, where there was a town of any reputation, should have a schoolmaster, "able to teach the grammar and Latin tongue;" and that "in *landward* parishes, the minister should take care of the youth of the parish, to instruct them in the rudiments, particularly in the Catechism of Geneva." The church never lost sight of this object. Many acts of the General Assembly were passed in relation to it. When applying for the restitution of the church property, the endowment of schools was never forgotten by the ecclesiastical courts.* In 1616, the Privy Council for the first time interposed their authority, and enacted that in "every parish of this kingdom, where convenient means may be had for entertaining a school, a school shall be established, and a fit person shall be appointed to teach the same, upon the expense of the parishioners, according to the quantity and quality of the parish." Episcopacy then prevailed; and this act was directed to be carried into effect, "at the sight and by the advice of the bishop of the diocese in his visitations." In 1633, the act of council was ratified in Parliament. This was the first legislative enactment authorizing the establishment and endowment of parish schools.

During the civil wars, a more enlightened act was passed, which, though rescinded at the Restoration, was adopted almost *verbatim*, in the celebrated statute of William and Mary, in the year 1696, which is the foundation of the present parochial system. The statute is as follows: The estates of Parliament,

* See Macculloch's British Empire, and the authorities referred to by him, Vol. II., p. 484.

“considering how prejudicial the want of schools in many congregations hath been, and how beneficial the providing thereof will be to the kirk and kingdom, do, therefore, statute and ordain, that there be a school founded, and a schoolmaster appointed in every parish not already provided, by advice of the presbyteries; and that to this purpose, the heritors (landholders) do, in every congregation, meet among themselves, and provide a commodious house for a school, and *modify* a stipend to the schoolmaster, which shall not be under 100 merks (£5 11s. 1½d.) nor above 200 merks, to be paid yearly at two terms,” etc. In 1693, an act had been passed, entitled: “An act for settling the quiet and peace of the church,” which declared, among other things, “that all schoolmasters and teachers of youth in schools are, and shall be, liable to the trial, judgment and censure of the presbyteries of the bounds, for their sufficiency, qualifications and deportment in the said office.” The whole system was arranged and completed by another act of the Parliament of Scotland, in 1699.

The object of these various acts of the government was happily attained. For more than a century after the enactments, the great body of the people in Scotland were better educated than in any other division of Christendom. The power to read and write, and an acquaintance with the elements of arithmetic were placed within the reach of almost every individual; while all classes of the people were enabled to read the Bible from their earliest years, and, with the assistance of the catechism (which was regularly taught in every school), have received the rudiments of a religious education, such as they could not have had the same means of attaining in any other country of Europe.*

During a large part of the last century, the schoolmasters, in many parishes, were qualified to give instruction in the Latin language to such as were desirous to acquire a grammar school education. A very considerable number of individuals, throughout the kingdom, have been prepared for the Universities, in the schools of the parishes in which they were born. In 1836, there were 916 separate parishes in Scotland, and the total number of schools was 1162, there being 146 endowed schools over

* A Brief Account of the Constitution of the Established Church of Scotland, by the Rev. Sir Henry Moncrief Welwood, Bart., D. D. 1833, pp. 103.

and above one school for each parish. These latter are termed *secondary* or *side* schools. Generally there is but one secondary school in a parish, sometimes more. Taking the average income of these 1162 schools at £27 10s, which is about the sum, the annual endowment amounts to £31,955, exclusive of school-houses, dwelling-houses for the teachers and a garden. The ministers of parishes, and the landholders have the power of determining the branches which a schoolmaster, on induction, must be competent to teach. These, of course, vary somewhat in different parishes. In burghs, there is often a separate school for classics only, sometimes classics and French. Most of the teachers have received a university education. In the three counties, for example, of Aberdeen, Banff and Moray, according to a report presented in 1835, out of 137 teachers, there were only 20 who had not studied at college. The law makes no provision for the payment of assistant teachers. No person can act as schoolmaster, until he has undergone an examination before the presbytery, which has the power, should he be found unqualified, or if his moral character be objectionable, to nullify the election. The decision of the presbytery is final in all matters relating to schoolmasters; unless when a civil question arises, which may be carried by the teacher before the court of session. All parochial schoolmasters must be members of the established church, and are required, on induction, to subscribe the confession of faith and the standards. Every presbytery is understood, by means of a deputation of their members, to visit and examine the various schools within their limits, once every year. This, however, is not uniformly done. The landholders and minister have the right of fixing the fees which the scholars are required to pay to the teacher. These fees are, generally, very low. The annual income from salary and fees may be about £55, exclusive of a house and garden. In the majority of parishes, however, the schoolmasters have slight additional emoluments, arising from their being session-clerks, and, in some instances, precentors. They have, also, small perquisites for making up militia lists, enrolments under the Reform Act, etc.

Great advantages must necessarily flow from such a system of education. The character for intelligence, which the native of Scotland has long borne throughout the world, may be traced, in no inconsiderable degree, to the parish-school of his native mountains. This common-school education has raised the private soldier above his English and Irish comrades. A

part of the men who conquered under Lord Wellington in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, were trained under the conjoint influences of the kirk and the school. The British lines were not a mere aggregation of brute force. It was intelligence, and, in some degree, moral principle, which made their onset so often irresistible. The benefits of this general education may be seen, somewhat, in softening the rigidity of the Scottish character ; in polishing, in a degree, its roughnesses ; and in imparting some show of reason, even where physical obstinacy was the predominating element. The two and a half millions of North Britain enjoy a reputation, and exert an influence, to which no other six millions of the population of the empire can make any pretension. One main ground of this distinction is the early education in the one case, and the want of it in the other. What a blessing beyond all computation would it have been to Ireland, if a parochial school-system had been, for two centuries, transforming her wretched potato-diggers into intelligent and independent yeomanry !

This system, however, was found, at an early period, insufficient to meet the wants of the people. The grand object of the Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge, as described in the patent in 1709, was, and it still is, "the increase of piety and virtue, within Scotland, especially in the Highlands, islands and remote corners thereof, where error, idolatry, superstition and ignorance do mostly abound, by reason of the largeness of the parishes, and the scarcity of schools." The society has accumulated a capital of about £100,000. Of the 340 functionaries of the society, all are stationed in the Highlands and islands, with the exception of six teachers and one missionary. When the society was instituted, neither the Bible, nor any religious book, had been translated into the Gaelic language. This great deficiency is now supplied.

Notwithstanding the labors of this society, much ignorance still remained. In 1824, a committee of the General Assembly discovered, that in the northwest parts of Scotland, there were not fewer than 10,500 children, under fifteen years of age, destitute of the means of education, and that not less than 250 additional schools were necessary ; and they have since ascertained, that the total number of persons of both sexes, of six years of age and upwards, in all the parishes of the Highlands and islands, unable to read either in the English or Gaelic languages, amounts to 83,397. The Rev. Dr. Gordon stated at the last meeting of the Assembly, that there were 90,000 per-

sons in Scotland who were unable to read. The Rev. Dr. Paterson of Glasgow testified at the same meeting, that there were 80,000 persons in the limits of one synod, who could not read the Bible, and that Glasgow has a population of 60,000 persons, and Edinburgh of 50,000, not one of whom has any connection with the public worship of God, and among whom there is no reading of the Bible at home, and no catechetical instruction of children. It was also mentioned that the town of Peterhead, with 6000 inhabitants, had no place until recently for parochial education, except a single small apartment. From the report of the committee, it appears that there are now, (May, 1840,) 120 schools, with 12,000 pupils, all of whom are instructed in English, and more than 2,500 in Gaelic. The annual income is between five and six thousand pounds sterling. A majority of the committee were in favor of accepting the government-grants on the conditions annexed by the privy council. The resolution of the committee was approved by the General Assembly, with the additional clause, that nothing shall be done by the government inspectors, prejudicial to the interests of the established church.

The Secession church has, like the establishment, shown an interest in the cause of education. The number of schools, owing their origin to this church, exceeds 100. They are established, on a large scale, in the great cities, and form models of good tuition. The number of Sunday schools in Scotland is about 600, two-thirds of which belong to the Dissenters. The whole number of schools in Scotland may be estimated at about 4,600, of which 3000 are private, or voluntary schools. It is supposed that about one ninth part of the population are in the process of education.

There is a species of school established within the last thirty-five years, called *academies*, in the larger burghs, such as Edinburgh, Dundee, Perth, etc. They are under the direct care, either of the subscribers by whom they have been founded, or of the magistrates. These academies, and the ancient burgh schools, such as the High School of Edinburgh, are regarded as the best seminaries in Scotland, embracing all the necessary and ornamental branches of education, each taught by a separate master.*

* See Macculloch's *British Empire*, II. 488, and *Edinburgh Almanac* for 1840.

Our account of the state of the schools in Scotland, and our estimate of the influence of education in the formation of the national character would be incomplete, without some notice of the Universities. And here we are glad to avail ourselves of the very voluminous and enlightened report, made to king William IV., by a royal commission of inquiry into the state of the universities of Scotland. These universities are not now of an ecclesiastical character, or, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, ecclesiastical bodies. They are connected, indeed, with the established church of Scotland, the standards of which the professors are required to acknowledge, though this is now, often, practically set aside. Like other seminaries of education, they may be subject to the inspection of the church in relation to any religious opinions which are taught in them. The professors of divinity, whose instructions are intended for those connected with the established church, are, in their character of professors, members of the presbytery of the bounds; and each university returns a representative to the General Assembly. But in other respects, these universities are not ecclesiastical institutions, not being more connected with the church, than with law or medicine. They are intended for the general education of the country.* All the classes may be taught by laymen, with the exception of those of divinity; and in no part of the system, except in theology, is any distinction observed with reference to the views or pursuits of those intended for the church. It is also very important to observe, that they have, in no respect, been framed or modified, with reference to the means, or pursuits, or habits of the aristocracy. The system is that of a general plan of education, by which persons of all ranks may be equally benefited. It is the peculiar and beneficent character of the Scottish universities, that they are intended to place the means of the highest education in science and philosophy within the reach of persons in humble ranks of life, while, at the same time, they are equally fitted to educate and enlighten the youth of the highest class in society. The Scottish universities have always embraced students of every variety and description. Men advanced in life, who attend some of the classes for amusement, or in order to recall the studies of early years, or to improve themselves in

* Not a few of the dissenting ministers of England have been educated at the Scottish universities.

professional' education, originally interrupted; or persons engaged in the actual occupations of business, who expect to derive aid in their pursuits from the new applications of science to the arts; or young men not intended for any of the learned professions, or meaning to go through any regular course of university education, but sent for one or more years to college, in order to carry their education farther than they could prosecute it in the parochial schools, before they are engaged in the pursuits of trade or commerce. And all persons may attend any of the classes, in whatever order or manner it may suit their convenience. The system of instruction by a course of elaborate lectures on the different branches of science and philosophy, continued daily for a period of six months, is admirably calculated to answer all the objects which such persons may have in view, as well as to afford much useful instruction to regular students.

The remuneration of the professors depends, in the larger universities, mainly, and in Edinburgh, it may be said, entirely, upon the fees paid by the students, or, in other words, upon the number of students. From the fact that the reputation of the professors must be greatly increased by the number of persons attending upon them, especially those who have just been alluded to, there is danger, that in proportion to the increase of auditors of this description, the important and primary object of the regular education of youth may be overlooked, examinations and exercises being gradually given up, the professor being entirely confined to lecturing. The students in the Scotch universities do not reside within the walls of the college, or in any place subject to the inspection of the university authorities. They reside wherever they choose; and after they leave the class-room, their studies and occupations are not necessarily under the inspection of the professors. In Edinburgh and Glasgow, it may be safely said, that the professors do not generally know much more of the students, (except when in their class-rooms,) than of the other youths of these great cities.

There are no endowments or establishments connected with the Scotch universities, such as fellowships for the maintenance of literary men, after their own education is finished, and who do not necessarily take any share in the business of instruction. There is no encouragement, therefore, to prosecute, to any great extent, those branches of literature which do not directly tend to useful objects in life. Without the strongest natural

inclination, it is in vain to hope, that many persons will devote themselves to classical literature as their peculiar pursuit, with the zeal exhibited in other countries, when they cannot thereby attain any immediate honor or future advantage.

The medical department of education in the universities of Scotland is evidently of the greatest importance. During a long period, a large proportion of the persons who have practised medicine throughout the country, and who have occupied the medical stations in the army and navy, have been educated for their profession in one or other of those universities. The medical school of Edinburgh has long possessed high celebrity, and that of Glasgow has, of late years, risen into great eminence; and there is reason to believe that this branch of academical instruction may soon attain an important rank in the university of Aberdeen. Much less attention has been paid to the study of the law. A full course does not seem to have been established at either of the universities, unless that at Edinburgh is an exception. The session for the study of divinity in the university of Aberdeen is three months; in St. Andrews, four; in Edinburgh, though nominally longer, it is not so practically; while in Glasgow it is six months. Divinity is studied almost exclusively by persons intending to become ministers of the established church; and the General Assembly has, by various acts, prescribed the course of study, and the period of attendance at the divinity-hall, which shall be sufficient to qualify candidates for obtaining a license to preach the gospel, as the means of entitling them to hold parochial livings.*

* We subjoin, in a note, some more particular information in regard to the universities, as they exist at the present time, 1840. The oldest of the universities is that of St. Andrews, which was founded in May, 1410, by Bishop Henry Wardlaw, and confirmed by a papal bull in 1411. The college of St. Salvator was erected in 1456; that of St. Leonard in 1512; and that of St. Mary in 1537; the first two were united by parliamentary statute in 1747. In the united college there is a principal (Sir David Brewster) and 8 professors; in St. Mary's, a principal (Robert Haldane, D. D.) and three professors. In the three colleges there are 29 charitable foundations, called *bursaries*, of the aggregate value of about £1100 per annum, whose benefits are extended to 92 individuals. The university of Glasgow was founded in 1571, by a papal bull,

We now proceed, in the fourth place, to the main object of this paper. What is the present ecclesiastical condition of Scotland? What are the prospects of the established church? Why have there been secessions from her ranks? How has the Scottish character been affected by the church policy? What

and its privileges were subsequently confirmed and extended by royal charters and parliamentary statutes. The discipline is administered by a court, consisting of the rector, (now Rt. Hon. Sir J. Graham,) the principal, (Duncan Macfarlane, D. D.,) and the 21 professors. The common business of the college is managed by the principal and 13 professors. The number of charitable foundations is 29, of the average annual value of £1165, and extended to 65 students. The principal and members possess the right of nominating ten students, members of the church of England, to exhibitions in Baliol College, Oxford. University and King's College, Aberdeen, was founded by Bishop Wm. Elphinstone. A papal bull was issued for its erection on the 10th of Feb. 1495. The affairs of the college are conducted, and its discipline administered by a Senatus, which consists of the principal, (Wm. Jack, D. D.,) and 9 professors. The fees, in the complete course of instruction, in the faculty of arts, do not exceed £20. The charitable foundations are 32, of the value of £1771 per annum, and extended to 134 students. Marischal College and University of Aberdeen was founded by George, fifth earl of Marischal, by a charter, dated April 2, 1593, and in the same month, it received the sanction of the General Assembly, and in July was ratified by parliament. The number of bursaries is 115, of the aggregate value of about £1160 annually; about 67 are open to public competition. The rector is the Hon. J. C. Colquhoun; principal, Daniel Dewar, D. D. The whole number of professors is 13. The university of Edinburgh was founded in 1582, by James VI. The principal is John Lee, D. D., one of the ministers of Edinburgh. There is no chancellor nor rector. The number of professors is 32: 4 in law, 3 in divinity, 12 in medicine, and the remainder in arts. Bursaries 34, of the value of £1172 per annum, and extended to 80 students. The whole number of students, at all the Scotch universities in 1837, was above 3,400, of whom Edinburgh had 1580; of the remaining 1820, Glasgow had above two thirds. Edinburgh, in 1822-23, had 2,234 students. The number has been regularly diminishing since that time. In 1835-6, they were thus distributed: law 217, divinity 173, medicine 679, arts and literature 511.

are the lessons which are taught by the interesting crisis which the national communion is now passing through? Our limits will forbid us to answer these questions with that fulness which we could desire. In order to accomplish our object with any degree of satisfaction, we must briefly advert to a few prominent points in the history of the Presbyterian church.

The reformation from Popery began at an early period in Scotland, but made little progress till the time of John Knox. This distinguished reformer was born in 1505. He was educated in the University of St. Andrews, where he took a degree in arts. He was at first a zealous Romanist. About 1544, he renounced that religion and became an equally zealous reformer. Soon after the accession of queen Mary, he retired to Geneva, where he remained till 1555, and where he became acquainted with the doctrines and polity of Calvin.* On the 24th of August, 1560, Popery was abolished in Scotland, and the Protestant religion established by act of parliament. The system of ecclesiastical policy, introduced in room of that which was abolished, was embodied in a work, entitled "The First Book of Discipline, or the Policy and the Discipline of the Church." It was laid before parliament in 1560, as a necessary accompaniment to the legal constitution of the national reformed church; but, though not formally ratified by the legislature, it was subscribed by many of its members. It was approved, in the same year, by the General Assembly at Edinburgh. Though the parliament did not ratify the first book of discipline, it accepted and confirmed the confession of faith drawn up by the Protestant ministers, the object of which was to abjure Popery; and hence it was called the *negative* confession. Another confession or national covenant was subscribed in 1580, 1581, and on subsequent occasions. In 1581, the Assembly first divided the country into presbyteries and synods. Three years afterwards, Episcopacy was established by act of parliament, and the Presbyterian ministers were persecuted or banished. In June, 1592, the Presbyterian form of government was restored, and it received, for the first time, the sanction of parliament, as the authorized government of the established national church. Manses (parsonage-houses) and glebes were provided for the ministers. From 1606 to 1638, Episcopacy

* See the Life of Knox, prefixed to his History of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland, Vol. I. Paisley, 1791.

again prevailed. In 1640, the Presbyterian government received the sanction of Charles I., and of his parliament. At the Restoration in 1660, Episcopacy again attained the ascendancy, which it with difficulty maintained, and at the expense of much persecution and martyrdom, till the Revolution in 1688; soon after which it was abolished, and the national church of Scotland declared Presbyterian; a form which it has ever since maintained. By an act of the parliament of Scotland, 1706, it is "provided and declared, that the true Protestant religion, contained in the Confession of Faith, with the form and purity of worship *then* in use, within the church of Scotland, and its Presbyterian church government and discipline, that is to say, the government of the church by kirk-sessions, presbyteries, provincial synods and general assemblies, shall remain and continue unalterable."

During the whole period from 1690 to 1712, the most important deliberations in the General Assembly turned on subjects of internal regulation. It was a principal object to provide Presbyterian ministers for the remote districts, which were in the greatest need; and, till this could be done effectually, to supply the vacant parishes in the mean time, by individuals sent from the southern counties, who, at intervals, officiated in succession for a limited period.

In 1712, lay-patronage was revived, or the right of nominating to a vacant parish by a lay-patron. The idea of patronage took its rise from the canon law. Neither James VI. nor any of his successors before the Revolution were willing to abolish the right, though it was unquestionably the doctrine of the church, that no minister should be intruded upon any congregation, either by the prince, or any inferior person, without lawful election, and the assent of the people over whom the person is placed. The acts of parliament, while they are authoritative and explicit in enforcing the right, at the same time contain clauses of restriction, by which it was evidently intended to be limited. From 1690 to 1712, it was abolished, and the right of presentation was lodged in the landholders of parishes and the members of kirk-sessions. In 1712, patronage was revived, and continued the law of the church, uninterruptedly, till 1834. After a presentation had been sustained by the presbytery, the presentee was appointed to preach in the vacant church for one or more Sabbaths; and a day was fixed posterior to his preaching, on which a *call* was to be extended to

him by the people, notice to that effect being given from the pulpit. At that meeting, after a sermon had been preached by a member of the presbytery, the parishioners were invited to subscribe a written call to the presentee, to be their future minister. At one period, the call was essential to a presentation, but its efficacy was gradually given up, till, at length, without any alteration being made in the law, it virtually fell into desuetude, that is, a presentation was reckoned valid, if a single name, or perhaps not a single name, was attached to it.*

The act of 1712 had long been a favorite object with the episcopal and tory party in Scotland; an act which was certainly intended by them to operate against the whigs of Scotland, but which no whig administration afterwards could be persuaded to repeal. For many years after the date of the act restoring patronages, presentations were, by no means, introduced into general practice. There were, however, abuses which early created serious disorders. One of the abuses was the practice by which patrons presented individuals, who held rich livings, to very small benefices; being certain that they would not accept of their presentations. The patrons thus protracted the vacancies; and under the law, as it then stood, they were enabled, in the mean time, to retain the vacant stipends.

In 1732 the General Assembly passed an act, decreeing, that where an accepted presentation did not take place, the decisive power of electing ministers for the supply of vacant congregations is lodged *only* in a conjunct meeting of landholders and elders, no other qualification of those landholders being required but that they should be Protestants.† A few days before this enactment, the assembly had decided a question relating to the settlement of a minister in Kinross, in the presbytery of Dunfermline, to which great opposition had been made by the parishioners and the presbytery, and in which the Rev. Ralph Erskine of Dunfermline, and the Rev. Thomas Mair of Orwett, were deeply involved. The assembly had commanded the set-

* See Macculloch, Vol. II. p. 432; and Moncreiff, p. 24.

† Mr. Wellwood thinks that the act of 1732 goes no farther than almost every overture on the subject framed by the assembly for 20 years before, and not beyond what had been the general practice of the church after 1690. The secession of the Erskines and others he attributes very much to the exasperated feelings produced by the Kinross case.

tlement of Kinross to be carried into execution, with circumstances of peculiar severity, and had prohibited the clerks from receiving any dissents from their sentence, or a protest offered from the bar, signed by 42 ministers, or a petition subscribed by many hundreds of elders and people. In 1733, Mr. Ralph Erskine, Mr. Mair, and others were rebuked at the bar for their determined refusal to enrol Mr. Stark, then minister of Kinross, as a member of the presbytery of Dunfermline. In the high tone of church authority, they were *commanded* to acknowledge Mr. Stark as minister of Kinross, though, after his enrolment by the assembly, they had already judicially declared their willingness to treat him as a brother. The Commission* of 1733 pronounced a sentence on four refractory ministers, Messrs. E. Erskine, Wilson, Moncreiff and Fisher, "loosing their relation to their parochial charges, and appointing this sentence to be *intimated* from their pulpits respectively." In several instances, the people tumultuously resisted this intimation, and prevented it from being made. The opposition excited against the act of 1732 became so general and decided, that the assembly found themselves compelled to repeal it in 1734. In 1734 and 1735, there were two feeble and ineffectual attempts made to obtain a repeal of the act of 1712, restoring patronages. In 1736, a more conciliatory assembly passed an act against the intrusion of ministers into vacant congregations, affirming that an intrusion of a minister, contrary to the inclinations of a congregation, is in direct opposition to what had been the principle of the Scottish church since the Reformation. In the spirit of this act, a number of presentees were set aside by the assembly in deference to public opinion.

In the mean time, the Erskines and their associates, who appear to have acted somewhat intemperately, constituted themselves into a presbytery at the Bridge of Gairney, near Kinross. By printed documents, as well as by public declarations from their pulpits, they renounced all subjection to the judicatories of the church. On the 15th of May, 1740, eight ministers were deposed by the General Assembly, and their parishes declared vacant.† To these ministers the name of *Seceders* was given ;

* A large committee acting in the interval of the meetings of the Assembly. It may include all the members of the Assembly.

† See, on the one side, the account of these proceedings by

and as most of the members of their congregations adhered to them, and others followed, they became the foundation of the Secession church in Scotland. The number of congregations and clergymen belonging to the body rapidly increased, and have continued to increase till the present day.*

Mr. Welwood, and the History by Dr. Cook ; and, on the other, the Life of E. Erskine, by Fraser, and Rev. John Brown's (of Haddington) History of the Rise and Progress of the Secession. Mr. Welwood does not advert to one thing, which had much weight in the minds of the Erskines, in inducing them to secede from the church, viz., the low tone of piety, and the lax views of theology, which existed in the establishment.

* On admission to the privilege of a burghess in any of the royal burghs of Scotland, the following oath was required to be taken : "I protest, before God and your lordships, that I profess and allow with my heart, the true religion presently professed within this realm, and authorized by the laws thereof; I shall abide thereat, and defend the same, to my life's end, renouncing the Roman religion called Papistry." Respecting the propriety of this oath, the ministers of the Secession were divided. A separation, in consequence, between the two parties, took place in 1747 ; the party in favor of taking the oath being called Burghers ; the party in opposition, Anti-burghers. The two parties continued separate till 1821, when, the burghess oath being generally dispensed with or abolished, they again united, and assumed the denomination of the "United Associate Synod of the Secession Church." This synod has now (1840) 19 presbyteries in Scotland, 330 ministers, and about the same number of churches. A few additional churches are found in the adjoining districts of England. The professors of divinity are Rev. Messrs. Alexander Duncan, D. D., Mid-Calder, Rev. Robert Balmer, Berwick, Rev. John Brown, D. D., Edinburgh, and Rev. John Mitchell, D. D., Glasgow. The divinity-hall opens at Edinburgh on the first Tuesday of August. The course of study, etc., is much the same as in the established church. The number of persons belonging to the Secession has been estimated at 300,000. The congregations of Broughton Place and Bristo-street chapels, Edinburgh, consist of no fewer than 1200 members, exclusive of hearers and children who are not communicants. The united church abjure patronage ; their ministers are chosen by the communicants of each congregation. They disallow and denounce all connection of ecclesiastical with civil matters. They are

The secession of a portion of the established church was attended with important consequences. When the patrons of parishes began to exercise their rights more frequently, and with less attention to the wishes of the people, and when the people saw that they had a ready access to ministers of their own selection in the seceding churches, the opposition to presentees became more inveterate and unmanageable, and it was soon very difficult for the church courts to decide between the patrons and the people. Both parties, who now began to divide the church, admitted the constitutional necessity of a call from a parish, to become the foundation of a pastoral relation between a presentee and his parishioners. But the *moderate* (or high-church) party affirmed the legal call to be limited to landholders and elders, while the other party contended, as the original seceders had done, for the right of parishioners at large, or at least of the heads of families, to be admitted as callers. The former had the support of the government, who, by this time, perpetually interfered in the management of assemblies, and especially on every point which related to the settlement of ministers; while the latter derived their chief strength from popular favor, and from the influence of those who deprecated every measure which they thought calculated to alienate the people from the established church, and to lessen the usefulness and respectability of the parochial ministers.

Dr. Patrick Cumin, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, and professor of Church History in the University, became the leader of the moderate party, under the direction of the duke of Argyle. This party did not pretend to attempt the abolition of *calls*, in the settlement of ministers, and they always professed to require the call of landholders and elders, before they gave effect to a presentation. But under their management, it was seldom difficult to procure such a call as satisfied them, even in cases where the great body of the parishioners were hostile to the settlements. By the strongly exerted influence of the patrons, and

generally more strict in discipline than the established church. When the Burghers and Anti-burghers united, several congregations of the former declined the coalition. These are called "Original Burgher Associate Synod," and comprehend three presbyteries in Scotland, and two in Ireland; in Scotland, they have 9 churches and 12 ministers. They have a professor of divinity for themselves.

with the help of non-resident heritors, they seldom failed to effect their purpose. Many individuals,* who conscientiously believed that the consent of the congregation was essential to the pastoral relation, thought that they were bound in duty to decline to take any active part in the settlement of ministers to whom a general opposition was made by the parishioners. On the other hand, the moderate party, who controlled the assemblies, were pertinacious in maintaining the authority of their sentences; and the ministers who ventured to disobey them were subjected to the severest ecclesiastical censures. The active rulers of the church affected to despise the seceders. But every church-settlement accomplished by the strong arm of authority, in opposition to the great body of the parishioners,

* Among these was the Rev. Thomas Gillespie, minister of Carnock. The circumstances of his deposition were these. A call, sustained by the assembly, to the parish of Inver-Reviting, in the presbytery of Dunfermline, depending, in a considerable degree, on non-resident heritors, was violently and generally opposed. The ruling party in the church determined to apply ecclesiastical censures. They ordered the presbytery to hold a meeting, and admit the presentee, and declared that the quorum should be five instead of three, which is the legal quorum. Only three ministers, however, attended. Of six members, who pleaded at the bar of the assembly conscientious scruples, one, Mr. Gillespie, was solemnly deposed. Three others were afterwards suspended, all men of unimpeachable character. Mr. Gillespie was one of the most inoffensive and upright men of his time. When he heard the sentence of deposition from the moderator's chair, he nobly replied: "I thank God, that to me it is given, not only to believe in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, but also to suffer for his sake." Mr. G. was the correspondent of President Edwards. See the Works of the latter, Lond. ed. 1839, Vol. I. p. 120, seq. Mr. G. became the founder of the Relief Synod very unwillingly. On his dying bed, he advised his congregation to apply to the church to be restored to her communion; which was accordingly done. The synod now contains 11 presbyteries, about 120 churches, and about the same number of ministers. Professor of divinity, James Thomson, D. D., of Paisley. The Relief church differ from the establishment on no other point than the right of patrons to appoint ministers against the inclinations of the people.

opened a new dissenting meeting, and separated a new congregation from the communion of the establishment.

From 1752 to 1763, there were not many examples of the settlement of ministers when the opposition was very considerable. From 1765 to 1774, there occurred some cases, which occasioned more obstinate and protracted litigation than are to be found on record since 1688. But, by this time, the duke of Argyle had died, and Dr. Cumin no longer held the same sway as leader of the church. Dr. Robertson, the great historian, succeeded him as leader of the moderate party.* At length, the principle was avowed and adhered to, that a presentation to a benefice was in all cases to be made effectual, independently of the merits of the call or concurrence. Cases had sometimes occurred, previously, in which presentees were set aside. But this can scarcely be shown to have happened during the time of Dr. Robertson's management, merely from defects in the concurrence of the parish. To his sound sense and splendid eloquence, was conjoined the steady influence of every administration of government. The struggle with the people was, however, perpetual. The opposition to presentees was so decided, as in a great measure to engross the business of the assemblies. The parties in the church were more equally balanced than they were afterwards. The popular party were led by men of great ability and eloquence. Among them were Drs. Dick, Macqueen and Erskine, Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Andrew Crosbie, etc. The zeal of the people was at last exhausted, and the great majority of the church became convinced that the system of patronage was firmly established, partly by a long series of decisions in the Supreme Court. In a few years after Dr. Robertson retired, the people began to leave the church courts to execute their sentences without opposition, and set themselves to rear seceding meeting-houses, which frequently drew away a large proportion of the inhabitants of the parish.

For many years, during the present century, the Rev. Dr. Andrew Thompson was a leader of the popular party in the

* See the *Life of Dr. Robertson*, by Dugald Stewart. Dr. Drysdale, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, and afterwards the principal clerk of the General Assembly, was the coadjutor of Dr. Robertson in the management of the party. He was a man of talents and of indefatigable industry. See Welwood, p. 79.

church of Scotland. In defending the rights of the people, in opposition to a rigorous enforcement of the law of patronage, he, for many years, displayed, says Dr. McCrie, his unrivalled talents as a public speaker, sustained by an intrepidity which was unawed by power, and a fortitude which was proof against overwhelming majorities. One of his distinguished opponents was the Rev. Dr. John Inglis, of Edinburgh.

At length, there having been many violent intrusions of clergymen, and the dissatisfaction becoming general, a statute was passed by the General Assembly, which is known by the name of the *Veto Act*. This was enacted in 1834, through the exertions of J. C. Colquhoun and Alexander Dunlop, Esquires. "If," to use the words of the act, "at the *moderating in* a call to a vacant pastoral office, the major part of the male heads of families, members of the vacant congregation, and in full communion with the church, should disapprove of the person in whose favor the call is proposed to be *moderated in*, such disapproval shall be reckoned sufficient ground for the presbytery rejecting such person, and he shall be rejected accordingly." The act further declares, "that no person shall be held to be entitled to disapprove as aforesaid, who shall refuse, if required, solemnly to declare, in presence of the presbytery, that he is actuated by no factious or malicious motive, but solely by a conscientious regard to the spiritual interest of himself or the congregation.

Difficulties, however, soon occurred under the Veto enactment. In the case of a presentee to the parish of Auchterarder, where the principles of the act were applied by the presbytery, the Court of Session, the highest judicial tribunal in Scotland, to which an appeal had been made, declared the Veto Act to be *incompetent* and *illegal*, as incompatible with the full exercise of the right of patronage. On the 3d of May, 1839, the House of Lords affirmed the judgment of the Court of Session. On the 22d of the same month, the General Assembly determined, by a majority of 49, to adhere to the Veto Act, notwithstanding the decision of the Lords. On the 12th of June, in obedience to a summons from the Court of Session, the majority of the presbytery of Dunkeld appeared at the bar to answer for a contempt of court, in having inducted a minister at the church at Lethendy, in defiance of their lordships' interdict. On the 14th, the censure of the court was pronounced against them, and they were found liable in the expenses. On the 14th of

August, the commission of the General Assembly, by a majority of 81, prohibited the presbytery of Auchterarder from taking any steps towards the settlement of the presentee of the patron, the Rev. Mr. Young.*

In the mean time, another case occurred, which has occasioned a protracted controversy, and which, in the opinion of many, *may* end in the dissolution of the establishment. The call of Mr. John Edwards, the presentee to Marnoch, in the presbytery of Strathbogie, was signed by only *one* parishioner. Mr. E. had officiated there for several years, as assistant to the minister, and had been removed by him, on a strong expression of disapproval of his services, by a large body of parishioners. Various proceedings took place between the parties, until, in 1838, the General Assembly ordered the presbytery to reject the presentee. This order was obeyed. Thereupon the patron, acquiescing in the judgment of the church courts, offered another presentee, Mr. Hendry. Mr. Edwards then raised a civil action, and also applied for an interdict forbidding the presbytery to ordain Mr. Hendry. The presbytery referred the matter to the synod, and the synod directed them to proceed to settle Mr. Hendry. They declined, and resolved, that the Court of Session had jurisdiction in the case, and that they were bound to obey its interdict. The matter was brought before the General Assembly in May, 1839, who enjoined the presbytery not to determine the question themselves, but to refer it to the Commission, that that court might decide it. The Commission took up the case, and ordered the presbytery not to settle either party, hoping that the legislature would pass some enactment which would relieve the difficulty before the next meeting of the Assembly. In the mean time, however, Mr. Edwards had obtained a decree in the Court of Session, declaring that the presbytery had acted illegally in rejecting him, and that they were bound to try his qualifications, and, if

* In the case of Jedburgh, in which all the parishioners, except five, were totally opposed to the presentee, Mr. Douglas, 2000 left the church, in one day, in consequence of his settlement. In the instance of Biggar it was objected, and admitted by the presbytery, that the voice of the presentee could not be heard in the church; notwithstanding, he was admitted. In another parish, that of Kircudbright, the presentee was stone blind!

they found him fit, to admit him as minister of Marnooch. A requisition was immediately made on the moderator of the presbytery, by several members, to summon a *pro re nata* meeting, in order to take the decree into consideration. The presbytery assembled, and the moderator laid before them the sentences of both the civil and ecclesiastical courts. They declined, however, to consider the ecclesiastical sentences, to continue to meet, or to enter on their minutes the dissent and complaint of the moderator. He immediately appealed to the Commission by complaint and petition. The Commission, in December, ordered the complaint to be served, and suspended the members of the presbytery from their ministerial functions. The presbytery then resolved to sustain the call in favor of Mr. Edwards, and to proceed in his settlement; though they afterwards stated, that they did not intend to *admit* him, but only meant to take him on trial. They also continued to exercise their spiritual functions; and, in addition, prayed the Court of Session to prohibit the ministers from preaching in their parishes, who had been sent down by the Commission. This latter body, at their meeting in March, 1840, sent a committee—Rev. Drs. Gordon, Mackellar, and Mr. Bruce—to hold a conference with the suspended brethren. This conference, however, owing to a misunderstanding in regard to the time and place of meeting, was not held.

At the meeting of the General Assembly, in May, 1840, the whole proceedings in relation to the suspended ministers came under review, and elicited warm and protracted discussions. In the first place, a committee was appointed to confer with the seven ministers. The committee reported that the conference left the deep impression on their minds, that the said ministers had not intended any disrespect to the church judicatories, but were influenced by the conviction, that they were obligated to submit to the judgments of the civil courts. They thought that they were bound, under the civil law, to take Mr. Edwards on trial, with a view to ascertain whether he was qualified by terms of the statute, while it was their purpose, from the beginning, to give every opportunity to state objections to the presentee. They, furthermore, stated explicitly, that they could not renounce their views on this subject, nor confess that they had done wrong in not obeying the church judicatories.

The following resolution, submitted by the Rev. Dr. Patrick

M'Farlan of Greenock, was adopted, by a vote of 166 to 102: "That the sentence of suspension be continued, that the seven ministers be cited personally to appear before the Commission in August; and, if they then should continue contumacious, and refuse submission to the church-courts, that they should then be served with a libel for that contumacy, and that the Commission should proceed until the case was ripe for the next General Assembly." Mr. Edwards was cited to appear personally before the Commission in August. A special committee was appointed to advise and co-operate with the minority of the presbytery of Strathbogie, in providing supplies for the parishes of the suspended ministers. Of the results of the meeting of the Commission in August last, we have no advices.

Various other subjects, vitally affecting the interests of the church, were debated with great warmth. One of these subjects was the bill introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Aberdeen, a distinguished nobleman and Presbyterian of Scotland. It was supported by the minority—the successors of the old moderate party—on the ground, that it would tend to restore the constitution of the church, which had been subverted by the Veto-act; that it would prove a safeguard to the church against all interference from without; and be an additional safeguard against her injuring herself by any capricious exercise of her authority within. On the other hand, it was objected to the bill by Dr. Chalmers and his friends, that it merely confirmed the law as laid down in the civil courts (the judgment in the Auchterarder case for instance) and that it was an outrage on the principle of non-intrusion. On a division, 221 voted for the resolutions of Dr. Chalmers, disapproving of the bill; and 134 for the motion of Dr. Cook, in favor of it. Our limits will not allow us to advert further to the proceedings of the General Assembly.*

* The leaders on the popular side in the Assembly of 1840, were Dr. Chalmers, Mr. Dunlop, advocate of Edinburgh, Dr. M'Farlan of Greenock, Dr. Simpson of Kirknewton, etc. Among those who voted on the same side were Sir David Brewster, Principal Dewar, Drs. Patterson and Henderson of Glasgow, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, etc. The leader on the moderate side of the house was Dr. George Cook, professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews, a gentleman of commanding talents, Rev. James Robertson of

The number of ministers belonging to the establishment is 1190, synods, 16, presbyteries, 80. These presbyteries send 218 ministers and 94 elders as delegates to the General Assembly. The city of Edinburgh sends two elders; 65 other royal burghs, 65; 5 universities, each one minister or one elder; churches in India a minister and an elder; total about 220 ministers and 167 elders. The number of churches in the establishment is probably between 1100 and 1200. It has been estimated, that the number of Dissenters in Scotland, of all denominations, may be about 520,000. The whole population is reckoned at nearly 2,500,000.

We have already noticed the United Secession church,* the

Ellon, Rev. Alexander Hill, D. D., professor of Divinity at Glasgow, Rev. John Hunter, minister of the Tron church, Edinburgh, Sir George Clerk, M. P., Rev. John Lee, D. D., principal of the University of Edinburgh, etc. Mr. Dunlop stated that the friends of the popular party, who petitioned parliament, amounted to 250,000 individuals; while 13,000 only signed the petitions of the opposite party. Of the 16 synods, all but three were in favor of the non-intrusion principle. These three were Shetland, where the vote stood, 14 to 2; Glenelg, by a majority of one; and Dumfries, by a majority of 12 or 14. On the other hand, it was mentioned that a large majority of the officers and members of the five universities were with the moderate party.

* We have read a considerable part of the volume of the Rev. Dr. John Brown, of the United Secession church, entitled, "The Law of Christ respecting Civil Obedience, especially in the Payment of Tribute," 1 vol. 8vo., 1839, 2d ed., pp. 539, Appendix pp. 123. In 1837, Dr. B. refused to pay the annuity-tax, on the ground that he conscientiously disapproved of civil establishments of religion of every form, the tax in question being avowedly imposed for the support of the established church. Some of his property was accordingly *distained* and sold for the payment of the tax. This occasioned considerable excitement. Dr. Brown was attacked in the newspapers with great bitterness, especially by Dr. Haldane, (who seems to regard himself as a consecrated heresy-hunter,) and, in order to defend himself, delivered two lectures in his church, which are the foundation of the present volume. A large, we had almost said, an immense number of illustrative notes is subjoined, indicative of much learning

original Burgher Associate Synod and the Relief Synod. In 1806, a number of individuals separated from the Burgher denomination, in consequence of opinions held by the latter respecting the total independence and incompatibility of the civil and religious authorities. They termed themselves the Associate Synod of Original Seceders. They are in favor of a national church. On the 31st of July, 1839, they voted, 39 to 13, to annex themselves to the church of Scotland. The reunion had been approved by a majority of the presbyteries of the national church. The Reformed Presbyterian Synod represent the Covenanters of the time of Charles I. They are the most rigid Presbyterians in Scotland. They have a professor of theology, A. Symington, D. D. of Paisley, 6 presbyteries and 26 ministers in Scotland, besides 4 presbyteries and 24 ministers in Ireland.

The number of Independent churches, in connection with the Congregational Union of Scotland, is 98; ministers 84; Tutors of the Theological Academy, Glasgow, Ralph Wardlaw, D. D., Rev. Messrs. G. Ewing and J. M. Mackenzie. The Scotch Episcopal church have a theological academy at Edinburgh; professors, Rt. Rev. James Walker, D. D., and Rt. Rev. M. Russell, LL. D.; number of dioceses 6; chapels, between 70 and 80, with about the same number of clergymen. It is supposed that the whole Romish population of Scotland amounts to 140,000, including the children of Catholic parents. The Catholics in Glasgow alone amount to 35,000; in Edinburgh, to 12,000. They have three dioceses, 60 places of worship, and 74 priests and bishops. There are, besides, various small sects in Scotland, as Baptists, Methodists, Unitarians, Sandemanians, Bereans, etc., which it is not necessary here to describe.

From the foregoing observations and statements, it is obvious that the Scottish national church is in circumstances of no little peril. In the language of Dr. Chalmers, "the ark is now in the midst of conflicting billows." One of the greatest difficulties is, that the civil questions, in the last resort, must be decided in *English* courts. Englishmen will not, or cannot un-

and of indefatigable industry. The celebrated passage, Rom. 13: 1—7, is treated by Dr. Brown with great ability. Those who are not convinced by his arguments will be pleased with the force of his reasonings.

derstand the great points in dispute. In the characteristic language of the leader of the popular party,—“The thing of immediate practical importance for us to observe, is the utter hopelessness of inoculating therewith the mind of parliament, where, perhaps, there are not ten, in both houses, who could state, and there are not three who could vindicate the great principle for which we are contending.”* The parliament appear to be about as much interested in the controversy, as the American congress might be supposed to be, in the building of a bridge over the Genesee river. And yet it is a question of the gravest import. It is a conflict of the government and the church. The poor presbyter is between two fires. If he disobey the lords of session, he may find his next lodging-place to be the county jail; if he should contravene the command of the assembly, he is degraded from his ministerial functions, and it is *intimated* that his parish is vacant. When two jurisdictions are conflicting, which must be obeyed? The difficulty is not lessened by the zealous efforts which are made to mix up the question with political appeals. Thus it is represented, that the Veto-act of 1834 was passed through the influence of the Edinburgh whigs, and that it was the legitimate progeny of the reform-mania of 1833.† The English tory party are earnestly called upon to come and assist the intelligence and property of Scotland in the contest with revolutionary violence and religious fanaticism, in which the North Britons are now engaged.

It is manifest, furthermore, that the principle of establishments is in imminent hazard. No man has, recently, done more than Dr. Chalmers to uphold national churches, and, perhaps, no one is now doing more to pull them down. Of this the venerable theologian himself seems to be aware. “It is grievous,” he remarks, “to be thus thrown back again on the original elements of the question; and, after having won

* Perhaps there is some apology for this obesity of understanding, when such jargon as the following is plentifully sprinkled through the Scottish ecclesiastical proceedings—“Should be *sisted* as parties;” “any part of the *sederunt* ;” “present when the *deliverance* was pronounced;” were *astricted* to obey;” “they *implemented* the veto law;” “when the call was *moderated in* ;” etc.

† Blackwood’s Magazine, Dec. 1840.

the cause of national churches in the field of argument, to have the victory so wrested from our hands." The great object of the popular party now seems to be, to abolish patronage altogether, and to vest the right of presentation in the voters, in the communicants, or in the landholders, or in these classes jointly. But the right of patronage is private property, and may be sold or alienated like any other property.* Will it be given up peaceably, and without compensation? and will the state continue to support a church which thus trifles with private property, and with those very means which the government possesses for extending the influence of the church of Scotland, and which that church has called on it to employ, and which it has employed? It seems to us that the passing of the Veto-act was the first step towards a separation of the church from the state altogether. The abolition of patronage will be another great step. And happy the day, in our opinion, when the last link shall be sundered. It is in vain to try to make a pure church, out of one entangled with state intrigue, and supported by state funds. Dr. Chalmers and his friends may glory in proclaiming, that the Lord Jesus Christ is the only Head of the church of Scotland. But it is not so. It never will be so, as long as that church depends on the state for her support. The headship will be shared in by some duke of Argyle, lord of session, or privy counsellor. The spirituality of the church is corrupted, and it must be corrupted by the contact of worldly men. Is it not owing to this contaminating union of church and state, that there has existed in the Scottish communion, a *moderate* party, in distinction from the *evangelical*,—a party, which for a long time swayed, by a decided majority, the councils of the General Assembly, so that the fate of every measure materially affecting the spiritual interests of the church, might, with certainty, have been pre-

* The patronage of about 300 of the parishes of Scotland is vested in the crown, and 600 in noblemen and landed proprietors. Out of about 36 parishes in the synod of Orkney, the earl of Zetland has the patronage of twenty-nine! When those livings are deducted which are at the disposal of universities and municipal corporations, a very small fraction of the whole is found in the hands of the people. In the church of England, out of 12,000 livings, not *seventy* are in the hands of the people.

dicted ; and that, though this party has of late been, happily, losing ground, while the other has been gaining, yet there is still many a parish, both in the Highlands and Lowlands, in which there is a miserable want of religious instruction, because another gospel than of Christ is preached ! † These men who preach an unevangelized morality were, doubtless, the presentees of some nobleman or gentleman, who consulted his own family interests, rather than the spiritual edification of a hungry flock.

The interests of vital piety in Scotland, must necessarily languish, while Synods, Assemblies and Commissions are holding stormy debates, and while the great mass of the people are looking for deliverance, not from their glorified Head, but from a civil court, or from a Parliament, who, in general, care no more for the interests of spiritual religion, than they do in respect to the individual who shall be the next Grand Lama of Thibet. Revivals of religion may occasionally occur, as they are now said to exist in Ross-shire, but they will take place in spite of the existing condition of things, or because God will employ the bitter lessons, which his people in Scotland are reading, as an occasion of bringing rich spiritual good out of terrible evils.

We cannot close these observations without expressing our deepest conviction that a new order of preparation for the Christian ministry is demanded in the churches of Scotland. The law on the subject is well enough. It requires a four years' regular attendance at the divinity-hall, as a course of study for the church ; but this is almost completely nullified by the recognizing, on the part of the Assembly, of what is termed irregular attendance, and which is in fact no attendance whatever. Students of divinity who merely enrol their names in the books of the different professors, for six years, and who deliver a certain number of discourses specified by the General Assembly, though they never hear a lecture, or receive any instruction whatever on the subject of theology, in any university, were held, till very recently, to be equally qualified with the regular students for

* See Dr. Wardlaw's *Lectures on National Church Establishments*, 1839, p. 82 ; also Dr. Witherspoon's " *Characteristics*," Works, 1802, Vol. III. p. 200. See, also, the interesting volume of Dr. John Dunmore Lang, entitled: " *Religion and Education in America*," London, 1840. Many interesting notices of the Scotch church may be found in it.

being taken on trials for a license to preach. Some modification has taken place, but it does not effect any substantial change. The acts of Assembly enjoin that every person, entering upon trials, shall be examined as to his knowledge of the Hebrew language; but they do not require that the Hebrew class should be attended; and, in point of fact, a *large proportion* of those who become ministers never have attended it.* In teaching Hebrew, the professor of oriental languages at the University of Edinburgh states, that he does not use the points, because he is satisfied, that in the time allowed him, he could do nothing with the points! So little interest was taken in the study of Hebrew, that the study of Persian—not a cognate dialect—was introduced as an inducement. The average of those who enter the Hebrew class at Glasgow was about seventeen or eighteen, when the divinity students were about two hundred. All the Hebrew students are required to be furnished with *Parkhurst's Hebrew Lexicon*. Those parts of the Old Testament, which are written in Chaldee, are not read in the class, because the students have no dictionary for that tongue! The Hebrew professor at King's College, Aberdeen, states, that he accustoms his pupils to look for the words of a dictionary; but owing to the mode in which Hebrew dictionaries are generally prepared, they have not commonly become expert at this, when the studies of the class are finished! At the Marischal College, the professor of Hebrew remarks, that “when he can get his class together, he lectures, either upon the origin of the language, or upon Hebrew antiquities. The students *scramble* for a little of the elements of the language, and then leave the class. Chaldee and Syriac are not taught, because the professor can hardly ever get his students to be masters of Hebrew!”†

With such sad statements before us, we cannot wonder at the low condition of biblical,‡ and, we might add, of classical learn-

* One year's regular attendance has been since required.

† Report on the Universities of Scotland, p. 355.

‡ “We have repeatedly expressed our warm approbation of the Biblical Cabinet, a series of translations from German works on biblical topics, projected and carried on by Mr. Thomas Clark, bookseller of Edinburgh. It is a noble undertaking. We regret that it receives but a slender patronage. The slight appreciation of it, by the thousands of educated clergymen in Scotland and England, is proof enough of the

ing in Scotland. Logic and philosophy have not been studied too much, but too exclusively. The system of education has produced strong-headed reasoners, acute dialecticians, but not accomplished Greek and Hebrew scholars. The Scottish systems of divinity which we have seen fail essentially at the very foundation. They do not rightly expound the text. How can they do this, with Parkhurst's *Lexicon*, and other such contrivances?

Scotchmen ought, like their southern countrymen, to become acquainted with the rich and inexhaustible stores of continental learning. Gesenius' *Lexicon* would not overturn the establishment. Hengstenberg's *Christology* would make no breach in the Confession of Faith. The grammars of Kühner, Ewald and Winer might be imported into Caledonia, *salva fide et Ecclesiâ*. The sturdy Pict would not be corrupted, if he should read Von Hammer, or Niebuhr, or Ranke. If the ministers of religion would do the highest good to their beloved communion, they must become earnest students of the original Scriptures, and thus be imbued with the mind of the inspiring Spirit. They may adhere as firmly as they please to the good old catechism. We honor them for it. But let them join a profound knowledge of God's word with attachment to systems of divinity, and with elevated personal holiness. Thus with the sound sense and strong logical understanding which they now possess, they will raise Scotland to a higher intellectual and spiritual eminence than any other nation of the old world can boast. Scotland will be truly a city set on a hill; like the mountains which are round about Jerusalem—the light and glory of Britain and of her colonies, now extending over every island, and on every shore.

miserably low state of biblical studies in both countries. The works translated for the Cabinet are, in general, well selected. Most of the versions which we have examined, are made with fidelity. Some of the translators, however, are not sufficiently practised in German, and care is not taken to secure a good English idiom, or to provide illustrative notes. The printing is done admirably.

ARTICLE VII.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EMULATION AS A STIMULUS TO ACADEMICAL STUDY.

By Rev. Nathan Lord, D. D., Pres. of Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.

WHOEVER seriously contemplates improvement in any department of patriotic or Christian enterprise will, almost of necessity, encounter two evils ; first, severe misconstruction, simply because he goes upon the idea of reform ; and, secondly, the danger of becoming bewildered in speculation, and of committing settled and important interests to the chances of experiment. The idea of progressiveness, although not convertible with that of innovation, evidently implies it, and awakens, in a certain class of minds, more or less of the same jealousy and distrust. At the same time, the hazards of advancing upon commonly received opinions and measures are such as few sufficiently contemplate beforehand, and none can adequately appreciate without actual trial. But to shrink from either of these evils, and to remain content in a state of admitted imperfection, through fear of odium, which, however undeserved, is certain, or, mistake, at the same time possible and fatal, is unworthy of those whom God has made, in a measure, responsible for the common weal. These alternatives are, undoubtedly, a weighty argument for the exercise of modesty and charity, of sound wisdom and discretion, but a poor apology for indifference and sloth. It is perhaps impossible for man not to err, either on the side of not doing, or of overdoing ; but it were almost better to suffer the consequences of an erroneous, though honest zeal, than of heartless negligence and unbelief, or an obstinate holding to positions which time is showing to be false, or out of season and untenable.

There is, however, less danger to society than is commonly supposed in prosecuting improvements upon principles about which there can be no mistake but in the application of them. Society is destined to advance. But its advancement consists in the successive development, admission, practice of elementa-

ry and essential truths. These truths are all original in nature or in Revelation, and are brought out, in the providence of God, as society is able to comprehend and bear them. There is nothing new in morals or religion, more than in the relations and laws of the material world, and reform that is propounded to us only in consistency with that acknowledgment, and offers but a more excellent way of applying an old and unquestionable faith, can be hardly injurious otherwise than as it may anticipate the designs of Providence, and provoke an unnecessary degree of agitation and resistance. *New-light*, another system of the world, the hallucination of enthusiasts, the consuming element of fanaticism, bewilders and destroys. But there is not a greater error than to put, indiscriminately, into the same class with visionaries and dreamers, those who, following God's appointed luminaries, the sun and moon and stars which he has ordained, yet aspire to take their observations with the advantage of more favorable circles, a clearer atmosphere, or a higher elevation. It is to discredit the source of all wisdom. It is to disparage those benefactors of mankind who have contributed to raise society to higher successive levels, or have laid the foundations on which others have erected those goodly and perfect structures which continue always the delight and admiration of the world.

The guardians of some of our public institutions have, of late, discarded the principle of emulation as a stimulus to academical study, and have substituted means which they regard as more simply moral, and for that reason more likely to answer the legitimate purposes of education. Have these men acted unwisely, injuriously? Is the change which they have introduced visionary, empirical, illusory? The inquiry is important. The regulation of the colleges and universities of our country is a matter of too great moment to admit of rude or romantic experiment. If such an error has been committed, the correction of it cannot be too speedily or imperiously required by an enlightened public sentiment. But if, on the other hand, a questionable principle has been exchanged for one whose soundness is undeniable, however intelligent and good men might differ in their judgments upon its practicability, there would be at least an apology for claiming a fair field of trial, if not a sufficient argument for the patronage and support of those who profess to favor the progress of society upon the principles of Revelation. It could not be thought wise, digni-

fied, or safe to discredit and oppose attempts, which, if successful, could result only beneficially to the community, and whose failure would argue a state of society more disordered and hopeless, from the fact that it was owing to the disapprobation of the very guardians and conservators of the public virtue.

The first issue respects the fitness of the principle of emulation, as an incentive in the education of youth ; and to that the following remarks will be confined.

A distinction will be admitted between duty and interest, as impulsive principles of action. The former is a moral element, an original guide to virtue. The latter is sensuous, and peculiarly liable to the vicissitudes of the disordered mind. The one has relation to the right, to principle, to the general good, and to the will and honor of the Creator ; the other to the expedient, the politic, to personal convenience and happiness, as these objects are viewed by the degenerate mind ; the one purifying and elevating in its moral tendencies, in proportion to the degree of its cultivation ; the other, in similar conditions, running down into a lust, and inviting to sordid and unworthy gratifications, according to the predominance of one or another class of affections. This distinction, even if not of the nature of an axiom, will hardly fail to commend itself to minds inclined to a spiritual morality, and conversant with the different stages and phenomena of mental history.

Emulation is an excitement of the selfish principle in appropriate circumstances of the social condition. It is the desire of excelling ; it supposes competition ; it contemplates precedence, pre-eminence. It is the action of diseased mind, subject to the irregularities and excesses of the self-will, overreaching, sequestering, or otherwise counteracting the moral sense, the law of charity, according to the strength of the constitutional bias, or the acquired stimulus. If any think the term admits of a more rational and intelligible definition, this is the only idea contemplated by those who so describe the principle in question, and who, in this view of it, discard it as immoral and of pernicious tendency both in private and public discipline.

The subject has been rarely treated by moral writers, and society has acquiesced in loose and indeterminate views of it. Emulation has been strangely vindicated on the ground that it is inseparable from our nature, and coeval with intelligence ; that it was cultivated in the schools of antiquity, was the spirit of national games and festivals, and for these reasons has a sort

of *jure divino* authority, without any consideration of its moral qualities or results. Some more ingenious and candid minds have confounded it with other impulses and affections, less concerned with moral agency, mere instincts, and useful or injurious only according to their relation to other principles of our nature. Thus the ordinary natural sympathies, the feelings dependent on peculiarities of structure and temperament, on our complex nature, the diversities of place, or the power of association sometimes urge us forcibly in a career of improvement, influence and distinction, which is mistaken for the effect of the principle in question, yet does not result from it, and is not necessarily indicative of any wrong habit of the mind. The same is true of the principles of self-respect, regard for personal rights, the love of approbation, the desire of an honorable standing, and of the rewards of industry, temperance, frugality and study, all inherent and innocent, subserving important uses in the forming of our character, and no more to be condemned than the instinctive pleasures of the palate, or of vision. The Scriptures speak of this general appetency to personal good with decided commendation: *A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and loving favor rather than silver and gold.* They reprobate the want of it, as more injurious than speculative unbelief: *He that provideth not for his own house hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.* It is indispensable to individual and social advancement. He, who obeys it, is not, indeed, on that account, a good man, in the evangelical sense of that appellation; but neither is he, on that account, a bad man. It is a mercifully conservative element in our nature. We put in the same class with taste, the pleasures of the imagination, the love of letters. We should as wisely disparage polite learning, mechanical improvements, the fine arts, or any other ingredients of civilization, as that property of our nature which is obviously related to these effects of intelligence, and which is the evidence of our capacity for elevation and enjoyment, and of likeness to the original of all fitness and beauty. It is a poor substitute for moral virtue, but a necessary preservative from the coarseness of brutality. It regulates the inferior passions, bringing into correspondence the material and the spiritual of our nature, and, when controlled by the higher principles, conducing to that symmetry, proportion and harmony which are essential to the idea of a perfect man.

We can easily stop here, at the idea of desiring a personal

good, and putting forth the requisite effort to obtain it. And in coming to this point, we offend not against any moral sentiment. It is obedience to an instinct, a law of sentient being, apart from any regard to moral faculty or accountability. We have it in common with the lower orders of the creation. But when we place ourselves in connection with our fellow-beings, then a law comes over us adapted to that new relation, regulating the instinct so far as it affects the interests of social life, and limiting our desire of personal good to a rigid impartiality. *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* No commentary can simplify the conception of our obligation in this respect. To have an exclusive regard for our own advantage, or a selfish complacency in it, is a violation of the law; and to seek that advantage, in a course of competition, aggravates the criminality, just in proportion to the excitement of the race. When we have attained the objects of our wrong ambition, we perceive that we have invaded the territory of conscience, and have lost the assurance and the recompense of spiritual integrity. The laurel and the crown are the price of disinterested virtue.

The ideas, related to those which have been already considered, of imitating a model, of appreciating our own abilities, or of taking a place corresponding to our merits, have been often confounded with that of emulation. Let it be considered with how little reason. We are made to perceive and to admire the beautiful, the sublime, and to approve the right. By Christianity we are inclined to love true virtue, and reach forth to new degrees of moral excellence. Aspiration after greatness and goodness is legitimate; and eminence, honor, power, consequent upon the cultivation of our abilities, are as necessary, in the moral economy of God, as the proportion between gravitation and the quantity of matter, under the physical laws. They are the product, justly proportioned, of every man's seed sown. But this love of the excellent is distinct from the principle in question. It belongs to another class of our sentiments, and tends to abase and subdue the selfish passions. They propose distinction for an end; this receives it as a consequence. They run before that they may win; this follows that it may resemble. It obeys a universal law of Providence and of moral government; while they contemplate no divine arrangement or requirement, but a mere private interest, and that in circumstances and conditions where such a limitation constitutes transgression. You may be a Bacon, a Newton, a

Paul, with corresponding powers and advantages, and that by a constitutional necessity, and in harmony with all the divine counsels and arrangements. And so you may be an angel, may be like God. But to aim at that distinction for the distinction's sake, contemplating, not the positive, but the comparative elevation; that is a fatal incongruity. You become, indeed, the philosopher, the reasoner, the preacher, but not the Christian; a spirit fallen, an archangel ruined. You violate the social order, you overstep the law.

I charge thee fling away ambition.
By that sin fell the angels.

Let us suppose a perfect state of society, in which all minds are conformed, invariably, to the divine will. Such was heaven, till that mad ambition, which the poet has so significantly described, took possession of the tall archangel. We cannot, by any effort, bring the mind to entertain the idea of competition, the lust of pre-eminence, as a trait of such a society. On the contrary, it was just that feeling which divided heaven, and cast down the spirits who kept not their first estate into chains and darkness. But the same law, which binds the angels, rests on man. It is eternal over the universe of mind; and every sentiment and act, partaking of a moral character, and not conformed to that perfect standard, are forever wrong. They deserve a place no more on earth than in heaven. They should have no allowance where Christianity is admitted as a rule of life; least of all in institutions set up for the glory of Christ, and the conversion of the world.

It may be thought that these sentiments are too refined for a world like ours; that we cannot govern fallen beings by a perfect law; that we cannot move them but by motives suited, in some measure, to their present character. But, who cannot govern them? Who cannot move them? Not their Creator; not their Judge. We do not find his requirements mitigated and let down in accommodation to the immoral sentiments of apostate beings: and, certainly, neither the scenes of Sinai nor Calvary are fitted to diminish our sense of the efficiency of his administration. Shall man be wiser than his Maker? On what principle shall we introduce into our administration, and apply as indispensable to our success, a rule of action which would be fatal to the divine integrity? On what principle shall we disparage a rule which God pronounces essential to his moral

government, or bring it into such unnatural alliance with our own short-sighted arrangements, as to dishonor it, and make it ineffectual? Shall we do this in our families, in the church of God? Have we forgotten the half-way covenant of New-England?

But, it may be said that principles of acknowledged validity and authority are yet to be restrained and limited in their application, by other principles equally true and worthy of regard; as in physics, many theories, established by general reasonings, cannot be carried out in practice, without great allowance for conflicting influences in the processes of nature. He who should abate nothing for friction, for different and opposite forces, would find himself materially wrong in his calculations, and unsuccessful in his results. He might be a consistent reasoner from partial or erroneous premises, but an unskilful machinist, or a dangerous navigator.

If by this it is intended, that, on moral subjects, different and opposite principles may be equally true and important, it is sufficient to say that such a sentiment carries its own refutation. It can never impose upon a thinking mind. If it is intended that, although moral truth is in its own nature immutable, it must be limited in its application by the opposing forces in the human will, by the errors, prejudices and passions of society, we say this is begging the question, and it is sufficient to meet it by a contrary assertion. It is not invidious to charge upon so broad a declaration the vice of submitting an acknowledged principle to the construction of a self-seeking expediency, and making a trade of our morality. It is arresting the progress of knowledge, and virtually giving our countenance to admitted error. It is holding up the lamp, but covering it with an extinguisher. It is obscuring the sun, in kindness to diseased eyes, and leaving those who otherwise would rejoice in the good light of heaven, to grope in darkness at noon-day.

That we shall not, in point of fact, attain to a theoretical perfection in the application of our general principles, in the present imperfect state of society, is doubtless true; and so far the analogy between physical and moral science is admitted. But as this admission affects not the essential truth and obligatoriness of any revealed precept, or settled principle of morality; it is of no little importance to the virtuous man to secure himself against the evil consequences which must result when such a precept or principle fails of its proper influence in society. Moral truth

cannot be acceptable to depraved minds. It is not likely to be admitted when proposed in real or imagined opposition to any established policy, or by way of objection to the projects of interested men. But he who, on that account, refrains from the assertion of his principles, in positions where moral action is required of him, lowers the standard of virtue, without getting any corresponding advantage in his influence over other minds, and generally, with no other result than to be classed himself with evil-doers. Far different was the attitude of Paul, when he took his weeping brethren to record that he was pure from the blood of all men, for he had not shunned to declare unto them the whole counsel of God.

The disinclination or resistance of disordered mind to moral truth is no reason for holding that truth in our own judgments, in any qualified or restricted sense. Much less is it a reason, when the well-being of others depends on the expression of our sentiments, for yielding it in accommodation to human weakness and depravity. We cannot, indeed, have impossibilities. We may not treat infancy as mature age, nor compel the progress of civilization, nor the action of any moral causes; and it were chimerical to make our efforts disproportioned to the capacity or condition of society, to shape our measures merely to its prospective stages, or an ideal model. There is a law of correspondence and congruity, as well as charity, which it is preposterous to violate. But all this has relation, not to the substance of truth, but its accidents, to quantity and manner, to time and place, and so far from being a reason for the compromise of principle, should awaken a greater jealousy and carefulness, lest in making allowance for human imperfection, we create an impression unfavorable either to general rectitude, or our personal integrity. The innumerable obstacles in our way, resulting from human ignorance and sinfulness, while they call for tolerance and patience, for good taste and temper, should, nevertheless, urge us to more assiduous labor, till society shall become wiser and better through our honest, yet judicious exposition of those principles by which only it can be saved. If any are unable to receive meat, the sincere milk of the word is their only proper aliment; and we do well to be advised, that although we acknowledge the fundamental principles of moral truth, yet, if we build upon them wood, hay and stubble, our salvation, though possible by divine mercy, will be effected only through the fire that burns up the monuments of our folly.

It is a poor justification of silence, when truth requires a testimony, that our speech will be liable to misconstruction or abuse, and of inaction, when all the world is in motion, that there are pitfalls or lions in the way. Of all the secondary virtues, prudence is, perhaps, the most important, but, at the same time, the most likely to degenerate into a vice. "From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step," is as true in morals as in policy. When our simple wisdom admits a tincture of worldliness it defeats its own ends, and descends from its elevation. It renounces the Providence of God for the miserable supports of earth, and these yield in the very extremities, which, but for our timorousness and unbelief, he would have made occasions of exhibiting his faithfulness and power.

The divine administration presents analogies, obscure but intelligible, to aid us in these difficult solutions. Many evils, occasionally tolerated by the Old Testament, have been sometimes drawn into an argument for justifying, or at least excusing infractions of the social law. But polygamy, divorce, slavery, and other kindred irregularities can hardly admit, with any reason, of so loose an interpretation. They were all the while declared evils, inconsistent with the original constitution; suffered, not allowed; tolerated, not excused; and when not remediable by the motives of an ill-understood economy, limited and restrained by various prudential legislation. The moral law did not the less stand out against them. It did not the less require a different habit of the public mind and life; and although God winked for a season at such sins of ignorance, they did not the less certainly work out the natural ruin of society.

It is still more observable, that Christianity was not introduced with any mitigation of moral principle, but a more imperative enforcement of it; and that the very evils, which a ruder dispensation had not been sufficient to extirpate, were declared to admit of no apology, in view of the clearer illustrations which Christ and his ministers gave of the principles and sanctions of moral government. Its first preachers were remarkably tolerant in matters indifferent, but they endured all things, they laid down their lives in maintaining essential truths, as well the moral pertaining to human obligation, as the evangelical, which concerned more intimately the mysteries of redemption. It was the same to them, whether men would hear or forbear. They had not learned the way of avoiding difficulties which the more subtle casuists of later times opened

for the convenience of a feeble age, in which Christianity was diluted by the admixtures of a false philosophy, and bent to the purposes of the Man of Sin.

We take then an extremely uncomfortable and dangerous position, when we accommodate ourselves to habits of society incompatible with the decalogue, or only apparently excepted from that infallible rule, and more expressly condemned by Christianity upon the penalties of an eternal judgment. Even if we allowed ourselves to hope for ultimate forgiveness through the merits of Jesus Christ, notwithstanding this error, and were content to be beguiled by such an antinomian illusion, it is hardly conceivable that we could patronize unquestionable errors, without a diminished self-respect, and a distrust of our ability to answer the design of God in giving us influence over other minds. But it would be particularly humiliating to permit evils, which, with the gospel in our hands as an instrument of reformation, and the promise of the Holy Spirit to make that instrument effectual, we might reasonably expect to remedy.

Nor could it be supposed to lessen our difficulty, that others, placed under our influence or control, are personally accountable, and must meet their own risks in violating their obligations. We are undoubtedly answerable for whatever system of policy we adopt affecting the character and interests of society; and in regard to the principle now in question, as well as every other growing out of the moral degenerateness of mankind, it can be no excuse for measures which tend to develop and strengthen a wrong affection in other minds, that we put them under no invincible necessity of sinning, or that it is for them to take care for their own salvation. If we choose to proceed upon a denial of human depravity, or a future retribution, and shape our discipline to those theological errors, that may relieve us, more or less, from inconsistency, and shift our responsibility to other grounds. But if, with an understanding of our neighbor's sinfulness and accountability, we place him in circumstances of temptation, and minister to his depraved tastes and passions, his guilt and his pains will be any thing but an alleviation of our own.

It is obvious that we are obliged to reason at a disadvantage against the ambitious principle in education; for it may be alleged that we can show but little in point of fact, to justify the adoption of a different principle; and the allegation could not be denied. As yet, simple reliance on moral influence, by

which we mean law and its sanctions and the peculiar motives of Christianity, has been so partial and limited, that there is hardly a noticeable instance in which its sufficiency may be said to have been demonstrated by adequate experiment. Society has been guided by other views. Why it has been so, it is not our purpose, and it might be invidious to inquire. It is one of those mistakes in ethics which work themselves insensibly into other departments of study and action, perverting the intelligence and influence of ages. But it is unhappily real, and unfortunate for the purpose of these remarks. So extensive is the awkwardness of setting up general conclusions on such a subject, without facts, especially at a time remarkable for the utilitarian turn of the public mind, that we should entirely yield to the discouragement, were it not allowable to bring opposite theories to the test of their practical results.

And what are the facts on the other side? Let us be instructed by the history of society. It would seem that if our judgments could not be corrected by general reasonings upon the selfish principle, we might at least be startled by reviewing some of its obvious effects. It is not necessary to speak of those infractions of the social law which have marked every age with controversy, war, oppression and their kindred evils. It is sufficient, that the great labor of education itself has been, with remarkable inconsistency, and of course without success, to control the wrong propensity, on the one hand, while it has stimulated it on the other. Christianity, called in to cure the evils of a false philosophy, has been itself corrupted, and made to apologize for some of the grossest violations of its own precepts. Subserviency, intrigue, equivocation, envy, jealousy, wrath, strife, and all the host of malignant passions that are stirred up by a flattered and mortified self-love, have been absolved without confession, and have flowed out from the nursery, the school and the higher seats of learning, to disturb and desolate the world.

But it may be said that this is only the excessive acting of a right principle. We reply, it is merely the natural acting of self-love, under its appropriate excitements of competition, the very evil involved in our idea of emulation, the precise immorality, for which we would reject this principle, as far as possible, in our arrangements for the education of the young. It deserves no apology for the sake of its origin; and if it did, it were still an error to claim for it any hereditary property of moral

virtue ; for we have not learned that moral goodness, as it increases in degree, loses its essential character and becomes evil ; nor that any cause may produce effects unlike, and contrary to itself. We have better authority than that which has imposed on half of mankind with so shallow a pretence : *A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit ; wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.*

It is by no means an unimportant consideration, drawn from Christianity itself, not only that its first and great requirement of man, as a social being, is the exercise of a disinterested good will, and that its general spirit and precepts contemplate a profound humility, the taking of the lowest seats, the preference of another's honor, but that the entire theory and fact of our redemption, which makes and constitutes Christianity as a remedial and disciplinary system, proceeds in opposition to the principle in question. It casts us down before God, as to our own sufficiency, and raises us again to his favor only through the merits of another. It shows the perfection of religious character to consist in our becoming nothing, and less than nothing, that Christ may be all in all. A more pointed rebuke was never given by our Lord, nor one more significant of our social duty, than when, in the strife that occurred in the college of his disciples, which of them should be greatest, *he called them unto him and said : Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them : but it shall not be so among you ; but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister ; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.* What a commentary have we here upon the law that binds us ; exceeded in impressiveness only by that other instance, when, after he had washed the disciples' feet, he said : *If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet ; ye ought also to wash one another's feet : for I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you.* He added, doubtless for perpetual admonition : *If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.*

If the views here presented are correct, it is obvious that the adoption of them in education must materially favor the healthful progress of society. A nation, the world is soon made or unmade, in the schools of elementary learning. The believer in Revelation expects improvement in the condition of mankind. How shall he attempt it more hopefully, than by intermingling

the precepts of Christian morality with the growing affections and capabilities of the human mind. If any judge that society has been, hitherto, too infantile and rude for such an economy, its present aspects certainly encourage the belief that a better era is at hand. The strife of moral questions is setting mind free from antiquated prejudice, and the maxims of a sensuous philosophy; and a more spiritual wisdom succeeds to appetite and force. The world is rapidly determining, in respect to all its interests, between right and wrong, law and self-will; and however violent the conflict between these opposite forces, we may not fear if the advancing spirit of education be directed by the salutary influences of the gospel. Mind—cultivated mind—will control the world, despite the dreams of ignorant enthusiasts, or the madness of atheistic levellers. But it will tend to the accumulation of spiritual and secular power, to the exactions of lordly prerogative, and to iron consolidation, unless the sway of the selfish principle shall yield to the redeeming benevolence of Christianity. Paganism, prelacy, slavery, all the forms of despotism, and the opposite extremes of revolution, anarchy, and ruin, are but developments, the action and reaction of the wrong affection. Christianity alone restores the equilibrium, the harmony of the otherwise disjointed and jarring members of the social system, and secures the proper results of its complicated arrangements. All other conservatives are vain expedients that issue in a worse excitement, a more terrible dissolution. Be it ours to apply this renovating agency, to give it circulation and direction, through the proper channels of intelligence and moral sentiment, and we accomplish what is impossible to policy or power. The sense of right will prevail when sophistry and cunning fail, and the sword is drawn in vain. For this end were we created, to obey the law of the Eternal Mind. That everlasting memorial, set up without the garnish of a false philosophy, encumbered not with human appendages, freed from the glosses of old tradition, *the law of right*, proclaimed in thunders, sealed with blood, inwrought by fire, will bring the predicted end of the divine counsels, the subjection of this world to its Redeemer. Be it ours to hasten that consummation. It is the proper glory of a rational nature. It includes all the good that can be desired for us, and all the distinction that is worthy of us: *They that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars forever and ever.*

ARTICLE VIII.

EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PERFECTION, AS HELD BY REV.
A. MAHAN AND OTHERS.

By Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., Prof. of Theol. in the Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass.

[*Concluded from page 189.*]

IN the last number of the Biblical Repository, I endeavored to show that, in various instances, Mr. Mahan and others agreeing with him claim as a part of *their* system, what belongs to the common system as really as to theirs; and that, in this way, though it may be unintentional, they are likely to make a wrong impression upon incautious readers, and, for a time, to gain an unjust advantage to their cause. I also examined several of the arguments by which they labor to establish their doctrine; particularly the provisions of the gospel, the attainableness of complete sanctification, the promises of God, and the prayers of his people. If I mistake not, it was made evident that these arguments, taken separately or together, fail of proving that any believers ever have attained, or ever will attain to perfect sanctification in the present life.

Before proceeding to other points, I request Mr. Mahan and every reader to observe, that, so far as any of the above mentioned arguments prove that complete holiness is attained by *any* believers in the present life, they prove that it is attained by *all* believers. There is not the least intimation in the Scriptures, that the rich provisions of the gospel are made for a part of God's people, more than for all of them; or that perfection is more attainable to some than to others; or that the divine promises or the prayers of believers respecting sanctification will be carried into full effect in some, and not in others. Let this be well considered and remembered. It will certainly come out in the end, that the advocates of "Perfection" must give up the arguments just referred to, or, to be at all consistent, they must have the courage to maintain that *all* believers are perfectly sanctified in this life. They cannot, without palpable inconsistency, stay where they are. Their own arguments, so

far as they have already been considered, will unavoidably thrust them from their present position. They cannot, by any of these arguments, show that a *select few* are completely sanctified, without proving, at the same time, that this is the case with all Christians. But I shall have occasion to advert to this point more particularly in the course of the following discussion.

THE MAIN QUESTION AT ISSUE.

It is somewhat remarkable that men of sense, who are engaged in a controversy, should not be agreed as to the real question in debate. What! Do not disputants themselves know what they are disputing about? Mr. Mahan charges Mr. Folsom with having misapprehended and misstated the question at issue between the advocates and the opposers of the doctrine of "Perfection." And in the following passage (Bib. Repos. p. 409), he undertakes to state it *clearly* and *definitely*. The question is, he says, "*Whether we may now, during the progress of the present life, attain to entire perfection in holiness, and whether it is proper for us to indulge the anticipation of making such attainments.*" One part of the church affirm, that the perfect obedience which God requires of us, we may render to him. The other affirm that it is criminal for us to *expect* to render that obedience. One part affirm, that we ought to aim at entire perfection in holiness, with the expectation of attaining to that state. The other part affirm, that we ought to aim at the same perfection, with the certain expectation of not attaining to it. On the one hand, it is affirmed that we ought to pray that the very God of peace will sanctify us wholly, and preserve our whole spirit, and soul, and body blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, with the expectation that God will answer our prayers by the bestowment of that very blessing. On the other hand, it is affirmed that we ought to put up that identical prayer, with the certain expectation of not receiving the blessing we desire. On the one hand, it is affirmed that grace is provided in the gospel to render the Christian, even in this life, perfect in every good work to do the will of God. On the other hand, it is affirmed that no such grace is provided."

Mr. Mahan calls the question above stated a "*simple question*;" whereas it is very *complex*, being made up of different points, some of which are still compounds, consisting partly of

matters in dispute, and partly of matters not in dispute. This will be evident if we analyze the passage. He first states the question thus: "Whether we may now, during the progress of the present life, attain to entire perfection in holiness, and whether it is proper for us to indulge the anticipation of making such attainments." Here are two distinct questions, one of which, as I have explained it, we answer in the affirmative, the other in the negative. There is a sense, and an important sense, in which Christians might attain to perfection in this life; that is, they might attain to it, if they would do what they ought,—if they would rightly use all their powers and faculties of mind, and all their means and privileges;—so that their not attaining it is their own fault. We are accustomed to say that any object is *attainable*, if it may be attained on these conditions; although it never is attained; and so we answer the first question in the affirmative. The next question is, "Whether it is proper for us to indulge the anticipation of making such attainments?" i. e. in the present life. This we answer in the negative. For unless there is evidence that good men have attained or will attain to perfection in the present life, no one can properly indulge the *expectation*. These two questions Mr. Mahan puts together, and speaks of it as a *simple* question, and the question in debate; whereas it is *not* simple, and only a *part* of it is in debate. This mode of proceeding, instead of conducing to the end of free inquiry, certainly tends to throw confusion into the whole discussion.

The same is true of the other parts of the passage above quoted. After the general statement just noticed, Mr. Mahan goes on to exhibit it in various particulars, and most if not all of these, like the general statement above mentioned, are made up of two points, to one of which we assent, to the other we do not. He says: "One part"—those who agree with him,—"*affirm, that the perfect obedience which God requires, we may render to him.*" But in the sense above given, *we* hold to this as much as they. "The other part affirm that it is *criminal* for us to expect to render that obedience." I wonder he should think proper to dress up our opinion in such startling language,—language which we never use, and which it is wrong for *him* to use. Why did he not say: the other part affirm that *it is not proper for us* to expect to render that obedience. As to this, we do differ from him. He proceeds to state the point in another form. "One part affirm that we ought to *aim* at perfection in holi-

ness, with the expectation of attaining to it. The other part affirm that we ought to aim at it with the certain expectation of not attaining to it." Here again are two points. As to the first, that "we ought to *aim* at perfection in holiness," we agree with him. As to the other point, the *expectation* of attaining to it, we differ, if, as he intends, the expectation looks to the present life merely. Justice requires that it should be kept in mind, that, according to the common doctrine, all believers do expect *ultimately* to attain to perfect holiness. Again, he says: "On the one hand, it is affirmed that we ought to pray that the God of peace will sanctify us wholly, etc., with the expectation that he will answer our prayers by the bestowment of that very blessing; on the other hand," that we ought to pray for perfect sanctification, "with the certain expectation of not receiving" it. This statement, like the others, fails of presenting fairly the point in debate. We affirm that we ought to pray God to sanctify us wholly, and to do it with the expectation that he will, at no distant period, bestow the very blessing we ask. But as to expecting the blessing to be fully granted in the *present life*, we differ from the advocates of perfection. Once more, he says: "On the one hand, it is affirmed that grace is provided," to render Christians, "even in this life, perfect in every good work." "On the other hand it is affirmed that no such grace is provided." This is certainly a groundless charge; we all hold, as much as Mr. Mahan, that the grace provided and revealed in the gospel is all-sufficient and boundless, and that the present imperfection of believers is owing altogether to their own fault.

Mr. Mahan says, a little after: "The question is *entirely distinct* from the question, What attainments do Christians actually make?" I hardly know why he should say this, when, on the same page, he makes it one of the three questions connected with the nature and extent of the promises, whether "any have attained or will attain to entire sanctification in this life, and when it is so manifest, in many places, that the other points he discusses are meant to bear directly upon this, and to end in it. He shows, very clearly, what is the main point as it lies in his *own mind*, when he says (Disc. p. 97): "On the supposition," that perfect holiness is *not actually attained* in this life, "how can the position be sustained, that it is *attainable*?" That is, he thinks it *not attainable*, if Christians do, in fact, fail of attaining it. After all this, with what reason can he say, that the ques-

tion in debate is *entirely distinct* from the question respecting the actual attainments of Christians? Did he think this last point attended with some special disadvantages, and did he, on that account, prefer, as a matter of reasoning, to keep it rather out of sight, and to give prominence to those points, which could be made more plausible? However this may be, intelligent readers will see, that the chief point at issue really is, *whether Christians do in fact attain to perfect sanctification during the present life*. And how can Mr. Mahan refuse to recognize this as the main point at issue, *if we choose to make it so*, and agree with him as to the other leading points? Surely he would not compel us to dispute with him about the extent of the provisions and promises of the gospel, or the attainableness of complete holiness, or the duty of praying for it, when we profess to have as large views on these points as he has. If the advocates for the doctrine of perfection can fairly and conclusively prove, that any Christians *actually attain to sinless perfection during the present life*, the common doctrine is overthrown, and the controversy is determined in their favor. But if they fail of showing this, all they can prove respecting other points, will avail nothing. And Mr. Mahan himself shows, in many ways, that he does, after all, regard it in this light, and that he values most of his other arguments on account of their supposed relation to this.

The question whether Christians are to expect perfect sanctification in this life, of which Mr. Mahan so often speaks, evidently depends on the question, whether there is evidence that any have attained or will attain to it. And we have seen that no such evidence can be derived from any of the topics of argument already examined. We are now to inquire, whether there is other evidence of this.

DO ANY BELIEVERS ATTAIN TO COMPLETE HOLINESS IN THE PRESENT LIFE?

Mr. Mahan says: "There is positive evidence that some did attain to a state of entire sanctification." (Disc. p. 38.) The texts he produces are Gal. 2: 20; 1 Thess. 2: 10; 1 Cor. 4: 4; Acts 20: 26; Phil. 4: 9, 3: 7; 1 Cor. 11: 1; 1 John 3: 20, 4: 17, 18; Rev. 14: 4, 5; Is. 6: 5—8. He might have added 1 John 1: 7, 9, 2: 5, 3: 3, 9; and many others.

Now the Bible is a very precious book, and is worthy of being studied with the utmost care. Mr. Mahan is sensible of

this, and, in various instances, shows that he is not disposed to adopt that sense of a passage which first offers itself to the mind of the reader, but thinks it proper and necessary to look into the context, to compare different parts of Scripture, and to examine all the circumstances of the case, in order to discover the exact meaning which the sacred writers had in their own minds, and which they intended to convey to others. And although liable to err in the results of his inquiries, he is certainly right in thinking, that we cannot always determine the true meaning of particular texts, by the *sound* or even the *sense* of the words, *taken by themselves*, and that we are often unable to come to a just and satisfactory conclusion, without a careful, patient and even protracted examination.

According to this just principle, the texts which seem, at first view, to assert or imply that believers attain to complete holiness in the present life, must be thoroughly examined, and their true meaning determined. And here it should be remembered, that the prophets and apostles wrote in a very free, unembarrassed and artless manner. Their object was not to settle the disputes which might be got up by speculating, adventurous minds, but to give important instruction to men of teachable and honest hearts. Their manner of writing is indeed such, that an advocate of Universalism, or Socinianism, or almost any other error, may find texts, which, *taken alone*, will appear in his favor. The advocates of the doctrine of "Perfection," which I believe to be an error, argue very plausibly in support of their doctrine from a variety of passages, *construed in a particular way*. There are even more texts than they have mentioned, which may *appear* to favor their cause. They argue from the passages which set forth the provisions and promises of the gospel, and the prayers of believers. These passages, understood as they *possibly may be*, would seem to countenance the doctrine of perfection. But we must inquire, whether, on a fair examination, we can understand the passages in this way, consistently with other parts of the Bible, and with well known facts. The texts which Mr. Mahan quotes, and others which he might quote, *if taken by themselves, and understood in the highest and most absolute sense*, would prove that at least some believers attain to perfect holiness in this life. Job was a *perfect* and upright man. Some are said to have followed the Lord *wholly*. God planted Israel *wholly* a right seed. Some walked in *all* the commandments and ordinances of God *blameless*.

The blood of Christ cleanseth from *all* sin. The apostles behaved themselves holily and justly and unblamably, and exhorted others to copy their example. "A bishop must be *blameless*:" "Let as many as be *perfect*, be thus minded." "Ye are *complete* in Christ." Paul and others *followed* Christ, and were *crucified* with Christ. Paul was free from the blood of all men. John speaks of those whose love was *perfect*, and whose hearts did not condemn them; and in the apocalypse, he says of the hundred and forty and four thousand, that in their mouth is found no guile, and that they are *without fault* before the throne of God.

Now the question is, What is the true meaning of these and other like texts? *Are they to be taken in the highest and most absolute sense, or in a qualified sense?* On the determination of this question the controversy chiefly depends.

First, then, I inquire *how the sacred writers, in other cases, employ terms like those contained in these texts.* And I soon find that they often employ them in a *qualified, restricted* sense. Thus, it is said that Joshua took the *whole land of Canaan*; though some small parts still remained in the hands of the native tribes. The meaning doubtless is, that no *considerable* parts remained unsubdued, and that he proceeded, without molestation, to divide the land among the Israelites. It is said, Judah was *wholly* carried away captive, though a small remnant continued in the land. "Jerusalem and all Judea and the region round about Jordan went out to John and were baptized of him," which means that there was a *general* or *very extensive* gathering of the people to him. Paul said: "*All* seek their own," although there were exceptions. Jeremiah says of the people: "They are *all* adulterers." Solomon says: "*All* things come alike to *all*." And it is repeatedly said, that "*all* flesh shall be saved." I find then, that the sacred writers use expressions of this kind in a *comparative* sense, or in a sense that is in some other way *restricted*. And what is more natural than to ask, whether it *may* not be so with the texts which seem favorable to the doctrine of "Perfection." How do we know that those texts are meant to be understood in the highest and most absolute sense, when other texts, containing similar expressions, are necessarily understood in a limited sense?

But I proceed with the inquiry, and I find that *some of the very texts, which seem most favorable to the doctrine of "Per-*

fection," are unquestionably to be taken in a qualified sense. And here I cannot but think that Mr. Mahan will agree with me. Job was a *perfect* man, and yet he showed plainly enough that *he was not without faults*. It is said of David that he followed the Lord *wholly* except in the matter of Uriah. But his history and his confessions leave us in no doubt, that he was chargeable with other sins, especially sins of heart. God planted Israel *wholly* a right seed. But it must be evident to all, that this expressed their character only in a *comparative* and *very limited* sense. "A bishop must be *blameless*." But neither Mr. Mahan, nor any of his associates can think it essential to the character of a gospel minister, that he should be *absolutely sinless*. Paul said to the Colossians: "Ye are *complete* in Christ." But his epistle to them shows, that he did not think them *entirely without sin*.

I come then to this result: As a limited sense clearly belongs to *some* of the passages which seem, at first view, to favor the doctrine of "Perfection," it is quite *possible* it may belong to *others*, and it would be going too fast and too far, to decide at once, that *any* of that class of texts must be taken in the highest and most absolute sense.

In the next step of my inquiry, I fix my thoughts directly upon several of the texts which seem, at first view, most favorable to the doctrine of "Perfection." The texts I have in view are of no small moment, and I desire Mr. Mahan to join with me in a serious and unprejudiced examination of them, that we may discover what is the mind of the Holy Spirit.

I would then first ask my brother, whether his doctrine implies, that *all* true believers are *entirely sanctified*, either *now*, or *during the present life*. I know what his answer is; but I think it proper to propose the question, for the purpose of bringing out distinctly the exact *nature* and *extent* of the doctrine. In his publications, Mr. Mahan does often enough, and plainly enough, and with too much justice, represent the great body of true Christians, as deplorably deficient in their piety; and he labors with commendable earnestness, to excite them to make higher attainments. Indeed he claims complete holiness as a privilege enjoyed at present by only *a select few, a very small number*. I would then invite him to join with me in a careful examination of a few passages in the first Epistle of John. Let us begin with one of the texts which he quotes: Ch. 1: 6, 7. The apostle is here speaking of all true believers,

whose character it is, not to walk in darkness, but to walk in the light. Referring to *all* these children of light, he says: "The blood of Christ cleanseth us from *all* sin." He *now* cleanseth us from all sin; for the verb is in the present tense. But my brother does not understand it to mean that *all* real Christians are now, in the strict sense, cleansed from *all* sin, that is, *completely sanctified*; though he thinks the text somehow favorable to his doctrine. But it is perfectly clear, that whatever the text asserts of *any* Christians, it asserts of *all*. Let us then come fairly to the point, and inquire, what the text really means. Mr. Mahan will certainly be under the necessity of finding out *some qualified* sense, a sense consistent with what he regards as the real present state of *all believers*; for the text certainly relates to *all*. He may perhaps say, the blood of Christ *provides* for the entire cleansing of all believers *conditionally*; or that it *begins* the work of cleansing now, and secures its complete accomplishment *ultimately*. In this way or some other way, he *must* give the text a restricted sense, a sense different from what would, at first glance, be suggested by the words themselves, taken alone. He must do the same with v. 9, in which the apostle says, that, "if we confess our sins," as *all* Christians do, "he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from *all unrighteousness*." Does it mean that he *now* absolutely cleanseth all who confess their sins, i. e. the whole body of believers, from *all unrighteousness*? Mr. Mahan will answer, no. What then can he do, but, in some way, *limit* the sense? Again, ch. 2: 4, 5, the apostle teaches that every true believer keeps the word of God. And then he says: "*Whoso* keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God *perfected*; hereby know we that we are in him." He is evidently setting forth the character and state, not of a few, but of *all*, who are in Christ. Does Mr. Mahan think that the love of God is, in *his* sense, *perfect* in *all* true believers? No. He thinks it true of only a small number. But whatever the apostle here asserts, he asserts equally of *every true Christian*. Will not my brother then be compelled to find out some limitations of the sense, so as to make it apply to *all* true believers? Let him do this, and we shall see whether his interpretation of this text will not help us to the right interpretation of several others of a similar kind.

"Every man that hath this hope in him *purifieth himself, even as he is pure*." 1 John 3: 3. To be pure as Christ is

pure is a high attainment, and is doubtless the same as is required in the command to *be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect*. I suppose that every Christian does thus purify himself; that is, pursues a course of purification which will terminate in perfect purity. The expression, in my view, denotes, not the particular degree of purification which the believer has already attained, but the *gradual process* of purification, and the *perfect purity* after which he aspires, and to which he will come *in the end*. As his ultimate perfection in moral purity is *certain*, it is spoken of as though it were already accomplished;—a manner of speaking which often occurs in Scripture. Thus, Peter, speaking of his condition in the present life, says: “Who am an elder, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and also a *partaker of the glory that shall be revealed* ;”—a partaker, *even now*, of that *future glory by certain anticipation*. But how will Mr. Mahan explain the purity mentioned by the apostle John, so that he may predicate it, as the apostle does, of *ALL* Christians, and yet make it agree with the doctrine he maintains, that only a *FEW* are perfectly pure, while Christians, in general, are very far from perfect purity? If he says it means *complete purity* ; then he cannot predicate it of *all* Christians, nor of the greater part. If he says, it means *that degree*, or *that gradual process* of purification, which *does* belong to all true Christians, then he comes into the principle of *limiting* the sense. And if he gives a *limited* sense to this text, why not to all the other texts which appear to favor his doctrine?

But the most striking passage which I wish Mr. Mahan to assist me in examining, is 1 John 3: 9. “Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” Where, in all the Scriptures, can Mr. Mahan find another text, which seems to assert, so clearly and strongly as this, that Christians are *completely sanctified*,—*absolutely sinless*? It even declares that they are raised above the possibility of sinning. I am the more desirous of turning my brother’s attention to this passage, because he seems, somehow, to have overlooked it. This oversight may be thought by some to be a matter of wonder, considering that the text, understood in the large and absolute sense, which Mr. Mahan is so fond of in other cases, would be a better proof of the complete sanctification of believers, in the present life, than any he has quoted, I had almost said, than *all* the texts he has quoted. The language is exceedingly plain

and forcible. *Every believer*, we know, is born of God. And the text asserts, that "*whosoever* is born of God, *sinneth not, and cannot sin.*" True, if Mr. Mahan should introduce it, and argue from it as a *proof text*, it would give him trouble; because it would prove a great deal too much. It would go far beyond his scheme. Of course, if he should bring it forward, he would at once find himself in difficulty, and would be obliged to look out for some *limitations* of the sense. But any thing like this would hurt his argument. According to his way of interpreting other texts, this would certainly prove, that *all* Christians, from the time of their regeneration, are entirely without sin. But this is what he does not yet believe. He would, therefore, find it necessary to qualify the sense, and to say that it cannot be understood absolutely—that it can only mean, that those who are born of God do not sin *habitually*, or *impenitently*, as others do,—or, that they cannot sin with their *whole heart*,—or, that they cease from sin *as far* as they are sanctified by the Spirit, and will, *in the end*, cease entirely. In one way or another, he would be obliged to limit the sense, so as to make it applicable to all Christians. But if he should do this, he would be constantly expecting to hear the question: *Why not give the same limitation to other texts, which use language far less emphatical, and which will much more easily admit of limitations?* So that, after all, he may have done wisely in slipping by the text.

The query has sometimes arisen in my mind, how Mr. Mahan would meet a man, who should maintain, on the ground of this text and some others, that *all* believers on earth are absolutely free from sin, and do at once arrive at perfection. Such a man might frame his argument thus: "The apostle Paul says of himself and of Christians generally, *our old man is crucified with Christ, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin.* And he says of those who are thus crucified, that they are *freed from sin*, and are *complete in Christ*. And the apostle John says, that the blood of Christ *cleanseth believers from all sin*, and that they *purify themselves even as Christ is pure*. He speaks of this as a general fact; and he says, still more plainly and forcibly, that *whosoever is born of God*, as every Christian is, *doth not commit sin, and cannot sin.* Now why should Mr. Mahan take upon him to contradict the apostles, and to hold that any man is a true believer, who falls short of complete sanctification? Why confine

the present attainment of sinless perfection to a few extraordinary saints, when the infallible Word of God attributes it to *all* believers?" It would be gratifying to know what reply Mr. Mahan would make.

We will now proceed with our examination, making it our object to determine the true meaning of the texts which seem most favorable to the doctrine of "Perfection." And here, I think, we must be satisfied, that in some of the texts, the language used is intended to set forth the *sincerity* or *uprightness* of believers, in distinction from hypocrites, and also their freedom from any such offences, as would expose their public character to discredit, or their piety to suspicion. Job was *perfect* and *upright*. The two words are doubtless of the same general import, denoting real *integrity* or *goodness*. In several instances, the Psalmist uses the strong language of self-justification, and seems at first view to say, he is not chargeable with any sin, when his meaning evidently is, that he is innocent of the crimes which his enemies laid to his charge. Even if, at any time, he was not conscious of any particular sins; he was aware that he was liable to mistake, and apprehended that there might still be some concealed evil in his heart; and with a view to this, he prayed God to search him, and see if there was any wicked way in him. In some cases, pious men under the former dispensation are said to have *followed the Lord wholly*, when the obvious meaning is, that they kept themselves from idolatry, and adhered uniformly to the worship of the true God. When the New Testament writers speak of *perfection*, they often refer to a state of *maturity* or *manhood* in knowledge or in holiness, in distinction from a state of *childhood*,—a state of *advancement* in piety, in distinction from the common state of *new converts*; and sometimes they refer to the purity and blessedness of heaven, which is the high object to which all Christians aspire. But in no case do the circumstances require that the language employed should be understood to denote *complete sanctification as actually attained in the present life*. Now such being the fact, Mr. Mahan surely has reason to hesitate, and to go into a thorough examination of the subject, before he relies upon any of the texts which he cites, as proofs of his doctrine.

But it is so indescribably important to obtain a right understanding of the Scriptures, that we cannot pursue our inquiries with too much diligence and care. Let us then go forward with our examination, and see whether the sacred writers will

not, in *other ways*, not yet mentioned, help us to determine in what light they looked upon Christians in the present life, and how their language in the texts referred to is to be understood.

Are we not then plainly taught, by the current representations of the inspired writers, that *the religion of God's people, throughout the present life, is progressive*, beginning at their conversion, and advancing from one degree of holiness to another, till they arrive at a state of perfect purity and blessedness in heaven? Is not the description, which the apostle gives (1 Cor. 13) of the progress of believers from partial to perfect *knowledge*, equally applicable to their progress in *piety*? This is plainly indicated by the fact that the same apostle expressly requires believers to *grow in grace*, as well as in *knowledge*. Can it be supposed that there were any Christians in the apostle's day, who had no need to grow in grace, and to whom that precept did not belong? How plainly does the apostle show, that he regarded religion as *progressive*, by what he says to Christians at Philippi:—"Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perform it,"—*will be performing it, or bringing it to a completion*, "until the day of Christ." The work of sanctification was begun, and was to be *in a course of accomplishment*—was to be *finishing, until the day of Christ*; when it would be perfected. So the Psalmist viewed it: "I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness." Had the apostle considered the good work as fully accomplished already, he would naturally have said:—"Being confident of this, that He who has begun and completed a good work in you, will keep you in that state of complete holiness until the day of Christ. But instead of this, he represents the finishing of the good work as what God was *still to do*. In accordance with all this, he shortly after prays that their "love may abound yet *more and more*." In another place he speaks of all believers as changed into the image of Christ *from glory to glory*. So it is set forth in the Old Testament: "The path of the just is as the shining light, shining *more and more* to the perfect day. The writer to the Hebrews exhorts believers to "follow holiness." Mr. Mahan thinks the perfection mentioned, Phil. 3: 12, is the final state of blessedness in heaven. If this is the prominent sense of the passage, "following after" it denotes the strenuous efforts he made through life, to obtain it, as a *future good*,—efforts like those which a man in a race makes to obtain the prize. Now believers, in the passage just referred to, are di-

rected, by the same word, to *follow after holiness*,—clearly implying that it is not yet fully attained, but is still to be an object of pursuit. It will be noted, that the writer calls those to whom he wrote, “*holy*.” They were so, as all believers are, *in a measure*. For them to *follow after holiness* was to aim at *higher* measures of it,—to aspire to that *perfection* of holiness, which they had not attained. This was enjoined upon *all Christians*; showing clearly what was in the mind of the inspired writer as to their real condition. If there had been any who were already perfect in holiness, how could they have been directed to *follow after* it, as an object to be obtained by future exertions? The same word is used by Paul to Timothy: “*Follow after* righteousness, goodness, faith, love, patience, meekness.” Timothy had all these virtues in a degree; but he was to *follow after* them with a view to *higher* attainments.

The *progressive* nature of holiness in Christians is implied in all the texts which speak of their spiritual *warfare*. In this warfare, they are unceasingly to oppose every kind of evil, especially the evil in their own hearts. “Their warfare is within.” In this warfare all Christians are engaged. The most advanced are not exempt. The apostle does indeed say, that Christians are already crucified and dead to sin. But keep in mind that he says this of *all* Christians. Keep in mind too, that he exhorts the same Christians to *put off* the old man, which is corrupt, and to *put on* the new man; to *be transformed* by the renewing of their minds, and to *put on* Christ;—urging all this as *a duty still to be done*. In like manner, he represents all Christians as *renewed*; and yet exhorts them *to be renewed*. It all shows, that the work of dying to sin is *begun*, and is to be *constantly advanced*; that at their conversion they are *renewed*, and that, so long as they live, they are to be renewed *more and more*. If the texts which represent Christians as renewed, dead to sin, &c., are understood to imply that the work of renovation is *completed*, what can be the meaning of the other texts, which enjoin the same thing upon *all* Christians, as *a duty still to be done*? And I must again request Mr. Mahan and others, from whom I am constrained to differ, to consider well, and not to forget that the most important texts which seem to favor their doctrine, relate, not to a few Christians of extraordinary attainments, but to *all* Christians. And if they imply that sanctification is at present complete, they imply that it is so with the whole body of believers. My brethren then will be under the

necessity of adopting the *qualified* sense which I have given of the texts, or of going a step farther, and maintaining, that *all* real Christians are now perfectly holy. If they allow themselves in serious unfettered thought, they cannot long retain their present position.

But I must refer to another class of texts, which will afford us additional aid in determining how we are to regard the present condition of good men,—those which represent *their desires after holiness*. It is the very nature of *desire*, to aspire after a *future good*,—a good not yet obtained. According to the Scriptures, it is characteristic of all the followers of Christ, that they *hunger and thirst after righteousness*; that is, they have a strong desire for *complete holiness*; which implies that they have not yet obtained it. If, in any part of their life, they were already “filled,” why should they “*hunger and thirst*?” When David said: “My soul *thirsteth and panteth* for God,” did not his desires fix upon a good, which he did not then enjoy?

Consider also *the prayers which believers offer up for themselves*. No part of the Bible exhibits a more striking view of the devout exercises of the believer's heart, than Psalm cxix. In various ways, it expresses the sincerest reverence and love for the divine law, and the most determined obedience; and, at the same time, a reaching after what had not yet been obtained. “O that my feet were directed to keep thy statutes!—Then shall I not be ashamed, when I have respect to all thy commandments.—My soul cleaveth to the dust; quicken thou me according to thy word.—Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not unto covetousness.—Turn away mine eyes from beholding vanity, and quicken me in thy way.—I have seen an end of all perfection; but thy commandment is exceeding broad.—I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek thy servant; for I do not forget thy commandments.” Language like this undoubtedly expresses the moral state and exercises of all true believers on earth. It is the language of those who, with warm desire and strong purpose of heart, are following after complete sanctification. As to the true meaning and intent of the language, let the wisest and best men who use it be the judges. It is easy to invent novel and eccentric interpretations of the Bible. But novelties and eccentricities will wax old and vanish away; while common sense and Christian experience, and the teaching of the Holy Spirit will guide into all the truth.

Consider too *the prayers which Christ and the apostles offer-*

ed up for the whole body of believers. Jesus said: "I pray not that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from the evil.—*Sanctify them through thy truth.*" The work of sanctification was begun in them. Jesus prayed that it might be advanced and perfected. So when Mr. Mahan, and the followers of Christ generally pray God to sanctify their fellow Christians, they doubtless fix their desires upon a degree of sanctification not yet attained. Jesus prayed also that believers might be *one*,—referring to a degree of union far above what then existed, or ever has existed since that time.

The first Christians were in circumstances highly favorable to eminent holiness. The great truths of the gospel came to their understandings and hearts in all their beauty and freshness, from the lips of inspired Apostles, unadulterated by human mixtures, and attended with the extraordinary power of the Holy Spirit. No doubt they did attain to a remarkable degree of faith and obedience, and may properly be regarded as patterns of piety to Christians in following ages. But how were the Apostles accustomed to *pray* for them? And what must have been the desires and aims, implied in their prayers?

After addressing the Christians at Thessalonica, who had truly received the gospel, and in whom it worked effectually; and after calling them his joy and crown, and telling them that he and his fellow-laborers, in all their afflictions, were comforted over them by their faith; the Apostle says: "We pray exceedingly that we might see your face, and might *perfect* that which is *lacking* in your *faith*." And then he adds: "The Lord make you to *increase* and abound in love towards one another, and towards all men, to the end he may establish your hearts in holiness." Again, in the same Epistle: "The God of peace sanctify you *wholly*." So in Heb. 13: 21: "The God of peace—*make you perfect* in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight." In another place: "The Lord *direct* your hearts *into* the love of God." He also prayed that God would *fulfil* in them all "the good pleasure of his goodness." For the Ephesians he prayed, that God would grant unto them "to be strengthened with might by his Spirit"—that they might "know the love of Christ," and "be filled with all the fulness of God." He expressed the same devout desires for the Colossians. And to the Corinthians he says: "I pray God that ye do no evil;" "And this also we *wish*, even your perfection."

Now what was implied in these prayers for primitive believers? The same, unquestionably, as is commonly implied, when similar prayers are offered up at the present day. Devout ministers and Christians everywhere pray for believers,—for *all* believers, that their hearts may be directed into the love of God; that their love may *increase*; that God would *sanctify* them, and sanctify them *wholly*; and that they may be filled with all the fulness of God. And if Mr. Mahan and other Christians will look into their own hearts, and see what they really mean, when they offer up such prayers, they will be likely to know what the Apostles meant. We have no evidence that the disciples ever prayed in *any* way for their Lord and Master. But if they prayed for him at all, did they ever pray for him in *this* manner? He offered up prayer to God for *himself*. But did he ever pray, that his love might *increase* and *abound*, and that God would sanctify him *wholly*?—The prayers which Christ and the Apostles offered up, and which are now offered up, and doubtless will be, to the end of time, for the whole body of believers, evidently imply, that whatever their attainments may be, they do, and always will, while here below, fall short of perfect sanctification; and that all the saints on earth are and will be in such a state, that they will always do, what Jesus never did, make continual *confession* of *sin*, and continually offer up *the sacrifice* of a *broken heart*, and a *contrite spirit*, as the sacrifice which God approves, *till they arrive at heaven*.

One thing more. All Christians suffer *affliction*. And what is the meaning and design of affliction? “The Lord does not afflict willingly the children of men, but for their profit, that they may be partakers of his holiness.” “It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy statutes.” The design of affliction is set forth with special clearness in Heb. 12. “Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. What son is he whom the father chasteneth not? If ye be without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not sons.” And the writer adds, that God chastens us “for our profit, that we may be partakers of his holiness.” What now must be our conclusion, but this, that, as all Christians on earth endure affliction, which is always designed as *chastisement*; they all *need* it as a means of improving their character. Mr. Mahan’s “reply” to this argument directly confirms it. Speaking of the rod of our heavenly Father, he says: “Its object is to render us partakers of his holiness. *Till* this

end is accomplished, the rod will be used. *When* this end is accomplished, it will no more be used." Who could express the sentiment of the sacred writer better? This is the view which gives all its force to the argument. *Till* believers are made partakers of God's holiness, the rod is used. *When* this is fully accomplished, *the rod is no more used*. Who now has this evidence of complete conformity to the divine holiness? Has Mr. Mahan, or Mr. Fitch, or any who agree with them? Are they free from affliction? Can they say that the rod is no more used with them? But would they any longer endure chastisement, if sanctification, which is the object of it, were fully accomplished? If any of them are indeed "*without chastisement*" what does the Scripture say of them? Now chastisement, if just, always implies some fault in the one who is chastised. When you see a wise and good father correcting his children, you know that he sees something amiss in them. And as divine chastisement is continued to all believers, as long as life lasts, it must be that God sees in them some fault to be corrected, or some moral deficiency to be supplied. When the end of chastisement is fully accomplished, Mr. Mahan says, "it will no more be used."

Now, the last and generally the greatest affliction which believers suffer, is *death*. And why may not this, as well as all preceding afflictions, be intended, by a wonder-working God, for their benefit, that they may, in a higher degree than before, be partakers of his holiness? Being the last, and a most remarkable case of suffering, why may it not be the means of completing their sanctification; and so the means of working out for them, in the last instance, a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory? On the very principle laid down by Mr. Mahan, as well as by the sacred writer, why is it not reasonable to conclude, that the whole end of suffering is not accomplished *before* death, but is accomplished *at* death; and that this is the reason why there is no affliction after death? And how common it has been for the wisest and best of men to look upon death in this light, and to anticipate the event, however painful, as a blessing—a means of delivering them from all remains of depravity, and of finishing in them the work of preparation for heaven! *So long as they are in this tabernacle, they groan, being burdened*. And what burden so great as sin? The time when they expect to be like Christ, that is, perfectly so, is the time when he shall appear, and when they shall see him as he is.

I marvel that Mr. Mahan treats this common view of the subject as he does. See Disc. p. 47. He calls it *absurd*, and thinks he can dispose of it by a single stroke. To overthrow the doctrine that the work of sanctification is completed at death, he uses two arguments. "First, the grave, which sanctifies believers amid the gloom and wreck and distraction of dissolving nature, would, if applied, have sanctified him at an earlier period." Undoubtedly it would have done it, "*if applied*." But what if it was *not* applied? And how does Mr. Mahan know that it may not have seemed good in the sight of God to apply it at the time of dissolution, rather than *before*? May not this be one of the unsearchable things in the divine dispensation? And why did not Mr. Mahan see how easily he might disprove the Scripture doctrine which *he* believes,—that *Christians are sanctified by means of the common afflictions of life*? He might say: "The same grace which sanctifies the believer amid the gloom" and distress of heavy affliction, "would, *if applied*, have sanctified him before." And by this argument he might prove, in opposition to the sacred writers and to himself, that God does *not* sanctify believers by means of affliction;—yes, he might verily prove, that God does not sanctify believers by means of *chastisement*, because the grace, which sanctifies them by such means, would, *if applied*, have sanctified them before. In the same way, he might prove that *sinner*s are not, in any case, *converted* by means of preaching, because the grace which converts them by that means, would, *if applied*, have converted them at an earlier period! His second argument is this: "No other reason can be assigned for this grace (the grace which would wholly sanctify believers before death) being withheld, but the supposition that God can better glorify himself, and his kingdom be better advanced by saints partially, than wholly sanctified." The argument, plainly stated and carried out, stands thus: *There is no reason* why God should not bestow the grace which would wholly sanctify believers during the present life, but the supposition, that he is better glorified by their partial, than by their entire sanctification. And as this supposition is inadmissible, therefore, God does not withhold, but *actually bestows* the grace which wholly sanctifies believers during the present life. Now try this argument, and see how it would work in other cases. Would not God be more glorified, if all Christians should be perfectly holy *to-day*, than if they should remain partially holy? Must he not

then actually give them the grace, which will *make* them perfectly holy to-day? Again, would not God have been better glorified, if Mr. Mahan and other Christians had been converted at an earlier period of their life? If so, then there was no reason why he should withhold the grace which would have converted them earlier. And as he *does* nothing and *omits* nothing without reason, it must be that he actually bestowed the grace which converted them earlier; that is, bestowed the grace which converted them before they were converted. Once more. Mr. Mahan thinks that he was a wanderer from the right way, while he was a member of this Seminary; and in his charitable judgment, all his fellow-students were in so low and lamentable a state, that "not a single individual," out of so large a number, "enjoyed daily communion and peace with God." Surely Mr. Mahan thinks God would, at that time, have been more glorified by his complete holiness and that of his brethren, than by their very partial holiness. Must it not then have been the fact, that God did actually give them the grace which *made* them completely holy? But as this grace was not given, and as he thinks there could have been no other reason for not giving it, than the one he mentions, must not his conclusion be, that it was withheld without any reason?

I have dwelt so long on this point, to show that this mode of reasoning involves the most glaring falsities, and leads to the most dangerous results. What shipwreck will any one make of the truth, who argues in this manner! It is going beyond our province, and attempting to intrude ourselves irreverently into those secret things which belong only to God. Why should we take upon us to determine, by our own fallible judgment, what the dispensations of God will be? We know what the Lord requires of *us*,—that we should glorify him by constant and entire obedience. But how he will see fit to glorify *himself*, in his sovereign Providence, is another question. And who is able to compare the different ways in which God may do this, and to determine, by his own reason, which God will prefer? Who is authorized to say, that God will not overrule the sinfulness which remains in his own children to the end of life, so as to make it the means of honoring, in the highest degree, his own infinite wisdom and grace? By this and all the other acts of his government, he will cause the world to know, that he is God. How admirable will his forbearance and mercy appear to his people hereafter, when they remember that they

carried with them, to the very gate of heaven, so much that was offensive in his sight! What wonder, love and praise will fill their illuminated and purified souls, when they call to mind their own deficiencies, and the long continued perverseness of their hearts, and then think of that redeeming grace, the aboundings of which rose so far above the aboundings of sin!

Finally. I make my appeal to *the consciousness of the most advanced Christians*,—the Baxters, the Mathers, the Brainerds, the Edwardses, the Martyns and the Paysons,—Christians who have probably risen as high in their spiritual attainments, as the most favored of those who maintain the doctrine of Perfection; and I could show, from their own repeated and humble confessions, that they all had a deep and growing sense of remaining depravity; that they always abhorred themselves on account of indwelling sin, and felt the need of pardoning and sanctifying grace, even to the end of life. And the sacred writers show, in the various ways above mentioned, and in other ways, that they had the same conviction as to their own state, and the state of all the saints on earth. I might refer to John, who asserts that it would be false for believers to say, they have *no sin*, and immediately speaks of their *confessing* their sins, and of the readiness of God to *pardon* and *cleanse* them;—all showing that he meant to speak of what they were at the time he wrote. The writers of the New Testament manifestly had the same views with Solomon, who said, in the midst of a solemn, public prayer: “there is no man that sinneth not,” and who afterwards repeated the same sentiment: “there is not a just man on earth who doeth good and sinneth not.”

Such is the examination which we have pursued in order to ascertain the true meaning of the texts which seem, at first view, to favor the doctrine of “Perfection.” I have not presumed to determine this in a moment; but have felt it to be necessary, in so important a matter, to search the Scriptures, and to compare one part with another, so that, if possible, I might be able to determine exactly what is the mind of the inspired writers, and what is the doctrine they mean to teach respecting the subject under consideration.

In this examination we have found, 1. That the Scriptures, in other cases, frequently employ terms similar to those used in these texts, in a *restricted sense*. We conclude, therefore, that they *may* proceed on the same principle here. The most literal, absolute sense *may* not be the sense intended. 2. As to some

of the texts referred to, we have found that the circumstances of the case clearly forbid us to understand them in the literal and absolute sense. And our conclusion is, that the same *may* be true in respect to the other texts, though for reasons less obvious. 3. We have found, that the terms used in some of the texts are evidently designed to express the *integrity* of true believers, in distinction from hypocrites, or their freedom from *particular sins* which were charged upon them by others, or to which they were exposed; or the *maturity* of their religious character, compared with its commencement; or perhaps the fact, that they had *all the essential parts of the new man*, though in an imperfect state. In no case is the highest sense of the words absolutely required. 4. The *current* language of the sacred writers, in a variety of respects, implies that the piety of believers during the present life is *progressive*. 5. Complete holiness is represented as an object of *desire* to believers, desire, from its very nature, fixing upon a *future* good—a good not yet possessed. 6. Complete holiness is an object of the *prayers*, which the saints offered up for themselves and for one another; implying that it was regarded as a *good, not yet obtained*. 7. *Affliction*, or chastisement, which is intended as a means of sanctification, is continued to believers up to the very close of life; implying that, so long as life lasts, they have remaining sinfulness which calls for it. 8. The most advanced saints have always been *conscious* of the imperfection of their holiness.

Now do not all these plain instructions and representations, both separately and unitedly, make known the real spiritual state of the people of God during the present life? Do they not show very satisfactorily, that it was not the design of the sacred writers to teach the doctrine, that the saints as a body, or any part of them, actually attain to sinless perfection here? And must we not, therefore, understand all the texts which, at first view, seem to favor the doctrine of "Perfection," in a *qualified or comparative* sense, a sense corresponding with the general teachings of the Bible, as to the actual state of believers in the present world?

To guard against every thing which might appear questionable or inconclusive, I have thus far framed my argument without any reference to Rom. 7: 14—25. And yet, if the Apostle intends to speak of himself in his renewed state, the passage affords an argument of the first importance in support of the

common doctrine. I cannot now enter into the controversy respecting this passage. Highly respectable writers are found on both sides. I can only say, that I agree with those who consider the Apostle as setting forth his own state, and the state of others, as true believers. The reasons which satisfy me, are briefly given by the two most recent expositors in our own country, Hodge and Barnes. The considerations which are of most weight are these. 1. This is the sense which appears the most obvious and natural to common readers. 2. The language of the Apostle is well suited to express the exercises of the best men with whom I have ever been acquainted. And, so far as I know, those who have made the highest attainments in piety, have spoken of themselves most freely in the very language of the Apostle. 3. Some of the expressions cannot, without difficulty, be made to apply to the unrenewed. 4. The same conflict, which is here described, is set forth very plainly, and in similar language, in Gal. 5: 17, a passage which, by common consent, is applied to Christians.

Now if the other evidence in support of the common doctrine were in any way deficient, the passage from Rom. 7, would, in my view, supply the deficiency, and would at once make known the real doctrine of the Scriptures. According to this passage, the state of Christians in this life is one of constant conflict between sin and holiness, the old and the new man; a state of high aims and endeavors, but of comparatively low attainments; and while, in view of the power and grace of Christ, they rejoice, and give thanks, and are confident of a final and speedy victory; they have reason also, when they look at the remains of sin in their own hearts, to abhor themselves and repent in dust and ashes.

Consider how different the result of this examination would be, if we had found all the evidence which exists in support of the common doctrine, to be on the other side, going directly to confirm the doctrine of "Perfection." The question is: How are we to understand those texts which seem at first view to assert the present perfection of believers? Suppose we had found nothing, either in the texts themselves, or in any other part of the Bible, to show that the terms employed are ever to be taken in any other than the most absolute sense: suppose we had found that the current representations of the sacred writers clearly imply, that believers in general, at least the better part of them, are now without sin; that their piety, instead

of being progressive, comes to perfection at once : suppose we had found, that believers, instead of desiring and panting after complete holiness, have always been in the habit of congratulating themselves as already possessing it; and that, instead of earnestly praying for it, they have habitually thanked the Lord, that he had already bestowed it upon them : suppose we had found that their struggle with indwelling sin is past, their warfare ended ; that they have no more chastisement, and of course no faults that call for it : and suppose it to be the belief, the inward consciousness of Christians, especially of those most distinguished for their piety, that they have already attained to a state of sinless perfection : suppose all this to be true, how different would be our conclusion ! We should at once agree to give all the texts referred to the largest and most absolute sense. And instead of disputing against "the doctrine of Christian Perfection," we should carry it much higher than its present advocates do. But what shall we say, and what will the advocates of the doctrine say, when it is seen that the evidence is all on the other side ?

As to the many remaining topics of remark introduced by Mr. Mahan and his associates, I shall confine myself to those which seem to be of chief consequence, and shall dispose of them as briefly as possible.

PAUL AND OTHERS HELD UP AS EXAMPLES.

It is mentioned as a proof of Paul's complete sanctification, that he exhorts Christians to *copy his example*—to be followers of him as he was of Christ. The argument is, that he could not have held himself up as an example, had he not been perfectly free from sin.

On this I remark, that Paul speaks of the Thessalonian Christians much in the same manner in this respect, as he does of himself : "Ye became followers of us and of the Lord, so that ye *became ensamples* to all that believe in Macedonia and Achaia." He also speaks with approbation of the Thessalonians as *followers of the churches in Judea*, implying that those churches were worthy of imitation. This argument then would prove that the mass of believers in Thessalonica and Judea were perfectly sanctified ; which is much more than any man will assert.

My next remark is, that Paul and the Thessalonians and other Christians being held up as examples, does not necessa-

rily imply more than that they were distinguished for piety in general, or for some particular branch of it. It is the same at the present day. If any man, a parent, a minister, or other Christian, exhibits the character of goodness more uniformly and conspicuously than is common; who hesitates to speak of him, as an *example of goodness*, and to exhort others to the duty of imitation? Our meaning is, not that he is without any fault—far from it—but that he is a good example *in the main*, or as to the *prominent traits of his character*, or as to *what is visible*. Thus Leighton, Baxter, Doddridge, Edwards, Brainerd, Payson and others are often spoken of as safe and useful examples. But who has any idea that they were *perfectly sanctified*? Who knows not that they were conscious of many sinful imperfections? Undoubtedly the sacred writers were accustomed to speak in the same *qualified sense*. Nothing can be more manifestly contrary to all just principles of interpretation and of reasoning, than to force the sense of a Scripture word or phrase to *the highest possible pitch*, and then to argue from that extreme sense, as though it were the *true sense*, in support of some uncommon opinion.

PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PERFECTION, AND OF THE
COMMON DOCTRINE.

Mr. Mahan thinks much of the *practical effect* of his doctrine; and he represents those who do not embrace it, as making void God's law by their traditions. He seems to think (Disc. pp. 44—46, etc.) that the most eminent saints on earth have done nothing effectually towards their own sanctification, because they have not been in possession of the grand secret of efficient holy action. He says: "Who would expect an army to fight under the impression of inevitable defeat?"—thus misrepresenting our views, and taking advantage of the misrepresentation to discredit our doctrine, and to give plausibility to his own. Again, not seeming to be at all sensible how strangely and totally he misrepresents the great body of ministers and Christians, he first asserts (Repos. pp. 418—19) that his doctrine involves the principle which is considered essential to efficient action, and then says: "The belief that, as a matter of fact, we never shall attain to a certain state, renders it impracticable to aim at it;" and he speaks of it as "the testimony of universal consciousness, that no man ever did or can aim, or intend to reach a point, which he fully believes to lie beyond the line of *all*

expectation." And he asks, what more effectual means a parent could take to prevent the obedience of a child, than to require that child to believe that he will *never* render that obedience. When Mr. Mahan talks thus, it must be understood that he means to put down the doctrine of his opponents. But who among them believes any thing like what he thus implicitly charges upon them? Can he say, and does he mean to say, that we believe we *never* shall attain to perfect holiness; and that perfect holiness is entirely beyond our expectation? He certainly does *not* mean to say this. He only intends to say, we do not expect to attain it *during the present life*. Then why does he not take care to say just what he *means* to say? And why does he, by misstating our doctrine, give an appearance of strength to his arguments, when a true statement would leave his arguments, not only without strength, but without any *appearance* of it? He is right in saying, we cannot aim at a thing which we believe we shall *never attain*. And if his readers suppose that such is our belief,—and his language would naturally lead them to this supposition,—they will conclude at once that we are wholly in the wrong, and are in a very sad condition. But it is surely a very different thing to say, we believe we *never* shall attain to perfect holiness, from what it is to say, we do not expect to attain to it in a *day*, or during *the short period of the present life*. The fact is, that Christians in general *believe* and *expect* that they shall attain to complete holiness, as really as the advocates of Perfection. And I undertake to say, that our expectation is far more *confident* and *certain*, than that which our opponents indulge. If we are true Christians, we can say: "We *know*, that when he shall appear, we shall be like him." Here is a hope which has no mixture of doubt or uncertainty, and is rightly called *knowledge*. Though Mr. Mahan signifies that complete holiness is entirely beyond our expectation, we do expect it, and expect it soon. We believe that we shall, in a little while, be free from all remains of sin, and be completely changed into the image of Christ. We hope to reach this blessed state shortly, perhaps to-morrow. "We now groan, being burdened;" and we often cry out: "Who shall deliver us from the body of this death?" But we confidently look for deliverance. Yet a little while, and the day of victory will come. Has Mr. Mahan still to learn what joy, yea, what ecstasy of joy, devout Christians often experience, from the hope of speedily attaining

to perfect holiness in heaven; and how they reach forward and press on towards it, putting forth their highest efforts in the pursuit? He thinks the perfection, which Paul speaks of as the object of his desire, was the heavenly state, and not any thing he could reach in the present world; and yet he sees that this circumstance did not prevent him from exerting all his powers in the pursuit of it. Had he adopted the same principle here, as in the case under consideration, he would have said: the apostle must have expected to attain to the perfect state he aimed at, *in the present life*, or he could have had no motive to pursue it. He would have said too, that Paul believed he *never* should attain to it, because he did not expect to attain to it here below, and, therefore, that he could put forth no vigorous endeavors after it, being destitute of the only principle of efficient action. If he allows that Paul had a faith which gave reality to *future glory*, and brought it near, and that, under the influence of such a faith, he made great exertions to obtain it; why not allow the same to be true with Christians generally, in regard to that *complete moral purity*, which they look upon as an essential part of future glory? Why may they not exert all their energies in the pursuit, although, in their view, it is not to be fully attained within the short space of the present life? The apostle John brings out the principle concerned in this matter with perfect plainness, and speaks of it familiarly, as a thing well understood in his day. He tells us what the assured hope of believers is: "We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him;" and then adds: "And every man that hath this hope in him, (the hope of being perfectly like Christ in heaven,) purifieth himself, even as he is pure." The object was not to be reached in this life. But did this circumstance prevent primitive believers from laboring to purify themselves, and to become like Christ? Far from it. And it is my persuasion, that this *future* perfection in holiness, connected as it is with all the unseen glories of the upper world, has a far more commanding influence upon devout Christians, and rouses them to higher efforts after complete sanctification, than the expectation which Mr. Mahan and his associates indulge, of obtaining perfect holiness in the present world. In the first place, the *object* of our hope is far *higher* and *nobler* than the object of theirs. They are led, by the position they take, to lower down their object, that is, *Christian Perfection*, so as to bring it within their reach,

and to make it just that which they have attained, or are likely to attain in the present state. For consistency's sake, they are obliged to do this, and they have begun to do it. But it is a bold and perilous attempt. The law of God cannot bend; and those who undertake to bend it know not what they do. The moral law will not adapt its requirements to our mistakes, or to our attainments. And it certainly is a dangerous and daring thing for any man to take such ground,—as the advocates of "Perfection" evidently do,—that they will feel themselves urged, for the sake of consistency, to represent their own attainments as being the perfect holiness which God's law requires. Now let those, who hold to the Oberlin doctrine, come up, as some of them have done, to that which they consider to be "Christian Perfection;" and what further influence can the *expectation* of complete holiness have upon them? *Expectation* is superseded by *enjoyment*. And what occasion for efforts to *obtain* that which they already *possess*? They may pursue other objects; but their expectation of entire conformity to the divine law is realized. They have reached the object; and there is no place for further efforts. Where then is their "only principle of efficient action?" Look now at that state of perfect spiritual purity, that complete likeness to Christ, which is the high object of desire and expectation with Christians generally. How evident it is, that we shall be stimulated to pursue it with an intensity of effort, proportioned to the sublimity and excellence of the object.

But, in the second place, this expectation of ours stands before us in close connection with circumstances which make a strong appeal to the principles of the human mind, and powerfully move the springs of human action. That perfect holiness, to which we are taught to aspire, is associated in our thoughts with the ineffable joys and glories of the world above, with the presence of the exalted Saviour, and with things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor heart conceived,—an object so sublime, and excellent, and attractive in itself, and surrounded with such invisible and celestial glories. Oh! how much deeper interest does it produce in the mind, and how much more powerfully does it excite the active energies of our spiritual nature, than the low attainments which man ever has made, or ever will make, in this state of weakness, and error, and moral defilement! That perfection which is actually attained by Christians, feeble and inconstant like ourselves, is

in sober truth, an object *too near, too familiar, too human*, yes, and *too easily obtained*, to take hold of our minds with the strongest grasp, and to elicit our mightiest energies. But tell Christians of the glorious appearing of their Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and inspire them with the hope of being like him when they shall see him as he is; the hope of being then adorned with all the beauties of holiness, and of sitting with Christ on his throne, and of dwelling forever in that blessed but unseen world, in which no sin shall be found, and you may be sure that they will hunger and thirst after righteousness, and will give all diligence to purify themselves, and to prepare for a heaven so holy and so glorious.

Thirdly: the expectation, which Christians generally entertain, has greatly the advantage over that which the Oberlin doctrine inspires, in respect to *certainty*. Those who act under the influence of that doctrine aim at perfect holiness, with a hope and expectation of attaining to it in the present world. But is their expectation entirely free from *doubt*, and attended with *certainty*? Can they say we *know* that we shall attain to perfection before this short life is ended? Are they certain that they shall *do* that which will insure complete sanctification—that they shall fulfil the conditions on which the blessing is promised? Those among them who have not yet reached perfection, would, I presume, think it going too far, to say that they certainly *know* they shall reach it in the present world. And those who cherish the pleasing, but, as I apprehend, delusive idea, that they have already reached that state, would probably be backward to say they *certainly know* that they shall continue in it. But the expectation, which believers generally indulge, is attended with *certainty*. They *know*, that if they are true Christians, they shall reach their object, and shall reach it soon; that when they are absent from the body, they shall be present with the Lord, and shall then be holy as he is holy. Now until those who embrace the Oberlin doctrine are able to entertain an expectation of complete holiness in this life, which rises to *certainty*, it must be evident to them, that, on their own principles, the hope which we indulge has a real advantage over theirs in point of *practical influence*. And if I mistake not, they themselves will, after all, feel the value of the common doctrine, and be sometimes driven to take refuge in it. For they will, in all probability, have seasons of doubting whether they have attained, or shall attain to perfection in

this world. And if they are disturbed with such doubts, what can they do but resort to the comforting truth, that, though they may fail of reaching complete holiness here, they shall reach it in heaven? And a small portion of true faith will bring the perfection of the heavenly state *very near*.

I have sometimes tried to account for it, that Mr. Mahan's doctrine exerts so mighty an influence over his mind and the minds of others, calling forth energies and imparting joys before unknown. He will allow me to say that I cannot ascribe all this to the *truth of his doctrine*; for I do not consider the doctrine to *be* true. And I would not undertake to pry into the secret chambers of his mind, and to judge of the unwonted movements which have been going on there. But there is a principle, implanted in our common nature, which operates powerfully in such a case, and in some minds *very* powerfully. When a philosopher, or a navigator makes a discovery, he is filled with emotions which can hardly be described; and he publishes it abroad with a zeal proportioned to his view of its importance. And its importance will be likely to rise very high, in his view, from the circumstance that *he* is the discoverer. The doctrine of perfection has indeed been long before the public. But Mr. Mahan appears not to have received it at second hand. It came to him as a new discovery. Suddenly, and in a remarkable manner, his eyes were opened, and he saw the freeness and fullness of gospel grace, and the way in which a believer can at once obtain sanctification. Now I would not, for the world, trifle with those unusual operations of his mind; for there is reason to think, that the Spirit of God was with him, and that he did actually attain to a more entire consecration of himself to God than before. But who can be sure that he was not more or less elated with the new discovery? Even the Apostle Paul, —that Mr. Mahan thinks was perfect,—even that great Apostle was in danger of being exalted above measure with the revelations made to him, when he was caught up to the third heaven. And it was found to be necessary that he should have a very humbling and long-continued affliction, a thorn in the flesh, to guard his heart from pride and self-complacency. And it cannot be going too far to suppose, that Mr. Mahan is as much exposed to this danger, as the great Apostle was. And surely it will not be amiss for him to inquire, whether his remarkable discovery, and the novelty of those exercises, which seemed to distinguish him above other ministers and Chris-

tians, may not have worked in with certain principles of his nature, not yet fully sanctified ; and whether the singular zeal he shows in writing books, and in compassing the land to make proselytes, may not be owing in part to these principles of nature ; and whether it would be safe for him to look upon all this excitement of feeling, and all this labor to propagate his new opinions, as the unmixed result of the Holy Spirit's influence, and as a certain evidence of his likeness to the blessed Jesus. And may it not be well for him to keep his mind open,—as I trust he will,—to farther instruction from the Word and Spirit of God ? For, possibly, a higher degree of illumination may disclose to him some remaining deficiencies in his character, which he has overlooked. His heavenly Father may perhaps visit him with some severe affliction : “ for whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth.” If he does indeed trust in God and seek his help, God will supply all his need,—will correct any mistakes into which he has been betrayed, and help him to separate the hay, wood and stubble, from the gold and silver and precious stones,—will graciously assist him in reviewing his writings, and the whole course he has pursued in preaching, and the effects he has produced on the churches of Christ. And if there has been any thing wrong,—“ for there is no man that doeth good and sinneth not,”—God will teach him what it is. And it may be, God will make him a greater blessing to the Institution over which he presides, and to the church of Christ, than he ever has been.

There are many minor points, on which I might remark. But I have meant to confine myself to the chief points. If the principal arguments, on which this doctrine of Perfection depends, have been shown to be inconclusive, it is all the case requires. In these two numbers, I have said all I have to say on this subject. I leave it to others to do what the cause of truth may further require to be done.

I close with three brief remarks.

My first remark is on the effect which will naturally be produced upon a man's own mind, by his believing that he has already attained to perfect holiness. And here I grant, that a man's believing himself perfectly holy, *if he were so in reality*, could have none but a good influence upon him. In such a case, it would be *a belief of the truth*. And surely, a *belief of the truth* must be supposed to have a good influence upon a perfectly holy mind. But suppose a man believes himself to be

perfectly holy, *when he is not*. This would be the *belief of error*. And it is easy to see what effect the belief of error, particularly of such an error as this, must have upon one who is sanctified only in part. And as I am persuaded, that those who think themselves completely sanctified are mistaken, I cannot but conclude, that their opinion of themselves, is really thinking of themselves more highly than they ought to think, and that its hurtful influence upon their feelings and conduct will ere-long become visible.

My second remark is, that we, who do not believe the doctrine, are *in some danger of injuring ourselves and others by opposing it*. The preaching and the writings of those who maintain the doctrine contain a great portion of most precious truth. And it is by this mixture of truth, that the error is made plausible, and insinuates itself into the minds of others. Now the danger is, that by means of the opposition we make to the particular error which they hold, we shall be led to believe the important truths contained in their writings with less firmness, to love them with less sincerity, and to use them less profitably. The Lord preserve us from this danger, and so influence our minds and hearts, that we shall most heartily believe that portion of the truth which is exhibited in the writings referred to, and shall give it even a higher place in our thoughts and in our preaching, than we have heretofore done. Thus, while we prove all things, may we hold fast that which is good.

My last remark is, that *we ought not to be over anxious on account of the temporary prevalence of error*. We ought to exert ourselves to the utmost in the spirit of love, to defend and propagate the truth, and confute error; to cherish the sincerest desires, and offer up the most fervent prayers for the good of our fellow men, and for the advancement of the reign of Christ. Thus faithfully performing the duties which devolve on us, we may, with confidence and with quietness of mind, commit all the interests of the church to the God of truth, who will certainly take care of his own cause, and will, in his sovereign Providence, confound every false doctrine far more effectually, than we can by our arguments. And this he often does by letting error run on, till its nature is acted out, and its fruits are made manifest to all. It pleases the most High God to carry forward his plan of redeeming mercy through various and mighty conflicts. And every conflict will be made a means of clearing up and establishing divine truth; and will in the end contribute to

the glory of God, and the good of his people. The errors, as well as the wrath of man, will be made to praise God. This mixed, disordered state, this war of elements in the moral world will continue a while longer ; but it will not last always. Better days will come to the church on earth, and an eternal day of perfect light, and purity, and joy to the church in heaven.

ARTICLE IX.

REVIEW OF NORDHEIMER'S HEBREW GRAMMAR.

A Critical Grammar of the Hebrew Language. By Isaac Nordheimer, Phil. Doct., Prof. of Arabic and other Oriental Languages in the University of New-York. In two volumes. Vol. II. New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1841.

By Tayler Lewis, Esq., Prof. of Greek in the University of New-York.

THE ardent lover of Philology might justly regard, as its chief excellence, the happy position which it occupies between the subjective and objective sciences. Whether we employ these terms or others of a similar import, the distinction conveyed by them is important and clear. Science relates to the world within, and to the world without. It is, therefore, internal and external, subjective and objective, logical and experimental, intuitive and inductive, or essential and phenomenal. Each of these sets of terms presents ultimately the same distinction, and, in reference to it, two modes of scientific inquiry are suggested, which may be denoted by the same or corresponding appellations. In the one class, without aiming at great accuracy, we may include mental philosophy in all its various departments, together with logic, ethics and the pure mathematics, which is only a knowledge of the mind's necessary conceptions in relation to space and figure ; in the other, the whole range of the physical sciences. In the one class, the soul goes not out of itself to seek for facts or make experiments. Being at the same time object and subject, it views itself either by introspection, or through a reflex objective medium of its own creation. The knowledge obtained does not consist so much

in new discovered facts, as in seeming recollections of what had previously been concealed beneath the soul's own consciousness; although forming as real a part of its being, as its best known, its most familiar thoughts and emotions. In the other class all is external,—a posteriori,—inductive,—never exceeding the limit of those generalizations, to which experiment is the only guide. Theories here are themselves experiments. Even when best founded, they are but hasty generalizations, in which the impatient mind, in order to obtain a better field of view, ventures to assume an advance position, to be retained only in case subsequent induction should fill up the links which connect it with previously ascertained facts.

We have said that Philology possesses the middle ground between these two grand departments of science; or rather, that it belongs equally to both. Language is an emanation of the mind, and may thus be regarded as part of the mind itself. When actually formed, however, it is as clearly objective as the phenomena of astronomy or chemistry. It is what the natural sciences would be, were nature really, and not merely in the dreams of the transcendentalist, the creation of the soul that contemplates its laws. Language is the objective medium through which the mind views itself,—the *intelligible species* of its own creation (if we may use the language of the schoolmen), by which it impresses, with its own image, the *sensible species* of the external world, and transmutes them into that knowledge, which becomes a part of its intellectual being. These remarks are applicable to language in its most extensive sense, as that medium of communication from soul to soul, which, however it may vary in its modes, must be supposed necessary for every rank of being beneath him to whom all things are *immediately* present in their unveiled essences.

Its modes of investigation partake of the same character. It may be studied by the a priori, or by the inductive method. It may be regarded as a type of the soul, or as the object of experiment, having a phenomenal existence in vocal enunciation or written characters. These two methods may be united, and it is their happy union that gives rise in certain minds to that exquisite delight which is found in the study of philology; especially, that part, which relates not so much to the external dress, as to the inner spirit. Induction here is not so much the instrument of discovery as of verification. The mind goes forth into the field of experiment, with full confidence, that its

a priori views will be realized ; whilst in every process of the kind, other modes of conception are suggested, which, when verified in their turns, open still more distant views, and impart a deeper insight into those processes of the soul, which, although constantly going on within us, lie beneath the surface of ordinary consciousness. It is thus a constant source of ideas begetting ideas, branching forth into all the relations of our being, and producing in the study of verbal combinations, and the various modes of mental conception exhibited by them, a more delightful excitement, and a nobler exercise of the soul than can be found in all the synthesis and analysis of natural science.

These remarks are applicable, in some degree, even to the etymological department of philology. The very sounds, forms and inflections of words, instead of being arbitrary, have without doubt some relation to the laws of the mind, and the modes in which its conceptions are varied. These, however, may be supposed to be more immediately connected with the sensitive, than with the rational soul, and are therefore less capable of a priori explanations. But in the department of Syntax, or the combination of words in logical propositions, mind meets mind with a delightful and unwavering confidence in the identity of human nature in all ages, and with a full belief of finding in the languages of David and Homer, the same analogies of thought that exist in our own. It is true that peculiar emotions, modified by peculiar external circumstances, may have given such a prominence to certain modes of conception, as to render frequent in one tongue, what is comparatively rare in another ; yet without introducing any that are absolutely new, or not to be traced in some form in every human dialect.

That excellency of method which we have been regarding in the abstract, the author of the work before us has most happily and practically exemplified. His first volume was most favorably noticed by several periodicals, both at home and abroad. The second has even a higher claim to commendation, not only for the great beauty and neatness of its execution, but still more, for the perspicuity of its style, and the intrinsic excellence of its matter. He has composed, not simply a book of reference, but one which can be read through repeatedly, both by scholar and critic, with unfailing interest. It is this very circumstance, which tends to blind the mind of the reader

to one of its principal merits. The delightful ease with which we pass over its pages, the interesting manner in which the author has laid open to us the processes of our own minds, the many apposite and beautiful examples adduced by way of illustration, the absence of all pedantry, its freedom from far-fetched theorizing and illogical reasoning produce such an impression of ease, truth and clearness, that we almost claim the thoughts and conclusions as our own, so spontaneously do our own minds meet those views which are everywhere presented. It is this, which makes it at first difficult for the reader to conceive the vast amount of labor which the work must have cost, the great care which must have been used in arranging principles in such natural succession, the toilsome minuteness of investigation which has produced so great a number of apposite illustrations, and that watchful avoidance of prolixity whereby the author has been enabled successfully to condense, into an octavo volume of 350 pages, such an amount of practical knowledge and philosophical investigation.

We might enlarge upon the style, arrangement and typographical beauty of the work. Its chief merit, however, as before observed, is the well-sustained union of the subjective and objective, or a priori and inductive modes of investigation. The latter, when used alone, produces an uninteresting collection of facts, and of rules, apparently arbitrary, founded upon them. Unlike the results of induction in the physical sciences, they present the phenomena of principles with continual exceptions; and these, at times, almost as numerous as the cases which seem to be embraced by the rule. The impression is thus produced, that every thing in language is arbitrary; that its principles are not to be found already deposited in the soul itself, but must be obtained only by induction from without, and retained only by the iron grasp of memory. This must be so, as long as the external manifestation is alone the object of study. A resort to the other process shows us, that these exceptions are only apparent, and that with each variety of expression, there is also connected—whether we can discover it or not—a corresponding variation in the mode of conception. The one process presents the mere anatomy of language, the other supplies it with nerves and muscles. The one furnishes the materials, the other builds them into a living, organic system.

There are also strong objections to exclusive theorizing. Theories in syntax, it is true, are not like theories in chemistry.

The former may be deduced, and deduced correctly, by a priori reasoning. The results obtained will be correct; the hypotheses will be well founded; but they will lack system. They will not be all the results. They may not be the results which are most needed. A careful study of the modes of the mind's conceptions will give us truth on which we may rely as far as it goes, but it will not give us all the truth, neither does it necessarily conduct us to those we most desire. The mind needs a guide in the examination of itself, and this guide is found in the experimental use of that objective instrument which the soul has instinctively created, and in which its most secret processes will be found to have exhibited themselves in a visible form and order. Besides, although all human minds are essentially the same, yet, from peculiar circumstances, certain modes of conception may be more common in one age and nation, than in others. In a system of general grammar, they must all be alike viewed as having their foundation in the universal laws of the mind. Those, then, which in any one language are more prominent, or so frequently employed as to become idiomatic, can only be ascertained by a careful examination of it, as an external existing thing. As, for example, the occasional use of the present for the past may be said in some degree to belong to every tongue. It may, however, be the case that a greater vividness of conception, a fondness for the descriptive rather than the narrative style, arising from the peculiar circumstances of a people, may make this a predominant trait in one language, whilst in another it is hardly known. Again, there may be something so very unusual in the condition and habits of one nation, that its dialect may exhibit peculiarities of which no traces can elsewhere be found; as in the case of the Hebrew prophetic past. This could hardly be contained in a system of general grammar, and could not well be deduced from a priori reasoning, because it depends upon a supernatural state of the soul, superinduced by a divine influence.

The almost exclusively inductive method may be said to characterize the works of Gesenius. The opposite fault is less common, although it manifests itself, in a high degree, in the writings of some of the ablest German philologists. Our author, as we conclude after a careful examination of the work, has most happily combined the two methods, and the success of the effort is exhibited, as before observed, in the delightful satisfaction with which we follow him in the illustration and appli-

cation of his principles. The mind is not wearied, on the one hand, with a dull collection of apparently arbitrary rules, followed by hosts of exceptions beyond the power of memory to retain, or bewildered with theories of general grammar, which have not been verified by a careful induction from the particular language to which they are applied. In almost every page we are reminded of the presence of one pervading principle, which may be regarded as the soul of the work. It seems to be assumed as the fundamental position, which every thing else is designed to illustrate, that there is nothing arbitrary in the syntax of a language; that a reason exists for every change, although that reason may not be always discoverable, or may not have been, in the majority of cases, distinctly present to the consciousness of the writer; or, in other words, that we have not the full sense of a passage, until we can enter into the variation of feeling or conception, by which a variation of expression was caused. When this is discovered, the rule of syntax no longer comes by induction from *without*, and lodges in the folds of the memory, but is found to exist *within* us, written on the soul, though now, it may be for the first time, brought forth into the light of its own consciousness. It follows also conversely from this, that for the student to give the full meaning of a passage, and to feel the emotion which gave rise to its peculiar phraseology, is to give its rule of syntax. Unless they lead to this, rules are useless; and when they do accomplish this, they absolve the memory from the difficult task of retaining them as mere abstract propositions.

We will not say that there can be no exception to a rule of syntax, as there can be none to a principle in physics when rightly understood and cleared of every thing extraneous; but we must conclude, that language is not a correct representation of the minds of those who use it, in as far as it allows of arbitrary varieties in the expression of the same subjective state. The external fact stated, or the scene described may indeed be set forth in various modes; but these arise from, and constantly follow certain modes of conception, under which the same fact or scene may present itself to different minds, or to the same mind in different circumstances. In translating, therefore, it is not enough merely to ascertain the event narrated, or the proposition set forth. The emotion, or state of mind with which it is contemplated, forms likewise a most important part of what may be styled the full sense of the passage, and in no

case is this principle of more value than in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. The critical grammarian must then investigate the new aspect or change of conception, to which the superadded emotion is to be attributed. In one case there may be the mere historical mention of a fact, in which the writer manifests but little interest, and demands none of the reader: at another time, the same event or one in all respects similar, may be connected with certain strong emotions of the narrator. In one case, the subject and predicate may be viewed as of equal importance, or the mind may be simply occupied with the assertion of their logical connection. Here the sentence will present its ordinary grammatical form, free from all apparent anomalies. The ordinary principles of agreement in gender and number will be observed, and every thing will be adjusted to a proper balance. Again, in relating the same fact or stating the same proposition, the soul may be so occupied with one part, as to destroy this balance, and to impel to a mode of expression, giving greater conspicuousness to that which lies nearest the heart. This can only be effected by sundering the ordinary connections, and causing the emphatic word to stand out in anomalous prominence. To understand this, it is not enough to be content with external induction, which would class all these apparent irregularities as exceptions, but we must enter subjectively into the writer's state of mind, or in other words, put our soul in his soul's stead. Then do we not only understand or remember, but we are *feelingly impressed* with the fact or sentiment intended to be communicated.

The work before us is entitled to the praise of having done much to accomplish this important end. The space allotted to us would not admit of extended illustrations. We select a few portions, and dwell upon them with some degree of minuteness. Passing over the chapter on the article, we select examples from that department of agreement, which is supposed to abound so much in anomalies, and in which, in other grammars, there are so many arbitrary exceptions. Many of these are satisfactorily disposed of under the head of nouns construed collectively. Others are found, which, as our author observes, "appear to be utterly subversive of all order and harmony." We refer to cases of the disagreement of the subject and predicate in gender. These, however, he satisfactorily explains by a concise mention of the principle to which we have more fully alluded. Sometimes more is intended in such examples than simply to

assert a logical connection. There is associated with them an emotion of the speaker, which destroys the balance, and leads him to adopt some mode of expression, which may place the mind of the hearer in the same state. Hence if the cause of this emotion be the subject, it is separated from its verb by a difference of number or gender; or rather, the predicate is thrown into the impersonal form, and the isolated subject presents thereby a stronger claim upon the attention. Thus, for example: *A grievous vision is declared unto me:—Thy terror hath deceived thee:—A cry is heard among the nations:—Iniquity was not found in his lips:—Knowledge is pleasant to the soul.* In all these examples, as they stand in our translation, there is simply the assertion of the logical connection of the subject with the predicate, with nothing to suggest any thing anomalous in the original. Such anomalies, however, do exist, without an understanding of which we cannot put ourselves in the subjective state of the writer, or receive *all*, whether of fact or emotion, which he intended to convey. In every one of these cases, the predicate is of a different gender from the subject, by which fact, the reader is, as it were, directed to use the former impersonally, and to regard the latter as in a certain sense independent. Their best rendering into English, according to this view would be as follows:

*A grievous vision! it is declared unto me.**
Thy own terribleness! it hath deceived thee.†
A cry! among the nations is it heard.‡
Iniquity! it was not found in his lips.§
Knowledge! it is pleasant to the soul.||

In the first example, the ordinary translation is too cold. Something anomalous in the expression was required to set forth a peculiar modification of the conception. The context will show why this apostrophic mode was adopted. The soul of the prophet, *on the watchtower*, was occupied with the vision itself, not simply with the fact of its having been declared. In the second example, there is a superadded emotion. It was not simply *terribleness*, but *thine own terribleness*, etc. This, it is true, might have been expressed by the suffix pronoun alone, but it would not have been sufficient to give that prominence to the fact, which arises from the mode adopted. In the fourth

* Is. 21: 2. † Jer. 3: 5. ‡ Jer. 50: 46. § Mal. 2: 6. || Prov. 2: 10.

example, there is an expression of surprise and indignation. The bare suspicion of the contrary produces an apostrophe of the subject. *For the priest's lips must keep knowledge*, etc.

Other cases, in which agreement in number is neglected, are well explained by regarding plural nouns, joined with a singular verb or adjective, as taken distributively. This, however, is noted by almost all writers on Hebrew Syntax, and is generally well observed in our translation. We are told that the number is frequently neglected, when the verb commences the phrase; as in Jer. 51: 48, *the spoilers shall come upon her*—יבוא־לָהּ חֲשׂוֹדֵדִים or, in the Hebrew order, *shall come upon her the spoilers*. We are not to infer, however, that this arrangement is arbitrary or accidental, or that the neglect of number is the result merely of the collocation. The verb is not only designedly placed first, but left uncontrolled by the number of the noun, in order to give it prominence and emphasis. The noun (spoilers) was in itself of secondary importance. That there should be an invasion, an invasion of Babylon, was the strange thought that filled the writer's mind, which called forth the strong emotion, and forced upon him the anomalous expression. In the preceding part of the same verse, the noun contains the predominant idea, and the verb, notwithstanding it is placed first, conforms to it in its accidents. *The Heavens shall cry out against Babylon*—וְרָצְנוּ עַל-בָּבֶל שָׁמַיִם

We regret to find the author regarding the plural names of the Deity as merely plurals of pre-eminence. He has no doubt the majority of modern authorities on his side, and may perhaps be right, although we are inclined to differ from him; still it is far from being so clear as to warrant its being laid down, as an unquestioned principle in a work on Syntax. A good grammar is likely to be a book of far more authority with a student than any commentary. His mind, therefore, should not be prejudiced in favor of a theological opinion, in respect to which there may be good grounds for a contrary belief.

The following reason is assigned for the different location of the adjective, according as it is predicative or qualificative. "In the latter case, the idea it expresses is accessory to that of the noun it belongs to, which, as the principal member of the compound term, is placed first, by a constant law of the Shemetish languages, according to which the most important word assumes the right of priority in the sentence. But when an adjective forms the predicate of a proposition, the case is

different; for then, instead of being an appendage to a noun, it constitutes a most important part of the sentence, and is accordingly placed before the noun, at or near the commencement of the proposition." The mere order of the location of words must, we think, be regarded as belonging to the externals of a language, in the same manner as its elementary sounds and forms. For these, no doubt, reasons exist, but they pertain rather to the sensitive than to the rational or logical soul, and are, therefore, less capable of a priori explanation. Other languages, we know, assign a different place to those which are deemed the most important words, and sometimes defer them to the very close. We can, however, determine a priori, with almost as much confidence as is felt in the solution of a mathematical problem, that every language must have *two distinct modes* for expressing the difference of conception, which arises from regarding the adjective as predicative or qualificative, and that these modes when established would be almost invariably adhered to. Induction is to determine the particular method adopted; but when this is done, it belongs to the critical grammarian to explain apparent exceptions, and reduce them all, if possible, in subjection to the reason of the general rule. We think that our author has not always gone as far as he might in the application of his own principles. He allows the predicative adjective, in some few cases, to follow the noun. It may be a question, however, whether in all the instances cited as exceptions, the full sense is not better brought out by adhering to the general position, and regarding the adjective as a qualificative. Thus, Ps. 99: 2 is rendered: *Jehovah is great in Zion*. The adjective in the Hebrew has the position of a qualificative, and we cannot help thinking that by so regarding it in reality, we obtain a more vivid sense, and enter more truly into the conception of the writer: *The Great Jehovah is in Zion*. The one proposition seems to limit his greatness; the other expresses, at the same time, his universal agency and condescending protection of his peculiar people. On a careful examination of all the cases of apparent exception cited under this head, we have little doubt that they may all, in a similar manner, be reconciled with the general usage of the language.

We are compelled to pass, although with regret, several intermediate chapters, throughout which we find that same predominant feature, which may be regarded as the peculiar

excellence of the work. Attempts are everywhere made, and generally with complete success, to refer all varieties of expression, to changes in the subjective state of the writer. We find this, especially, in the very full discussion of direct and indirect objective relation, which abounds in the most apposite illustrations, and renders what is generally regarded as the least interesting portion of Syntax, one of the most satisfactory in the work. All seeming departures from the more ordinary *usus loquendi* are regarded, not as arbitrary, but as having a real foundation in the state of the writer's soul, according as it views an event or a truth under different aspects, or with different degrees of emotion. In this way, the author accounts for the frequent omissions of prepositions in Hebrew poetry, as arising from the particular manner of viewing the relation, and the energetic conciseness of the poetical conception.

We would notice here, by the way, the accuracy everywhere exhibited in the divisions and subdivisions under each head of each chapter, and the great number of carefully selected examples, with which they are enriched. Some might fancy that there is too much minuteness. Whilst, however, so little is omitted that the subject almost seems exhausted, there is, at the same time, still less that can be regarded as redundant. The author can seldom be charged with bringing under special subdivisions, what might have been included in the general principle, although such cases may occasionally be found. It may also be thought that the book is crowded with too many examples. This, however, should be regarded as one of its chief merits. No reduction in the size of the volume could have countervailed the loss arising from such an omission, although, if collected in a body, these examples would form no small portion of the Hebrew Bible. The object could not have been to swell the work with matter easily obtained; on the contrary, there can be no doubt, that in this very department there have been bestowed the most scrupulous care, and the severest toil. He has thus furnished to his reader a most agreeable exercise, in tracing the application of principles, in the thousands of examples cited, and methodically arranged. To obviate all objections on the score of economy, it may be said, that the course adopted entirely supersedes the necessity of a *praxis* or *chrestomathy*. The student who is tolerably acquainted with the etymology, and has acquired a moderate facility in reading, will be able to see the bearing and application of each example. To

such a one a better course could not be advised, than to read this second volume, without the omission of a single reference ; examining also, when necessary, the contexts in the Bible as far as is required for their more full explication. He will thus familiarize himself in the most pleasant manner with all the important principles of Hebrew Syntax, and at the same time, peruse to great advantage, in a critical point of view, no small portion of the sacred writings. Should he mark in the margin of his Bible, opposite to all the examples quoted, the number of the paragraph in which they are cited, and in his subsequent reading endeavor to associate these marked passages with the sections of the grammar to which they refer, he would adopt one of the most rapid and effectual means of rendering himself a critical Hebraist.

We proceed to the chapter on the Hebrew tenses. This may be regarded as, in some respects, the most finished and satisfactory portion of the whole work. The subject has long been viewed as presenting almost insurmountable difficulties. Many excellent scholars have been led to regard them as having in themselves no distinctive character, but to be determined in every case by the context and the *exigentia loci*. The student, on his first introduction to the language, is struck with that peculiarity by which the Hebrew is distinguished, in the use of only two tenses, the past and future, without any distinct form for the present. His surprise is increased on learning that the office of each of the tenses is reversed by simply prefixing the conjunction Vau. Indulging the hope that these rules, so unlike all his former experience, will nevertheless be found definite and fixed in their applications, he enters upon the reading of the Hebrew Bible with little apprehension of any practical difficulty. In the narrative parts they are observed with a tolerable degree of uniformity, with now and then some rather startling exceptions ; but on entering upon the study of the didactic and devotional books, he finds himself perplexed at every step, and almost utterly without a guide. All the special exceptions and explanations, laid down in his grammar, fail to meet the difficulties which are constantly presenting themselves. No rule holds good for a single consecutive chapter ; till at length, he ceases to pay any regard to them, and governs himself, in every case, by the apparent demands of the sense. To escape these difficulties, some have substituted for the usual appellations, those of the first and second mode ; the sole result of which, as our au-

thor says, is to represent the Hebrew as destitute of tenses altogether. These terms suggest nothing as to the nature of the forms to which they are applied. It is most evident that they do contain a distinction of time of some kind, and that the predominant office of the one, when standing alone, is to designate the past, and of the other the future. This most plainly appears in those cases in which the time is an essential part of the proposition, and, especially, when the two forms are antithetically employed.

We are satisfied from careful examination, that our author has adopted the only theory by which these apparent anomalies may be explained. Its novelty does not consist merely in the use of the terms *absolute* and *relative*, for these had been employed by others before him; but in the peculiar manner in which he applies them to particular examples. We would, however, venture the opinion that the author has not tested, to their fullest extent, his own views. The principles he has laid down, if carried out in all their details, might perhaps have interfered with the assigned limits of the work. But we are satisfied, that a faithful application of their spirit would introduce a most beautiful order into what has heretofore been regarded as a chaos, and deliver his own system from some apparently arbitrary exceptions which are yet allowed to remain. We fully concur with him in the opinion, that the source of all our perplexity is found in our occidental mode of viewing time. Time with us is ever on the wing. The present is our fixed point, and we are stationary in it. The future is regarded as an unreal and imaginary region, ever coming forwards and sweeping by us into the certainty of the past, whilst the latter is continually receding farther and farther from our view.

Ut unda impellitur unda
Tempora sic fugiunt

is the standing simile in all the occidental tongues. Hence, according to our mode of conception, the present becomes the *standard tense*, and is always our own fixed position. In the Hebrew, on the other hand, time is fixed, whilst we are moving on. The present has in itself no extent, but is absorbed, either in the past on the one side, or in the future on the other. These constitute the only real divisions. Our present arises from a false conception, by which we combine into one stationary period, two small portions which belong to those two depart-

ments. According to the Hebrew conception, the future world does not come to us and acquire *reality* by being made present, but we are going into it. It has as real an existence as that through which we have passed. In the prophetic vision, events are there, even now, preceding and succeeding each other. It has its relations of antecedent and consequent, of cause and effect. The Hebrew present, on the other hand, is ever the shifting station from which past or future scenes are viewed. It has only a subjective existence in the soul by which its position is determined. We may transport ourselves far back, in the annals of time, and view historical facts as still past or future to each other; or into the ages to come, and find there the existence of the same relations. The position assumed is ever the dividing point. In a simple narration of the successive order of events, the first of the series constitutes this subjective standpoint of observation, and all that follow bear to it the relation of future. In the prophetic ecstasy, the order is reversed. Events, which require the journey of ages before we can reach them, are to the Seer long since past and gone. This then is the peculiarity of the Hebrew. It ever represents facts, not in reference to a *fixed* present, but as they exist subjectively in the mind of the narrator; who views them in the relations which they bear, not to himself, or to us, but to each other. When there is a necessity for fixing the actual present, other modes, as we shall see, are resorted to.

We cannot stop to show that this conception of time is as natural as our own, and more philosophically correct. It is sufficient for us to be satisfied that it is the Hebrew mode, and the true cause of those apparent anomalies, which have so much perplexed the lovers of this ancient language. When the soul of the reader is thoroughly imbued with this view, so that the order of his conceptions begins to be influenced by it, we can easily imagine how much more life and strength will be imparted to Hebrew narration and description. The occidental style may be compared to an historical painting, in which actors and events are fixed immovably upon the canvass; the oriental to a picture, in which, by some mysterious art, they are endowed with life and motion, ever presenting a varied aspect according as they are seen from varying positions.

In correspondence with his theory, the author deduces four distinct modes of time;—two *absolute*, which relate to the *actual* present, or present of the narrator; and two *relative*, viewed in

their relations to the *present* of the actor or subject. 1. The absolute past or קָטַל form. 2. Absolute future or יִקְטַל form. 3. The relative past or יִקְטַל form. 4. The relative future or יִקְטַל form. No particular objection need be made to this phraseology. We think, however, that the symmetry of the system would have been better maintained by giving different appellations to the third and fourth. The prefixing of the Vau does not wholly divest the one of the idea of futurity, nor the other of that of the past; and these ideas should have been preserved in the names. Might they not have been better distinguished as *future past*, and *past future*, or by some such Hebrew technics, as our author has used to so great advantage in his first volume? This is a matter of little consequence, yet we think that some of the illustrations would have been better understood, by the adoption of some different mode of naming.

"The present," says our author, "is merely a moment separating two immeasurable durations of past and future; and as the province of one tense ends where the other begins, and as the point of their mutual coincidence is the time of narration, either may be properly used to predicate an event at the time of its occurrence, *the choice, in every instance, depending on whether the writer's attention is more particularly directed to the commencement of the action in the past, or its continuance in the future.*"

This last remark clears up at once hundreds of passages in which the change of tenses, without such explanation, presents an inexplicable enigma. In the narrative parts of the Bible, we find long series of the relative past succeeding each other like the Greek aorists in Homer. These, even in the ordinary explanations, present but little difficulty. In the expression, however, of thought or feeling, we often find a change from the preterite to the future, or *vice versa*, without the prefixing of the Vau. The author refuses to regard these as arbitrary changes, but as arising from a difference of view or conception in the writer, although they are both properly rendered into English by a present. Thus, *Why do the Heathen rage* (רָגְזוּ) *and the people imagine* (יִדְבְּרוּ) *vanity?* Ps 2: 1. In the use of the first verb, the writer's mind was occupied with a past *experience* of popular commotion, in the second, with a foreboding view of the continuance of popular delusions. *The Lord hears* (שָׁמַע) *my supplication* (past experience), *the Lord receives* (קִבֵּץ) *my prayer* (hope of an answer). Ps. 6: 10. Sometimes the future

precedes. *The work of the Lord they regard not* (יִבְיטוּ) *nor consider* (רָאוּ) *the productions of his hands.* Is. 5: 12. The latter fact stated may be regarded as the cause of the first, and therefore preceding it in time, although not in the order of logical construction; the first as a consequence of the second, and therefore future in reference to it. *I trust* (בְּטַחַתִּי) *in thy mercy, my heart rejoices* (יִגֵּל) *in thy salvation, oh let me sing* (אֲשִׁירָה) *unto the Lord, for he hath, &c.* Ps. 13: 6. First, *present trust* founded on *past experience* or promises;—the second, *present joy*, with the *expectation* of its continuance;—the third (the paragogic future), *present praise*, with an ardent *desire* that it may be eternal. All these, taken together, constitute one present subjective state of the soul. The language however expresses not only this, but also all their modified relations. It may be said that the second verb here might be rendered directly in the future: *My heart shall rejoice.* But this would not give the full sense, as it would contemplate a future time detached from the present. The full emotion can only be received by discarding all occidental forms, by entering into the Hebrew mode of conception, and thus taking the sense directly from the original. We fully believe that nothing will more contribute to such a habit of reading, than a careful study of the principles laid down by our author, and that, in this respect, their constant application will serve the purpose of a living commentary, evolving not only the facts and truths, but all the thought and feeling of a passage, in a manner at once the most satisfactory and delightful.

When thus viewed, the want of a precise form for the present, and the supplying of its place by the varied use of the preterite and future, might seem an excellence, rather than a defect. We would not wholly adopt a position so paradoxical. There is undoubtedly a want of precision, in those cases in which the actual present time of an event is an essential part of the proposition. Still the opinion may be hazarded, that in description, and the expression of the states, and emotions of the soul, there is a positive advantage, in not being confined to a form which in its natural acceptation relates only to one point of time. In the examples we have cited, and others of a similar kind, the nature of the subject sufficiently indicates the present existence of the emotion at the period of utterance; whilst the variety of form sets forth the character of the feeling, according

to the predominance of experience or faith founded upon the past, or of hope, fear, or desire in reference to the future.

In respect to the relative forms, the author makes every thing to depend upon a right understanding of the leading tense. Being in their nature merely consecutive, they are to be regarded as past, present, or future, according to the time of the principal verb to which they stand related. Careful attention must here be given to the rules laid down by the author, in order to a proper appreciation of the truth of his theory. But, there is one difficulty in respect to the relative future or וַיִּקְטֹּל form which we do not think is sufficiently explained. He regards it as inversely analogous to the relative past. To be completely so, however, it should represent a future nearer to the actual present than the leading verb; that is, a future to which this leading verb is still more remotely future. There are doubtless many cases to which this view of the matter would be applicable, and in which the particle *Vau* may be rendered by the connective *when*, denoting that the verb to which it is prefixed, although subsequent in the order of construction, either actually precedes the other in time, or is simultaneous; being brought in by way of explanation, or as constituting the cause, of which the preceding verb denotes the effect. Thus, *Then shalt thou delight (תִּשְׂמַח) thyself in the Lord, and I will feed (וַיִּזְנוּךְ) thee with the inheritance of Jacob* (as it is in our translation), would be better rendered: *Then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord, when I shall have fed thee with the inheritance of Jacob.* Is. 58: 14. The majority of cases, however, will not submit to this explanation. The relative future will often be found to be strictly consecutive. Why then should not the וַיִּקְטֹּל form be used to denote *succession* in the future, as well as in the past, since this is its natural office, and since it depends for its actual time on the leading verb? The truth is, that it is often used in this manner, when, as our author tells us, the succession of future events is to be set forth with great emphasis and solemnity, as: *I will call thee in righteousness, and I will hold thee by the hand*; just as we repeat the auxiliary *will* in like cases. But in ordinary predictions, there seems to be a propriety in the avoidance of the וַיִּקְטֹּל form, in consequence of its being constantly used to denote the succession of past events. On this account, for the prevention of ambiguity, there seems to be a change to an apparently opposite mode, and hence the origin of the וַיִּקְטֹּל form or relative future.

“If a clause,” says our author, “commence with any other word” (than Vau), the connection is broken, and the absolute form is again made use of.” The spirit of his whole grammar has produced in us such a habit of seeking for reasons, and given us such an aversion to regard any thing in the syntax of a language as arbitrary, that we feel as though he should have gone farther, and not simply have referred to the change of expression, but have given us the reason on which it is founded. May it not be that in such cases, the use of the consecutive future or relative past would not have conveyed the meaning intended; which may have been to express simultaneous acts, or parts forming a whole, instead of consecutive events? As, in the example given: *And God called the light day, and the darkness he called night*, there is evidently but one act of calling, although consisting of two parts, such as we could express by one verb; *and he called the light day, and the darkness night*. But suppose the Hebrew had been thus וַיִּקְרָא לְאֹר יוֹם וַיִּקְרָא לְחֹשֶׁךְ לַיְלָה, would it not have represented them as consecutive, instead of concurrent parts of one great act? Whether the same explanation would apply to all similar cases, we are not prepared to say. Sometimes the descriptive may have been adopted instead of the narrative style, and events may have been conceived of, *as passing together* before the mind, although actually consecutive. Had the author given his attention to this point, his investigations would doubtless have resulted in a certain and satisfactory rule.*

After the general statement of the nature of the absolute and

* Some examples of this kind seem very much to resemble the change in Greek from a series of consecutive aorists to the imperfect. There is in both cases a stoppage in the flow of the time, a going back, or a recapitulation and bringing up, of some event which was coextensive with all that were mentioned before. *And they took* (וַיִּקְחוּ) *Absalom, and (after that) they cast him* (וַיַּשְׁלִכוּ) *into a pit, and (after that) they placed upon him* (וַיַּצְבּוּ) *a heap of stones; (וְכָל-יִשְׂרָאֵל נָסוּ) and all Israel (during all this time) were fleeing.* 2 Sam. 18: 17. The last event mentioned did not *succeed* the others, but was cotemporaneous with them all. It forms, as it were, the back ground of the picture. The proper Greek rendering would be καὶ ἔλαβον τὸν Ἀβσαλὼμ, καὶ ἔρριψαν αὐτὸν εἰς χάσμα, καὶ ἐστήλωσαν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν σωρὸν λίθων, καὶ πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ ἔφευγον. The LXX however have in the last case an aorist.

relative forms, the various modifications which arise from them are clearly set forth. A general proposition, which always holds true, is expressed in other languages by a present or an aorist. In Hebrew, the past or future is used, according as it is regarded as a maxim founded upon *experience*, or an inference of *necessary consequences*. We have another modification in what may be styled the *habitual future*, denoting habitual or constantly repeated acts. This is evidently an elliptical substitution for a more extended phraseology, which, if given in full, and with the repetitions which are peculiar to the Hebrew, would consist of a series of consecutive futures depending on a leading preterite. In the full expression, the future form being predominant, in the ellipsis, it is put for the whole.

Besides the וַיִּקְטֹל form the author admits of a species of relative past, not depending on a leading preterite, but on a particle of time, such as אָז, עֲתָה, טָרָם etc. It is regarded as substantially the same with the ordinary relative past; the particle of time standing in the place of the leading verb, so as to commence an order of succession without the connecting Vau. Cases, however, yet remain, in which the future, although apparently absolute and unconnected with any stand-point of either kind, seems to denote a past, and can hardly be rendered otherwise, without a harsh violation of the context. We are told that in such examples, "the narrator speaks of an action that has already taken place as passing before his mind; in which case he employs the future form with the force of the present." This explanation does not seem satisfactory, or, rather, it does not go far enough. It opens the door to arbitrary exceptions in a system, otherwise completely guarded against them. It seems to countenance a theory to which our author is opposed, viz. that what is commonly styled the future is primarily and radically a present. It does not explain why in those cases there is often a mixture of preterites. Would it not be more in accordance with the whole spirit of our author's theory, to regard such cases as really expressing a species of past futurity; or as examples of the relative past, in respect to which the stand-point is neither in a leading verb, nor in a particle of time, but is to be assumed as existing in the mind of the speaker, although not expressed in words. May we not suppose the future form, in all cases, to demand of the reader to conceive himself at a point back of the event mentioned, and to have in his soul the feelings that belong to such a post of observation? It may be difficult to express this

in words of another language, yet the mind may acquire the habit in silent reading of thus connecting the form with a conception so modified ; and it does seem to us, that by such a process, the Hebrew poetry is invested with a power, a life and beauty which can be realized in no other way.

We would illustrate our meaning by a reference to the vision of Eliphaz, Job 4: 13. Most of the verbs here are preterites. They are mingled, however, with three futures. In the ordinary version all are alike regarded as past. Although necessity may compel us thus to render them in a concise and plain translation, we contend that the reader of the original ought to vary his conception, in the case of the three futures, and to feel that the writer intended such variation instead of a mere arbitrary change of expression. It should be regarded not as the future used for the present, and then that present used for the past, whilst preterites are strangely mingled in the description, but as a carrying back of the mind *in medias res*—to a point at which some of the feelings, which go to make up the compound emotion, partake of the characters of experience, and others, of fear or apprehension. In such cases, *events* are not so much narrated or described, as the *state* of soul which resulted from, or existed in anticipation of them. In the passage selected, the scene opens with the period, when the first mysterious presentiment of the approaching vision *was coming* upon the narrator. This is expressed by the future. *It was stealing upon me* (יִגְנֹב), or *it was about to steal upon me, and mine ear received a hint (or whisper) thereof*. His bodily state is described by preterites : *Fear came upon me and trembling which made all my bones to shake*. A return to the vision itself, and to the mention of the approaching spirit, arouses the feeling of apprehension or foreboding fear, and the tense, true to the subjective state of the soul, changes to the future. *A spirit was about to flit* (יִחַלֶּה) *before my face, the hair of my flesh began to rise ; it was about to assume a form (or position יִצְמַד), yet I could not discern its appearance ; an image was before mine eyes, and I heard a voice, &c.* Job 4: 13. This seems to be in accordance with the idea of Jarchi in a note which the author has given on page 168. He thus renders Job 3: 3. יֵאָבֵד יוֹם אֲנִלֵּךְ בוֹ *May the day perish in which I was about to be born, and when I was not yet born*. Jarchi regards this as much more forcible, than the similar expression, Jer. 20: 14, in which the preterite is used ; *cursed be the day in which I was born* (יִלְדֵּתִי). A simi-

lar example may be given from Ps. 107: 4. *They wandered* (אָפּוּ) *in the wilderness, &c. ; their soul was on the point of being overwhelmed* (אָפּוּצָה). So also, in the language of prophecy, a most exquisite beauty is sometimes conferred upon a passage, by thus taking a position *in medias res*, from which the soul views events as at the same time advancing and receding. *Joy and gladness shall overtake them* (יִשְׂמְחוּ), *sorrow and sighing have fled away* (נָסוּ). Is. 51: 41. We fully believe that these views result directly from the principles laid down by our author, and that when properly applied, they leave but very few apparent anomalies in the use of the Hebrew tenses, that will not readily admit of an easy and satisfactory solution.

There is an immense advantage derived to the reader from this habit, into which our author leads him, of viewing the Hebrew poetry, not so much as setting forth events, as the narrator's feelings in reference to them. We are too much in the habit of regarding the Psalms and other devotional parts of the Bible, as a record of the past devout feelings of others, rather than as those into which we ourselves are called to enter. The church has too much neglected them as liturgical exercises, applicable to all times and circumstances. The Psalms express, not merely the hopes and fears and prayers of David, but of the Head of the church while on earth, and through him of its members until the end of time. In reference to such a use of them, nothing can be more valuable than those views of our author, which seem to pervade every part of his work, and to form its actuating spirit.

In a highly commendatory review of the first volume, an objection is made to the names which the author has applied to the tenses. It is contended, in accordance with the theory of Professor Lee of Cambridge, that what has heretofore been universally called the Hebrew future is, in reality, a present, and that its frequent use as a future is only a secondary application. Notwithstanding many plausible arguments for this view, drawn from the analogy of other languages, we are still inclined to the old nomenclature which our author retains. Although the other presents a plausible solution of some apparent difficulties, it leaves many others entirely unexplained. We can only here allude briefly to the objections, and state what appear to us the corresponding answers. It is true, that in the occidental tongues the present has more the appearance of an original tense than the future ; but it should be borne in mind, that in those lan-

guages, the present is the *root* or fountain of the whole verb. In this latter respect, there is a fundamental difference between them and the Hebrew, in which it is admitted, on all hands, that the preterite is the root. From the difference in their mode of conceiving time, the two races seem to have started in the development of the verb from different positions. In the occidental tongues, time being viewed in relation to the *actual present*, gives rise to three modifications. In the Hebrew, the first event is ever a shifting present to the second, and hence arise only two modifications, of precedence and succession. Hence the present, when found as an original form, is ever attended by its preterite and future, both branching from it as collaterals. No examples can probably be found of a language with but two tenses, and those two the present and the past.

In the Hebrew, the preterite is beyond all doubt the earliest tense or fountain of the verb. As ideas naturally evolve their opposites, a form for the future would be the next necessary development, and this is clearly shown in those cases in which the tenses are antithetically contrasted. Their joint use answering all the purposes of the present, (and, as our author has shown, even better, in some cases, than a peculiar form confined in its general application to a precise point of time,) there would be no actual necessity for any further development, and the language might long retain its ancient constitution. In a more perfect stage, such a form might perhaps arise. This in fact is the historical order of the Greek tenses. The second aorist, and the old second future seem to have been first in use, and to contain the simple radicals without addition or insertion. The present, in all verbs in whose letters the process can be traced, has evidently the appearance of a subsequently added form. It contains, in many cases, letters which have been doubled, inserted, or lengthened, and of which it must be divested in order to arrive at the pure radical. Thus, second aorist and future, *ταμ, τεμ, βαλ τυπ λιπ λαβ*, present *τεμν, βαλλ, τυπτ λειπ ληβ*.

Much stress is laid upon the fact, that in our own tongue the present is sometimes used for the past. This is true, to some extent, in all languages. We do not, however, regard it as presenting the same case with the use of the *Vau conversive* future in Hebrew. This latter is the ordinary tense of sober narration,—used for consecutive events, in a manner similar to the consecutive use of the Greek aorists. The use of the pres-

ent for the past, whenever it occurs in any tongue, has a poetical aspect. It is the language of description, or an animated recital of events so near to each other, that a vivid conception regards them as simultaneous. Even when the historian thus employs it, he affects the poetical style, and instead of consecutive narration, aims at presenting to the mind of the reader a picture, in which acts, which constitute minor parts of one great act, and which follow each other at small intervals, are set forth as concurrent. This is done to heighten the effect, or to produce totality of view; and is not merely used as an arbitrary substitute for the more ordinary mode. The effect is not to bring down past events, even in imagination, to the *actual present* of the writer, but to represent them as *present to each other*. They are thus, as it were, thrown upon one canvass, and a deeper emotion is produced by their being viewed as a whole, and not in successive parts. If present time then constitutes the radical and primary idea of this Hebrew tense, it would not be adapted, in its *Vau conversive state*, to the narration of events in succession, but could only represent them as simultaneous or concurrent. To convince ourselves that this is so, we need only take up any of the plain historical passages of the Old Testament. It will be found that consecution is ever expressed by this form, and that often in a sober narrative series, it follows on, chapter after chapter, precisely in the manner of the Greek aorists. If the name *future* should be abandoned, we regard the present as not at all qualified to supply its place. Better style it, when joined with the Vau, the tense of succession. This name would, at all events, preserve in the mind one of its predominant features.

Our translation, it is said, has been marred in some cases by an improper rendering of the future as future. It could be shown, however, by hundreds of examples, that it has suffered far more by the neglect of the radical and primary idea of this form. In many cases, it has been arbitrarily rendered in the past, because found in connection with preterites, when the rendering of the absolute future is not only free from objections, but actually makes the easiest sense, and produces the strongest emotion. By this means, an interjacular expression of feeling, or a devout utterance of faith and hope, called forth by the recollection of the events described, is violently converted into a part of the narration. Thus, to give one example out of many, in Ps. 18, we have a series of preterites in the 4th

and 5th verses, followed in the 6th verse, by a sudden transition of this kind to the future, which the translators have entirely disregarded. *In my trouble I will call* (אֶקְרָא) (*not I called*) *upon the Lord, and to my God will I cry* (אֶשָּׁע). *He will hear my voice and my prayer shall come before him; even when* (וְ) *the earth shall rock and tremble, and the foundations of the mountains shall be moved and toss themselves because of his wrath.* The passage is in all respects similar to Ps. 46: 2: *Wherefore will we not fear though the earth be removed, &c* After this expression of strong confidence in God, the writer proceeds with his narration in a series of verbs in absolute or relative past time, until in the 17th verse there is a similar burst of prospective feeling, with a similar change to the absolute future. *He will send forth* (וְשָׁלַח) *from above; he will take me* (וְקִיְּמָנִי), *he will draw me out of many waters. He will deliver me* (וְצִלֵּנִי) *from my foes.* Some reason must have existed in the state of the writer's soul for these sudden changes of tense; can any reason be assigned, why, in these, and so many similar cases, they are utterly neglected in the translation?

The space, which we have allotted to the consideration of the tenses, compels us to pass very briefly over other parts of the work. In the chapter on the modes, we find the same philosophical depth and clearness, that are manifested in the discussion of the tenses. "The indicative," says our author, "makes a direct and independent statement, and its form is consequently concise, but as the other modes are used to indicate, not facts, but desire, possibility, or necessity, existing in the conceptions of the soul, the speaker dwells on the verb, and this gives rise to a protraction of its form." We were at first disposed to regard this explanation as fanciful. But an examination of the analogies of other tongues, and the reasons advanced by the author satisfy us that he is correct. The rudiments of the Hebrew modes are traced in the future, in a manner reminding us strongly of the connection in Greek between this same tense, and the subjunctive, which seems to have been developed out of it. The optative has a greater affinity to the past, and the examples of what may be called the corresponding mode in Hebrew, formed by the union of the preterite with a conditional particle, present a striking resemblance to the process in which the Greek form must have originated.

The chapter on the particles is one of the most valuable in

the book. Most of the defects, which the warmest advocate of our translation must admit to exist in it, arise from the neglect of particles. The same remark is applicable to the Latin and Greek versions. Propositions, having a close connection, appear detached from each other, or united in a manner so stiff and unnatural, that it cannot escape the notice even of the ordinary reader. This is doubtless, to some extent, the nature of the Hebrew style; yet a close study of these joints and sinews of the language would show, that it has more flexibility and a closer connection of parts, than is generally supposed. The conjunction *Vau*, for example, is almost everywhere regarded in our translation as equivalent to *and*, with some few exceptions in which it is rendered *or*. Almost all Hebrew scholars, however, admit that it has a much more extensive range of meaning, denoting connection, not only by way of addition, but also of consequence, cause and effect, purpose and motive,—being often equivalent to the Greek *ὅτι*, *ἵνα*, and *ἐπεὶ*. It is sometimes disjunctive, expressing connection by way of contrast, and sometimes used as a particle of time, in which case it may be rendered *when*. In the proverbial or antithetical style it is often a particle of comparison; for the want of attention to which circumstance, some of the most pointed of the Proverbs of Solomon are reduced to the most naked truisms. The various uses of all the particles are clearly pointed out in the work before us, and illustrated by the most apposite examples.

The subject of the consecution of the accents closes the book. We can only make a very few remarks in relation to it. This is a department in which the best of Hebrew scholars have often confessed themselves deficient. The intrinsic difficulty of the subject has not been the only reason. It is impossible to enter heartily upon any pursuit, without a corresponding motive; and where,—it has been often asked,—is the inducement, sufficiently powerful, to engage the mind in what appears so barren, so utterly destitute of utility and interest? Nothing but the disagreeable consciousness of failing, in what had so long been regarded as a branch of Hebrew scholarship, could overcome the repugnance felt at devoting time to what seemed a mass of rabbinical fooleries, utterly useless in respect to the substantial advantages of biblical interpretation. But the views presented by our author clothe this heretofore most perplexing of all studies, with an interest which we did not imagine it could

possess, and which other grammars had failed to impart. One important distinction, which we have met with nowhere else, presents the whole subject in a new aspect. The consecution of the accents is shown to be based on a most perfect system, combining the principles of *rhythmical* and *logical* harmony, and of great value as an ancient guide to the proper interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. We are aware that we have indulged in the language of praise, and have been more anxious to point out excellencies than defects, yet perhaps nothing that has been said will appear so extravagant as the opinion now advanced, that Dr. Nordheimer has in reality rendered the Hebrew accents a branch of study, in which the reader may find, not only profit, but delight.

It is but justice to say, before we close, that the author, in the execution of the work, has had the assistance of two most valuable auxiliaries. This volume is the most beautiful specimen of Hebrew typography, whether from the English or American press, which we have ever seen. For this, and it is no small merit, it is indebted to Mr. John F. Trow, printer of oriental languages, whose types have been procured from the celebrated foundry of Karl Tauchnitz. We can only say in addition that the book is entitled to equal praise for its exceeding accuracy. The other aid to which we refer pertains to the spirit rather than the letter. With honorable frankness, the author acknowledges "the important assistance" of Mr. W. Turner, not only in giving the work "its English dress," but in perfecting "the scientific treatment of its details and the completeness and symmetry of its parts."

The closing remark of the preface reminds us of what is of more value than any merely critical commendation. It contains the author's devout acknowledgments to the God of his fathers for the assistance rendered in the composition of the work—(אֲשֶׁר עֲזָרָנִי עַד כֹּה־) —and a fervent prayer that it may be a means of promoting his glory. The *Laus Deo* was a common conclusion of our older writers, both theological and civil. It has fallen into disuse in modern times, and we must confess that we were most agreeably surprised to find this pious custom revived in the work before us. Although little in accordance with the spirit of the age, the sentiment is purely scriptural; and it was uttered, doubtless, under a devout feeling that even learning is a divine gift, and that all true wisdom cometh from the Lord.

ARTICLE X.

THE INTERMEDIATE PLACE.

By Rev. Enoch Pond, D. D. Prof. Theol., Theol. Sem. Bangor, Me.

THE question of an intermediate *place* is very different from that of an intermediate *state*. This latter phrase has generally been understood to denote the conscious, active state of the departed, between the periods of death and the resurrection, in opposition to those who hold to a temporary sleep of the soul. All evangelical Christians, at the present day, are believers in the doctrine of an intermediate state. Indeed with the Bible in his hands, I see not how any one can disbelieve it.

But the doctrine of an intermediate place is quite a different matter. This teaches that the soul, when it leaves the body, does not go to heaven or to hell, but into an intermediate place, denominated in the original Scriptures *בֵּית* and *אֵדֶן*, where it remains confined, till the resurrection. Different ideas are entertained as to the nature and situation of this place, and the condition of those who inhabit it. Some fix it in the centre of the earth: others are not so definite, but regard it as a *nether* world—a place of shades, of gloom, of repose. “It is always represented,” says Campbell, “under those figures which suggest something dreadful, dark and silent; about which the most prying eye and listening ear can acquire no information.” One part of *אֵדֶן*, however, is represented as more pleasant, or less gloomy, than the other. Into this better compartment, the souls of the righteous descend at death, and are there confined until the resurrection. They are “the spirits in prison,” spoken of by Peter, 1 Pet. 3: 19. The author of the “Physical Theory of another Life” represents this as “the *chrysalis* period” of the Christian. He describes him as in a state of “comparative inaction,” of “suspended energy,” of “seclusion,” of “destitution.” Into the other part of *אֵדֶן* the souls of the wicked descend at death, and there await their final sentence to depart accursed into hell, the place prepared for the devil and his angels. The better apartment in *אֵדֶן* is supposed to be the *paradise* of the New Testament; where are Abraham

and Lazarus, and into which the penitent thief entered, on the day of his crucifixion. The other apartment is called *Tartarus*; and is that place of torment into which the rich man was plunged at death.

In remarking on the subject thus introduced, it may be well to state plainly, and at once, that I reject this whole theory of an *intermediate place*; believing, according to most of the Protestant Confessions of Faith, that "the souls of the righteous at death, being made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies; and that the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day."*

The questions first presenting themselves, in entering upon this discussion, are: What is heaven? and, What is hell? What are we to understand by these important terms? I answer, that they denote, not mere *states* of being, but *places* of being—the separate abodes of the righteous and wicked in the other world. So they are uniformly represented in the Scriptures. Heaven is spoken of as a "city which hath foundations," a "house not made with hands," a kingdom which God hath prepared for them that love him." Our Saviour expressly calls it a place: "I go to prepare a place for you." John 14: 2. Hell, too, is uniformly spoken of as a place. It is the "place of torment"—the place "prepared for the devil and his angels."

In what parts of the universe these opposite places are situated, as God has not been pleased to inform us, it would be presumptuous even to conjecture. We may be sure, however, that our blessed Saviour is now in heaven. When he ascended from Mount Olivet, it is expressly stated that he was taken up into heaven." Acts 1: 11. In subsequent parts of Scripture, he is repeatedly and positively said to be in heaven. Heb. 9: 24, 1 Pet. 3: 22. Heaven is further spoken of as the residence of the holy angels. Mark 12: 25, 13: 32. To quote passages in proof of this point would be superfluous. Hence, to be with Christ and with the holy angels is to be in heaven.—Hell, too, in whatever part of the universe it may be situated, is the place where the devil and his angels are now reserved, in chains under darkness, and to which, with all the

* Presbyterian Confession of Faith, p. 32.

finally miserable of our race, they will be remanded after the judgment.

The questions before us are, therefore, these: Do the souls of the righteous at death go to be with Christ and holy angels in heaven? And do the souls of the wicked at death go to the place of the devils in hell? Or do both go into different portions of the same general region, denominated in the original of the New Testament *αἶδης*, there to await the resurrection of their bodies, before entering on their final state?

It is obvious, at a glance, that the decision of these questions must depend very materially on the signification of the word *αἶδης*. And it is insisted by the advocates of the intermediate place that, in interpreting this word, we must have a strict regard to its ordinary signification, in the classics, and in cotemporary Jewish writers. But I would ask, in reply: Is the word used with such precision and uniformity by classical authors, as to fix upon it any determinate and invariable signification? And, if we admit that it is so used, will it of necessity follow, that it must be used in the same sense by the inspired writers? The word came into the New Testament, not from the Greek classics, nor from Josephus, but from the Septuagint, where it was introduced as a translation of the corresponding Hebrew term *לְאֻמִּים*; which is of too ancient a date to receive any modification from those classical or cotemporary authors, of which we have any knowledge. It might be presumed, therefore, that these words would be used in the Scriptures in a somewhat peculiar sense; and so I think we find them. And the proper question is not, how are they used by classic and Jewish authors, but, how in the book of God? If the language of Scripture is to be interpreted according to the opinions of Josephus, and his Jewish cotemporaries, we must receive, not only their paganized notions of *αἶδης*, but a great deal more. We must receive their doctrine of the seven heavens, of the transmigration of souls, of purgatory, and of a semi-terrestrial, sensual paradise. That this last idea was common among the Jews, is evident from a question which the Sadducees proposed to our Saviour: "In the resurrection," or future life, "whose *wife* shall she be of the seven? for they all had her,"—Matt. 22: 28.*

* See Basnage's History of the Jews, Book 4, Chap. 32. Also, Wetstein on Luke 23: 43.

But it is said that these words are used in the *Scriptures* to signify the *nether world*, an *intermediate place*, into which the spirits of both good and bad men depart at death, and where they are confined till the day of judgment. In reply, I observe that the words in question are used by the inspired writers to signify the *grave*—the resting place of the bodies of both the righteous and the wicked. They are also used to signify hell—the abode of miserable spirits. But they are never used, so far as I have been able to discover, to signify the abode of the spirits of just men made perfect, either before the resurrection, or afterwards.

In by far the greater number of instances, the word *בֵּרַךְ* is used in the Old Testament to signify the *grave*—the place of the dead body; and is properly so rendered by our translators. “I will go down into the grave to my son mourning.” Gen. 37: 35. “Ye shall bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave.” Gen. 42: 38. “The Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up.” 1 Sam. 2: 6. David charged Solomon respecting Joab: “Thou shalt not let his hoary head go down to the grave in peace.” 1 Kings 2: 6. Job says: “O that thou wouldst hide me in the grave.” “If I wait, the grave is my house.” “They shall go down to the bars of the grave, when our rest together is in the dust.”—Chap. 14: 13; 17: 13, 16. In very many instances, this word is used, in the writings of David, Solomon and the prophets as it obviously is in the cases above referred to, to signify the grave. Indeed, this is the more common and literal signification of the term, in the Old Testament. But as the grave is regarded by most persons, and was more especially so by the ancients, with awe and dread, as being the region of gloom and darkness, so the word denoting it soon came to be applied to that more dark and gloomy world, which is to be the abode of the miserable forever. Numerous passages to this effect may be quoted from the Old Testament, some of which are, perhaps, doubtful, but others are decisive. “A fire is kindled in mine anger, which shall burn to the lowest hell.” Deut. 32: 22. Isaiah, predicting the destruction of the king of Babylon, says: “Hell from beneath is moved for thee, to meet thee at thy coming. It stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth.”—Chap. 14: 9. In this sublime and awful passage, we have either a bold personification of the grave and its

inhabitants, or—what is more probable—a direct reference to the world of miserable spirits. Certain it is, we find no good or happy spirits here.

In many passages in the Old Testament, **שְׁאוֹל** is used in immediate contrast with heaven, and of course must be supposed to signify hell. “It is high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell, what canst thou know?” Job 11: 8. “If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there.” Ps. 139: 8. “Though they dig into hell, thence shall mine hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down,” Amos 9: 3. Really, I think there ought to be no dispute respecting the meaning of this word, in passages such as these. It certainly stands for the opposite of heaven; and of course must signify, not the grave, nor the general state and region of the dead, but hell.

There are other passages, if possible, still more decisive. “The *wicked* shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God.” Ps. 9: 17. The hell here spoken of certainly is not the grave, nor any other place in this world or the next, into which the *righteous* are sent. It is the place prepared for the future abode of the wicked, and for them exclusively. In other words, it is hell. “Thou shalt beat him (the unruly child) with a rod, and shalt deliver his soul from hell;” not from the grave, certainly, nor from the future abodes of the righteous, but from hell. Prov. 23: 14.

In the New Testament, **αἵδης** is used much as **שְׁאוֹל** is in the Old, except that, in a less proportion of cases, it signifies the grave. Still, there are instances, in which the word is used in this sense; as, “O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory!” 1 Cor. 15: 55. In general, however, the **αἵδης** of the New Testament is no other than the world of future misery. “Thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell;—” a place the opposite of heaven. Mat. 11: 23. “On this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Matt. 16: 18. As, in ancient times, the chief men of a city were accustomed to sit in the gates to decide causes, and execute judgment; so by the gates of hell, I think we are to understand the *chiefs* of hell, particularly the devils. These shall never be suffered to prevail against the church; and the place of their abode is the hell spoken of in the passage above quoted. It was in this same place that the rich man lifted up his eyes, be-

ing in torments. Luke 16: 23. This passage needs no comment. Certainly, the world of future misery is here set before us. I know it is said, that this was the lower Tartarean part of *ᾗδης*, and that Abraham and Lazarus were in the upper part, and this is thought to be evident from the fact, that they were sufficiently near to each other to hold conversation. But I see no evidence that Abraham and Lazarus were in *ᾗδης* at all. The Scriptures do not so teach us, and the supposition is altogether gratuitous. The supposed *division* of this place into the two apartments of paradise and Tartarus is of heathen and not of Christian origin. I can find no trace or intimation of it in the Bible. The fact that Abraham and the rich man were in circumstances to speak to each other no more proves that they were in different apartments of the same place, than does the fact that God and angels are often represented as speaking out of heaven to inspired men prove that earth and heaven are but different apartments of the same place. Without doubt, spirits can see each other, and hold conversation, at much greater distances, than would be possible to us. We certainly know, that the rich man and Lazarus were *widely* and eternally separated. The former "lifted up his eyes, being in torments, and saw" the latter "afar off." There was an impassable gulf betwixt them—wide enough to sever between the everlasting abodes of the righteous and wicked—between heaven and hell.

I have said that neither *ᾗδης* nor *ᾗδης* is ever used in the Scriptures to signify the abode of the spirits of the just. In opposition to this statement, a single passage has been referred to. David says: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption." Ps. 16: 10. The Apostle Peter, having quoted this passage and applied it to Christ, goes on to assure us, that David here "spake of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither did his flesh see corruption." Acts 2: 31. We have then, in this verse from the Psalms, a poetical prediction of the resurrection of Christ from the tomb, and of nothing else. The prediction is expressed, after the usual manner of the Hebrew poets, in a parallelism; the plain import of which is, that Christ was to be raised from the dead, he was to be raised speedily. His life was not to be left in the grave. His flesh was not to see corruption. The *ᾗδης* and *ᾗδης* in this passage properly signify the grave, and not the future world of spirits. In this interpretation I am sustained by eminent critics, some of whom are ad-

vocates of the intermediate place. As this passage is the only one on which the semblance of an argument can be founded, that the words in question are ever used, in the Scriptures, to denote the world of happy spirits; and since, properly interpreted, they have no such signification here; I am warranted in affirming that they have it nowhere. They signify the grave—the place of the dead body; and also the world of miserable spirits; but never, the future abode of the righteous.

Another argument for the intermediate place is derived from certain passages of Scripture, in which “things under the earth” are represented as doing homage to God and the Saviour. “That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things *under the earth*.” Phil. 2: 10. The “things under the earth” are supposed to be the souls of departed saints, who are shut up somewhere in the bowels of the earth, and who, from those deep caverns, are sending up a spiritual worship to the Saviour.* But a comparison of passages will show, that the time, when every knee is to bow to Christ, is the day of judgment. “We shall all stand before the *judgment seat of Christ*: for it is written: As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God.” Rom. 14: 10, 11. In the great day of judgment, every creature will do homage, of some sort, to the Saviour. But then, the bodies of the saints will have been raised, and the intermediate region, if there be any, will have been deserted.

The following passage has been quoted for the same purpose, as that above. “And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and in the sea, heard I saying: Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever.” Rev. 5: 13. This grand chorus of praise the holy Apostle heard sung in *heaven*; and every creature in heaven united in it, even those who had left their bodies to moulder and dissolve on the surface of the earth, and under the earth, and in the sea. That this is the proper sense of the passage is to my own mind certain; and thus interpreted, it not only does not prove an intermediate place, but it proves the contrary. It proves that the souls of the righteous dead were, at the time of the vision, in heaven. If the passage before us proves that any

* See Physical Theory of another Life, p. 192.

of the souls of the righteous were, in John's time, "under the earth," it equally proves that some of them were "in the sea"—a place to which no critic, I believe, has yet consigned them.

Another passage, which has been appealed to in proof of the intermediate place, is that in which Christ is said to have gone and "preached to the spirits in prison." 1 Pet. 3: 19. These "spirits in prison" are supposed to be the holy dead—perhaps the virtuous heathen—imprisoned in the intermediate place, into which the soul of the Saviour went at death, that he might preach to them the gospel. On this interpretation, I remark, in the first place, that the preaching spoken of was bestowed, not upon the holy dead, or the virtuous heathen, but upon the impious antediluvians, who were "disobedient in the days of Noah," and perished in the flood. This is indubitable, from the passage itself. Secondly, Christ did not preach to these imprisoned spirits in person, but by his Spirit,—the Holy Spirit,—that Spirit by which his lifeless body was quickened, or raised from the dead. "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit, by *which* also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison." Thirdly, this preaching was accomplished, not while the body of the Saviour was entombed, but "when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was preparing." Then, "while the ark was preparing," Christ preached by his Spirit, inspiring and assisting Noah, to those who, in Peter's time, were "spirits in prison"—spirits shut up in the prison of hell. I know of no other interpretation which can fairly be given to this vexed passage of Scripture; and thus explained, it goes not a step towards proving the doctrine of an intermediate place.

Another passage from the Apocalypse has been often quoted, in proof of the intermediate place. "And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire." Chap. 20: 14. This is represented as taking place at the close of the general judgment, after which there is to be no more death, and the entire world of *ἄδης*—paradise, Tartarus, and all—is to be cast into the lake of fire! To me, I must confess, this is a very strange interpretation. The tree of life, which grows in the midst of the paradise of God, is then to be burnt up, root and branch! Those holy seats, in which Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, all the patriarchs and prophets, saints and martyrs had so long dwelt, and where they had offered up their songs of praise, are to be cast into the lake of fire! The whole paradise of God, with all its lovely bowers

and pleasant fruits, is to come to an end, and a most miserable end ! It is to be cast into the lake of fire, which is the second death. This will be "Paradise Lost," with a vengeance. Suffice it to say, that I reject such an interpretation as this, and adopt one which, to my own mind, seems much more natural and consistent. At the close of the judgment, *death*, which is the last enemy to the believer, is to be destroyed ; and all those who came to the judgment from hell, the world of miserable spirits, are to be cast into the lake of fire. They are to be remanded back to hell again, which is now to be their prison forever.

It is further urged, in proof of an intermediate place, that the Scriptures represent the happiness of the righteous as not complete, until after the resurrection. The fact here alleged is admitted ; but the conclusion drawn from it is denied. It does not follow, because the happiness of the righteous is not complete, until after the resurrection, that previously their souls are imprisoned in the centre of the earth, or in any other similar place or region. If in the moment of death, their disembodied spirits rise to heaven, and continue there till the resurrection, it is altogether likely that their happiness in heaven will be incomplete. It will be greatly increased, when they shall have received their glorified bodies from the tomb, and entered on the full rewards of eternity.

Again : it is insisted, that the early Christian fathers inculcated the doctrine of an intermediate place. It is admitted that such was the belief of many of the fathers, particularly those in the East. It may be accounted for, too, that such should have been their belief, without supposing that they derived it from the apostles. They were in continual controversy with the Gnostics, who undervalued the body, considered it as the grand corrupter of the soul, and denied altogether its resurrection. This led those fathers to set a high value on the resurrection of the body, to insist much upon it, and to represent the soul as in a very imperfect condition—in *abditis receptaculis*, vel in *exterioribus atriis*—while the body was entombed. The *effect* of this error, on the minds of those fathers who adopted it, was unhappy ; leading them early to institute prayers for the dead, and resulting, after a time, in the belief of a purgatory. On the whole, the authority of the fathers, in reference to the matter before us, is of little weight. The question to be decided is not, What thought the fathers ? but, *What saith the holy Scriptures ?*

I have now examined the principal arguments in favor of an intermediate place; and to my own mind, they are far from being conclusive. They fail essentially in establishing the point for which they are adduced.

Let us now consider the arguments on the other side;—those which are urged to show that the souls of the righteous, at death, go immediately to heaven, into the presence of Christ and the holy angels; and that the souls of the wicked go immediately to hell. I commence with the proof of the first part of this proposition,—the souls of the righteous, at death, go immediately to heaven.

1. As much as this seems to have been indicated to the ancient patriarchs, in the promise of Canaan. These fathers of the faithful regarded the earthly Canaan as a type, an emblem of the heavenly Canaan. In the promises of an earthly inheritance, they read their title to a better country, even a heavenly. So we are assured by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And where did they think this heavenly Canaan was situated? *Directly across Jordan—the cold river of death.* They did not place it in ~~that~~ that gloomy and horrid region, of which the dark grave was to them but a type. No; it was heaven which they looked for. Heaven had been promised them, and heaven was the object of their hopes. Nor were their hopes disappointed. They have gone to heaven. They are spoken of in the Scriptures as those who “through faith and patience, now inherit the promises.” Heb. 6: 12. Now, while their bodies are slumbering in the earth, their glorified spirits possess the promised rest above.

2. Our Saviour represents the saints, in the future life, and—as the connexion shows—previous to the resurrection of the body, as being “*like* unto the angels in heaven,” and “*equal* to the angels.” Mat. 22: 30. Luke 20: 36. Indeed, it would seem, that they must be more like the angels, before the resurrection of the body, than afterwards. But if they are like and equal to the angels in heaven, why should they not dwell with the angels in heaven? Why should they be imprisoned, many of them for thousands of years, as some will have it, in the centre of the earth?

3. Our Saviour’s declaration to the dying thief: “This day shalt thou be with me in paradise,” is evidence, that the souls of believers go immediately from this world to heaven. The attempt has been made to use this passage in proof of the inter-

mediate place. Paradise, it is said, is no other than the upper and better part of *ἄδης*. But to me it is evident, that the paradise of the Scriptures has no connexion with *ἄδης* at all. It is heaven—the third heaven—where are the throne of God and the Lamb. Of what, I ask, was the earthly paradise—the garden of innocence—where grew the literal tree of life,—the symbol or emblem? Not of the upper part of *ἄδης*, but of *heaven*, where grows the tree of life above. The Apostle Paul represents himself as having been “caught up into the third heaven”—“into paradise,” where he “heard unspeakable words.” 2 Cor. 12: 2, 4. No person, I am sure, could ever have regarded the Apostle, in this short passage, as referring to two distinct visions, and as describing two different places, under the terms, “third heaven,” and “paradise,” unless he had first got his notions of paradise from some foreign source, and then felt it necessary to break in the passage, that it might correspond with his preconceived views. The writer of the Apocalypse, in one place, represents the tree of life as growing in the heavenly city, near to the throne of God and the Lamb. Chap. 22: 2. In another place, he represents this same tree as growing in the midst of the paradise of God. Chap. 2: 7. The conclusion is, that the heavenly city and paradise are one and the same place. Hence, the paradise, which our Saviour promised to the penitent thief, on the very day of his death, was heaven. This is the happy place, to which the glorified spirit of the Saviour went, while absent from the body, and to which all the spirits of the righteous are received, when they depart out of the present world.*

4. The case of Moses and Elias, on the mount of transfiguration, has an important bearing on the question before us. One of these personages appeared there as a disembodied spirit; the other with his glorified body. The latter, we know, when he left the earth, was taken “up, by a whirlwind, into heaven.” 2 Kings 2: 11. In all probability, he came from heaven, when he met his Saviour on the mount. Is it not morally certain, that Moses came also from the same place?

5. Another case, bearing on the question before us, is that of the martyr Stephen. Just before his death, he “saw the heavens

* The early Christian fathers, even those who held to the intermediate place, believed that paradise was heaven, and that the souls of the martyrs were received directly there.

opened and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." And he prayed and said: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Acts 7: 56, 59. Who can believe that this prayer was rejected; and that Stephen, instead of being received up to heaven, was sent down to *ᾠδης*, where he remains imprisoned to the present time?

6. The Apostle Paul represents the whole church of God as being, at present, in *heaven*, or on *earth*. "Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named." Eph. 3: 15. I see not how this representation can be reconciled with the idea, that a great part of God's redeemed family—and probably the greater part—are now neither in heaven nor on earth, but in *ᾠδης*, the dark and secluded prison of unbodied souls.

7. We are taught by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, that in the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, there dwell, not only God, the judge of all, and Jesus, the mediator of the new covenant, and an innumerable company of angels, but also *the spirits of just men made perfect*. Chap. 12: 21—24. All are represented as dwelling together, in the same holy and happy place.

8. In several passages in the epistles of Paul, the souls of the saints, while absent from the body, are represented as being with Christ in heaven. "We know that, if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved"—in other words, if the body die—we know that "we have a building of God, a house not made with hands"—where? "eternal in the heavens." "We are willing rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord." 2 Cor. 5: 1, 8. "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better." Phil. 1: 23. "Who died for us, that whether we wake or sleep," i. e. whether we live or die, "we should live together with him." 1 Thess. 5: 10. These passages of Scripture, if there were no other, are decisive. They prove, beyond all reasonable controversy, that the souls of believers, while absent from the body, are with Christ—the risen and glorified Saviour in heaven.

I know it is said, that Christ may be, in some sense, in *ᾠδης*, and that Paul expected to be with him there. And so is Christ, in some sense, with his people on earth; and Paul, on this ground, need have been in no strait betwixt living and dying, in order that he might be, in some sense, with Christ. But could Paul have been where he desired to be, in the personal

presence of Christ—the glorified God-man and Mediator—and not have been in heaven? Could he have gone to that “building of God”—that “house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens”—and still not have been in heaven? There ought to be no question here.

9. The beloved John, in his visions on the isle of Patmos, saw, in a great many instances, the spirits of the just made perfect in heaven. It was these which sung that “new song saying: Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation.” Chap. 5: 9. None but redeemed spirits can ever sing such a song as this. On another occasion, John “saw a great multitude which no man could number, of all nations, and kindred, and people, and tongues”—of course gathered from the earth—“standing before the throne of God, and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands.” Chap. 7: 9. On still another occasion, John saw “the Lamb standing on Mount Zion, and with him a hundred and forty four thousand” redeemed spirits; and they sung a new song, which no beings in heaven could sing, except themselves. Chap. 14: 1—3. At another time, John saw in heaven “the souls of them which had been slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held.” Chap. 6: 9. I might quote many other passages from this wonderful book, proving as certainly as that there is any heaven, that the souls of redeemed saints are there.

It may be said, in reply, that the place described above—the happy abode of the spirits of the just, where they sing the new song of redeeming love—is only the better part of *ἁδης*. To this I answer:

1. If the upper region of *ἁδης* is such a place as is here set forth, I have no objection to the thing itself, but only to the bad name by which it is called. For this, surely, is a bad name. It is the name, uniformly, of a bad place. The cold and silent grave is the least gloomy prison to which it is ever applied in the Scriptures. In the New Testament, it is most commonly used to set forth the prison of despair. Why should the blessed abodes of the righteous in the other world be ever designated by such a name?

2. The place described by John and Paul is no part of *ἁδης*. It is heaven. If there is any heaven spoken of or promised in

the Scriptures, it is here. It is "a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." It is inhabited by "an innumerable company of angels." It is near the throne of God and the Lamb. It is expressly and repeatedly called heaven by the Apostle John. In the commencement of his vision, he saw a door opened in heaven. And the vision throughout is a heavenly vision, in which the glorified spirits of the just are represented as mingling with angels, with Jehovah and the Lamb.

But it is time that I turn to the other part of the subject, and show, in few words, that the souls of the wicked at death go immediately to hell—the place prepared for the devil and his angels. It is admitted by the advocates of the intermediate place, that the souls of the wicked, when they leave the body, go immediately into *punishment*: but the place of their punishment, previous to the resurrection, is not hell; it is *Tartarus*—the lower and more miserable part of *ᾗδης*. But it is certain from the Scriptures, that Tartarus is hell—the very prison of the devils—the place prepared for their confinement and punishment. So it is represented in the only verse of the New Testament in which there is any mention of Tartarus. "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell (Tartarus), and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment." 2 Peter 2: 4. Here then is that place, prepared for the devil and his angels, into which, our Saviour has assured us, the wicked of our race shall be plunged, at the close of the judgment. "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Matt. 25: 41. Beyond all question, this place is hell—the hell of the New Testament; and if it be still insisted that this is in *ᾗδης*, I admit it. *ᾗδης* is hell; at least, as the term is commonly used in the New Testament. In two or three instances, it signifies the grave, but much more frequently, the prison of the devils and of damned souls; in which case it has substantially the same meaning with Tartarus, and Gehenna, and with the strictest propriety is rendered hell.

Whether the righteous and wicked, after the judgment, will go to literally the same places, in which they were situated before, it is not material to inquire. But, both before and after the judgment, the righteous will be in the same place with their glorified Saviour and his holy angels; and this will be heaven; and, both before and after the judgment, the wicked will be in

the same place with the devil and his angels ; and this will be hell. It may be added, too, that both before and after the judgment, heaven and hell will not be the same place, nor different apartments of the same general region ; but will be widely and eternally separated, the one from the other.

I have thus examined, in as few words as possible, and with all the scrutiny and fairness of which I am capable, the question of an intermediate place. And I feel constrained to reject the theory, as one having no real foundation, or countenance, in the Word of God. I regard it as of heathen, and not Christian origin—one better becoming a believer in the mythology of ancient Greece and Rome, than a disciple of the Saviour. I regard the theory, too, as of dangerous influence. Could it be generally received by Christians, it would be followed in a few years, I have no doubt, with prayers for the dead, and with the doctrine of a future probation and restoration,—perhaps, with all the superstitions of purgatory. This is the course which the error took in the ancient church ; and there is every reason for supposing that it would take the same again. The believers of God's truth should then beware. Let them learn wisdom from the ages which have gone before them. Let them hold fast the form of sound words which they have received, and not be driven about by every wind of doctrine.

ARTICLE XI.

UPHAM'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Elements of Mental Philosophy, embracing the two departments of the Intellect and Sensibilities, in two Vols:

A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will. Forming a third Volume of a System of Mental Philosophy:

Elements of Mental Philosophy abridged, and designed for Academies and High Schools. By Thomas C. Upham, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Bowdoin College. New-York. Harper & Brothers. 1841.

THESE works have been the result of the long experience and extensive researches of the author as an instructor in the departments of Mental and Moral Philosophy. His "Elements of Mental Philosophy," as first published, a number of years

since, consisted chiefly of a collection of facts, and was especially valuable for the richness and variety of its matter, the perspicuity of its style and its adaptation to the existing state of the science in this country. It was then, as it has continued to be, eclectic in its character, and left the author uncommitted to any school of philosophy in his subsequent investigations. His first original work was the "Treatise on the Will." In this he assumed a threefold division of the mind, as the basis of the system which he has since more fully illustrated, and which distinguishes it from that of some English and American writers, who appear to have embraced all the faculties of mind in the Understanding and the Will.

The Treatise on the Will was, at the time of its publication, the only one in our language that professed fully to examine this department of mind. The work of President Edwards was not designed to be a full and complete view of the Will, but "*of that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame.*" Nearly every treatise on the Will, which has since made its appearance, has been either a review, or an explanation of, an apology for, or an attack upon Edwards. This work of Professor Upham was, therefore, in some sense a novelty; but was not of that startling kind, which is fitted to excite a momentary wonder, and then be forgotten. The work advances from step to step, calmly and cautiously, without doing violence to cherished associations, without assailing existing prejudices or attempting to overthrow established systems.

After the Treatise on the Will had been published and favorably received, the "Mental Philosophy" was re-written on the philosophical basis already adopted in the Treatise on the Will, viz., that the Mind is to be contemplated in the threefold aspect of the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will. The first volume embraces the Intellect, the second the Sensibilities; so that each of the three volumes (the Treatise on the Will forming properly the third volume) is in a sense distinct; and yet all are essential to a full view of the Mind. And perhaps no other works in our language will give the student a better introduction to the outlines of a course of mental and moral training for himself, and for those he may have opportunity to influence. The whole work, as it now appears, embraces the results of extensive research, of patient analysis, and of long experience; and appealing, as it does, to consciousness, and

fortifying its positions by cumulative evidence and illustration, it can be read with great pleasure and profit by many, who would find some difficulty in mastering the works of Stewart or Brown. As the best justification of our opinion, we proceed to give a brief analysis of the work itself; in which the reader, we trust, will find some interest and instruction.

The propriety of the threefold view of mind adopted in this work seems manifest on a moment's reflection; and the wonder is that it should ever have been overlooked. No other evidence of it would seem to be needed, than what is implied in the simple expressions, *I know, I feel, I will*.

However these states of mind may be connected, and however rapidly one may succeed the other, our consciousness clearly reveals to us a fundamental distinction in the mental states thus designated. But obvious as the distinction is, the author has done well to exhibit its reality and importance so fully as to remove every objection.

THE INTELLECT.

This department of mind receives and combines knowledge. In other words, it *perceives, compares* and *reasons*. The several bodily senses are the inlets of external knowledge. The mind through these becomes acquainted with the external world, and the mental states thus occasioned are named *sensations*.

When the mind refers these sensations to certain objects as their causes or occasions, and thus has a knowledge of those objects, we are said to perceive; and the states of mind, which then exist, are called *perceptions*. The mind recalls some past or absent object, and dwells upon it till mental impressions or states arise, similar in many respects to those which the objects occasioned when present; and these mental states are denominated *conceptions*. The states of mind, which are thus furnished to us, are entitled by our author *intellectual states of external origin*.

But the mind has an *internal* as well as an *external* empire. It has fountains of knowledge in itself. Locke, heretical as he is supposed to be on some points, expressly admits this. He says: "the other fountain of knowledge, from which experience furnishes the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operation of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got, which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider them, do furnish the under-

standing with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understanding ideas as distinct as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly within himself, and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with EXTERNAL objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called INTERNAL SENSE. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this reflection; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself." Our author, perceiving the errors into which Locke fell, has wisely chosen a phraseology which covers a much broader ground than the term reflection. That knowledge which is of internal origin, considered in reference to powers by means of which it is developed, is susceptible of classification, and is arranged in the work before us as follows:

Original Suggestion. To this important source of internal knowledge, which is distinctly recognized as such by the leading writers of the Scotch school, are traced the ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, personal identity, unity, succession, duration, time and its measurements, eternity, space, power, right and wrong, moral merit and demerit, and a number of others. The reason for using the term *suggestion* we give in the language of the author. "In giving an account of the ideas from this source, we have preferred as designative of their origin, the term *suggestion*, proposed and employed by Reid and Stewart, to the term *reason*, proposed by Kant and adopted by Cousin and some other writers, as, on the whole, more conformable to the prevalent usage of the English language. In common parlance, and by the established usage of the language, the word *reason* is expressive of the *deductive* rather than the *suggestive* faculty; and if we annul or perplex the present use of that word by a novel application of it, we must introduce a new word to express the process of deduction."

Consciousness. This, considered as a source of knowledge, embraces at least three distinct things. 1, Self or personal existence; 2, a state or operation of mind; 3, a feeling of relation, that is to say, the relation of the state of mind to the conscious being or self. Consciousness does not properly embrace, or have relation to any thing *extra-*

neous to the mind, although it may relate to the sensations which they produce within us ; nor to the perceptions and feeling of *past times*, although we may be conscious of the recollection of them. We are not, strictly speaking, *conscious* of the existence even of our own minds ; but only of their operations, and of the *belief* of their existence, which these operations indicate. We are conscious of different degrees of belief and disbelief, of doubt, uncertainty, full assent, etc., when our minds exist in those particular states which these terms express. We are conscious of thinking, attending, perceiving, conceiving, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, reasoning, imagining, and all similar mental acts and operations ; not of the mental *powers* it will be noticed, but of the mental exercises or acts. We are conscious of emotions, desires, affections, and of all other mental states, which properly come under the head of the natural sensibilities. Accordingly it will be perceived, that a wide range of knowledge is opened to us here.

Relative Suggestion or Judgment. These two terms are used by Brown as nearly synonymous, and in the work before us the same usage is admitted, although the author remarks that "the latter term is sometimes employed with other shades of meaning." Although the number of relations is very great, which are discoverable by means of this power, it is supposed that they are susceptible of being arranged in the seven classes of identity and diversity, degree, proposition, time, place, possession, cause and effect.

Reasoning. An idea of this source of knowledge, as it stands related to the other internal sources, we give in the words of the author :

Reasoning is not identical with, or involved in consciousness. If consciousness gives us a knowledge of the *act* of reasoning, the reasoning power, operating within its own limits, and in its own right, gives us a knowledge of other things. It is a source of perceptions and knowledge which we probably could not possess in any other way. Without the aid of Original Suggestion, it does not appear how we could have a knowledge of our existence ; without consciousness, we should not have a knowledge of our mental operations ; without Relative Suggestion or Judgment, which is also a distinct source of knowledge, there could be no Reasoning ; and unassisted by Reasoning we could have no knowledge of the relations of those things which cannot be compared without the aid of intermediate propositions. The

reasoning power, therefore, is to be regarded as a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as it is later in its development, so it comes forth with proportionally greater efficiency.

After defining reasoning, and describing the process of mind which takes place in every case of reasoning, the author proceeds to illustrate the two leading kinds or forms of Reasoning—Demonstrative and Moral. Demonstrative Reasoning, as is well known, is employed generally, and perhaps exclusively, with abstract ideas and the necessary relations between them. Moral Reasoning, in distinction from Demonstrative, relates to *matters of fact*; and in some respects also its conclusions differ. In conclusions drawn from moral reasoning there may be different degrees of belief, expressed by the words presumption, probability, moral certainty, and an opposite belief or opinion may not necessarily be absurd; but demonstrations do not admit of degrees of belief, and their opposites always involve an absurdity. Three processes of moral reasoning are illustrated by the writer—reasoning by Analogy, Induction, and by Cumulative Argument.

Imagination. Mr. Upham regards this as involving an intellectual, rather than a sensitive process of mind, and as closely related to the Reasoning power; from which, however, he thus distinguishes it. "Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge of the truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less probable. Imagination, as it aims to give us pleasure, is at liberty to transcend the world of reality, and consequently often deals with the mere conceptions of the mind, whether they correspond to reality or not." Such is a concise and imperfect outline of the volume on the Intellectual. We proceed now to the other great department.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

The action of the Sensibilities is easily distinguished from that of the Intellect, inasmuch as it always implies an antecedent intellectual action. "As a general thing," says the writer, "there is, and can be, no such thing as an emotion, desire, or feeling of moral obligation, without an antecedent action of the intellect. If we are pleased or displeased, there is necessarily before the mind some object of

pleasure or displeasure ; if we exercise the feeling of desire there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect." In this department of the mind the leading distinction adopted by the author is between the *Natural* and *Moral* sensibilities. The distinction is important, as the following statement, taken from the second volume, will show.

The Natural and Moral Sensibilities appear to take fundamentally different views of the objects, in respect to which they are called into exercise. The one considers objects chiefly, as they have a relation to ourselves ; the other as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness ; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks, what is good ? the other, what is RIGHT ? The Natural Sensibilities, which are first considered, admit of a subordinate division. The result of the action of the Natural Sensibilities are found in the two classes of Emotions and Desires. Emotions precede and give rise to Desires. This is not only the order in succession of time ; but it is also the order of nature."

The emotions are represented as being numerous ; and as we have a knowledge of them by Consciousness, every person has a key to them, if he will learn to use it. As they arise in consequence of previous intellectual acts, their character will change in accordance with changes in the perceptions. They give rise to desires ; and without careful analysis and attention we are liable to confound them with desires, from which they should be distinguished. Among other emotions of especial interest are those of Beauty. The occasions of these emotions are various. "All nature, taking the word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty ; the Intellectual and the Sensitive, as well as the Material world." The examination of objects in reference to their power to awaken emotions of beauty admits of a twofold view. Hence we have what may be called Original beauty, and also, in distinction from it, Associated beauty. Objects may awaken emotions by means of their original and intrinsic elements ; or they may do it by association with other objects. Nearly allied to emotions of beauty are those of Sublimity, differing from them more in degree than in nature or quality. There are also *Emotions* of cheerfulness, joy, gladness, melancholy, sorrow, grief, surprise, astonishment, wonder, dissatisfaction, displeasure, disgust, regard, reverence,

adoration ; all of which and others are subjected to examination and analysis.

The Desires. These are embraced in the Second Class of mental states, resulting from the action of the Natural Sensibilities ; and are distinguished from the Emotions by the position they occupy and by other characteristics. Their place, as we have already seen, is after the emotions. They are separated from intellections by the emotions which are antecedent to them ; and come between the emotions and volitions ; which last evidently have a subsequent place in the mind's action. They differ from emotions in having more permanency. They also necessarily imply an object, which is desired. And it is another characteristic, that their fulfilment (that is to say, the attainment of their object) always gives pleasure. The term Desires is, for reasons which are particularly indicated, employed *generically*. And under this general head the author considers a number of distinct mental states, some simple and others complex ; particularly the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections.

The Affections. These are still higher in rank than the principles which have been mentioned, and distinguished by characteristic features. One characteristic of the Affections is, that they are not *simple* states, as the Appetites and Propensities may probably be, but *complex*. The Affections are emotions either pleasant or painful, exercised in view of some object ; and combined with and modified by a desire of good or evil to that object. They are accordingly divided in the work before us on this basis—the nature of the *desire*—into the Malevolent and Benevolent Affections.

Under the class of the Malevolent Affections are arranged Resentment or anger with its modifications, Peevishness, Envy, Jealousy, Revenge, Fear. The author suggests the query, which would naturally arise, whether Fear should be classed among the Malevolent Affections, but as it includes the emotion of pain with the desire of avoiding the object of fear, it necessarily implies a degree of *aversion*, and seems naturally to fall into this class.

Benevolent Affections. Love or benevolence in general being first considered, we have then arranged under the general head of these affections, the Parental affection, the Filial affection, and the Fraternal affection. These, in accordance with common parlance, are properly termed the Domestic Affections ; and

their uses and moral character are beautifully dwelt upon by the Author. Humanity or the love of the human race is also set down as belonging to the Benevolent affections; and the evidence that it is an original affection is examined at considerable length. Patriotism or love of country and Friendship are regarded not so much as distinct and original affections, as modifications of other affections; and yet they are sufficiently important and remarkable to deserve a separate notice. Pity or Sympathy is classed with the benevolent affections; for, although attended by painful emotions, it is connected with a desire of good to the object of sympathy.

In this part of the work is a chapter devoted to an interesting inquiry; the result of which we can only state in few words, earnestly inviting the attention of our readers to the discussion itself. The inquiry is, whether there should not be, in order to complete the proportions and preserve the harmony of the Sensitive nature, another affection, which reaches forth and claims the Supreme Being as its object. The conclusion of the Author is, that originally such was the case. The relations we sustain to God, the evidences of design and adaptation in all other departments of mind, our necessities, the testimony of the Scriptures that man was created in the image of God, the passages which contemplate the restoration of that image, are all appealed to in support of the position, that, originally, supreme love to God was an implanted element of human nature, and that at the present moment, it is, or ought to be, in every human being a distinct and operative principle. It is in this part of the work also, that we find the Author's views of Human Depravity, which seem to agree with those of President Edwards, and which naturally flow out of the general principles of his philosophy.

The law of Habit, which first makes its appearance in the volume on the Intellect, is considered in relation to the Sensibilities likewise, and we have various illustrations of the fact that the mind, in its sentient as well as intellective action, acquires strength and facility by repetition. The Appetites, Propensities, and Affections of every grade are subject to this law, and may acquire strength of action for good or for evil, of the most glorious or the most fearful import.

The Moral Sensibilities come next under review. The fact that man has a moral nature being established, the classification of the phenomena embraced in it, and its place or position,

mentally considered, are attended to. The results or actings of the Moral Sensibilities are divided into moral Emotions, viz., feelings of approval and disapproval, and feelings of Moral Obligation. The Moral emotions, like the Natural or Pathematic emotions, are immediately successive to acts of the Intellect; and the feelings of moral obligation, which succeed the emotions, may be considered, like the desires, as in immediate proximity to the Will. If we may be allowed the expression, the Will has an opportunity of acting sometimes in accordance with the feelings of moral obligation, and sometimes in accordance with the desires.

The relation of the reasoning power to the moral nature, which has led many to confound the two, and to deny the existence of the Conscience as a distinct moral principle, is carefully considered. This connexion, it is admitted, is very intimate, and yet, the two mental principles are found to be distinct. Reasoning, when in exercise, is purely an *intellectual* process, in distinction from an *emotive* or *sensitive* process. They belong, therefore, to different departments of the mind. Yet such is the connexion of the conscience with the reasoning power, that it admits of improvement or perversion by means of this connexion; and is susceptible of education as well as other parts of mind. Men may consequently be guilty of wrong consciences as really as of wrong affections. So that man is under obligation to keep a *conscience void of offence*, and to enlighten and strengthen it by the appropriate exercise of his intellect.

The various principles which are laid down under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, furnish basis enough for a consistent and durable Moral Education. This education should begin early. The earliest years of life are favorable to moral culture. It is true, the Intellect is developed *first* in the order of nature; but the Heart and the Intellect are so closely united, that emotions, both natural and moral, follow closely the intellectual perceptions and deductions. Accordingly if the intellect is early occupied, whether with good or bad principles, these principles must necessarily affect the heart. If good principles are neglected, bad ones will inevitably spring up; and as they gain strength by time and repetition, it will not be easy to dislodge them. There is no ground of discouragement if the efforts for moral culture seem for the time being less effective than those of an intellectual kind. "The moral and religious

instruction, communicated to the youthful memory, is deposited in the keeping of a power, which may sometimes slumber, but can never die. It may long be unproductive; it may remain for years without giving signs of vivification, and of an operative influence; and yet it may be only waiting for some more favorable and important moment, when it shall come forth suddenly and prominently to view." The importance, in this view, of correct speculative opinions, and of a knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of religious truth generally, as insisted on by Mr. Upham, will be distinctly seen.

THE WILL.

The Treatise on the Will, as it may be important for the reader to recollect, is philosophical and practical, rather than theological. It appears in a separate volume, and is sold separately; but it is bound uniformly with the volumes on the Intellect and the Sensibilities, and seems to be necessary to a complete view of this great subject. The first part of this treatise is chiefly occupied with a classification of mental powers, and with the relation of the intellect and the sensibilities to the will. The student who has examined the other volumes, will probably not regret this circumstance, as it affords substantial aid in reviewing and fixing principles more firmly in the mind. And to those, who had not this preparatory training, this course seemed absolutely necessary.

There is, however, one other important topic, which is discussed in Part I. of this Treatise, on the Distinction between Desires and Volitions. Edwards, Brown, and some other writers appear to regard them as identical. The writer of these volumes, reasoning at some length, endeavors to show that they are not so. The reader will naturally pay close attention to the various arguments which are adduced on this topic; because if there is a failure here, it necessarily vitiates the whole book. If desire and volition are identical, what need of a philosophy of the Will? Does not the philosophy of the Desires cover the whole ground?

Part II. is occupied with the difficult subject of the *Laws of the Will*. In entering on this topic, our Author seems duly impressed with the importance of the subject in hand, considered not only in its inherent and intrinsic worth, but in view of the great difference of opinion which has prevailed, and the controversies thence arising in relation to the Laws and the

Freedom of the Will. Whether the will has Laws, he considers as an inquiry preliminary to that of its freedom; and the method, taken to establish the general fact of the Will's being reached by Law, may be considered one of the most thorough specimens of cumulative argument to be found in the compass of moral reasoning. Our limits, however, will not permit us to give an analysis of it. We merely quote one or two of his concluding remarks.

It is in this simple proposition of the Will's subjection to Law, that we find the golden link, which binds us to the throne of God. If my Will is not subject to Law, then God is not my master. And what is more, he is not only not so in fact, but it is impossible that he should be so. But on the other hand, if my will is not independent, in the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand of the Almighty is upon me, and I cannot escape even if I would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things ever attends my path; and, whether I love or hate, obey or rebel, I can never annul his authority, or evade his jurisdiction.

The subject of Part III. is the Freedom of the Will.—The leading topics in this part of the Work are the Nature of Mental Freedom; Mental Harmony the basis or occasion of Mental Freedom; the Freedom of the *Will* in distinction from the mere general idea of mental freedom, sustained in a number of successive chapters by various arguments and illustrations; the consistency of Law and Freedom, and the Enthralment or Slavery of the Will. In connection with this last named topic a note is appended at the end of the volume, which is designed to throw light upon its Theological bearings.

The leading subject of Part IV. is the Power of the Will. The writer makes a distinction,—which some will perhaps regard as novel, but which if true will aid in the understanding of the nature of the Will,—between freedom and power. The titles of the chapters, as they appear in this part of the Work, are as follows: Nature of Mental Power, The Power of the Will, Self-determining Power of the Will, Differences of Voluntary Power, and Consistency of Character; followed by a chapter, which concludes the whole work, on the Discipline of the Will. The views previously unfolded prepare the way for a chapter on this important topic; and the question arises spontaneously, Why in systems of mental philosophy,

in treatises on education, in schools and in all processes of education, has the *education of the Voluntary Power* been so generally overlooked? We stop not to consider or comment upon the inquiry. The importance of the subject seems to be duly estimated in the Treatise we are examining, as will appear by a mere reference to the topics discussed. The titles of the sections which are embraced in the chapter on the Discipline of the Will are as follows: A due balance of all the powers, the most favourable state of things to the just exercise of the Will, Of the culture of the appetites, propensities, and passions as auxiliary to the discipline of the Will, Instances in proof of the necessity of this culture, Importance of repressing the outward signs of the passions, Of enlightening the intellect in connexion with the discipline of the Will, Of aiding the Will by a reference to the regard of others, Of aiding the Will by a reference to the conscience, Of the aids furnished by the principle of Imitation, Aiding the Will by placing ourselves in circumstances which do not admit of a retreat, Effects of habit in giving strength to the Will, Of strengthening the Will by religious considerations.

We cannot forbear quoting at the close of this examination the closing part of the paragraph on the influence of religious considerations.

Other considerations may undoubtedly give strength, but those of religion give *more*; mere worldly motives may impart a considerable degree of strength, but the ennobling incentives, drawn from the character and government of God, inspire an energy far more intense as well as more elevated and pure. How many have been able to say with Pellico in the miseries of his ten years imprisonment: "Religion taught me to experience a sort of pleasure in my troubles, to resist and to vanquish in the battle appointed me by heaven." How many in a yet higher strain have been able to say with the three pious friends of the Prophet Daniel: "We are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God, whom we serve, is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace." How many in all ages of the world have been sustained by such unspeakable energy, extracted from the quickening elements of religion, that they could truly exclaim with the poor and suffering Waldenses, when encircled with fire and sword in their Alpine fastnesses, and hurled "*mother and infant down the rocks*:"

" Yet better were this mountain wilderness,
And this wild life of danger and distress,
Watchings by night and perilous flight by day,
And meetings in the depths of earth to pray,
Better, far better, than to kneel with them,
And pay the impious rite thy laws condemn."

We have thus, with as much brevity as the nature of the subject seemed to allow, followed the investigations of the author in his analysis and classification of the various mental powers and operations. Whether his classification is in all respects just, or not, it is certainly a great convenience to find an attempt of this nature. The outlines of a system, the several parts of which are adapted to each other, as they seem to be in the three volumes which we have noticed, afford, at least, a fair starting point for future inquiries in this department of study. We shall have failed in the design of preparing this analysis, if it shall not have the effect to draw attention to the works themselves, and to aid to some extent in entering upon their thorough study. They deserve to be studied.

ARTICLE XII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Correspondence of William Wilberforce. Edited by his sons, Robert Isaac Wilberforce, M. A., Vicar of East Farleigh, late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford; and Samuel Wilberforce, M. A., Archdeacon of Surrey, Rector of Brighthelm, revised and enlarged from the London edition: in two volumes. Philadelphia: Henry Perkins. 1841. pp. 336, 332.*

Those who have read the life of Wilberforce will be anxious to know more of this venerable man. We have never closed a biographical work, with greater respect for the subject, or greater reverence for that religion, which could so appropriate genius, wealth and influence, and make them habitually subservient to the interests of truth and humanity. It would be difficult to find an instance of such winning gentleness, such untiring benevolence, and such uniform consistency, in times and amid events which held out the strongest temp-

tations to unfaithfulness, as well as the best apologies for occasional deviations from the path of Christian rectitude.

In some respects, the Correspondence of Wilberforce is less interesting than his Life. In the memoir which his sons have given us, we see him in the family and the closet; here we obtain access to the inmost workings of his heart; here we discover his humility, his submission, his forbearance, his purity; here, in short, we behold the hidden springs of that machinery, the outward results of which are destined to be so benign and lasting. But the Correspondence is by no means devoid of interest. It covers a most eventful period—from 1783 to 1833—and brings before us the chief actors, both in the political and moral world, during that era of commotion and change. It contains the familiar letters of Pitt, Fox, Canning, Brougham; also the gentler and more disinterested effusions of Newton, Cecil, Venn, Milner, Thornton and Hannah More. But the letters of Wilberforce are the great attraction of the work. These are always written without affectation and without effort; he had no time, indeed, to devote to mere beauties of style. The writer, therefore, is seen in his genuine character—the affectionate father, the steadfast friend, the advocate of the wronged and the hater of oppression, the ardent lover of domestic quiet, and yet the willing servant of his country, the church and the world.

2.—*The Works of W. Chillingworth, M. A., containing his book, entitled The Religion of the Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation, together with his Sermons, Letters, Discourses, Controversies, etc. First American from the twelfth English edition, with Life by Birch.* Philadelphia: Herman Hooker. 1840. pp. 764.

It augurs well for American literature, that the solid learning and masculine logic of the seventeenth century are receiving so much attention in this country. And it augurs well for the American church, that ministers and laymen are becoming familiar with the English divines of that stirring period. It is healthful and invigorating to go back, and mingle, occasionally, with those intellectual giants. They were men of profound and accurate thought, and, though deficient in symmetry of learning, as well as of character, they grasped many subjects with a power which has never been surpassed.

It is hardly necessary, at the present day, to commend the Works of Chillingworth. Archbishop Tillotson pronounced him "incomparable, the glory of his age and nation." Locke

proposes the constant reading of his works as teaching "perspicuity and the way of right reasoning better than any book" he ever knew. The most valuable of his productions are controversial. He was born and educated in the established church—Laud, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, was his godfather—but he became, while fellow at Oxford, perplexed with the sophistry of a Jesuit, and embraced the doctrines of Romanism. He actually went over to the Jesuits' College at Douay; but, through the influence of Laud, then Bishop of London, he was induced to return to England in 1631, and subject the claims of the church of Rome to a new and more thorough examination. The result of a protracted and careful investigation was a firm conviction, that the pretensions of the papal hierarchy were utterly groundless. His return to Protestantism involved him in several disputes with the Jesuits; and his "Works" are made up, almost entirely, of the writings which he published in defence of his new position. His principal work—the Protestant Religion a Safe Way to Salvation—appeared in 1637, and was received with great favor. Two editions were issued in less than five months. It is a successful vindication of Protestantism against the most plausible objections of the Romanists. His extensive learning and his patient industry eminently qualified him to produce a treatise, which has never been satisfactorily answered.

3.—*General History of the World; from the earliest Times to the year 1831. By Charles von Rotteck, LL. D., Prof. in the Univer. of Freiburg, Aulic Counsellor, Member of the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Baden, etc. Translated from the German, and continued to 1840; by Frederick Jones, A. M. Illustrated by 24 Engravings. In four volumes. First American Edition. Philadelphia: C. F. Stollmeyer. New-York: J. A. Hoisington. 1840. pp. 381, 466, 384, 398.*

Rotteck was born at Freiburg in the Grand Duchy of Baden, in 1775. He was made a Doctor of Laws in 1797, and, in the following year, professor of history in the university of his native city. In 1818, he exchanged the professorship of history for that of natural law and politics. In 1819, under the new constitution of Baden, he was elected by the university to the Chamber of Deputies. In this situation he soon became distinguished as one of the most liberal advocates of political

reform. On the reorganization of the university in 1832, he was dismissed with a pension. His death, which occurred a few months ago, produced a general sensation of regret throughout Germany: a costly monument is to be erected to his memory by the citizens of Freiburg.

The work before us is justly regarded as one of the ablest historical productions of the present century. Its popularity has been almost without a parallel. More than 100,000 copies, in various forms, have been sold in Germany; and it has been translated into several European languages. It ought not to be supposed, however, that the General History is merely *popular*; a term which too often means attractive but superficial, elegant without penetration or depth. On the contrary, while the narrative is always well sustained, and sometimes eloquent, its philosophy is comprehensive and profound. According to his definition, "the History of the World is a continuous representation of all the principal revolutions of the earth and mankind, by which we may become acquainted with the present and past condition of both and its causes." It holds, therefore, a middle ground between an exhibition which is too ideal and argumentative, and a dry collection of facts. It differs from the History of Mankind, inasmuch as the latter has less of narrative, giving results rather than facts and dwelling mainly on the course of the human race as a whole. It differs from Universal History, inasmuch as the latter is a general repository of all the memorable occurrences of all times and places and kinds, while the former selects only the *events* of the world,—those occurrences which have exerted the greatest influence, mediately and immediately, on the condition of man.

Rotteck adopts the usual division of history into Ancient, Middle and Modern. The first period extends to the great migration of nations,—A. D. 395; the second, to the discovery of the two Indies,—1492; the third, to 1831. Each of these intervals is again divided into three shorter periods. The first volume is devoted to Ancient History; the second, to the Middle Ages; the two last, to Modern History. The fourth volume begins with the French Revolution. It is the design of the author, as he travels down from age to age, to present to the reader, not the greatest number and variety of facts, but the most comprehensive and satisfactory view of society as a whole—its changes, its improvements, the lessons of wisdom it imparts and the hopes it inspires. He is peculiarly instructive, therefore, on many subjects which have

received too little attention in most of our general histories.

We are sorry that we cannot close our notice without advert-
ing to one objectionable feature of this valuable work. We have been much pained by the author's want of respect for biblical history. It is a favorite theory of German historians that the province of history embraces only *natural* events: the *supernatural* they resign to theologians. This theory appears to have been adopted by Rotteck; in pursuance of which he affects to have nothing to do with the facts of Revelation. But facts so important in the history of the world could not be passed over without notice. They must either be adopted, as historical verities, or discredited. Our author has ventured on the latter alternative. The third chapter of Genesis, he thinks, "is similar to the box of Pandora, and several other fables of different nations, showing the same tendency;" though "the Mosaic fable is distinguished by more true and significant images." "The scientific inquirer" "admits Noah by no means to be the second ancestor of mankind, but is contented with the first ancestor, Adam, if he is inclined to admit such a general origin anywhere. He by no means appropriates to *history* the accessory circumstances related by Moses, of what is called the deluge, which are connected with the description of it, as a divine punishment, but resigns them to theologians. According to such views he necessarily rejects every theory of the population of the earth, which is confined to the sons of Noah." "The population of Egypt and its civilization are more ancient than the deluge." In the wonders which were wrought at the exodus of the Israelites, "we can often discern a real fact" "which easily took the form of the miracle, sometimes by its peculiar nature, sometimes by the enthusiasm of those upon whom it operated, and, perhaps, also, by a sage policy of the narrator, which was adapted to the time." In speaking of the legislation of Moses, he says: "It was not the divine Spirit, which is a Spirit of love and justice, that suggested to Moses those inhuman laws against Canaan." His account of the early spread of Christianity leaves out of view entirely "the mighty power of God." His notice of several religious controversies is not altogether candid and impartial. We regret that we are obliged to mention these faults in a work of such distinguished excellence. In the next edition, we hope the translator, who has generally done his work well, will enter his caveat by appending suitable notes to the objectionable passages.

4.—*The Martyr Lamb ; or Christ the Representative of his People in all Ages. Translated from the German of F. W. Krummacher, D. D. Author of Elijah the Tishbite, etc.* New-York : Robert Carter. 1841. pp. 288.

5.—*The Flying Roll ; or Free Grace displayed. By F. W. Krummacher, D. D. Author of Elijah the Tishbite.* New York : M. W. Dodd. 1841. pp. 296.

The popularity of this attractive and spiritual writer is not at all surprising. It is seldom that a voice from Germany finds its way so directly and irresistibly to our hearts. We are constantly importing the multifarious learning of that distant land, but we are able to reckon among our treasures very little religion. The bones are very many and very dry. But Krummacher comes to us, not as a scholar, but as a Christian brother. He speaks a language which needs no interpreter, because it is the language of the heart, the world over.

These volumes are like those which have already been published in this country. They will be expected, of course, to bear the impress of the author's peculiar style. They abound in expositions of Scripture, sometimes fanciful, but always interesting and often exceedingly instructive. At the same time, they bring out strongly and boldly his doctrinal sympathies ; and exhibit him as a fervent, orthodox and distinguishing preacher. The subjects of the first of the above named volumes are Christ and the first Sinners, Moses' Wish, David and the Man of God, Bethlehem, the Blood of Sprinkling, the New Creature, the Martyr Lamb, the Great Exchange, the Easter Message, the Easter Morning, the Walk towards Emmaus, Easter Peace, the Office of the Holy Spirit, the Christians after the Feast of Pentecost. Among other topics discussed, the author dwells upon the necessity and nature of the atonement, the agency of the Holy Spirit, etc. The subjects of the other volume are the Flying Roll, Who is he that Condemneth ? the Characteristics of a State of Grace, the Abuse of the Doctrine of Free Grace, the True Church, the Ransomed of the Lord, Stephen, Solomon and the Shulamite. The last is a beautiful illustration, in six discourses, of the relation of Christ to his church, founded upon several texts in Solomon's Song. Both works have many rich veins of thought, and many passages of great beauty.

- 6.—*Jacob Wrestling with the Angel.* By Rev. G. D. Krummacher. *Solomon and the Shulamite.* By F. W. Krummacher, D. D., Author of *Elijah the Tishbite.* Translated from the German. New-York: John S. Taylor. 1841. pp. 298.

Of Solomon and the Shulamite we have spoken in the previous notice. The author of "Jacob," the reader will perceive, is a different individual from the one who has become so extensively known on this side the Atlantic, within a few years. But the writings of each might be easily mistaken for those of the other. We recognize in both the same warm hearted piety, the same extensive acquaintance with the Scriptures, and the same copiousness of thought and illustration. The author of *Elijah the Tishbite* is more imaginative and fanciful, but the author of *Jacob* is equally felicitous in unfolding the deep things of the inspired volume. This will be evident to any one who reads the work. It is founded upon that portion of Genesis which describes the wrestling of Jacob with the angel. The various truths taught in the passage, directly and indirectly, are successively considered in eleven short sermons.

- 7.—*Cornelius the Centurion.* By F. A. Krummacher, A. M. Translated from the German, with notes and a biographical notice of the Author, by Rev. John W. Furguson, Minister of St. Peter's Episcopal Chapel, Edinburgh. New-York: John S. Taylor. 1841. pp. 212.

Still another Krummacher, strongly resembling the two already mentioned in mental bias, doctrinal sympathy and devotional spirit. He was born in Westphalia in 1768. He was formerly a professor of theology; but he relinquished this station for the more congenial employment of preaching. He now resides in Bremen. "From an early period, he has been intimately acquainted with ancient and modern poetry; this, with his profound knowledge of the languages and customs of the Eastern world, and his diligent study of the Scriptures, has given that peculiar bent to his mind, which beams through all his writings. "The meditations on Cornelius," the author observes, "were originally preached as sermons at Bremen. They are now divested of that form; some are enlarged, and some are curtailed. The style is historical, as being suited to the subject and my own views of Scripture. It appears to me that the numerous divine manifestations related in the Old

and New Testaments, may be regarded as one continued history of God in his relation to man. Luther calls it 'the history of all histories,' for it is an account of the stupendous miracles of the divine majesty and grace, from the beginning even unto eternity. The sermon of Peter is the simplest and at the same time, the most comprehensive of all narrations."

8.—*Popular Lectures on Geology ; treated in a very comprehensive manner. By R. C. von Leonhard, Counsellor of State, and Prof. at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. With illustrative engravings. Translated by J. G. Morris, A. M., and edited by F. Hall, M. D., formerly Prof. of Math. and Nat. Phil. Middlebury College, Vt., and afterwards Prof. of Chem. and Min. Washington College, Ct., Nos. I.—III. Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1839–40. pp. 100, 89, 100.*

The author of these Lectures is favorably known in Europe and to some extent in this country, as a distinguished professor at Heidelberg. His Manual of Geology and Geognosy, and his Treatise on Basaltic Formations have secured for him a high rank in this department of investigation. The present work is intended to be—as its name imports—*popular* ; it is prepared with a particular reference to the wants of those who desire some acquaintance with geology, but who have too little auxiliary knowledge to plunge at once into the technicalities of this science. Ten lectures have been presented to the American public, the subjects of which, we presume, will give some idea of the general plan. They are as follows: Sources of Geological Knowledge, Importance of the Art of Mining in Geological Researches, Description of Mines and Miners ; Sciences auxiliary to Geology,—Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Mineralogy,—general Properties of Bodies ; Observations on Light, Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism and Thermo-magnetism ; Chemical Phenomena, Elements, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Carbon, Sulphur, Chloride, Fluorine, Phosphorus ; Metals ; Air and Water ; Combinations of Gases, and with other Elements ; Acids, Alkalis, Salts ; Earths and Ores ; are Rocks forming at the present day ? simple and compound Rocks, Forms of Minerals, Quartz, Feldspar, Albite, Labrador-spar, Mica, Augite, Hornblend, Magnetic Iron, Lime, Gypsum.

Prof. Leonhard, as our readers will perceive, has traversed a wide field ; indeed he has touched upon topics that might have been omitted, even in a popular course on geology. But

he is always interesting ; his style is well chosen and his illustrations are abundant and happy. The last three or four lectures create a desire to see the remaining numbers. Hereafter, the proprietors expect to publish a No. once in two months, till the whole shall have appeared.

- 9.—*Sermons on Public Worship, suited to the Times. By Samuel Nott, Jr., Author of Sermons from the Fowls of the Air and Lilies of the Field.* Boston: Whipple & Dammell. 1841. pp. 404.

The subject discussed in this volume is always important. The Christian ministry can effect but little without the aid of the sanctuary : if the courts of the Lord's house are empty or thinly attended, religion must decline. But there is reason to fear, that, in some parts of our country, the urgent necessity of sustaining public worship is not felt as it should be. The influences adverse to the Sabbath are many ; and these, of course, bear directly on the ministrations of the Sabbath. The customs of society, particularly in cities, the rapid increase of light reading, lax notions of personal duty—all tend to aggravate the evil.

A work "suited to the times" in this respect, if generally read, cannot fail to be useful. This volume contains twenty discourses ; the first five discuss the object, character and history of public worship ; the next six, the character of the ministry required by public worship ; the eight following, the character demanded of the attendants on public worship ; the last is a centennial discourse. Sermons are far from being the most popular reading of the present day ; these, however, will be perused with pleasure as well as profit. The style is perspicuous and animated, the sentiments are weighty and earnestly enforced. We feel as we accompany the author, that we are communing with one who is deeply penetrated with the sacredness of his office. Prevented by the Providence of God from laboring in a foreign country, he is evidently solicitous to devote himself wholly to his Master's work in the land of his birth. We trust that this effort will not be in vain.

- 10.—*Universalism as it Is : or Text Book of Modern Universalism in America. By Rev. Edwin F. Hatfield.* New-York: J. A. Hoisington. 1841. pp. 341.

The history of modern Universalism affords a melancholy illustration of the downward tendency of error. Huntington

and Winchester would have recoiled with horror from the blank and soulless creed of Balfour, the Ballous, etc.; and the full development of this mystery of iniquity, we firmly believe, is yet to come. Abner Kneeland was once a Universalist, and many appear to be treading in his steps. The prevalence of this sect is no matter of surprise. A system, that makes such fearful havoc with the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel, must always secure numerous adherents.

The work before us is timely and valuable. "Orthodox preachers," the author observes, "in order to acquaint themselves with the peculiarities of this sect, have, in too many cases, contented themselves with an examination of the masterly argument of the younger Edwards against Chauncy, or the Calvinism Improved of Dr. Huntington, or the writings of Winchester and Mitchell. Thus informed, they have constructed a most powerful argument, and completely overthrown the strong holds of the early advocates of this peculiar creed, and they wonder that any can hold on to a doctrine so untenable, and be Universalists still. The truth is, that not a Universalist preacher in the land, so far as the author has been able to learn, does hold on to the system thus attacked. These are not their text-books. They that would know what they believe must consult more modern writers, and gather their creed from their more recent publications, and inform themselves thoroughly in regard to the latest discoveries and intrenchments of the sect, or they will labor in vain." Hence the publication of "Universalism as it is." The picture is frightful, but, we fear, too true.

The results of the author's investigations were first given to the public in the New York Evangelist. This volume is a republication of those essays, rewritten and enlarged. His diligence and fidelity are entitled to confidence, and there can be no reason to doubt the substantial correctness of this exposition.

11.—*An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will. By Jeremiah Day, President of Yale College.* New-Haven: Durrie and Peck. Philadelphia: Smith and Peck. 1841. pp. 352.

This is a labored exposition of Edwards on the Will. Such an undertaking was called for at the present time. The treatise on the "Freedom of the Will" was never adapted to popular reading. In addition to this, we have that which

claims to be the philosophy of Edwards served up in almost every imaginable form. The abettors of error and of truth avail themselves alike of the name and authority of Edwards, whenever they fancy, that by so doing, their cause will be subserved; and by some his doctrines are represented as leading legitimately to the most dangerous and absurd doctrines of fatalism. Now if the work were popular in its character, and likely to be read by those who take some interest in metaphysical discussion, it might be safe for its friends to leave it to make its own defence, and stand or fall according to its merits.—But, as this is not the case, it is evident that many will form their judgments of Edwards' work on second hand authority; and if from any thing, either in the character of the work itself, or in the habits of the age, his doctrines are in danger of being misrepresented or perverted, this brings a challenge to some lover of truth and friend of Edwards to stand forth as his advocate. No one could have presented himself, in this character, more able and trustworthy than President Day. His general character for extensive and thorough learning, his calm and patient habits of thinking, and especially his sincere and unprejudiced state of mind eminently fit him for his undertaking, and will secure a favorable reception for his work among all candid inquirers; and if our impressions are correct, those who take pains to read the book with care will not be disappointed. To say the least, Edwards is here dealt with by a friendly hand. Many recent attempts to sketch the portrait of this venerable man have been failures. The modern pencil and brush have so far changed his antique features and vestments, that his old friends have scarcely recognized him. But in this newly finished drawing, Edwards is professedly exhibited in his own robes, and with his own appropriate physiognomy. We cannot say that the lineaments of his countenance are not shaded, here and there, with a few modern improvements, but the great outlines are his, and his friends may embrace him as the object of their long cherished affection.

Some of the characteristics of the "Examination" are these:—First, *its faithfulness*. The Author has spared no labor in possessing himself fully of the meaning of Edwards, and has set it forth in connexion with ample proofs that it is his *true* meaning. He shows himself to be familiar, not only with every part of the treatise on the will, but with all of Edwards' works; and in several instances he has drawn his illustrations and proofs from his other productions. Thus Edwards is made to interpret himself. The first five sections

are occupied in ascertaining the signification which Edwards attached to the terms he employs ; and here he finds the great source of mistake and misrepresentation concerning his philosophy, arising chiefly from the *broad*, and, in some instances, the *peculiar* sense in which he used his terms. Partial and superficial readers, not having been aware of this, have honestly, it may be, but unjustly represented him as unintentionally teaching error and even absurdity.

Another characteristic is *the independent and liberal views* which the writer entertains of the subject which he examines. He is evidently, for the substance of his views, an Edwardean—an honest and an ardent one ; yet he is not a servile follower of Edwards. Favored with the additional light, which a century has shed upon a subject so continually under discussion, he finds some things to disapprove. He objects to Edwards' classification of the mental powers, and says, "a threefold division of them is needed." He also thinks that the terms "necessity, inability," etc., are not well adapted to moral subjects and relations, and that the sanction of his name to the frequent use of them has given them a general currency, in connexion with such subjects, which is likely to result in serious evil. This is doubtless an infelicity in the work of Edwards.

Dr. Day, as might have been expected, has conducted his examination with fairness and courtesy towards his opponents. He has not even called their names, thus showing, that while he will not shrink from maintaining what he considers to be the truth, he respects the feelings of those who differ from him. He has indeed felt himself called upon, in a few instances, to rebuke with sharpness the reckless manner in which some have dealt with the *Work on the Will*. His work must be regarded, not only as an "Examination," but as a defence of the main positions of Edwards. Dr. Day, therefore, is not uncommitted. He has fairly taken his stand by the side of his great author, evincing that all which has yet been said against the "*Treatise on the Will*," has neither convinced nor awed him. After explaining the meaning of Edwards' terms, he proceeds to rescue his arguments from the misconstructions and perversions which he believes have been put upon them. One view which he takes of the source of these perversions is interesting. He says : "*It is the great object of the Work to show that the dependence of volitions is consistent with accountability.* Many hold to accountability, and thence draw the inference that our volitions are not dependent. Others believe in the dependence of our wills, and, therefore, deny

our accountability. It is Edwards' object to maintain both. He has chosen, however, to treat of these two great points in distinct portions of his work. The subject of independent freedom of will occupies the second part. The consistency of dependence with accountability is largely discussed in the two following parts. Is there not reason to believe that some form their opinions of the whole work, from reading the former portion only? Has not this partial examination suggested doubts and objections, which an attentive perusal of the sequel might have effectually obviated? In the unwarrantable separation of these two parts of the inquiry, is to be found the secret of the perversion of the work by some skeptical philosophers. They make a show of accompanying the author through the first half of his book, but there they leave him, and walk hand in hand with his opponents. They form to themselves a welcome but ruinous combination of the Calvinistic doctrine of dependence with the Arminian tenet that dependent volition is inconsistent with accountability. What infidel ever made a reference to the latter part of Edwards' *Work on the Will*?"

These remarks are worthy of consideration. They may account, in a good degree, for the alleged fact that Edwards' *Treatise on the Will* has become the text book of infidelity.

We will only notice one other singular fact; it is that president Edwards, in considering the supposable ways of evading his reasoning, has mentioned that as the least likely to be resorted to, which, in point of fact, is the very manner which has been most frequently and confidently adopted. "The first evasion which Edwards notices is this, that the *faculty* or *power* of will, or the soul, in the use of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does it *without any act going before* the act determined. This he considers so full of the most gross absurdity, that he doubts whether he should not wrong the Arminians, in supposing that any of them would make use of it. Absurd as it may seem, this is, perhaps, at the present day, the most popular form of expressing the supposed independence of volition. How often do we hear it asserted, that a man's *power* of willing is the only cause of his willing as he does. Edwards did not anticipate all the transcendental logic, the higher metaphysics of our times. Were he now living he would meet with those who could teach him that he was far from having exhausted the science of mind."

On the whole, we thank Dr. Day for his examination of Edwards on the Will. It is timely, faithful and able. We commend it to the reading and thinking public. If any have not

the time or the patience to read Edwards through, or the ability to understand him, they will find this an important, if not an indispensable aid.

12.—*The Doctrine of the Will, applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility.* By Henry P. Tappan. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1841. pp. 356.

It is less than two years since the first of Professor Tappan's volumes on the Will made its appearance, entitled *A Review of Edwards' "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will."* In our notice of it, [Bib. Repos. July, 1839,] we hailed its appearance as "ominous of good." A spirit of inquiry was abroad, and the time seemed to have arrived when an examination of the doctrines of Edwards, so long revered and extensively embraced, seemed to be called for. The great mass of our theologians and metaphysicians, who stand substantially on the ground of Edwards, were neither fully aware of the strength of their position, nor the difficulties they might be called to encounter; while those who were inclined to dissent from some of these views had perfected no system of doctrines which they were prepared to substitute for these. The uncommitted inquirer was thus left without any recent and thorough investigation of the great and ever-varying arguments on *liberty, necessity, moral responsibility*, etc.

In the result of these discussions, thus far, we have not been disappointed. Several articles have appeared in our own work on topics connected with this general subject, in which the pen of Dr. Woods has largely shared, and the work of President Day, which we have noticed above, has doubtless been called forth by the perceived wakefulness, and, to some extent the unsettled state of the public mind in respect to the cardinal positions which it elucidates and defends. In the mean time Professor Tappan, having awakened attention to the subject by his first volume, has diligently employed his temporary release from professional engagements in the prosecution of his inquiries. His second volume, entitled *The Doctrine of the Will determined by an Appeal to Consciousness*, was noticed in our No. for July, 1840, where we enumerated the leading topics embraced in the whole series. The third and last volume is that announced at the head of this notice.

The *Doctrine of the Will*, as proved and illustrated in the two previous volumes, is here viewed in connexion with *Moral Agency and Responsibility*, and also in connexion with the *Truths and Precepts of the Bible*. The author treats of the

mind under a threefold division, the Reason, the Sensibility, and the Will, and having, as he thinks, refuted the celebrated argument of Edwards against a self-determining will, viz., that of the *infinite series, and contingency as implying no cause*, he finds in the human mind two elements of necessity and one of freedom. The reason and the sensitivity are related to their phenomena, as substance to attribute. The will is related to its phenomena, as cause to effect. All causality is thus resolvable into will; the will being free and self-determined. This view of the will, our author urges in support of the great doctrines of morality and religion. The leading topics of this volume are the necessity and immutability of moral distinctions,—moral agency and responsibility,—extent of responsibility,—conscience,—pantheism,—evil, natural and moral,—the Divine government,—the doctrines of Scripture on these subjects.

We need add nothing to what we have said in former notices of the style and spirit of Prof. Tappan's discussions. Among the chapters of the volume before us, that on the Divine government is particularly fine, and will be attractive to such as adopt the author's philosophical views. The Divine government, he maintains, is constituted of law and power, and is universal, extending to all created things and all created minds. The fulfilment of law is absolute and necessary in respect to all physical phenomena, but is contingent where a power is committed to an intelligent being to obey or disobey. In this case the law is moral, and the subject of it is responsible for his power of obedience; and if he disobey, the wisdom and power of God are sufficient to control the results; so that here the ends of government are as secure and certain as in the physical world. In accordance with these views, the *decrees* are absolute and causative in respect to all physical events. Here the *decree* necessitates the *event*. But in his moral government, though God infallibly secures certain developments of moral character and conduct, yet the certainty of their occurrence is not founded upon *necessity*, but upon a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances of moral action. Between the decree and the working out of the great moral end there lie innumerable volitions of moral agents, and a vast number of these are exercised in violation of the moral law. These are not decreed as God decrees his own acts, and natural events. Thus to decree transgression would make God the author of sin, which our author maintains has its origin solely in the free will of man. These prin-

ciples he applies to the decree of *election* to eternal life, and makes the certainty of its result not a *necessary* but a *moral* certainty, as above explained, but just as infallible as if it were necessary. *Regeneration* is represented as a change of the governing purpose of the mind, in accordance with the above principles. The *Agent* in regeneration is the Holy Spirit, but the subject of his supernatural influences is free and active, and his will is self-determined in all its purposes of good.

As to the correctness of these views, we announce, editorially, no decision. We speak as to wise men, who will read and judge for themselves. We have every disposition to encourage a free and candid examination of the conflicting philosophical systems, defended by Dr. Day and Mr. Tappan in the works we have here noticed, and doubt not that the refutation of error and the establishment of truth will be the result.

14.—*Religion and Liberty. A Discourse delivered Dec. 17, 1840 ; the Day appointed for public Thanksgiving by the Governor of New-York. By Thomas H. Skinner. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1841. pp. 77.*

This discourse is worthy of the attractive form in which it appears in the neat little volume before us. The leading topics announced for discussion, as causes of thanksgiving, are "our civil institutions—the existing relations between these and religion—and the care which Providence hath extended to this country, both as to its temporal and spiritual well-being." Assuming that there is, in all respects, a close connection between the civil institutions of a people and their happiness, the author contrasts our own republican government with the monarchies of Europe, and claims for it immense advantages, particularly in the relation existing, in this country, between the civil government and religion. In the course of his discussion, and in several notes appended, he sharply resists the doctrines of the "Oxford Divines" in respect to the authority of the church, and rebukes, with deserved severity, the spirit and sentiments of an article in the former series of the *Biblical Repository*, January, 1835, entitled "*Law suited to Man.*"

15.—*God's Hand in America. By the Rev. George B. Cheever. With an Essay, by the Rev. Dr. Skinner. New-York: M. W. Dodd. London: Wiley & Putnam. 1841. pp. 168.*

The Essay by Dr. Skinner is introductory and commendatory, and the remainder of this little volume is composed

principally of the substance of two discourses by Mr. Cheever, delivered, the first on the day of public thanksgiving, and the other on the first Sabbath in the year. It embraces *two parts*, which are divided into ten chapters. It is rich in the variety of its thoughts and suggestions, rendered attractive by a style of expression at once striking and chaste. The current of thought is, from a general view of the grounds of national responsibility and retributive Providence, to a more particular consideration of the opportunities and responsibilities of this country for its own and the world's evangelization. The author's illustrations from foreign sources show that he has not been an idle observer of the condition and tendencies of the institutions of the old world, while his genius makes the events of history and Providence speak in glowing and impressive language to the new.

16.—*Sketches of Conspicuous Living Characters of France.* Translated by R. M. Walsh. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard. 1841. pp. 312.

These sketches first appeared in Paris in weekly *livraisons* and were exceedingly popular. They were regarded authentic in respect to their statements of facts, and as impartial in their delineations as could reasonably be expected. The author's name is unknown; he styles himself *homme de rien*. Himself unseen, he has drawn a picture of the leading men of France, who are now upon the stage,—Thiers, Guizot, Lafitte, Soult, Lamartine, Châteaubriand, Berryer, Dupin, etc. Each is sketched with a bold and vigorous hand. It is impossible, of course, at this distance from the originals, to form a confident estimate of the fidelity of this gallery of portraits. The character of the translator, however, is a sufficient guaranty of their general accuracy. Assuming their correctness, they are a most valuable help to the just appreciation of the men, who are exerting such a mighty influence on the destinies of France. The *translation* is admirable.

Additional Notices.

We are obliged to condense our notices of the following books for want of room.

Patchwork. By Capt. Basil Hall, R. N., F. R. S.; in two volumes. Philad. Lea and Blanchard. 1841. pp. 301, 252.

This is a much better book than the title led us to anticipate. It contains an account of the author's rambles in Switzerland and Italy; but his

remarks frequently extend to other countries which he has visited. We have a great variety of information, presented in a very easy, sprightly style. The things described are not new, but we often see them from new and interesting positions.

The Philosophy of Rhetoric. By George Campbell, D. D., Principal of the Marischal College, Aberdeen. New Edition, with the author's last additions and corrections. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1841. pp. 396.

This is a work of undisputed excellence. The treatises on Rhetoric, which have appeared more recently, have not superseded it. Those, who would write well or speak well, should read it and study it.

Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Gospels. By Albert Barnes. In two volumes. Revised and corrected, with an index, Chronological table, etc. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1841.

Sixteen editions of these notes—2000 copies each—have been sold, a conclusive proof of their value. This edition is a decided improvement; it is both revised and enlarged. Numerous illustrations and wood cuts have been introduced; and a valuable map of Jerusalem, by Catherwood, has been added. The chronological table is the fruit of much labor. It would be superfluous to commend these volumes.

Religion in its Relation to the Present Life. In a series of Lectures delivered before the Young Men's Association of Utica. By A. B. Johnson. Published at their request. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1841. pp. 180.

Contents:—Every department of nature obeys determinate laws; The conduct which results injuriously; The conduct which results beneficially; The art of controlling others; The art of self-control. The book abounds with valuable thoughts and striking illustrations. It may be read with profit by all ages.

The Backslider. By Andrew Fuller, with an Introduction by Rev. John Angell James. New-York: John S. Taylor. 1841. pp. 122.

Fuller was among the first of modern Theologians. One of his best practical treatises was this on *Backsliding*. "It is faithful, searching, tender and discriminating. The author handles his patient with a kind gentleness, yet probes the disease to the bottom, and with vigilant assiduity labors to restore him to sound health."

Popular Exposition of the Gospels; for the use of Families, Bible Classes and Sunday Schools. By John G. Morris and Charles A. Smith. Vol. I. *Matthew, Mark.* Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1840. pp. 346.

The plan of this book was suggested by several German works, particularly those of Starke and Brandt; who, together with Doddridge, Henry, Scott, Clarke, Rosenmüller, and Olshausen, furnished the principal materials. The authors have endeavored to present a simple explanation of the most difficult passages, without any account of the process by which their opinions have been formed. Their sentiments are evangelical, reflections appropriate, and explanations generally judicious and correct.

Pastoral Addresses. By John Angell James: with an Introduction, by Rev. Wm. Adams. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1841. pp. 213.

These addresses were not intended for publication, but having been useful to his own people, they have been, in compliance with repeated re-

quests, given to the public, and have met with an extensive circulation. Their spirit is truly evangelical, the style simple, and manner affectionate. They cannot fail to be useful. Christians constantly need to have their minds directed to the contemplation of the truths here discussed.

Sacra Privata. The Private Meditations, Devotions and Prayers of the Rt. Rev. T. Wilson, D. D., Bishop of Sodor and Man, with a Preface by J. H. Newman, B. D. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1841. pp. 338.

This is a beautiful specimen of typography; indeed it is in the best style of the publishers. The contents are worthy of the dress in which they appear. Bishop Wilson was an eminent Christian. His Meditations and Prayers breathe an excellent spirit.

The Philosophy of History, by Frederick von Schlegel; 2 vols. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1841.

The Natural History of Society, in the barbarous and civilized state; by W. Cooke Taylor, Esq. LL.D. 2 vols. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1841.

We have not had time to examine these works, we shall, therefore, notice them in our next number.

ARTICLE XIII.

RECENT LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Great Britain.

The Eclectic Review, Jan. 1841, contains a long article on "London University and the Colleges connected with it," from which the following statements are taken. This university commenced its operations in 1838. Several colleges have been allowed by the government to send students to it to complete their course. These are University and King's College, London; Bristol College; Oscot College (Roman Catholic); St. Cuthbert's College (Roman Catholic), Ushaw; Manchester College (formerly York, Unitarian); Homerton College; Highbury College; Spring Hill College, Birmingham. The three last are connected with the Congregationalists. University College takes the lead; it is open to all classes, but chiefly sustained by Dissenters. The number of students is rapidly increasing.

No one can be admitted to the degree of B. A. in London University, "within two years of his matriculation examination;" nor without a certificate of two years study and good conduct at one of the affiliated institutions. The fee for this degree is £10. The examination is conducted by printed papers; but the examiners may put questions on the written answers when they require explanation. The writer in the Eclectic thinks that those who have passed this examination would have no difficulty in obtaining a like degree at Oxford or Cambridge. He observes, however, very correctly, that the quantity demanded in the principal departments is by no means excessive. French and German, animal physiology, vegetable physiology and structural botany are among the prescribed studies.

The University has nothing to do with theology; it has power to give degrees only in arts, law and medicine. Still it has introduced a voluntary examination in the Hebrew of the O. T., the Greek of the N. T., the evidences of Christianity and Scripture history; awarding certificates of proficiency. None but bachelors of arts are admitted to this examination.

Dr. John Pye Smith has entered on the 41st year of his connection with Homerton Seminary. He has recently published the second edition of his *Scripture and Geology*.

Among the more recent publications are *Ancient Christianity*, No. 6., containing a Sketch of the Demonolatry of the Church in the fourth century; *Analysis of the Bible*, with reference to the Social Duty of Man, by R. Montgomery Martin; *The Bible Monopoly inconsistent with Bible Circulation*, a Letter to Lord Bexley, by Dr. Adam Thomson; *Pictorial History of Palestine*, Part xvii.; *Lisco's Parables*, translated by Rev. P. Fairbairn; *Memoir of Dr. Payson*, in Ward's Standard Library; *Treatise on the Lord's Supper*, by Daniel Bagot, B. D.; *Historical Sketch of the Protestant Church of France*, by Rev. J. G. Lorimer; *Fisher's Historic Illustrations of the Bible*, Division III.

France.

The Bible—A New Translation, by S. Cahen, is the title of a work in progress at Paris. Vol. X has already appeared, containing a translation of Jeremiah. The *Revue Critique* commends it in the following terms: "Never, perhaps, has the poetry of the sacred volume been rendered with so much force;" "the translator seeks to bring the French as near as possible to the Hebrew." The volume contains the Preface of Abrabanel to Jeremiah, Dahler's Historical Introduction to the same, and some new observations on the Jewish Calendar. A new periodical—*Revue Théologique*—has been commenced, edited by two of the professors at Montauban Theological Seminary. It will undoubtedly be well conducted and useful.

Switzerland.

The School of Theology had its opening sitting at Geneva, Oct. 1, 1840. Seven new students were admitted; the whole No. was 36. Prof. Gausen has just published *Theopneustia*, or the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. It is regarded in France and Switzerland as an able vindication of the Orthodox belief.

United States.

Wm. Radde, German bookseller in New-York, will soon publish *Throckmorton's Hours of Christian Devotion*, both in English and German.—Gould, Newman and Saxton will issue, in a few weeks, a work on the Antiquities of the Christian Church, abridged from Augusti, with compilations from Rheinwald, Gieseler, etc. by Rev. Lyman Coleman. It will comprise a history of our own sacred seasons—fast and thanksgiving—by Rev. J. B. Felt; and a short account of the rites of the Armenian Church by Rev. Mr. Dwight, Miss. at Constantinople.—Dr. Grant, Missionary to Persia, will soon publish his "*Nestorians*" or the Lost Tribes—the prominent object of the book is to prove that the Nestorians are the descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel. The work is looked for with interest.

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